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ABSTRACT
Intra-service politics can help explain many behaviors and outcomes across a variety of
military services and countries. The thesis begins by developing a framework for
understanding intra-service politics based on a review of organization theory. Every
military service contains a variety of communities or unions organized by specific
missions, functions or technologies. These communities compete with one another to
determine a service's dominant culture and missions; and the distribution of a service's
budgets, equipment and personnel. Three patterns intra-service relations are proposed: a
strong and independent central leadership capable of acting as an honest broker between
competing communities (e.g., the German Army of the interwar period); a single
monarchical community dominating a service (e.g., the U.S. Air Force); and an oligarchy
of communities controlling a service (e.g., the U.S. Army). In the latter two patterns,
doctrinal developments, capabilities, and distribution of resources will mirror and tend to
reinforce the power of the dominant unions. In order to test the relevancy and plausibility
of the oligarchic pattern, the bulk of the thesis is taken up with three case studies
examining the division design process in the U.S. Army during the 1970s and 1980s: the
Division 86 design, the High Technology Light Division, and the Light Infantry Division.
Overall, the evidence from these three case studies suggests the utility of an explanation
based on intra-service community politics for certain behaviors. Moreover, it suggests a
U.S. Army dominated by an oligarchy composed of an armored/mechanized infantry
("heavy") community, an artillery community, an aviation community and a light infantry
community. The oligarchy itself has a multi-tiered structure, one where the light infantry
community has the least power and influence, while the heavy and artillery communities
have the most; the aviation community occupies a position in-between, wielding
considerable power but never being the equal of the two dominant ground force
communities.
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CHAPTER ONE
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION
Why does the U.S. Army have a legacy of neglecting traditional lighter infantry
forces, lavishing attention and resources instead on heavier mechanized forces, despite
the more frequent use of the former in combat operations since World War II and
especially in the post-Cold War era? Why, nearly fifteen years after the Cold War, does
it maintain a force structure and balance of forces essentially unchanged from the time its
principal mission entailed the defense of Western Europe? Why, as late as 2002, was the
Army proposing to procure a 40-ton artillery system, the Crusader, more suited to the
NATO mission than to an expeditionary force? And why, while engaged in two
counterinsurgency wars emphasizing the importance of dismounted infantry operations,
does it continue to put the bulk of its R&D budget into mechanized forces? This
dissertation will argue that these and many other forms of service behavior can be
explained, in part, by examining the Army's intra-service politics.
Military services (armies, air forces, and navies), like most organizations large
and diverse enough to require multiple specialties, are composed of subunits. These
subunits struggle and cooperate with one another over missions, resources and status
within the parent organizations; these interactions constitute intra-service politics. This
politics affects many areas of a military service, from the individual behavior of officers
to budgets and weapons acquisition, from the ways services organize for combat to the
ways they fight wars.
And, as with all organizations, military organizations require tools to perform
their assigned missions, such as aircraft for air forces and ships for navies. For the U.S.
Army, the basic tool is the individual soldier, who is then organized hierarchically into
standardized groups of various sizes for tactical, functional and administrative purposes.
These groups range in size from squads at the smallest level to armies and army groups at
the largest. Below a certain size, units do not contain all the necessary functionality to
operate independently on the battlefield and, consequently, are highly dependent upon
other organizations for such functions as fire support, transportation, logistics, and
maintenance. In general, since World War I, the smallest unit in the U.S. Army that is
designed to be self-contained enough to fight independently has been the division.' Over
1 In the nineteenth century, units as small as companies were scattered across the American West and were
designed to fight independently. In the twentieth century, the Army had a small number of independent
the course of the twentieth century, as the largest tactical organization that trains and
fights as a combined arms team, the division became the basic U.S. Army unit for
planning and conducting land battles, and for performing the Army's major role in
national security - fighting and winning the nation's ground wars.
As a result, the Army has attached great importance to the number, size and
composition of these divisions. These characteristics have been important indications of
what threats the service takes most seriously and what missions it views as most
important. And most importantly for this study, these characteristics are also an
indication of the relative distribution of power within the service. Maintaining or
increasing the number of divisions in the force structure has been important to the Army for
several reasons. Divisions have been the "coin of the realm" for armies, in the same way
that air wings and ships are for air forces and navies, respectively. Hence, divisions have
been seen as more prestigious for armies than brigades, regiments, or smaller formations.
Within DoD, the number of Army divisions has been used as a short-hand for comparing
how well the service does versus its sister services in competition for resources. Also,
increasing the number of divisions was thought to enhance deterrence vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. Many in military circles, after noting how the West assessed Soviet ground forces,
believed that the Soviets also used "number of divisions" (without assessing their individual
capabilities) as a short hand for determining an army's combat power. Finally, increasing
the number of divisions enhances training and command opportunities for officers.
Given the importance of divisions, the Army has spent considerable time and
resources designing and maintaining these forces. While the service has developed a
number of highly successful - in some cases even highly innovative - division designs
(such as the World War II infantry divisions, the airmobile/air assault divisions of the
Vietnam era, and the heavy armor and mechanized divisions arising from the Division 86
design of the mid-1980s), the service has also produced a series of less successful
designs. This latter list includes airborne divisions (though these have been quite useful
in situations such as crisis response for which they were not specifically designed),
Pentomic divisions, the High Technology Light Division, and the Light Infantry
Divisions. Moreover, the U.S. Army has proven itself better at designing some types of
divisions than others over time. During wartime, the Army has shown some skill at
learning and adapting a variety of divisions to fight as needed by the dictates of a
brigades and regiments. In the twenty-first century, the Army is moving away from division-sized units to
brigade-sized formations designed to deploy and operate independently of one another; this is the thrust of
the service's "modularity" program
particular conflict, with some notable exceptions. 2 During times of peace since World
War II, however, the Army has generally been more successful at designing heavy
armored and mechanized formations than units relying much less on armored vehicles.
PURPOSE
To understand why the U.S. Army has been more successful in the latter half of
the twentieth century with "heavy" (mechanized) divisions rather than "light" (non-
mechanized) divisions, and why this pattern has persisted in the post-Cold War period,
this dissertation will examine the service's internal politics and, in particular, the power
relationships between its various subunits. Indeed, intra-service politics can help explain
many behaviors and outcomes across a variety of military services. Intra-service politics
is important for understanding service output and structure, particularly during peacetime.
For instance, it can help explain why the U.S. Navy has been able to develop a very
successful and sophisticated anti-submarine warfare capability, but has failed to achieve
similar success with a far-less technologically complicated capability against a far more
ubiquitous threat such as anti-mine warfare. Or, why the inter-war French Army of the
1920s and 1930s failed to fully exploit the operational possibilities made available by the
internal combustion engine. Although not a complete answer, intra-service politics is a
very important factor in understanding these and a wide range of other behaviors and
outcomes. However despite the prevalence and seeming importance of intra-service
organizations and relationships on military organizations, very little theoretical work has
been produced that is specific to intra-service military politics.
The objective of this work is three-fold: 1) to develop a framework for
understanding intra-service politics; 2) to test the relevancy and plausibility of a portion
of this theoretical framework, specifically a set of propositions concerning the expected
behavior of services ruled by an oligarchy of intra-service communities; and 3) to better
understand U.S. Army's intra-service politics and its relationship to force structure and
division design. While many observers have pointed to the importance of intra-service
politics, much of this has been anecdotal; there have been few systematic attempts to
examine this phenomenon across time, location and services. This work is an effort, in part,
to initiate such a research program by developing a framework for thinking about intra-
2 For example, the Army was quite adept at learning and adapting both its tactics and organizations during
World War II, but displayed much less skill during the Vietnam War; on World War II, see Russell A. Hart,
Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004); on
Vietnam, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986).
service politics and its effects on service behaviors and outcomes. In particular, this
dissertation will examine the internal politics of the U.S. Army and use it to test one set of
propositions concerning the impact of a specific pattern of intra-service politics: i.e., a
pattern in which two or more communities are dominant in a service possessing a weak
central leadership. This particular pattern of intra-service politics, it will be argued, best
describes the U.S. Army for most of the twentieth century.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of this section will be to develop a theoretical framework for
understanding intra-service politics and its effect on military organizations, a framework that
will be used to examine the U.S. Army's division design process in the post-Vietnam War
era. To do so, it will begin with a review of the available literature concerning
organizational sub-units and their interactions, moving from organizations in general down
to the specific phenomenon of military services. Among the issues to be examined are the
characteristics that distinguish sub-units, the relationship between subunits and the mission
of the broader organization, and the influence of these subunits on individual officers'
behavior. The issues over which intra-service conflict occurs, as well as the arenas in which
this conflict occurs, also will be described. Next, the chapter will describe the interaction
between the external environment and intra-service politics, including the role of civilians in
this process. Three general patterns of intra-service politics then will be developed, along
with sets of illustrative examples. Although resistant to change, the ways in which these
patterns can be altered, often by way of the external environment, will also be described.
The resulting framework will be used to build up a set of propositions concerning intra-
service politics, a portion of which will be tested in the remainder of this thesis by
examining the U.S. Army division design process in the 1970s and 1980s. The chapter
concludes with a description of how this U.S. Army during the post-Vietnam War era might
fit into this theoretical context.
Characteristics of Organizational Sub-Units
James March has described the general phenomenon of organizational subunits in
the following terms:
Organizational subunits are important to the development
of individual preferences and identities....They are a focus
for the development of values, wants, and allegiances.
They serve as information networks for the development of
common perceptions of resources and alternatives and for
the development of a common sense of agenda and timing.
Subunits are also collections of shared experiences. 3
Similarly, Peg Neuhauser has described the presence of "tribes" within
organizations:
Any organization with specialized functions and departments
is made up of groupings - which we shall call "tribes" - that
look at their work and at the organization in very different
ways. They have their own dialects, values, histories, ways
of thinking, and rules for appropriate behavior.4
Whether called subunits, sub-cultures, tribes, communities, or unions, the concept is
basically the same: most organizations contain smaller groups whose membership consist
of individuals with specialized training, knowledge and/or missions that distinguish them
from members of other sub-units in the organization. They typically are centered on
specific technologies or functional areas. They provide values and perspectives to their
members, and command the long-term loyalty of those members.
Like other organizations, military services have always contained such sub-
cultures. And, as militaries grew in functional diversification and incorporated new
technologies over time, the numbers and types of these subunits grew and changed as
well. For several millennia, armies were composed of one or more of the following sub-
units: archers, foot-soldiers (perhaps armed with a short sword or pike) and mounted
troops. With the arrival of gun powder, armies gradually shifted to artillery and infantry
armed with individual firearms, while retaining horse cavalry. Over the course of time,
arming and supplying these armies became separate specialties, and hence communities,
unto themselves. Technological advances in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
gave rise to further subunit expansion through mechanization, electronic
communications, chemical weapons, and, in many armies, aircraft. Indicative of most
modem armies, today's U.S. Army has been described as two-tiered, with the top tier
reserved for the so-called "traditional" combat arms (armor, infantry and artillery) along
with the two newest combat arms - aviation and air defense artillery. The second-tier
3 James G. March, A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen (New York: The Free Press,
1994), 117.
4 Peg C. Neuhauser, Tribal Warfare in Organizations: Turning Tribal Conflict Into Negotiated Peace
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing, 1988), 4.
contains all the other subunits of the organization (such as engineering, logistics,
communications) in subordinate and supportive roles.5
Up through the mid-nineteenth century, navies were composed simply of surface
ships. But with the arrival of steam technology, the U.S. Navy, to cite one example, split
into two functional groupings or communities: officers aboard ships and on-shore ship
designers and engineers. By the end of World War II, technological advances had
divided many modem navies into at least three platform-centric communities: a
weakened combat surface ship community and two new communities of aviation (aircraft
carriers and their accompanying aircraft) and submarines. Additional, lesser naval
communities also arose including mine/counter-mine warfare and sealift (including
amphibious forces). 6
In the early days of aviation, air forces - whether independent or as subunits
themselves of armies - performed simple reconnaissance functions. During World War I
and the interwar period, their functions - and consequently their communities - expanded
to include fighter (pursuit), ground attack, and, later, strategic bombardment and
transportation. By the late 1950s, many air forces contained such unions as fighters,
ground attack, strategic bombardment, ballistic missiles, reconnaissance, and airlift, as
well as a variety of communities representing support functions (e.g., mechanics,
logisticians, etc.). 7 However, in order to gain independence from ground armies, many
air forces choose to emphasize strategic bombardment as their core mission, which led to
a dominant role for the strategic bombing community within these services.
Services versus Intra-Service Communities
With one notable exception, our discussion of the military services will be limited to
a nation's army, air force and navy - the military organizations of a nation designed for
5 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 26.
6 Roger Thompson, Brown Shoes, Black Shoes and Felt Slippers: Unions of the Post-War U.S. Navy
(Newington, VA: Mine Warfare Association, 1997), 19-50.
7 Wm Bruce Danskine, Fall of the Fighter Generals: The Future of USAF Leadership (Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University (thesis), 2001), 20-24; Walter J. Boyne,
Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the U.S. Air Force (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1998), 103-34;
Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
1974), 28-32; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 406.
warfare on land, in the air, or at sea, respectively.8 Within each service are subunits which
we have called communities, unions or sub-cultures. These subunits can be based on
specific functions (communications, logistics, maintenance), centered around specific
weapons platforms (submarines, aircraft carriers, artillery, helicopters, armored vehicles), or
oriented towards specific missions (air defense, close air support, strategic bombardment).
In any case, membership in these subunits requires specialized knowledge and skills
distinguishing them from other subunits in the service. A common knowledge and skill
base, along with common experiences, gives rise to a shared identity among subunit
members. As March has described it, members "define their own group in opposition to
other groups" within the service.9
Communities may coincide with officially recognized service arms or branches. For
example, many armies in the period between the First and Second World Wars recognized
infantry, artillery and cavalry as official service arms. For most of these armies during this
period, a single community can be identified with each of these arms. In some cases,
however, an officially recognized arm may contain several different communities; this has
been particularly true for the modern infantry. Many armies contain three or more separate,
identifiable communities within their infantry branch: mechanized infantry, designed to
fight alongside tanks; regular infantry, either foot-mobile or truck-borne; and one or more
elite units, such as paratroopers. Similarly, air defense artillery in the U.S. Army was a
separate community - with special skills, training, and outlook - within the broader
artillery branch, until its designation as a separate branch.. Alternatively, a distinct
community may be spread across several branches of a service. A distinct aviation
community, for example, existed within the U.S. Army during and following the Vietnam
War although its members were scattered throughout a number of Army branches.
Finally, elements from separate branches of a service may join together to form a single
community. Because of the need for close cooperation on the battlefield and
subsequently similar skills and training requirements, mechanized infantry often form a
community in league with the armor branch. In some armies, mechanized (or armored)
infantry are actually part of the armored branch, while in others, the tactical development
and training of mechanized infantry are closely control by the armored branch. In the
U.S. Army, although responsibility for tactical development and training of mechanized
8 The exception is the U. S. Marine Corps which, though officially part of the U.S. Navy, has been treated
as a separate service by the U.S. government since World War II.
9 March, Decision Making, 117.
infantry remain with the infantry branch, mechanized infantry and armor officers have
often joined together to form a single "heavy" community within the service.
However, despite the strong bonds among members of specific communities within
a given service, loyalty to the parent service is always greater. Rarely, for example, will
coalitions form among similar communities across services (e.g., among aviation
communities from separate services). Indeed, the fiercest inter-service rivalries often
involve similar communities within different services (e.g., U.S. Army aviation and U.S. Air
Force close air support). Moreover, as Huntington has pointed out, inter-service rivalry
always will be stronger than intra-service rivalries. 10 This becomes particularly apparent
when the parent service's existence or independence feels threatened. For example, in
the mid-1940s, other communities within the U.S. Air Force halted their intra-service
conflicts and subsumed their views to those held by the strategic bombing community in
order to help the Air Force obtain independence from the U.S. Army. Likewise, later in
the 1940s, during the "Super Carrier" controversy, all unions within the U.S. Navy came
together to argue for the importance of the Navy's aviation community in nuclear
warfare, when it look as if that service was to be eclipsed by the Air Force for the then
all-important strategic nuclear mission.
Communities and Officers
Service communities play a strong role in the careers of their members. Junior
officers usually begin their careers focused on one particular community within their
service - learning the skills specific to it, serving in staff functions relevant to it, and
leading troops or operating platforms unique to it. As a consequence, officers become
inculcated with the perspectives of their particular community, maintain a loyalty to it,
and seek to promote its interests within the service. While promotion officially occurs
from a service-wide promotion list, intra-service distinctions are carefully, if informally,
noted. 11
10 Huntington, Common Defense, 407.
1 This point was made, for instance, in Arnold Kanter, Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 18. According to John Lehman, the Secretary of Navy
typically offers guidance to the Navy promotion broads regarding the percentage of officers from each of
the service's three dominant unions (aviation, surface, and submarine) that should be promoted each year;
see John F. Lehman, Jr. Command of the Seas: Building the 600 Ship Navy (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1988), 36.
Unions often have their own journals for transmitting knowledge, enhancing
skills, and maintaining communications among the community members. 12 And, many
unions also have professional associations for current and retired officers, acting as a
conduit for communications and promoting the union's interest both within the service
and outside among other governmental entities and the public.' 3 Different clothing and
insignias often distinguish membership in a service's various communities. In the U.S.
Navy, for example, aviators traditionally wore brown shoes while surface ship officers
wore black. Submariners, on the other hand, have been known as the "felt slipper"
community for the footwear they used while at sea to limit noise emanating from a
submarine. Likewise surface ship officers wear the "Surface Warfare Officer" badge,
while submariners wear "dolphins" and aviators have "wings."' 4 Each branch of the U.S.
Army has its own insignia as well; for example, crossed rifles for infantry and crossed
cannons for artillery.
Some officers spend their entire careers within a single community, rarely gaining
knowledge of other communities within their service. In the U.S. Navy, for example,
"[o]fficers are not encouraged to have a broad understanding of all the naval warfare
specialties, thus affiliation with the warrior sub-cultures apparently has priority over other
concerns."' 5 It is only at the general officer level in most militaries that an officer usually
has the opportunity to command soldiers/sailors from other communities.' 6
As a result, officers over time develop strong community identities. According to
one Air Force officer, his brother "officers are accused of responding to the question
'What are you?" with "fighter pilot" or "missileer" rather than "Air Force officer." 7
12 Examples include the U.S. Army's Infantry Journal and the Cavalry Journal in the period prior to
World War II, and the service's Infantry, Armor and Field Artillery magazines today. Similar journals can
be found in the British and French armies.
13 Examples include the U.S. Army Armor Association, the Army Aviation Association of America, United
States Field Artillery Association, and the National Infantry Association. Some of these associations even
cross service boundaries, such as the Field Artillery Association which represents both Army and Marine
artillery members.
14 Thompson, Brown Shoes, 57.
15 Thompson, Brown Shoes, 64-65.
16 For example, a newly minted rear admiral with a background strictly in the surface navy can find himself
commanding a carrier battle group
17 Danskine, Fall of the Fighter Generals, 11. In a late 1990s survey of U.S. Air Force officers conducted
by an Air Force Academy professor found that "40-50 percent of junior officer flyers identified themselves
as pilots first - they just happened to be practicing that occupation for the USAF;" see James M. Smith,
USAF Culture and Cohesion: Building an Air and Space Force for the 21" Century (USAF Academy CO:
INSS, 1998), 12.
Likewise, Army officers often identify themselves by branch specialty when writing for
professional publications or service schools such as the Command and General Staff
College.
And, differences across communities within the same service can lead to
behavioral differences in the officers themselves, making it difficult to switch from one
sub-culture to another. During the Vietnam War, for example, pilots from the U.S Air
Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) often found it difficult to switch to the service's
fighter community when the opportunity was offered. According to one Air Force
officer:
SAC pilots who entered fighter units had to break into a
tough, insular culture...Many such pilots found it difficult
to make the transition to the aggressive, individualistic
ethos that valued flying skills in a more dynamic arena than
they had been used to as the first measure of
acceptance....a few did extremely well, but many did not
fare as well and remained somewhat alienated within the
fighter community.1 8
Areas of Intra-Service Conflict
A variety of issues have been identified as potential areas for intra-service union
conflict. As has already been mentioned, promotions are one issue over which communities
struggle. A second area is the determination of the service's "dominant professional
activity" or, as described by Mort Halperin, the organization's "essence." According to
Halperin, an "organization's essence is the view held by the dominant group in the
organization of what the missions and capabilities should be." 19 James Q. Wilson
18 Colonel Mike Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problem of Air Force Leadership, 1945-1982
(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 186. On the behavioral differences between fighter and
bomber pilots, famed WW II General James H. Doolittle explained: "The fighter pilot is a rugged
individualist; he doesn't take control or domination the way the bomber pilot does. The bomber pilot is a
team player he's got a team." Gen James H. Doolittle, interview by Prof. Ronald Schaffer, 24 August 1979,
transcript, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL; quoted in Danskine, Fall of the Fighter
Generals, 10, n. 17. However, it can be difficult to determine the degree to which these behavioral
differences are due to the influence of a particular community and how much of it has to do with the
selection process for officers. U.S. Air Force psychologists during World War II, for example, looked for
specific behavioral traits in junior officers when helping to determine pilot assignments; see Worden, Rise
of the Fighter Generals, 7.
19 Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics, 28.
equates this notion of "essence" to "organizational culture." 20 Carl Builder has described
the effect of organizational culture in this manner:
... the dominant concepts of war held by military
institutions have a significant effect upon the kinds of
forces they acquire and train and, therefore, upon the kinds
of wars they are prepared to fight.... [And,] the services'
dominant concepts of war probably serve their peacetime
institutional interest better than they serve their
preparedness for the next war.21
Following on the determination of the organization's dominant culture is the
determination of its doctrine - a third area for union rivalry.22 Doctrine describes the
method by which militaries conduct war, and determines the service's priorities relative to
roles and missions. Stephen Peter Rosen has described doctrine as at the heart of the
"ideological struggle" within military organizations. 2 3 Though often described by the
military as the product of careful analysis and a reflection of such grand terms as the
"principles of war," it just as often reflects inter- and intra-service struggles over budgets,
roles and missions. Many examples of this phenomenon can be found at the inter-service
level: for example, the role of strategic airpower doctrine in the U.S. Air Force's struggle
for independence from the U.S. Army, or the Air Force and Navy doctrinal debates during
the 1948-1949 "Revolt of the Admirals." 24 Within a service, doctrine can be a reflection of
the community power structure For example, the U.S. Air Force's official doctrine of the
1940s and 1950s, which dealt exclusively with strategic air power, reflected in part the
dominant role of SAC. 25 The U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine of the early 1980s, with
20 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic
Books, 1989), 101.
21 Builder, Masks of War, 127.
22 Danskine, Fall of the Fighter Generals, 13; and Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation
and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 19-20.
23 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 19.
24 On the Air Force, see, for example, Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace: 1943-1945
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); and C. F. Ziemke, In the Shadow of the Giant: USAF
Tactical Air Command in the Era of Strategic Bombing, 1945-1955 (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State
University (Ph.D. diss.), 1989). On the Navy, see Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S.
Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1962). According to a
description of the development of doctrine within the U.S. Air Force: "Often, doctrine is shaped significantly
by the policies of the time and reflect more the influences of individuals, budgets and emerging technological
changes than the evidence of experience, critical analysis, and study;" Lt. Colonel Johnny R. Jones, (ed.),
Development of Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1947-1991 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press,
April 1997), p. vii.
25 See Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals.
its almost exclusive focus on mechanized warfare and high-intensity combat in Europe,
echoed the joint dominance of armor, mechanized infantry, artillery, and aviation within that
service.26 Likewise, the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, which ensured equal
roles for the surface navy, aviation and submariners, was a reflection of the balance of
power between these three unions within the service.27
Finally, the budget process - determining who gets what - is a fourth issue area over
which intra-service communities struggle.28 The distribution of scarce resources such as
personnel, programs, weapon systems, and numbers and types of combat units often mirror
the distribution of community power within a service. And, if more than one community is
dominant, the struggles among these dominant sub-groups within a service are similar to
that of the negotiations between the parent services over budgets and missions. 29
Arenas for Intra-Service Politics
All modem military services are divided into two sets of organizations. The
operational side of a service consists of those forces that actually carry out the service's
primary mission of furthering its country's national security, and fighting and winning
wars. In armies, for example, the operational side includes everything from armor and
infantry divisions engaged in combat to medical personnel treating the needs of military
personnel or indigenous civilian populations. In navies, the operational side consists of
the "fleet." Although some internal politics occurs in these settings, for the most part it is
kept to a minimum as all branches and functions of a service generally must cooperate
together to achieve success on the battlefield. 30
There is, however, another side to most services, a side that never sees deadly
combat, but where struggles over budget and missions take place daily. These are the
organizations that support and prepare combat forces for their missions. It is here where the
intra-service cooperation typically found on the battlefield often breaks down. And, it is
here that intra-service community politics takes place, where political coalitions among
26 See Kevin Patrick Sheehan, Preparing for an Imaginary War? Examining Peacetime Functions and
Changes of Army Doctrine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University (Ph.D. diss.), 1988), 375.
27 See Paul T. Mitchell, "Ideas, Interests and Strategy: Bureaucratic Politics and the United States Navy,"
Armed Forces and Society 25, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 243-65.
28 Neuhauser, Tribal Warfare, 157; Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization, rev. ed. (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications, 2006), 161.
29 For examples of inter-service competition, see William A. Lucas and Raymond H. Dawson, The
Organizational Politics of Defense, Occasional Paper No. 2 (Pittsburgh, PA: International Studies
Association, 1974), 25-35 and 46-53; and Huntington, Common Defense, 369-84.
30 In armies, this cooperation is the very essence of modern combined arms warfare.
communities are forged, and where conflict among communities occurs. This is the arena
for Rosen's "ideological" struggle. This collection of organizations goes by various names:
the "institutional" or "developmental" portion of a service, the "force providers," the "shore
establishment" (in many navies), or the "sustaining base" (in the U.S. Army).31 This half
of a military service includes the people who decide what weapons and equipment the
service will develop and acquire; what types and numbers of forces and organizations the
service will design, train, and maintain; and what roles and missions the various branches
and unions will perform. It is in and around these agencies and their functions of doctrinal
development, training, force design, and materiel development and procurement that
resource questions get decided within a service. These developmental institutions can have
their own influence within the larger service structure, and the intra-services communities
and unions that come to dominate particular agencies can use that power to further their own
interests.
External Environment and Intra-Service Politics
The external environment can influence and constrain intra-service politics.
External factors or constraints include technological developments, national strategy,
security threats, and domestic economic and political conditions. Technological
developments can give rise to new functions and hence new communities within a given
service, and they can reduce or eliminate the importance of other communities. Changes in
national strategy or changes in the threat posed by international opponents can reinforce the
political power of certain communities or overthrow the power of others. Domestic
economic and political conditions determine the amount of resources available to a service,
can enhance or reduce the political power of certain communities within a service, and can
influence and constrain the ways different intra-service communities respond to internal
service conflict. Domestic political conditions can also determine the structure and power of
a service's central leadership, influencing the latter's ability to control its service's internal
political struggles. Finally, interservice rivalry can affect intra-service politics; for example,
driving intra-service communities together to combat a common interservice threat.
Intra-service politics, in turn, can help determine how quickly and how well a
service responds to changes in the external environment. If changes to the international
threat environment, for example, lead to a requirement for a new function or mission that
lays outside of a service's current community structure, that service may respond slowly,
31 See, for example, U.S. Department of the Army, Organization of the United States Army, DA-PAM-10-1
(Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 14 June 1994), 2.
ineffectively or not at all depending in part on its intra-service politics. A similar situation
can arise as a service attempts to respond to the introduction of new technology.
Role of Civilians in Intra-Service Politics
Civilians play one of two general roles in the intra-service political process. The
first is the promotion of a new or weak community by key government officials. In the
case of the rise of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Fighter Command, for example, a number
of civilian officials across various British governments during the 1930s - and
particularly the minister for defense coordination, Sir Thomas Inskip - have been
credited with helping to spur the rise of the fighter community within the RAF.32
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara played a similar role for U.S. Army aviation
in the early 1960s, spurring the service to develop innovative combat organizations
centered on helicopters and ensuring that adequate resources were pumped into this
effort.33 Likewise, James Forrestal was a strong supporter and promoter of the naval
aviation community to a position of dominance as U.S. Secretary of the Navy.34 The
motivations of these officials can range from impartial concern for national security and a
changing threat environment (as was the case for the British and McNamara) to a mixture
of strategic concerns and personal loyalties (such as Forrestal who had long-standing
personal ties to the naval aviation community).
However, while civilians can promote change within a prevailing intra-service
community structure, they also can hinder such change through their second role:
sustaining communities once they have achieved power within their parent service. As
before, key officials, whether from the executive or legislative branches of a government,
may support the interests of specific intra-service communities for what they perceived to
be sound reasons of national security, or for personal or professional loyalties to that
32 See, in particular, Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany
Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 171-5. While other authors dispute
the importance of civilian versus military sources for the rise of Fighter Command, all agree that civilians
did help promote the fighter community; see Rosen, Winning the Next War, 14.
33 See, Joseph Kristopher Keener, The Helicopter Innovation in Army Aviation (Cambridge, MA:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (thesis), 2001), 29-33, and Frederic A. Bergerson, The Army Gets an
Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent Bureaucratic Politics (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1978), 110-17. Again, there is debate over the relative importance of civilian versus military sources
for the airmobility innovation, but all agree that McNamara promoted the effort at a critical time; see
Rosen, Winning the Next War, 91-92.
34 Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, 147-49 and 203-205. Forrestal had been a navy flier during World War I;
see Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1967),
158.
particular community. For example, John Lehman, when he was Secretary of the Navy,
had a strong bond with the naval aviation community as a pilot in the naval reserves, and
did a great deal to support the interests of this established community. 35
On the other hand, members of the legislature may indirectly support specific
communities by voting for programs advancing the interests of these communities while
simultaneously providing money and jobs for their local political constituents. Such
programs can range from the production of weapons systems (ships, aircraft, tanks, etc.)
to the stationing of maintenance facilities and military bases (the latter two have been
particularly well used by the U.S. Navy). The industries directly participating in these
activities (producing weapons, repairing ships, etc.), the businesses that depend on these
industries, and the lobbyists and trade associations affiliated with both, constitute another
source of civilian support for specific intra-service communities. The local civilian
populations dependent upon these jobs are yet again another source of such support.
Finally, as the above suggests, the presence of an industrial base associated with a
particular intra-service community's weapon systems or platforms can help sustain
current intra-service politics; but they can also act as agents of change. In the first case,
an industrial base can help sustain the power of a related intra-service community by
supplying civilian-based local political constituencies, a professional group of industry
lobbyists, and a ready-made base of support in legislatures. 36 Second, and for largely the
same reasons, a pre-existing industrial base can enhance the chances that a new intra-
service community will become a dominant one within its parent service. A pre-existing
industrial base for helicopters and aviation, for example, enhanced the chances that the
aviation community would become a dominant union within the U.S. Army. Indeed,
though not a sufficient condition, the presence of an industrial base (at least in the
twentieth century) appears to be a necessary condition for a community to achieve,
maintain, or share dominance within a service. Alternatively, the absence of big-ticket
weapon systems and their associated industrial base may be a key reason behind the
gradual decline of the dismounted infantry community in the post-World War II U.S.
Army.
35 Lehman did nothing to hide his affection for naval aviation, see, for example, Lehman, Command of the
Seas, 339-40.
36 Huntington has written about the importance of industrial bases for the Air Force and Navy; see Samuel
P. Huntington, "Interservice Competition and The Political Roles of the Armed Services," American Political
Science Review 55, No. 1 (March 1961): 47-48.
Patterns of Intra-Service Politics
Several students of organizational theory have described organizations as political
communities. James March and R.M. Cyert developed a theory for explaining business firm
decision making in which the firm is considered a political coalition, with a senior executive
in the role of political broker between different subunits of the organization. In their
formulation, the composition of the firm is negotiated between the various players as are the
organization's goals. 37 Picking up on this point, Rosen has described militaries in general as
being complex, political communities:
Each branch has its own culture and distinct way of thinking
about the way war should be conducted, not only by its own
branch, but by the other branches and services with which it
would have to interact in combat. If the military organization
is health, there is some general agreement among the various
branches about how they should work together in wartime.
This agreement is a dynamic condition. There is no
permanent norm defining the dominant professional activity
of the organization. Many theories concerning the relative
priority of roles and missions compete. There are not only
fights about the relative resources of each branch but also
arguments about what the next war will or should look like.3 8
Like Cyert and March, Rosen sees a service's senior leadership acting as a political power
broker mitigating these fights, integrating the participants, and determining the service's
proper professional activity. Several tools are available to officers in this struggle; the two
highlighted by Rosen are doctrine and control over promotions.39 Elsewhere, March has
described an inherent rivalry within organizations between subunits who occupy dominant
positions within that organization and those who would like to do so (described as the
"ambitious"). This situation leads the dominant subgroup to choose between "sharing" the
top spot or resisting the encroaching subunit, just as the ambitious subunit has the choice of
"joining" or "fighting."40 The choices, in turn, can lead to differing patterns of intra-service
community politics, as noted below.
In essence, all military services contain unions or communities, and all experience
intra-service politics consisting of cooperation and conflict between these groups. Intra-
37 This is described, for example, in James G. March, "The Business Firm as a Political Coalition," Journal
of Politics 24, no. 4 (November 1962): 672.
38 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 19
39 Ibid., 19-20.
40 March, Decision Making, 115-16.
service politics, however, can be beneficial to the overall service. For example, the close
identification with a primary group smaller than the parent organization can enhance the
development of pride in service. The emphasis on specialized training and skills
stimulates professional expertise. If organized and fought properly, multiple unions and
the differing capabilities they possess can enhance survivability and combat effectiveness
on the battlefield by allowing the strengths of one branch to compensate for the
weaknesses of others.41 In times of technological change, the existence of competing
communities provides multiple opportunities for testing and experimenting with new
capabilities and ideas. The presence of multiple points of view helps prevent myopia and
the rise of "group think" within the service, preventing the focus on a single mission or
capability and enhancing the service's ability to respond to changing environmental and
contextual conditions. Moreover, the intra-service competition among ideas and
programs offers up more options for the civilian and senior military leadership to choose
from, and it can spur innovation. The existence of a variety of missions, programs and
capabilities acts as a hedge against uncertainty in regards to future threats and future
wars.42
But many of these benefits can not be realized in the absence of an actor operating
over and independent of these communities, one with an interest in the overall
performance of the parent service, and one strong enough to choose among competing
communities and enforce those decisions. Such an actor can also guard against the
dangers and bias inherent in the notion of "organizational essence" or "organizational
culture." James Q. Wilson has identified three potential dangers arising from
organizational culture:
First, tasks that are not part of the culture will not be
attended to with the same energy and resources as are
devoted to tasks that are part of it. Second, organizations in
which two or more cultures struggle for supremacy will
experience serious conflict as defenders of one seek to
dominate representatives of the others. Third,
41 While especially prevalent in modern ground forces, the employment and mutual reinforcement of
multiple unions can also be found in naval and air forces as well.
42 For the potential positive effects of unions, see Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (New York:
Quadrangle, New York Times Book Co., 1976), p. 63; Harvey Sapolsky, "The Interservice Competition:
The Solution, Not the Problem." Joint Force Quarterly, no.15 (Spring 1997): 51; Captain Jonathan M.
House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization,
Research Survey No. 2 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Army Command and General Staff
College, August 1984), 2; Neuhauser, Tribal Warfare, 8; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 238; and
Smith, Air Force Plans for Peace, 25.
organizations will resist taking on new tasks that seem
incompatible with its dominant culture.43
The pattern of intra-service community politics, specifically the ways in which
that politics is managed, can be a crucial element in determining how well a service
performs its overall mission and how well it responds to changes in the external
environment. Three general patterns can be identified: a "monarchy" in which a single
union dominates a service, an oligarchy of two or more unions dominating a service with
a weak or non-existent independent high command, and a strong independent high
command overseeing a collection of competing unions. 44
Thomas Ehrhard has described a somewhat similar set of internal service power
arrangements in his study of the adoption of innovative weapon systems in the U.S.
military.45 Ehrhard classified military organizations and their decision making structures
into two types of configurations - monarchic or feudal - determined by the degree of
control exerted by the service's central leadership. These two configurations, in turn,
were based on Machiavelli's observation that:
All kingdoms of which we have any knowledge are
governed in one of two ways, either by a single prince with
everyone else as servants ...or by a prince with the aid of
barons, who hold that rank not by the prince's grace, but by
right of birth in an ancient family.46
In Ehrhard's definition of a monarchic service, power is concentrated "in the
service chief as the top representative of a single dominant subgroup." 47 The present
study has adopted this terminology and definition for the single-community dominated
service; with the caveat that the service chief in this arrangement is not independent of
his subgroup, but acts largely in the interests of this community rather than the interests
of the service overall. Likewise, Ehrhard's feudal service is very close to this study's
description of a community-based oligarchy; both are decentralized collectives of
relatively co-equal subgroups, with service chiefs (i.e., the central leadership) having
43 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 101.
44 The term dominance is used in a manner similar to that employed by Danskine, in that it "implies the
ability to affect doctrinal changes, budget priorities and cultural imperatives within" a service; see
Danskine, Fall of the Fighter Generals, 15, fn.5.
45 Thomas Ehrhard, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the United States Armed Services: A Comparative Study
of Weapon System Innovation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins (Ph.D. diss), June 2000), 71-90.
46 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. and trans. Robert M. Adams, 2d ed. (New York: Norton, 1977), 12
quoted in Ibid., 72, n. 132.
47 Ibid.
limited power and rotating among the dominant subgroups. 48 The term oligarchy is used
here, however, as it better conveys the true source of power within the service (the
community collective) and helps to focus on the internal power structure within the ruling
oligarchy. Indeed, the oligarchy itself need not be monolithic, but can have a range of
internal power arrangements: e.g., all of the communities within the oligarchy can have
equal power or the oligarchy can possess a tiered power structure with some communities
more equal than others. Moreover, the term "oligarchic service" takes in a range of
possible power arrangements between the oligarchy and senior service leaders: from
those with a central leadership whose power is nearly co-equal to that of the oligarchy to
those where the power of the central leadership is all but non-existent. The key feature of
this category of intra-service structure is a service dominated by a collection of (roughly)
co-equal communities. Unlike Ehrhard, this study adds a third category of intra-service
power arrangement - the strong central leadership - which in Ehrhard's scheme would be
subsumed under the monarchic label. Under this third category, and in contrast to the
definition of the monarchic service, the central leadership is not beholden to a single
subgroup or community within the service and can act as an honest-broker for the overall
good or effectiveness of the service. Whether or not the central leadership tends to come
from a single subgroup or rotates amongst several subgroups over time, the key concept
is that the central leadership is a separate and independent, and the dominant element in
the service's power structure.
Services dominated by single, monarchic communities tend to be very good at
performing the missions or functions assigned to the dominant community.
Unfortunately, missions and functions performed by other communities within the
service tend to be neglected in terms of resources (financial, intellectual, and personnel),
technology, and training. In some cases, missions and functions falling outside the
purview of the dominant community are simply ignored, and no community within the
service may be identified with such purposes. Such services often are unprepared for the
wars they must fight, having prepared instead for the wars their dominant community
would like to fight. They can be very vulnerable to surprise and often find themselves in
disastrous situations early in wars if unanticipated circumstances arise. Mike Worden has
described single-community dominant services as suffering from a "condition" that:
... leans towards myopia and monistic thinking, often
manifested in a consuming focus on a purpose or mission
that favors the dominant culture. When these organizations
48 Ibid.
face inevitable environmental or contextual change that
challenges the existing paradigm, they fail to recognize the
need for change because of their uniformity of perspective.
This perspective also limits alternatives and adaptability to
the change. 49
Services containing several dominant communities, even if they lack a strong
independent high command, overcome many of the problems of a single-community
dominant service. 50 Such community oligarchies have the capacity, however, to develop
very effective combat forces for roles and missions within the purview of their dominant
unions. And, these dominant unions often will coordinate and integrated amongst
themselves to a high degree. Because of the availability of multiple perspectives and
capabilities, these organizations have a greater resiliency against surprise on the
battlefield than do single-community dominated services.
However, once a community oligarchy is established, the members of the
coalition have little incentive to upset the existing arrangements or to examine areas
outside the "reigning ideology." As a result, these types of organizations often fail to
adjust rapidly to changing circumstances if these entail new roles or missions, or require
the adaptation of new technology. Instead, the unions will exert strong pressures to
maintain the status quo - either ignoring the changes or attempting to incorporate them
within the existing union structure. The focus will be on roles, missions, and doctrines
that accommodate the most powerful unions (for example, the U.S. Army's Cold War
preference for the defense of Western Europe and mid-intensity combat or the U.S.
Navy's Maritime Strategy of the 1980s). 51 Existing programs and missions outside the
reigning intra-service power structure will be neglected (for example, minesweeping in
the U.S. Navy and Low-Intensity Conflict Operations in the U.S. Army), while new ones
either ignored or rendered ineffective. 52 Again, this can lead to failure in the opening
49 Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 238.
50 Whether or not, in the absence of strong senior leadership, a single community or an oligarchy of
communities can come to dominate a service depends on a variety of factors, both internal and external to
the service. One possible factor lies in the degree to which a service's communities perceive an
interdependence among the communities on the battlefield as necessary for victory. In other words, a
coalition of unions will tend to dominate a service the more it is believed that those unions are dependent
upon one another for success in the organization's prime mission area(s). Conversely, if unions believe
they can win alone or with little help from other unions, then they will tend to dominate their service. For
more on this seen Kanter, Defense Politics, 19.
51 On the U.S. Army and the defense of Western Europe, see Sheehan, Preparing for an Imaginary War,
375-76. On the Maritime Strategy, see Mitchell, "Ideas, Interests, and Strategy," 257.
52 See Zumwalt, On Watch, p. 64-65; Thompson, Brown Shoes, 91-102; and Danskine, Fall of the Fighter
Generals, 11.
stages of a war, until the service is able to properly adjust and overcome the dominant
communities' resistance. And, while single-community dominant services can suffer
from a dearth of alternatives, services containing several dominant communities can
suffer the opposite problem: multiple, competing, compartmentalized alternative
programs, leading to the inefficient use of limited resources and dissipation in the overall
effort.
By contrast, when a service's senior leadership is strong and able to act as an
impartial broker between the communities, that service is more likely to witness the
positive effects of intra-service competition. Oftentimes, such services find broad
internal agreement on their roles and missions, and on the means for successfully
performing those missions. Moreover, such organizations are much better able to
successfully adapt to changing external strategic conditions and incorporate and exploit
new technologies. Vital missions and functions are less often ignored. In military
services with strong central control, the unions tend to be integrated better both
organizationally and doctrinally to meet the service's missions and the nation's needs.
Whether or not such leadership exists depends on a variety of factors, including:
domestic political views on the desirability of a strong military high command, the size of
a service (the smaller a service, the easier for a central command to exercise control), and
the history of a service's high command (those services with a prior experience of strong
leadership, tend to maintain that legacy). However, a strong military high command
carries with it certain dangers. For example, if too strong, the high command may stifle a
healthy competition among the service's communities. And, the mere presence of
competing alternatives does not always guarantee that the high command will choose
wisely. A strong military high command also has potentially dangerous implications for
civilian control of the military. Moreover, the stronger the central military leadership, the
harder it will be for those inside or outside the service to correct its errors.
Community-Based Monarchy
In the absence of a strong, independent central leadership, one union may come to
dominate the service and its leadership in a monarchic fashion as described above. 53
Over time the union predominating over a service can change, but the underlying pattern
of behavior will remain unchanged. A variety of indicators would suggest single union
monarchic dominance: For example, a large percentage of officers at the upper echelons
53 On elites and organizational leadership, see Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 122-23.
of a service should all come from the same community background. A situation where a
service's culture, dominant mission, and doctrine are focused almost exclusively on a
single union would be another set of indicators. A third indicator can be found by
examining a service's budget; if it is skewed towards a single community, if the majority
of weapons purchased and programs funded are oriented towards that community, then it
is likely the dominant community. Similarly, a single community is likely to be
dominant if the majority of combat units within a service come from that community.
Finally, an examination of personnel policies would suggest single union dominance if
the majority of personnel, or better still, the majority of quality personnel are directed
into this union.
1. U.S. Air Force
One example of a single-community monarchical service is the U.S. Air Force,
where successive communities - first, the strategic bombing community, represented by
the Strategic Air Command (SAC), and then tactical fighter/ground attack community,
represented for much of the post-World War II period by the Tactical Air Command
(TAC) - have dominated the service. 54 Supporters of strategic bombing, a mission
widely recognized within the Air Force both before and during World II as the best
argument for an independent air force, originally came to dominance at a time when the
Air Force was seeking autonomy from the Army in the design of the post-World War II
defense establishment. 55 In 1948, the Air Force officially endorsed strategic bombing as
its "primary mission," a view which was to prevail for nearly the next twenty years. 56
Summarizing the period from 1945 through 1965, one author, AF Colonel Mike Worden,
pointed to the complete dominance of the Air Force by SAC, reflected in that fact that
this community "received clear budgetary, procurement, doctrinal, and personnel
preference." 57 But a shift began during the mid-1960s, leading to the eventual overthrow
of SAC and the rise to dominance of the tactical, or fighter, community (including fighter
pilots as well as those involved in flying aircraft engaged in ground support roles such as
close air support and interdiction) by the late 1970s.
54 Several other communities have been identified in the U.S. Air Force, including the missile, mobility,
reconnaissance and electronic warfare, logistics and support, and special operations.
55 As Perry Smith has written: "Bombardment and autonomy were natural partners, but fighters were
antithetical to both except when fighters were used to support the strategic mission;" Smith, Air Force
Plans for Peace, 25. See also Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 29.
56 Ibid., 38.
57 Ibid., 86. For more on the period from 1945-1955, see Ziemke, Shadow of the Giant.
The U.S. Air Force provides an excellent example of how events external to the
organization can influence intra-service politics. For example, the development of
nuclear weapons assisted the rise of SAC following World War II, while Eisenhower's
New Look/ Massive Retaliation grand strategy (with its emphasis on strategic nuclear
weapons at the expense of conventional forces) helped maintain its prominence during
the 1950s. Likewise, events external to the Air Force - most importantly, the Vietnam
War, the Kennedy Administration's Flexible Response Strategy, and an executive branch
emphasis on ballistic missiles over manned penetrating bombers for carrying out the
strategic nuclear mission - led to the rise of the conventional tactical air community at
the expense of SAC beginning in the mid-1960s. 58
A look at the distribution of general officer backgrounds within the service
illustrates the relative and shifting dominance of the strategic bomber and tactical fighter
communities over time. By 1953, seventy-one percent of the Air Force's rated positions
(i.e., positions occupied by aviators) above the rank of major general were filled by
officers from the bomber community. 59 And, by the early 1960s, nearly sixty percent of
all general officers were from the bomber community. In 1960, general officers with a
bomber background led all major USAF commands, except for TAC and U.S. Air Force
Europe (USAFE); within a year, under the new Air Force Chief of Staff, Curtis LeMay,
officers from the SAC community would take over these commands as well.
However, a change is apparent during the latter half of the 1960s. While in 1960,
bomber generals outnumbered fighter generals on the air staff by a ratio of 5.5 to 1; by
1975, this ratio had been reduced to two to one and by 1982 there were no bomber
generals on the air staff.6 0 Up through 1973, every Air Force Chief of Staff had a
background in strategic bombing or was a strong advocate of this community. 61 None
have had such a background since, with most post-1973 chiefs of staff coming from the
fighter community. By 1975, the bomber community held only twenty percent (three out
of fifteen) of the major Air Force commands, while the fighter community headed two-
thirds of the major commands. By 1990, while the percentage of major commands
58 Two technological developments have also been cited in the rise of the fighter communities: aerial
refueling gave fighter greater range, while precision guided munitions gave fighters the ability to deliver
munitions with greater accuracy and flexibility; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 191-92.
59 Ibid., 67.
60 Ibid., 243, 247, and 251.
61 Several early USAF Chiefs of Staff, (e.g., Carl Spaatz, Hoyt Vandenberg and Thomas White), while not
bomber pilots, were enthusiasts of strategic bombing; see Danskine, Fall of the Fighter Generals, 20, n. 49.
headed by the fighter community remained fairly constant (at about sixty percent or eight
out of fourteen commands), the percentage of such commands headed by the bomber
community was reduced to fifteen percent (two out of fourteen commands). 62 At the
time, even the head of the Strategic Air Command was led by a member of the fighter
community. The dominance of this community continued into the new century: by 2000,
fighter pilots occupied sixty percent of the four-star general officer slots and commanded
sixty-three percent of all major commands, although only slightly more than five percent
of all officers in the U.S. Air Force were fighter pilots.63
A look at budgets and aircraft procurement over time reveals a similar pattern in
community dominance. As early as the late 1940s, the Tactical Air Command,
representing the fighter community became, in the words of Colonel Worden, "a
command without sufficient money or priority to meet its demands." 64 And the situation
only became worse: while TAC was able to develop twenty-three different types of
aircraft from the end of World War II through 1954, this figure dropped to one new
production series aircraft during the period from 1955 to 1964.65 Even during the Korean
War, a war in which the tactical community played a strong role, Air Force planning
skewed toward the bomber community: a planned expansion program in aircraft,
announced in mid-1952, included thirty-two medium bomber wings, all but two of which
were assigned to SAC.66
But once again, a change can be seen beginning in the mid-1960s. Starting with
the budget for fiscal year 1966, tactical general purpose aircraft received the bulk of the
Air Force budget, and continued to do so through the remainder of the century. 67 In turn,
62 Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 247-48 and 255-56.
63 Danskine, Fall of the Fighter Generals, 1.
64 Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 38
65 Ibid., 85
66 Ziemke, Shadow of the Giant, 228
67 For fiscal year 1966, Air Force General Purpose Forces received $31 billion dollars in Total Obligation
Authority versus $29 billion Strategic Forces, $16 billion for C3I/Space and $12 billion for Mobility. (all in
FY01 constant dollars) Similar figures for FY62 were $18 billion for General Purpose Forces, $51 billion
for Strategic Forces, $12 billion for C3I/Space and $6 billion for Mobility; in FY70, $25 billion for General
Purpose Forces, $20 billion for Strategic Forces, $15 billion for C3I/Space and $11 billion for Mobility; in
FY80, $23 billion for General Purpose Forces, $13 billion for Strategic Forces, $8 billion for C3I/Space
and $8 billion for Mobility; in FY90, $27 billion for General Purpose Forces, $16 billion for Strategic
Forces, $7 billion for C3I/Space and $7 billion for Mobility; and in FY2000, $19 billion for General
Purpose Forces, $4 billion for Strategic Forces, $10 billion for C3I/Space and $10 billion for Mobility.
Data are from Danskine, Fall of the Fighter Generals, 125.
tactical fighter wings grew in number, while SAC wings were reduced: from 1970 to
1980, the number of fighter wings in the active-duty Air Force grew from thirty-five to
thirty-nine, while the number of bomber wings went from twenty-eight down to twenty. 68
During the 1970s, the tactical air community acquired several new aircraft, while SAC
faced continued hurdles in acquiring even one new aircraft (the B-1 bomber).
Air Force historians have pointed out the adverse effects arising over the years
due to this pattern of single union dominance within the Air Force. 69 Two oft-cited
examples are the difficulties experienced by the tactical air community during the
opening phases of both the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The SAC-dominated Air Force
largely ignored ground support missions in the period following World War II. Not
surprisingly then, the U.S. Fifth Air Force had a great of deal difficulty with interdiction
and close air support operations during the first nine months of the Korean War.70 A
secret Air Force study, reporting in January of 1951, cited the lack of doctrine, poor
training and inadequate equipment as major reasons for the shortcomings initially
experienced in the group support missions. 71 As Colonel Worden has described the
68 By 1990, the number of fighter and bomber wings stood at thirty-six and sixteen, respectively, while by
1999, the numbers of both had been reduced to nineteen and three respectively. Data are from Danskine,
Fall of the Fighter Generals, 126; See also Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 187-188; and Carl H.
Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air
Force (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 179-89.
69 Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 238; Smith, Air Force Plans for Peace, 25; Danskine, Fall of the
Fighter Generals, 44-71; Builder, Icarus Syndrome, 166-71. Another example of the effects of SAC
domination can be seen in the case of B-70 bomber, which the Air Force was able to maintain for twelve
years (first as the B-70 and then as the RB-70) despite opposition from both the Eisenhower and
Kennedy/Johnson Administrations (Eisenhower became a supporter, but only as an election-year ploy), the
development of Soviet high-altitude air defense capabilities early-on the development of this high-altitude
penetrating bomber, and the development and increasing reliance on ballistic missile for the nuclear
mission. Indeed, the rise of ICBMs spurred the bomber-dominated Air Force leadership to plead for the B-
70 before the Eisenhower administration, with Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas White imploring the
President to support the bomber because: " There is a question of what is to be the future of the Air Force
and of flying. This shift [to missiles] has a great impingement on morale." Memorandums of Conference
with the President, Nov. 16, 18, and 21, 1959, Augusta, Georgia, By Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower
Presidential Library, DDE Diary Series, Box 45, Folder: Staff Notes - November 1959; quoted in Kotz,
Wild Blue Yonder, 35. SAC commander Thomas S. Power nicknamed the B-70 "The Savior," while then
Vice Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay proclaimed that the Air Force would not be reduced to being "the silent
silo-sitters of the sixties." For more on the B-70, see Kotz, Wild Blue Yonder, 34-36, 61-64, and 69-76;
Michael E. Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1992), 210-29; Herbert York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 53.
70 The Fifth Air Force was able to overcome these problems by improvising a workable system that is
widely credited with helping to sustain the Pusan perimeter.
71 Specifically, historians have pointed to a lack of adequately trained forward air controllers, a poor air
control system, and inadequate communications equipment as problems plaguing the tactical community
during this initial phase. For more on these problems, see Allan R. Millett, "Korea, 1950-1953," in Case
situation facing the Fifth Air Force in the early days of the war: "Unpreparedness and
neglect led to a desperate situation..."72 Similar neglect of tactical aviation followed the
Korean War, and, as a result, the Air Force had to painfully relearn the lessons of ground
support operations during the opening phases of the Vietnam War. Concerning the early
phases of the air war in Vietnam, Caroline Ziemke has noted: "Doctrine and capabilities
for tactical operations in a limited, non-nuclear war had improved little since 1950."73
2. Israeli Army
The Israeli Army from the early 1960s through the 1973 Yom Kippur War also
presents a pattern of single-community monarchical dominance. In this case, the armor
corps became the dominant community among the Israeli ground forces. The leader of
the armor corps, and later Army Chief of Staff, General Israel Tal, argued successfully
during the 1960s that armor was the decisive arm of the ground forces and that
consequently Israel should focus almost exclusively on tank-heavy formations. This
argument was made, in part, on economic grounds of affordability: the Israeli Defense
Forces could not afford to purchase enough infantry vehicles and tanks, so it should focus
its efforts on the decisive weapon, the tank. The argument for a tank-dominant force also
rested on an analysis of the terrain: the flat, open desert terrain of the Middle East left no
place for defending infantry and armor to hide, giving the decisive advantage to tank-
heavy forces and negating the need for the "typical" armor-infantry-artillery combined
arms tactics. Although integrated combined-arms teams played a crucial role the initial
Israeli breakthrough of Egyptian defenses in 1967, this experience was ignored in favor
of the later rapid tank exploitation through the Sinai.
As a result, the Israeli armored forces of the late 1960s were equipped with
modern tanks while most of its infantry, even during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, rode
Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, DC: Office
of Air Force History, 1990), 353-73; Ziemke, Shadow of the Giant, 145-50; Worden, Rise of the Fighter
Generals, 41; David. MacIsaac, "The Evolution of Air Power Since 1945: The American Experience" in
War in the Third Dimension: Essays in Contemporary Air Power, ed. R.A. Mason, (Washington, DC:
Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), 16; Jerome V. Martin, Reforging the Sword: United States Tactical
Air Forces, Air Power Doctrine, and National Security Policy, 1945-1956 Columbus, OH: The Ohio State
University (PhD diss.), 1988); and Joseph W. Caddell, Orphans of Unification: the Development of United
States Air Force Tactical Air Power Doctrine, 1945-1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University (PhD diss.),
1984), 60 and 66.
72 Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, 41.
73 Ziemke, Shadow of the Giant, 303. For more on the tactical air ground support operations in Vietnam,
see John J. Sbrega, "Southeast Asia," in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed.
Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 411-90.
into battle on 1940s vintage half-tracks. Israeli artillery too suffered, with much of it
towed, and with most formations lacking their full complement of artillery. Promotion
patterns also illustrated the dominance of the armor community, with armored officers
promoted more rapidly following the 1967 War than those from other arms. Mechanized
infantry officers were even prohibited from commanding units larger than a company
without first qualifying as armored officers.
The Israeli ground forces paid a heavy price during the opening phases of the
1973 War for this armored community dominance, especially against Egyptian ground
forces. As a result, in the aftermath of that war, the Israeli Defenses Forces became a
combined arms forces, purchasing large quantities of self-propelled artillery and infantry
weapons.74
Coalition/Oligarchy of Communities
Several indicators should be present in situations where an oligarchy, or coalition,
of communities dominate a service. For instance, the service's upper echelons should see
a balance of officer backgrounds from across the dominant communities. The service's
culture, dominant mission, and doctrine should encompass the dominant communities
within the service. No single community should be considered decisive in terms of
combat; but instead several communities, either working together or independently, will
be necessary to achieve victory. Resources - personnel, budgets, weapons
systems/programs and missions - should be fairly evenly distributed across the dominant
unions. External change should see the reigning communities attempt to adapt to the
change within their traditional missions. New technology may be adopted by multiple
communities, for example, but usually as a means to further traditional missions.
Multiple, parallel programs may be developed to address similar problems or incorporate
74 For more on this period, see House, Towards Combined Arms Warfare, 174-179; John A. English, On
Infantry (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1981), 186-87; Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The
Lessons of Modern War, Volume I: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973-1989 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1990), 14-116; Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense
Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 153-247; Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Anatomy of the Israeli
Army: The Israeli Defence Force, 1948-1978 (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc. 1979), 114-220; Chaim
Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Random House, 1984) 135-323; Edward Luttwak and Dan
Horowitz, The Israeli Army, 1948-1973 (Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 1983), 165-336; Avraham Adan, On
the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War (Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1980); Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed
the Middle East (New York: Schocken Books, 2004); and Chaim Herzog, The War ofAtonement:
October, 1973 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1975).
similar technologies, but with little subsequent effort to integrate or coordinate across the
communities.
1. Postwar U.S. Navy
Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. Navy has been ruled by a triad
of unions: the surface ship, aviation and submarine communities. 75 While the relative
power of these communities has shifted over time, the dominance of these three within
the Navy is clear and has been attested to by many observers. 76 For example, of the
nineteen Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) in the postwar period, nine have come from
the surface warfare community, seven from aviation community and three from the
submarine community. The aviation and surface warfare communities have often
alternated the post of CNO. Though the submarine community did not have its first CNO
until 1982, they did have Admiral Hyman Rickover as their leader until the early 1980s,
whose influence with Congress rivaled and oftentimes exceeded that of any CNO.77 And
the balance in leadership between the three communities has been maintained below the
CNO level. In 2001, for example, out of thirty-two three- and four-star admirals, eleven
had backgrounds in surface warfare, fourteen in aviation and six in submarines. Finally,
until 1992, the power of these unions was institutionalization at the top echelons of navy
staff with Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, Surface Warfare, and
Submarine Warfare. These three deputies have been described by various observers as
the "'union representatives' in headquarters." 78
In the post World War II-era, the relationship between the three unions has
remained largely harmonious. 79 This situation arose, in part, due to a recognition of the
mutual dependence each often feels towards the other two in terms of ensuring mission
success at sea. For example, carriers are highly dependent upon surface ships and
75 The surface ship community refers here to those officers in U.S. surface combatant force composed of
destroyers, frigates and cruisers.
76 See, for instance, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense
Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 229; Zumwalt, On Watch, 63-64; Mitchell,
"Ideas, Interests, and Strategy," 245-48; and Thompson, Brown Shoes, 12.
77 On Rickover's influence, see Zumwalt, On Watch, 63-65 and 85-123; Lehman, Command of the Seas, 8-
29; and Thompson, Brown Shoes, 43-44.
78 Ibid., 65.
79 Indeed, when the service itself came under threat during the late 1940s, all elements of the Navy united
to promote the interest of one of the unions - the aviation community - against the alleged designs of the
Air Force; much as the Air Force communities united to promote strategic air power in order to achieve
autonomy. For more on this naval episode, see Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, 149-50. For intra-service
naval politics in the interwar period, see Davis, The Admirals Lobby, 73-85.
submarines for their protection: a typical Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) contains five to
six surface warships and two attack submarines, all with a major (if not sole) mission of
defending the aircraft carrier from air, surface and sub-surface threats. Similarly, the
surface navy's ability to carry out shore bombardment - an increasingly important
mission for this community in light of the absence in the post-Cold War era of opponents
with large surface fleets - is dependent upon the air superiority provided by carrier
aviation. But, another reason for the absence of serious internal conflict is the simple fact
that, as Paul Mitchell put it, calls for taking money from carriers, submarines, or surface
ships "would have stirred up an enormous amount of [in the view of the dominant
communities, unnecessary] debate within the navy." 80
The influence of these unions is often reflected in naval doctrine. For example,
the service rejected CNO Admiral Zumwalt's proposed convoy escort strategy of the
1970s, with its call for relatively simple and relatively inexpensive surface escort ships
and escort carriers. Instead, the Navy opted for the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s which
required the acquisition of large numbers of sophisticated and expensive platforms across
all three communities. Large numbers of high technology ships, such as Aegis-armed
surface ships and new highly-capable aircraft carriers, would be required to steam deep
into Soviet waters, while a greater emphasis on offensive anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
operations required a new generation of advanced attack submarines.
These three communities have occasionally engaged in limited competition
amongst themselves and this has had some positive benefits; providing, for example, a
greater variety of weapon platforms and systems for the civilian and senior uniformed
leadership to choose from over the years. However, the presence of such a balanced
intra-service political structure, coupled with the inability of the senior naval leadership
to exercise control independent of the communities, has had a number of negative
consequences. For example, missions and programs that fall outside the boundaries of
these three unions often fail to receive attention or resources. A prime example of this
tendency can be seen in the grievous state of U.S. naval mine/counter-mine warfare
capabilities during the latter half the twentieth century.81
Additionally, the desire to maintain balance between the communities can lead to
some perverse unintended consequences. An early example can be found from the
1960s, as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was conducting an analysis to
80 Mitchell, "Ideas, Interests, and Strategy," 245.
81 See, for example, Zumwalt, On Watch, 64; and Thompson, Brown Shoes, 95-100.
determine the proper mix of future ASW capabilities for the Navy. The service formed a
committee with representatives from the three dominant communities, all of whom had
R&D programs in this area. To demonstrate the importance of their programs and so as
not to lose out in future funding efforts, each community gave their respective systems
very high Probability of Kill values against submarines. With no one in the senior
leadership of the Navy willing to adjudicate these values, they all went forward into the
OSD analysis. As a result, while the Navy was arguing for more ASW capabilities across
the board, the analysis conducted by OSD using the Navy-supplied numbers suggested
that the service already possessed a substantial overkill in such capabilities. 82
2. Interwar French Army and Mechanization
During the period between World Wars I and II, the French Army witnessed a
similar pattern of intra-service community politics: a weak central senior leadership
overseeing three dominant communities. During the interwar period, the infantry,
artillery, and cavalry communities maintained their dominance within the French Army -
a dominance they had held for several hundred years. Other, typically newer
communities (e.g., engineers, signal, etc.) resided on a second-tier below this triad.
Despite the relatively equal status afforded to the three dominant communities, the
infantry remained the "Queen of the Battlefield" (as it did in most armies of this period),
while all the other unions played supporting roles. For example, the French Army's
interwar concept of the methodical battle envisioned the artillery "provid[ing] the
momentum and the rhythm for [the infantry] attack." 83 In fact, although French doctrine
exalted the notion of "combined arms," historians have criticized the French Army of this
period for interpreting combined arms to mean simply integrating weapons in order to
best support the infantry. 84
The French Army suffered from weak central leadership for most, if not all, of the
interwar period. The French High Command has been condemned by students of the
82 Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough, 229-32.
83 Robert A. Doughty, "The French Armed Forces, 1918-40," in Military Effectiveness, Vol. II: The
Interwar Period, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 60-61.
84 Rather than combining arms in a way that the weaknesses of one are compensated by the strengths of
another, which was the German interpretation of the phrase and is now the generally accepted definition in
the U.S. Army; see, for example, House, Towards Combined Arms Warfare, 2-3. On the French, see Ibid.,
60 and Doughty, "The French Armed Forces," 61. A similar criticism has been made of the U.S. Army
during this period; see Ronald Spector, "The Military Effectiveness of the US Armed Forces, 1919-1939,"
in Military Effectiveness, Vol. II: The Interwar Period, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 90.
period for the absence of "a clear chain of authority and responsibility that could provide
the army a firm sense of direction for developing its doctrine and designing its
weapons.... [Moreover] the fragmented organization... stifled creative solutions to
doctrinal problems." 85 This structure was tolerated and, in many cases, promoted by a
national political leadership more concerned about controlling the power of officers with
monarchist (versus republican) tendencies than about effective military leadership, and
who felt that maintaining a fragmented military high command was a hedge against
military encroachment on civilian prerogatives and the potential "unwanted health
problems for the Third Republic" that a concentration of military power might pose.86
One affect of this pattern of intra-service politics can be seen in the way the
French Army attempted to incorporate and exploit new technology during the interwar
period, specifically mechanization and tanks. Multiple and parallel mechanization efforts
arose and were split among the dominant communities. Early on, this situation provided
an excellent means for examining and testing the potential of the new technology.
However, the tank was often examined only as a means for better performing each
community's traditional missions. Owing to the absence of strong independent
leadership at the level of the French Army's high command, at no point short of the
Second World War was an effort made to integrate these parallel efforts into a coordinate
overall program.
The French Army had established a tank corps during World War I. But, this
independent organization had been disbanded by 1920, and its responsibilities for tank
development split among the dominant traditional communities. Responsibility for tank
doctrine and training was placed in the Infantry Directorate, while the development of
tank technology became the responsibility of the new Section Technique des Chars de
Combat in the artillery branch. During this time, the official role of the tank was seen as
strictly one of supporting the infantry, with Section Technique des Chars de Combat, in
85 Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939
(Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985), 128. For more on the problems of the French High Command, see
Ibid., 112-29. Similar assessments can be found in Williamson Murray, "Armored Warfare: The British,
French and German Experiences," in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Williamson Murray
and Allan R. Millett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 30; and Guy Chapman, Why France
Fell: The Defeat of the French Army in 1940 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968), 17.
86 See Douglas Porch, "Arms and Alliances: French Grand Strategy and Policy in 1914 and 1940," in
Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Have, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 141-
42; and Doughty, Seeds of Disaster, 112-28. For more on political tendencies and cleavages within the
French Army, see Martin S. Alexander, The Republic in Danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the
Politics of French Defence, 1933-1940 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 13-42.
announcing its first tank program in 1921, declaring explicitly "that the mission of the
tank was to accompany infantry." 87 A second center of armor development, however,
quickly sprang up around retired General Jean Baptiste Estienne (often called the Father
of French Armor) and this very same Section Technique des Chars de Combat, an
organization which he headed for several years as the Tank Inspector and in which he
was to have a major influence until his death in 1936. In the early 1920s, Estienne,
ignoring the Infantry Directorate and the French high command which had already
approved light and heavy tank programs to accompany the infantry, appealed directly to
industry to develop a medium tank whose role would be independent of the infantry.
Estienne eventually won approval for his program from the French Supreme War
Council, which in typical fashion continued all three tank programs - light, medium and
heavy. 88 Tension and the lack of coordination between the Infantry Directorate and the
armor enthusiasts in Section Technique des Chars de Combat - between the tank doctrine
writers and the tank designers - was to continue throughout most of the interwar period.
In the late 1920s the French cavalry too began to see the merits of mechanization, and a
third center of armor development began. In July 1930, the French military issued a
decree calling for the creation of an experimental Division Legere Mecanique (DLM or
light mechanized division) in the cavalry. 89 In association with this effort, the cavalry
community began its own tank design program.
By the end of the interwar period, no effort had been made to integrate these
parallel programs, wasting valuable intellectual energy and making inefficient use of very
limited financial and industrial resources. Robert Doughty has characterized the French
efforts during this period as fragmentary and lacking in clarity of purpose, where "each
branch decided what it wanted the tank to do and then energetically pursued the
construction of a tank designed and equipped to accomplish this end." 90 The DLM, first
activated in 1934, remained a mechanized cavalry division, designed to carry out
traditional cavalry missions. Meanwhile, the infantry program culminated in the division
cuirassee (DCR or armored division), which was designed to accompany and support the
87 Eugenia C. Kiesling, Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1996), 150.
88 For more on Estienne efforts during this period, see Bruce Gudmundsson, On Armor (Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 2004), 45-46; Kiesling, Arming Against Hitler, 150; and Doughty, Seeds of Disaster,
138-41.
89 Kielsing, Arming Against Hitler, 147.
90 Doughty, Seeds of Disaster, 176.
infantry in the methodical battle. 9 1 Likewise, three different French tanks were
developed for three different roles: the cavalry designed and built a cavalry tank, the
infantry developed a tank specifically designed to accompany infantry, and a medium
tank was developed by the armor enthusiasts around Estienne. Moreover, even within the
infantry branch a clear division developed between the infantry and armor, so much so
that it has been described as almost two separate branches. This separation even affected
cooperation on the battlefield: a French captain claimed that when a tank battalion was
attached to an infantry division, that division often failed to provide the battalion with
intelligence data.92 Again, according to Doughty, at no point during the interwar period,
did the branches show "a willingness to compromise and combine limited and precious
resources into a single effort for creating a tank" or appropriate armor doctrine, nor did
the French High Command ever attempt to force such an integration. 93 A somewhat
similar pattern of intra-service politics can be seen in both the British and American
armies' responses to mechanization during the same interwar period. 94
Strong Center
Many of the same indicators found in the community oligarchy pattern will be
found in this pattern of intra-service politics, including: multiple communities;
competing, parallel programs; and the pursuit of alternatives means for accomplishing
similar missions. However, as the name suggests, this pattern should find a strong high
command, largely independent of individual community interests, and one willing to
operate as an honest broker between the communities. In addition, it should be possible to
91 Ibid., 174; and Robert M. Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe,
1899-1940 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2002), 210.
92 Faris Russell Kirkland, The French Officer Corps and the Fall of France, 1920-1940 (Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania (Ph.D. diss.), 1982), 212.
93 Doughty, Seeds of Disaster, 177.
94 According to one student of U.S. mechanization efforts during this period: "The War Department
provided little leadership, critical or otherwise, to sort out these matters; the nominal head of the institution
was not in control of the component parts"; David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation
in the U.S. Army, 1917- 1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 223. In the 1920s, tank
development was limited to the infantry branch; while the 1930s saw efforts to develop armor in both the
infantry and cavalry branches. As was the case with French Army, however, no effort was made by senior
leadership within the U.S. Army to integrate or coordinate these efforts. In both cases, the tank was merely
used as a means to better conduct each of the unions' traditional roles; see Ibid., 22 and John T. Hendrix,
"The Interwar Army and Mechanization: The American Experience," Journal of Strategic Studies 16, no.
1 (March 1993): 75-108. Instead, the then-dominant communities within the Army (infantry, artillery, and
cavalry) independently sought ways to employ the tank and other mechanized equipment to support their
combat arm. For a discussion of the U.S. Army and its response to mechanization in the interwar period,
see Chapter 3 below.
identify situations where this command chose between competing communities and/or
attempted to integrate results or programs across such communities.
1. Interwar German Army and Mechanization
In contrast to the French Army's experience with mechanization, the German
Army was much more successful at exploiting the potential of tanks and mechanization;
enabling it to integrate tanks into an effective combined arms organization. The extent of
the German achievement, relative to the French Army, can be seen in the former's
success on the battlefields of Western Europe in May/June of 1940. Like its French
counterpart, the German Army of the interwar period contained a number of different
communities, each with differing views on the value and use of mechanization and tanks,
and each seeking to promote its own interests. In the German case, however, a strong
central leadership was able and willing to integrate and choose among competing claims
of these various communities.
As in the French Army, three traditional unions dominated the German
Reichsheer in the immediate post-World War I period: i.e., infantry, cavalry and
artillery. In the German Army, as elsewhere, the infantry remained first among equals
and the "Queen of the Battlefield." While the experience of the Western Front in World
War I led most German officers to acknowledge the end of the massed cavalry charge,
and even some to call for the abolition of the horse cavalry, this community retained a
strong role in the early post-war years. Army commander Hans Van Seeckt, who took a
favorable view towards tanks and mechanization, could write as late as 1927 that "the
days of the cavalry, if trained, equipped and led on modern lines, are not numbered....its
lances may still flaunt their pennants with confidence in the wind of the future." 95
Moreover, due to the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, the German Army from 1920 to
1933 contained an unusually high percentage of horse cavalry, not only compared to
other armies of that period, but also compared to the pre-World War I German Army. 96
Finally, while the artillery branch in the old Prussian Army was not held in very high
esteem, its status improved greatly under the Reichswehr, with great attention paid to
95 In B. H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, revised and enlarged (London: Cassell, 1951), 29;
quoted in Matthew Cooper, The German Army, 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure (Chelsea, MI:
Scarborough House, 1990), 136, n. 10.
96 The ratio of cavalry divisions to infantry divisions in the German Army rose from 14: 100 and 15:100 in
1899 and 1911, respectively, to 42:100 during the period 1920-1933. Likewise, the ratio of cavalry
regiments to infantry regiments rose from 46:100 and 48:100 to 85:100 during this time, and the ratio of
cavalrymen to infantrymen rose from 9:100 and 10:100 to 20:100. Data are from Gudmundsson, On
Armor, 31.
improving the technical capabilities of this arm. And while artillery officers in the pre-
World War I army could hope for little in terms of career advancement beyond their
branch, officers from this branch came to dominate the top positions within the German
Army of the 1930s and 1940s. The artillery community of this era has been described as
"a closely knit fraternity" and one "highly protective of its interests." 97 Communities
occupying a second tier in the Reichswehr included engineers (known as "Pioneers"),
transportation, and communications (signal).
The interwar German Army differed from its French counterpart in terms of the
leadership and independence exhibited by the German high command. The German
Army had a legacy of strong senior leadership in the form of its Great General Staff
stretching back to the Scharnhorst era. Although the Versailles Treaty called for the
removal of the Great General Staff, General Hans von Seeckt (chief of the General Staff
from 1919-1920 and commander of the Army from 1920-1926) merely reordered and
renamed most of the functions of this organization, in the process improving many
aspects of its performance. In 1919, the core functions of the General Staff were
transferred to a new organization known as the Truppenamt, set up immediately beneath
and directly answerable to the army commander-in-chief. Other elements of the former
General Staff were transferred to other government, mostly civilian, organizations. Also
directly under the army commander, and directly answerable to him, were two additional
organizations: the Weapons Office (Waffenamt) and a collection of nine branch
inspectorates. The Weapons Office was responsible for research, development and
testing of all ordnance and equipment as well as coordination with industry in the
manufacture of military armaments. The nine branch inspectorates (infantry, artillery,
cavalry, transport, pioneer and fortresses, signal, weapons schools, medical and
veterinary) were responsible for the development and direction of training and the
coordination of equipment development with the Weapons Office for their respective
branches. In 1925, the branch inspectorates came under the authority of the Weapons
Office.98
97 Cooper, German Army, 151. Cooper suggested that the rise of these officers to top positions in the post-
World War I German Army were related to their generally higher intelligence and lower death rate during
the World War I as compared to cavalry and infantry officers; ibid. The first two Commanders-in-Chiefs
of the Wehrmacht (von Fritsch, and von Brauchitsch) were originally from the artillery branch, as were the
first two chiefs of staff of the post-1935 General Staff (Beck and Halder). Forty percent of the German
general officer corps that fought in World War II began their careers in the artillery branch. See also Albert
Seaton, The German Army, 1933-1945 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 268-69.
98 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans van Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas Press, 1992), 35-36; James S. Corum, "A Comprehensive Approach to Change:
This simplified arrangement, whereby the technology research and development
organization and the doctrinal development organization operated under the authority of a
single commander, allowed for effective coordination of weapons and doctrine. Officers
frequently rotated from one organization to the other, enhancing this coordination.
Furthermore, the branch inspectorates and the departments within the Weapons Office
were structured in such a way as to require cooperation across these subunits for most
weapon design programs, inhibiting the development of compartmentalization within
these organizations. 99
This high command arrangement remained in place until Hitler renounced the
Versailles Treaty and its restrictions on the German military in 1935. At that time, the
Truppenamt reverted back to a reconstituted Army General Staff. Meanwhile the
functions of the Weapons Office were split amongst a number of new organizations, such
as the General Army Office and the Army Ordnance Office, all under the command of
the Chief of Army Equipment/Commander of the Replacement Army. Both the Chief of
the Army General Staff and the Commander of the Replacement Army reported directly
to the Commander in Chief of the Army (i.e., the head of the Army High Command or
the Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH). 1oo While these new arrangements were
somewhat more complicated, and were to become more so as the German military
underwent a massive rearmament, the high command retained considerable power and,
compared to its counterparts in other countries of the period, successively carried out an
impressive procurement program.101
Reform in the German Army in the Interwar Period," in The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions
and New Realities, 1918-1941, eds. Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NB: University of
Nebraska Press, 2000), 43; Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1955), 398; and Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959), 222-28.
99 Corum, "A Comprehensive Approach to Change," 44. The benefits of this arrangement for armor
development became clear as early as the mid-1920s. As Corum explains it: "...the Waffenamt was
directed to oversee one tank program that combined the efforts of several departments. While the motor
vehicle section of the Waffenamt was the primary office overseeing development of tanks, the artillery
inspectorate was given guidance on the development of appropriate tank guns and the communications
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Forces, War Department Technical Manual TM-E 30-451 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1945. Fascimile ed.
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101 As James Corum concluded: "For all of the inefficiencies of military procurement - and under the
Nazis there were many - the Germans were able to design a new family of maneuver weapons with
Turning specifically to German mechanization efforts, few within the Reichswehr
argued that the tank had no role to play on the battlefield. The argument instead centered
on exactly what that role would be. Elements of the cavalry community, especially
amongst its older members, were early opponents of mechanization in any form, seeing it
as a direct threat to their beloved horses. 102 The head of the cavalry, General von Poseck,
who asserted immediately after the war that no machine could replace the horse, led a
charge from 1924 to 1927 arguing for the continued relevance of the horse in an age of
mechanization.103 Von Seeckt responded by taking a middle approach, arguing that both
the horse and mechanization would have a place on any future battlefield. However,
following the failure of maneuvers in 1932 with a mixed horse-motorized division, many
cavalry officers called for a more thorough mechanization of the cavalry branch, while at
the same time retaining traditional cavalry missions. 104 The infantry community, on the
other hand, argued that tanks should properly be limited to the subordinate role of
supporting the infantry. For instance, a standard infantry training manual from the early
1930s stated that the role of the tank was "simply to make easier the infantry's push in to
the enemy's position."' ' 5 In contrast, the armor enthusiasts, centered around the
Inspectorate for Motor Troops, argued for an independent armored force.
The German high command of the 1920s and 1930s (particularly General Ludwig
Beck, head of the Truppenamt from 1932 to 1935 and then chief of staff of the Army
General staff from 1935 to 1938, and General Werner von Fritsch, army commander-in-
chief from 1935 to 1938) has been described by many historians as consisting of
considerably less duplication of effort and at a considerably faster ace than either the French or the British;"
Corum, "A Comprehensive Approach to Change," 63.
102 In his memoirs, Heinz Guderian specifically identified the Inspectorate of Cavalry as "our main
adversary" in the battle for an independent tank role; see General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New
York: 1952; reprint, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002) (page citations are to the reprint edition), 26.
103 Mary R. Habeck, Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet
Union, 1919-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 64.
104 Indeed, as in many armies of the period, the German high command formed an experimental mixed
division of horses and motorized vehicles. However, when field experiments in 1932 suggested the
infeasibility of such a force, the German high command ordered the abandonment of horse-motorized
divisions, in contrast to other armies. The French Army, for example, maintained a similar type of mixed
horse and mechanized unit through 1940. This is not to suggest that horse cavalry disappeared from the
German Army - horse cavalry regiments were assigned reconnaissance roles in many infantry units up to
the start of World War II - but division-size horse cavalry formations were subsequently abandoned, and
certain elements within the cavalry community began to argue for mechanizing the cavalry branch. See
Corum, "A Comprehensive Approach to Change," 49-50.
105 Habeck, Storm of Steel, 189.
thoughtful but cautious supporters of armor and mechanization.106 The notion that the
senior leadership in the German Army was unusually conservative or hostile to armor
innovation - a view promoted by armor enthusiast Heinz Guderian and his supporters -
has been described by James Corum as "a pleasant fiction." 107 As Mary Habeck and
other scholars have pointed out, the central point of contention between Beck and
Guderian lay in the fact that Guderian and his supporters were promoting the interest of a
very narrow interest group, the armored forces, while Beck needed to worry about the
health and fighting capability of the army overall. As a result, while the high command
often supported the goals of other communities within the German Army over the
opposition of the armor community, that same high command gradually moved towards
developing the panzer force desired by the armor enthusiasts over the course of the
1930s. Overall, Beck has been credited by many historians with taking a variety of
actions to ensure a proper balance of infantry and armor.108
For example, the Reichswehr doctrinal manual the Truppenfuehrung, written by a
committee headed by Beck and issued in October 1933, took a middle approach to the
mechanization debate, presenting elements crucial to both sides. For the armor
supporters, the Truppenfuehrung, while stating that armor and infantry needed to loosely
coordinate their efforts, decried tying the tanks too closely to the infantry, an action
which "robs the tank of the advantage of its speed and possibly leaves it to become a
victim of enemy defenses." ' 09 At the same time, conceding a point made by the critics of
the armor school, the Truppenfuehrung allowed that at certain times tanks could be made
directly subordinate to infantry commanders to enable them to break through enemy
defenses. 10
Continuing to follow a middle course, Beck created the first three panzer
divisions in 1935 following Hitler's renunciation of the Versailles Treaty. At the same
time, he established the Armored Troop Command (though this organization only had
authority over tank units) with Guderian's mentor, General Oswald Lutz, as its chief. But
106 See Ibid., 192; Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory, 212-13; and Murray, "Armored Warfare," 41.
107 Corum, "A Comprehensive Approach to Change," 57.
108 See, for instance, English, On Infantry, 51; Murray, "Armored Warfare," 38-47; and S. J. Lewis,
Forgotten Legions: German Army Infantry Policy, 1918-1942 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), 50-
55.
109 Truppenfuhrung (T.F): I. Teil (Abschnitt I-XIII):H.Dv. 300/1 (Berlin: Mittler, 1936), 133-34; quoted in
Habeck, Storm of Steel, 192, n. 178.
110 See Cooper, German Army, 137-138; and Habeck, Storm of Steel, 191-92.
Beck, ever cautious, took these actions only after the 1935 field maneuvers successfully
demonstrated for the first time the utility of the large tank formations."' And, in
response to the pleadings of the cavalry community, Beck established the armored car
and tank-equipped light (cavalry) divisions in 1937-38. Similarly, Beck responded to
calls by the infantry community for greater tank support by forming several separate tank
brigades during this same period. Finally, two additional panzer divisions were formed
in 1938. The army high command then attempted to integrate these efforts in late 1938
by assigning Guderian to a new post, the Chief of Mobile Troops (Chefder Schnellen
Truppen), charged with overseeing the development and training of all mechanized and
cavalry troops.112
Overall, Beck and others in the German high command concluded as early as
1935 that the entire German Army needed to be mechanized. But, they also determined
that financial constraints and limited German production capacity would make this goal
unattainable for many years. Instead they choose to mechanize the force on a schedule
consistent with their view of the needs of the German Army. According to S.J. Lewis:
Panzer divisions were their first priority; secondly light
divisions designed to function as motorized cavalry;
thirdly, four motorized infantry divisions; and fourthly, the
motorization of specialized equipment to be employed by
the army command at critical locations, such as heavy
artillery, anti-aircraft guns, engineer battalions, supply
columns, and signal units."113
And the German Army quite successfully carried out this program: When Beck began
his tenure as head of the Truppenamt in 1933, the German Army had no mechanized or
motorized units, but by the time he resigned in 1938, the army possessed five panzer
divisions, four light (cavalry) divisions and four motorized infantry divisions. 14
The German high command continued to bring about changes to the force even
after the army's first successful campaign of World War II. Shortcomings encountered
during the Polish Campaign led to the transformation of the four light cavalry divisions to
1" Lewis, Forgotten Legions, 50-51.
112 This new post was not problem-free, however, and Guderian never felt that he had all the authority he
required; see Guderian, Panzer Leader, 62-63. By this time, Beck had already resigned his post as Chief of
the General Staff over his disagreed with Hitler concerning the Czech Crisis.
113 Lewis, Forgotten Legions, 53. See also Gudmundsson, On Armor, 221-23.
114 Lewis, Forgotten Legions, 51.
the heavier Panzer division design, bring the total number of Panzer divisions to ten.115
In addition, the Panzer divisions increased their infantry support by acquiring motorized
infantry units from the four motorized infantry divisions. 116 Clearly, throughout the
interwar period and right up to the early stages of the Second World War, a strong
German Army high command successfully intervened in intra-service politics, choosing
and integrating from among the options and opportunities offered by the various army
communities. 117
Changing Intra-Service Community Membership
The pattern of intra-service politics can be very resistant to change. Military
organizations find it difficult to make radical changes in doctrine - doctrine that reflects
the prevailing intra-service politics. 118 Likewise, development and acquisition programs
115 A sixth Panzer division was created just prior to the start of World War II. The transformation of the
light divisions was aided by the availability of Czech heavy tanks captured by the Germans during the
Sutedenland Crisis.
116 See Cooper, German Army, 209-210; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 89; Gudmundsson, On Armor, 88; and
Seaton, German Army, 120.
117 Another example of a military organization with a strong central leadership is the modern United States
Marine Corps. The Marines contain a number of communities - including air, artillery, armor, engineers
and signal corps - but have been traditionally dominated by the infantry community. Since 1960, every
Marine Commandant but one has come from the infantry branch. However, the small size of the Marines,
the tightly-knit nature of its small number of developmental organizations located at a handful of sites, and
the near-religious zeal of its officer corps has enabled the central leadership - embodied in the form of the
Commandant and a small coterie of officers surrounding him - to exercise very strong control. The
relationship between the Commandant and Corps often has been described in terms reminiscent of the
Catholic Church. According to one Marine historian: "All power in the Corps emanates from the Holy See
of the commandant's office. His general's are his cardinals but they are only the princes of his church - he
remains the rock on which it sits. Like the Pope, only the commandant can speak ex cathedra." See F.G.
Hoffman, former Marine historian at the Marine Corps Combat Development Commander, interviewed by
Thomas Ehrhard on 27 May 2000, quoted in Ehrhard, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, p. 86. Aided by the
small number of missions typically assigned to the corps at any one time, this strong central leadership has
enabled the Marines to respond quickly and effectively to new missions over the years: small wars and
amphibious warfare in the 1930s; the infantry-heavy, limited conventional wars and small-scale operations
of the 1950s and 1960s; armored operations on NATO's flanks in the 1970s and early 1980s; and infantry-
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associated with the dominant communities are difficult to cancel or greatly down-size,
especially as they develop constituencies outside their parent service. Moreover,
changing promotions patterns, requiring the removal of the current set of officers in key
and senior positions and replacing them with a new generation of officers from different
communities, can be a long process.119 As a result, once established, the dominance of
particular communities within a service tend to persist for long periods of time.
In most cases, only a serious threat external to the organization can alter the
pattern of intra-service politics and change which communities dominate a service.
These threats may lie in the international arena: for example, war or a drastic change in
the strategic environment facing the nation. The establishment of the British RAF
Fighter Commander on an equal footing with the service's Bomber Commander arose as
a result of the changing strategic environment facing the British during the course of the
1930s. During wartime, successful militaries are able to overcome the adverse effects of
intra-service politics, although they may pay a heavy price during the early stages of the
conflict. For example, it took the British Army until the Battle of Tobruk in 1942 to
overcome the deleterious affects of its interwar pattern of intra-service politics and to
begin to develop an effective organization and doctrine for combined arms warfare. 120
Finally, the rise of the aviation community in the U.S. Army during the 1960s was a
result both of a changing strategic environment (a new emphasis on counterinsurgency in
the early 1960s) and the Vietnam War. The experiences and lessons learned from
conflicts also can bring new communities to positions of dominance. The armor
communities in the French, British and American armies all rose to positions of
dominance equal to that afforded to the traditional infantry and artillery communities as a
result of these armies' experiences with armor during World War II. The Israeli Army
gave a renewed emphasis to both the mechanized infantry and artillery communities as a
result of the IDF's near-disaster with its overly armor-heavy forces in the 1973 Yom
Kippur War.
Alternatively, the external threat may involve - or be perceived to involve - the
survival of the service itself arising from inter-service rivalries in peacetime. Even the
threat of a military service losing a previously unimportant mission to a rival can produce
a reaction whereby the community associated with this mission is boosted into the front
119 See Rosen, Winning the Next War, 20-2 1; and Danskine, Fall of the Fighter Generals, 108.
120 See, for example, Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, 2d edition (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1982) and John Bierman and Colin Smith, The Battle ofAlamein: Turning Point, World
War II (New York: Viking, 2002).
ranks. Oftentimes, it requires a combination of such events - e.g., war followed up by
interservice threats in the immediate postwar environment - to produce enough
momentum to propel a community into a position of dominance, either alone or as part of
an oligarchy. For instance, the evolution of the aviation community as a coequal with the
surface warfare community in the U.S. Navy arose both as a result the experiences of
World War II and as a consequence of the Navy's postwar competition with the Air
Force for nuclear missions.
Propositions Regarding Intra-Service Politics
The theoretical framework developed in this chapter suggests a number of
propositions concerning intra-service community politics and its effects on the parent
organization. First, every military service contains a variety of communities or unions
centered on specific missions, functions or technologies. These communities compete
with one another to determine the service's dominant culture and missions as well as the
distribution of the service's budgets, equipment and personnel. For services with a strong
and independent central leadership, one capable of acting as an honest broker between
communities, the intra-service politics can have a variety of benefits.
In services where such central leadership is absent, however, one of two patterns
develop: either a single community dominates the service or an oligarchy of
communities controls the service. As these patterns become established, the service's
resources, doctrine, and dominant roles and missions tend to align with these patterns.
Doctrinal developments will reflect the preference of the dominant unions. Likewise, the
distribution of resources - including budgets, weapons, programs, personnel and combat
organizations - will mirror and tend to reinforce the power of the dominant unions.
Consequently, current missions that are best suited to one of the dominant unions will be
performed well (i.e., will have appropriate doctrine, organizations, and weapons
programs), and new missions suited to these unions will be readily adopted.
In such services, communities other than the dominant ones often are not
represented in the service's core culture or mission, and receive far less doctrinal
attention. These lesser communities receive far fewer resources and training time. As a
result, missions and functions associated with these communities tend to be performed
less well by the parent service. Likewise, new potential missions and programs that fall
outside the jurisdiction or capabilities of the dominant unions tend to be neglected. The
doctrine, technologies or combat organizational designs associated with these missions or
programs often will either be given negligible attention or killed outright, unless pressure
is brought from outside the organization. And, in those infrequent cases where the lesser
communities appear to succeed in getting a new initiative adopted, the dominant
communities generally are able to turn the new effort to their advantage or else have it
implemented in such a way as to have the least adverse impact on themselves.
POST-VIETNAM U.S. ARMY AND COMMUNITY OLIGARCHY
Having developed a theoretical framework, the study begins to examine the specific
case of the U.S. Army. The following section will propose how the U.S. Army during the
1970s and 1980s fits into the theoretical framework developed over the course of this
chapter.
Community Politics
In the post-Vietnam War era, the U.S. Army consisted of a weak central leadership
and a dominant coalition or oligarchy of communities. While competition among the
communities exists, conflict and rivalry often appear muted. Kanter found, for example,
that it was "much more difficult to identify salient and stable cleavages which differentiated
among well-defined Army groups," than it was in the other U.S. military services, and he
characterized the Army as the most integrated of the services. 12 1 Builder essentially agreed
with this assessment, adding that, while the branch distinctions were a source of "pride and
banter" between the unions, each Army branch recognizes its dependence upon its fellow
branches and readily recognizes their contribution on the battlefield. 122
The Army is divided into a collection of functional or combat specific subunits,
known as branches. The service contains twenty different branches: Air Defense Artillery,
Armor, Aviation, Infantry, Engineer, Field Artillery, Special Forces, Chemical, Military
Intelligence, Military Police, Signal, Civil Affairs, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation,
Chaplain, Army Medical, Adjutant General, Finance, and Judge Advocate General. A few
of these officially are broken down further into sub-branches; for example, Psychological
Operations is a sub-branch of Civil Affairs, while Maintenance and Ammunition are sub-
branches of Ordnance.
While the infantry branch officially is a single unified branch, it is divided into
several different factions: mechanized infantry, equipped with armored personnel carriers
designed to move and fight with armored forces; elite airborne infantry; air assault infantry
tied to the aviation branch with which it fights; and traditional non-mechanized infantry.
121 Kanter, Defense Politics, 19.
122 Builder, Masks of War, 26-27.
Although infantry officers will often command a variety of these forces over the course of
their careers -with rotations among airborne, air assault and traditional infantry billets
especially common - they still tend to focus on one of these unofficial sub-branches. 1' 23
Mechanized infantry tactics, in particular, often are considered different enough from other
infantry tactics that officers below the rank of general officer rotate much less frequently
from mechanized infantry billets to other types of infantry. Likewise, commanders of light
infantry divisions typically come from a light infantry background, while those commanding
mechanized infantry divisions typically come from a career dominated by mechanized
infantry commands.
Because of the way they are trained and equipped to fight, mechanized infantry
officers frequently have views and positions similar to armored officers, lead them to form a
"heavy union" within the Army. Moreover, because of their critical role in the Army's main
mission during the Cold War - the defense of Western Europe - the armor/mechanized
infantry heavy union has dominated internal Army politics for most of the post-World War
II era. For similar reasons, the field artillery and aviation branches also have been politically
strong. By contrast, it will be argued that one element of the infantry branch, the traditional
non-mechanized, or foot-mobile infantry had been losing power within the service over
several decades, reaching a low point in the post-Vietnam era.
The Army's central leadership, or high command, is represented by the
Department of the Army Headquarters (DOA HQ) and the Army Chief of Staff. The
official role of the DOA HQ has been described as one of integration,
tying all of the subordinate subsystems together for the
Army as a whole. Its tasks [are] to decide what is to
be... accomplished by the whole system and to see to it that
the system performs as expected. It also acts as the source
of funds for the subsystems, obtaining them from DoD,
Office of Management and Budget, and Congress. 124
The Chief of Staff's relative power within the service as varied over time, with the
strongest chiefs found in the period from World War II (in the person of General George
Marshall) through the 1950s reign of the "hero" generals of that war (ending with
General Maxwell Taylor). The power of the chief of staff reached a nadir with the
appointment of General William Westmoreland in the late 1960s, who was once booed
off the stage by an audience of mid-ranking officers at the service's Command and
123 The tactics used by airborne, air assault and traditional infantry tend to have much in common; their
major difference lies in their means for getting to the battlefield.
124 U.S. Army War College, How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 24 t" edition
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003).
General Staff College. Though improving somewhat since then, the Chief of Staff's
position has remained relatively weak. Indeed, he has been described as "the king only
by the grace of the nobles," in contrast to the Marine Corps Commandant whom the same
author likened to the Pope.125 And, the Army Chief of Staff also is often not independent
of community interests, as he comes into office having had a long branch-specific career.
His background provides him with a set of loyalties and (possibly) prejudices that often
play themselves out during his tenure. Likewise, Army Chiefs of Staff enter office with a
set of views developed over the course of their careers and oftentimes with an agenda
(explicit or implicit) concerning what types of threats and missions the Army should be
prepared to meet, and consequently what should be its proper force structure.
As a working hypothesis, this study proposes the following picture of the Army's
internal power structure: a weak central leadership and a service dominated by an oligarchy
of communities. In this initial picture, the oligarchy consists of four co-equal communities -
a heavy armor-mechanized infantry union, field artillery, and aviation. With one possible
exception, the remaining elements of the Army lay outside this oligarchy, in less dominant
positions within the service. The one exception may be the traditional, foot-mobile infantry
community. Clearly, this community steadily lost its position of dominance within this
oligarchy. To begin, the study will hypothesize that the foot-mobile infantry has been cast
out of the service's ruling coalition of communities since the end of the Vietnam War.
Arenas for Intra-Service Army Politics
Rosen is correct in pointing out that the conflict and competition within the Army is
fundamentally between the service's various branches and unions, but this competition
occurs within the service's "sustaining base." For the purposes of combat unit design, two
post-Vietnam U.S. Army sustaining base agencies are critical arenas for the playing out of
intra-service politics: the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC). They are two of three Army Major Commands (MACOMs) under
the Department of the Army's overall structure. The third MACOM, Forces Command
(FORSCOM), has control over all active-duty and reserve forces based in the continental
United States (CONUS) with the primary objective of managing unit training and readiness
for these forces.
AMC is charged with the research, development and acquisition of weapon systems
for the Army. To fulfill this role, the command has maintained a number subordinate
acquisition, research, development and engineering centers (ARDECs), such as the Tank
125 Millett, "Army and Marine Corps," 38.
Automotive Command (TACOM), the Aviation and Troop Support Command (ATCOM),
and the Natick Soldier System Center. While providing equipment and services across the
Army, many of the centers have traditionally focused on specific branches or unions within
the service. For example, TACOM has generally supported the "heavy" union within the
service, while ATCOM has supported the aviation branch and Natick Center served the
needs of the infantry soldier. The commander of AMC has a largely technical and
managerial role in the organization; he rarely has control over the outcomes of specific
AMC programs. Real power within AMC rests, instead, at the level of the branch-specific
ARDECs. In existence since the early 1960's, AMC underwent a temporary name change
in the early 1970's to the U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
(DARCOM). Despite the change, the organization's function and subordinate organizations
remained the same. The organization's name reverted back to Army Materiel Command in
the middle years of the 1980s. But, for the period of time covered by the three case studies
found here, its name remained DARCOM.
TRADOC was established in the fall of 1973 with the merger of the Combat
Developments Command (CDC) and elements of the Continental Army Command
(CONARC). Prior to the creation of TRADOC, the CDC had responsibility for
developing and evaluating Army tactics, doctrine and organization. CONARC, meanwhile,
was assigned command of all active-duty and reserve Army units stationed within CONUS,
as well as having responsibility for all the service's branch schools and for the training of all
CONUS-based individual soldiers and units. By 1973, the senior Army leadership had
come to feel that CONARC had become far too unwieldy and bureaucratized to be effective,
while the CDC had too little authority to be effective. To remedy these problems, the
Continental Army Command (CONARC) was split into two commands: the Forces
Command (FORSCOM) and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC
also absorbed the CDC within its overall organizational structure. 126
TRADOC is charged with developing doctrine, designing combat forces,
establishing materiel requirements, and developing and maintaining the service's training
system. Most of these tasks are performed within TRADOC's school system, and in
particular at the various branch schools; each of the service's twenty branches has its own
school. For example, the Armor School establishes requirements for tanks and their
126For more see Lt. General James G. Kalergis, "Purposeful Change: Reorganization, 1973," Army,
October 1973, 62-64; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, rev. ed. (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1984), 550; and James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army
Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington, DC: USGPO for the Center of Military
History, United States Army, 1983), 335-41.
associated weapon systems, develops armored concepts and tactics, has principle
responsibility for the design of armored units, and develops and conducts armor training.
The Aviation and Infantry Schools perform similar tasks for their branches. Again, like
AMC/DARCOM, branch politics plays itself out through the various TRADOC
organizations. Unlike AMC/DARCOM, however, the commander of TRADOC plays a
strong role in guiding the activities of his organization. His approval is required before
products leave the organization and flow up the chain of command; and, as we will see,
he has often taken a direct role in unit design and doctrine development.
Combat Unit Design In An Oligarchic Service
If the theoretical framework on intra-service politics and the description of how
the U.S. Army fits into this framework are both true, then the following results would be
expected in terms of combat organization and design: When a proposed organization and
its mission fall under the purview of the existing union oligarchy and its dominant
combat concept (i.e., entails "heavy" forces designed for mid-intensity combat on the
plains of Central Europe), the organizational design process will engage and be the focus
of the majority of Army. The process will likely succeed, producing an effective combat
organization that will be the center-piece of service doctrine and program development
efforts. On the other hand, for combat organizations and missions outside the purview of
the union oligarchy (for example, "light" forces designed for expeditionary or low-
intensity operations), the design efforts will fail or become redirected in a manner to
better serve the interests of the reigning intra-service power structure. Because the desire
will be to maintain the status quo, the more expensive or otherwise disruptive such an
organizational design and its associated programs are to the reigning community
oligarchy, the more likely it will be that the overall effort will simply fail. If, on the other
hand, the initiative is seen as costing the dominant unions little or nothing in terms of
resources and (better still) can be made to support these unions in their primary missions,
then it is more likely that such efforts will be implemented however much they may veer
away from their original intent.
CASE SELECTION
The remainder of this work will focus on testing these propositions by looking at
three organizational design efforts within the U.S. Army of the late 1970s and early
1980s: the heavy Division '86 design effort, the High Technology Light Division
(HTLD) program, and the Light Infantry Division (LID). Each has been chosen to
illustrate particular aspects of intra-service politics. The Division '86 design appears to
fit in well with the proposed Army community oligarchy, with its emphasis on artillery,
aviation, armor and mechanized infantry units. If the theory described here is correct,
then the Army should have devoted considerable time, effort and financial resources to
seeing the design succeed. The HTLD on the other hand, was proposed specifically as a
counter to the prevailing emphasis on heavy forces. It was proposed by the Army Chief
of Staff and was widely (and correctly) seen as his favored project during his tenure. If
the senior leadership within the Army was strong, then his view should have prevailed.
If, as proposed here, such leadership were weak, and because it went against the views of
the proposed oligarchy, then the HTLD should have failed. Finally, the LID presents a
somewhat mixed picture. It was another "pet" project of a new Army Chief of Staff that
again ran to be counter to the emphasis on heavy forces. However, it did support the
interests of a previously dominant community - the traditional foot-mobile infantry. If
the senior leadership is weak and the foot-mobile infantry community no longer within
the oligarchy, then the LID effort should either clearly fail or simply become a supporting
element for the dominant members of the service.
OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION
The remainder of this work will examine the particular case of the U.S. Army and
the division design process. As the three division design cases to be examined occurred
sequentially from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, Chapter Two will describe some the
most important external factors influencing the service over the forty years following World
War II. Particular emphasis will be placed on examining two of the most crucial issues
facing the Army up through the early 1980s - its manpower and force structure. One of the
key external constraints on the Army's internal politics-the service's manpower policies-
and its leadership's attitudes towards manpower issues will be reviewed over the post-World
War II era up to mid-1983. The influence of changing budgets and missions on these
manpower levels will be explored, charting the trends in manpower policies over this time
period. The structure and use of the Army's Reserve Components - the National Guard and
Army Reserve - will also be examined, as will the influence of these issues on the active-
duty forces. Finally, by following changes in the overall distribution of defense resources,
the Army's shifting political fortunes relative to the other services can be followed.
Chapter Three will explore the changing internal political power relations among the
Army's various communities. Among the factors that have influenced these communities
and their relative positions within the service are the changing roles and missions of the
service, the introduction of new technologies, changing nature of the threat, their experience
in wartime, changing public and congressional attitudes towards particular wars, and the
service's traditional preference for substituting of firepower for manpower. The chapter will
illustrate how the membership of the service's oligarchy changed over the course of the
twentieth century. For example, it will describe the splintering of the infantry branch into a
number of subgroups and the gradual erosion of the traditional infantry from a position as
one of the service's dominant communities.
Having described the external factors influencing the Army's intra-service politics
and having described the structure and membership of that politics, the next three chapters
consists of case studies of specific U.S. Army division design efforts. Chapter Four
examines the heavy Division 86 design of the 1970s and early 1980s. This division concept
was designed to provide part of an integrated solution to the problems presented by high-
intensity conflict against a modem armored opponent, specifically Soviet-style forces in
Europe. Chapter Five looks at the High Technology Light Division (HTLD) concept. This
division concept was designed to provide a high technology solution to the Army's need for
effective forces capable of rapidly deploying to crises and conflicts outside the NATO area.
Through innovative organizations and tactics, combined with cutting edge technologies, the
HTLD was intended to be highly mobile - both strategically and tactically - while at the
same time providing a highly lethal anti-armor capability. Finally, Chapter Six examines
the case of the Light Infantry Division design. This division was designed to be light-weight
and have high strategic deployability, containing approximately ten thousand troops and
capable of being deployed in about five hundred C-141 sorties. The division also was
designed to be primarily a foot-mobile infantry force, with at least fifty percent of the troop-
strength composed of non-mechanized infantrymen. While meant to have utility in a NATO
environment, the division was to be optimized for low-intensity combat operations.
The lessons learned from this examination of the force design and internal Army
politics will be discussed in the final chapter. There too will be a discussion of the
Army's future and possible changes to its intra-service community structure.
CHAPTER TWO
CONSTANTS AND CONSTRAINTS
ON THE U.S. ARMY
INTRODUCTION
The external environment can influence and constrain intra-service politics. External factors
or constraints include technological developments, national strategy, security threats, and domestic
economic and political conditions. Technological developments can give rise to new functions and
hence new communities within a given service, and they can reduce or eliminate the importance of
other communities. Changes in national strategy or changes in the threat posed by international
opponents can reinforce the political power of certain communities or overthrow the power of
others. Domestic economic and political conditions determine the resources available to a service,
can enhance or reduce the political power of certain communities within a service, and can
influence and constrain the ways different intra-service communities respond to internal service
conflict. Domestic political conditions can also determine the structure and power of a service's
central leadership, influencing the latter's ability to control its service's internal political struggles.
Finally, inter-service rivalry can affect intra-service politics; for example, driving intra-service
communities together to combat a common inter-service threat.
This chapter will present an historical overview illustrating how the interplay of a variety of
factors external to the U.S. Army - e.g., U.S. strategic choices, congressional activities, inter-service
competition, and reserve issues - influenced the service's manpower levels, force structure, and
budgets for the first fifty years after World War II. This chapter will not be an exhaustive survey of
these factors; additional constraints will be described as they arise and relate to the case studies in
the chapters that follow.
THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR YEARS: 1945-1950
The U.S. Army won the Second World War, but lost the U.S. government's postwar defense
debate. The rapid demobilization at the war's end quickly dismantled the massive U.S. military
machine, and was followed closely by a squeeze on military budgets imposed by the fiscal policies
of a Truman Administration searching for a "peace dividend." The Army and Navy bore the brunt
of the budgetary restraints as atomic weapons, and the Air Force that possessed them, came to be
seen by many civilians as the basis for U.S. security through deterrence. Public apathy towards the
Army increased too due to a general postwar exhaustion with military issues. Despite the desires of
the American people and the Truman Administration to return to peacetime pursuits following the
war, a series of ominous political developments soon erupted around the globe; leading to the
deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet postwar relationship, and the gradual development and acceptance
of containment as the basis of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. The result of these
contradictory military and political developments was a growing perception of a gap between U.S.
political commitments and existing military forces.
At the end of World War II, the U.S. Army contained over eight million military personnel
and fielded eighty-eight full-strength divisions - sixty-seven infantry, sixteen armored, and five
airborne. Consistent with past U.S. practice, Army planners expected a large-scale postwar
demobilization of this force. At the same time, they expected this process to be a gradual and
orderly one, consistent with the service's immediate postwar occupation duties and commitments.
An elaborate demobilization scheme had been devised during the war, wherein military personnel
were scheduled for release based on a point system taking into account such factors as length of
service and combat duty, decorations, and number of dependents.1
The Army was hardly prepared for the relentless and overwhelming pressures which
immediately arose following the war to "bring the boys home." Not only did the Truman
Administration find itself under pressure from Congress and a vocal minority of the public to
release the citizen soldiers from their military duties, but in many areas the soldiers themselves
staged demonstrations and riots demanding to be released.2 Such pressures forced the Army to
quickly abandon the point system for an across the board release of all soldiers serving two years or
more, resulting in the most hasty and haphazard demobilization in U.S. history. The Army
underwent a seventy-five percent reduction in manpower levels from V-J Day to July 1946. 3
Stories abound of the deleterious effect of this rapid demobilization on an army deployed
across the globe. Personnel shortages overseas were so severe, that commanders found it difficult
even to guard the large stockpiles of Army materiel from theft by the local populace.4 Combat
effectiveness and morale slumped as enlisted personnel were deprived of officers, who in turn were
On the Army's postwar planning during World War II, see Michael S. Sherry, Preparing For The Next War:
American Plans for Postwar Defense 1941-45 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977). For a detailed
examination of post-World War II personnel demobilization planning, see John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel
Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington DC: Department of the Army, July 1952), 23-102.
2 Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956),
156-57; General Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Row, 1954; reprint, Blue
Ridge Summit, PA: TAB Books, Inc. 1988), 9-10 (page citations refer to the reprint edition); Weigley, United
States Army, 485-86; C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, American Military Policy: Its Development Since
1775 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Press, 1961; reprint, Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1974), 442-45 (page
citations refer to the reprint edition); and Sparrow, Personnel Demobilization, 141-70.
3 Huntington, Common Defense, 35.
4 Ridgway, Soldier, 158.
reassigned to new duties at a dizzying pace. 5 In later years, this process was to be decried by many,
not as a demobilization of the Army, but as its destruction.6
Nevertheless, while the haste was unprecedented, the large-scale demobilization of the
World War II Army followed a familiar feast-or-famine pattern in American military history. Every
war since the American Revolution had seen a rapid build up of U.S. forces and materiel during the
conflict, followed by drastic cuts in budgets and personnel at war's end. Moreover, several World
War II Army leaders, in particular Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, feared that a large standing
army would be incompatible with and dangerous to American values and democracy, while placing
an intolerable burden on the federal budget.7 In planning for the future, therefore, the Army
leadership foresaw the requirement for a small peacetime force capable of rapid mobilization to a
mass army through reliance on a large, pre-trained pool of citizen soldiers.8
To obtain such a system, the Truman Administration revived a call for Universal Military
Training (UMT). Under this concept, originally conceived following World War I,9 virtually all
males between the ages of eighteen and twenty would be called upon to serve one year of military
service in peacetime, during which they would receive basic and limited specialized training. Upon
release from active-duty, they would be placed into the federal military reserve system to await call-
up if needed. With the expiration of post-war selective service authorization in March 1947, the
Truman Administration introduced UMT legislation to Congress. However, traditional opposition
to this concept from educators, churchmen, and others, coupled with skepticism of the relevance of
mobilizable trainees in the atomic age and general public disinterest, led Congress quietly to reject
UMT legislation (a water-downed version was buried in the House Rules Committee) by the end of
1947.10
Further adverse effects on Army capabilities arose due to the fact that, throughout the 1945-
1950 period, the Truman Administration's fiscal policy focused on the twin goals of balancing the
federal budget and reducing the large debt accrued during the war. To meet these goals, the
5 Lt. General James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 106;
Ridgway, Soldier, 158; and Sparrow, Personnel Demobilization, 265-80.
6 See, for example, Gavin, War and Peace, 106.
7 Sherry, Preparing For The Next War, 50-51.
8 For a description of the War Department Circular No. 347 (issued 25 August 1944) outlining this policy, see
Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-
1983, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 79-80.
9 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939, (New York: Viking Press, 1963),
203-14; and Weigley, United States Army, 395-403.
10 Clyde Jacobs and John Gallagher, The Selective Service Act: A Case Study of the Governmental Process (New
York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1968), 27-42; and Weigley, United States Army, 496-500.
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Administration relied on the so-called "remainder method" for determining the military budget.
Under this procedure, domestic spending would first be subtracted from expected revenues, with the
remaining funds then allotted to the military.
By the beginning of 1948, the resulting military budget ceilings imposed by the Truman
Administration had forced the Army into "a shockingly deplorable state."" While Congress
authorized a personnel level of 669,000 officers and enlisted men, the Administration's budget
bureau reduced this figure to 560,000. Even this level of manpower proved impossible for Army
recruiters to meet, in part because postwar inflation had combined with static military pay to reduce
greatly military pay scales relative to civilian wages. As a result, the Army was able to recruit a
force of only 552,000 soldiers. 12 By contrast, while the Army was expecting a resulting manpower
shortage of 165,000 by the end of 1948, the Navy's personnel situation was expected to improve by
July 1948 and the Air Force's personnel picture was characterized as "satisfactory."' 3
Moreover, the manpower that was available to the Army was organized into a force with
limited combat effectiveness: one half was stationed overseas on occupation duty (hence, neither
trained or organized for combat), while most of the remainder was stateside performing
administrative chores. This situation led to a large gap in capabilities versus the perceived threat
and U.S. political commitments. According to a February 1948 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) briefing
to the President, the military could identify four "explosive" areas of the world where
political/military events could potentially lead to U.S. military deployments: Greece, Italy, Korea,
and Palestine. Yet, the Army could muster a U.S.-based strategic reserve of only two and one-third
divisions for deployment in emergencies, along with eleven Marine Corps battalion landing teams.
Moreover, all of these strategic reserve units were under-strength and, according to its Chief of
Staff, General Omar Bradley, only the 82d Airborne (short 1100 personnel) could "be remotely
described as combat ready."14
The Army's inability to obtain sufficient volunteers (by March 1948, the service had fallen
130,000 personnel below its authorized strength), combined with threatening Soviet activities in
Europe in the spring of 1948, led Congress to reinstate conscription with the passage of the
11 Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life: An Autobiography, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983),
474.
12 Ibid.; and Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 375.
13 At the time of February briefing, however, Navy personnel shortfalls resulted in the immobilization of 107 ships;
see Ibid.
14 Ibid., 374-76; Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 474; and Walter Millis, Arms and the State: Civil-Military
Elements in National Policy (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), 208.
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Selective Service Act of 1948.15 Despite this legislation, the Army would obtain only about thirty
thousand draftees by the middle of 1950.16
While the Army's manpower woes persisted, the military services were busy preparing their
first unified short-range emergency war plan, which was meant to serve as the basis for future force
planning. This war plan, code-named Halfmoon, assumed that the United States would respond to a
Soviet invasion of Western Europe by dropping atomic bombs on the Soviet Union. In these initial
stages, the Army's role would be limited to protecting U.S. Air Force bases from which these
atomic strikes would be launched, and denying the use of potential bases to the Soviet Air Force in
areas adjacent to the United States. Once the Soviets had surrendered, and following a World War
II-type general mobilization, the U.S. Army would serve in an occupation role throughout Europe
and the Soviet Union similar to its mission following World War II.17
Army planners calculated that Halfmoon would require an initial ground force of a million
men and eighteen combat-ready divisions. Realizing the impossibility of sustaining such a force in
peacetime under any reasonable apportionment amongst the services of the fiscal year 1950 defense
budget ceiling of $14.4 billion, the Army leadership settled for an active-duty force of 800,000 men
and twelve divisions, with seven divisions stationed overseas and five in a stateside strategic
reserve. The remainder of the Halfmoon force requirement would be met by six "elite" fully
equipped National Guard or Organized Reserve Corps (the predecessor to the Army Reserve)
units. 18
The 1949 war plan, Offtackle, carried forward many of the same assumptions found in
Halfmoon. The major difference lay in the new plan's emphasis on halting a Soviet invasion west
of the Rhine, in concert with our European allies. With Army force requirements similar to those of
Halfmoon, the JCS now agreed to the recruitment of an 800,000-man Regular Army, but formed
into only ten and two-thirds active-duty divisions. Throughout these deliberations, planners
assumed a constant fiscal year 1951 defense budget ceiling of $14.4 billion. 19
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However, all of these force plans were abandoned in mid-May 1949, when the new
Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, announced that the budget ceiling for fiscal year 1951 would
be reduced to $13 billion. In the final budget figures for fiscal year 1951, Secretary Johnson allotted
the Army only $4 billion, putting an end to the service's goal of an "800,000-man" force. Indeed,
the Army's planned fiscal year 1950 authorized strength of 677,000 was now scheduled to be
reduced during fiscal year 1951 to 630,000 active-duty personnel. And further cuts were expected:
initial planning for fiscal year 1952, begun in the spring of 1950, suggested a reduction in Army
manpower below 620,000 personnel and the resulting loss of its newly acquired tenth active-duty
division.20
By June 1950, five years after World War II and on the eve of the Korean conflict, the Army
stood at fewer than 600,000 active-duty personnel, 70,000 fewer than authorized force levels. Of
the service's ten under-strength divisions, five were assigned to the strategic reserve (known at that
time as the General Reserve) based in the United States and designed for emergency deployments.
The remaining divisions were on occupation duty in Europe (one based in Germany) and Asia (four
divisions in Japan). Completing the service's field army were a division-size European
Constabulary Force; five separate regimental combat teams stationed in the United States and
Hawaii, of which two were part of the General Reserve; four armored cavalry regiments, one
assigned to the General Reserve; and a number of smaller combat support and logistics units.21 In
order to meet declining budgets projected over the next few years, the Army was forced to remove
one battalion from each of its divisions' three infantry regiments as well as one of four artillery
batteries from each division.22 Moreover, two divisions assigned to the General Reserve (the 3d
Infantry and 1 lt Airborne) consisted only of two regiments of two battalions each (rather than the
standard three and three).23 So severe were the cuts to the active-duty Army force structure that
then Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, later revealed that he was prepared to resign
had Secretary of Defense Johnson recommended further cuts in the service's active-duty division
numbers. 24
20 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987), 26-27; and
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21 Weigley, United States Army, 502-503; Schnabel, U.S. Army in the Korean War, pp.43-45; and Hill, Minute Man,
501.
22 Blair, The Forgotten War, 28.
23 Ibid., 120.
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One of the two reserve forces available to the Army, the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC),
faced problems as well in the period between World War II and Korea. Unlike its active-duty
brethren, the ORC did not suffer from a lack of manpower. In fact, although the ORC had few
material benefits to entice recruits, over one-half of the discharged World War II-era officer corps
had accepted commissions in the ORC by July 1946. Similarly, by mid-1948, over seventeen
percent of the discharged enlisted personnel had also signed up for the reserves.25 The major
difficulties for the ORC, rather, stemmed from a paucity of organized units and a lack of financial
support, resulting in inadequate training opportunities and a dearth of equipment.26
By contrast, the picture was much brighter for the Army National Guard. The Guard fared
better fiscally than either the Regular Army or the ORC during this period, and successfully
competed for the limited manpower pool with the ORC. Traditional active-duty Army antagonism
of the Guard was still prevalent, however, and focused on issues of training standards and
deployability. This antagonism surfaced, for example, in a 1948 effort to federalize the state-run
Guard on a permanent basis. This effort, strongly supported by Regular Army officers, quickly died
in Congress as had similar efforts in the past; a victim both of its complexity and the traditional
strong political power of the Guard Association within Congress. 27 The power of the Guard
Association was demonstrated in other ways as well during this period, including the addition by
Congress of a total of $79 million to the budget of the National Guard during the financially
strapped years of 1947 and 1948. Indeed, in the latter year, the Guard's budget was the only
component of any service to be increased; the ORC budget remained constant, while all others were
cut.28 By 1950, the Army National Guard had grown from its immediate post-World War II total of
eighteen divisions to twenty-five infantry and two armored divisions, along with twenty regimental
combat teams, seven armored cavalry regiments, and over one thousand smaller units.29
THE KOREAN WAR: 1950-1953
During the period 1950-1953, Army manpower and force levels were dominated by the
Korean War and the massive rearmament that accompanied it. As typically occurs in wartime,
previous fiscal constraints were removed from the Army budget, and its force levels grew
25 Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 84.
26 John Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983),
198-204; and Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 88-90.
27 Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 483; and Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1965), 73.
28 Ibid., 72-73.
29 Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 204-205.
proportionately. The result was a narrowing of the gap between political commitments and military
capabilities.
The North Korean invasion of South Korea, in June 1950, ignited a large-scale rearmament
of the U.S. military, especially of the U.S. Army. The framework for this effort had been developed
several months before in an interdepartmental review of national security policy, NSC-68. This
document, which painted a distressing picture of Soviet political intentions and the East-West
military balance, called for a large expansion of U.S. limited war and general war capabilities.
Although not yet approved at the time North Korean forces first crossed the 38th Parallel in South
Korea, NSC-68 guided the buildup that followed.30
The immediate cause for the rearmament was the commitment of U.S. military forces to the
war in Korea. The first U.S. ground troops sent into Korea were pulled directly from occupation
duty in Japan. Largely untrained, inadequately equipped and greatly undermanned, these units
suffered heavy initial losses and gave up much territory to the rapidly advancing North Korean
ground forces. 31 In response, General MacArthur requested immediate individual replacements,
both to fill out under-strength units and to replace casualties. In addition, he sought smaller units in
order to bring his divisions in Japan and Korea up to full wartime strength (e.g., a third infantry
battalion for each regiment and a fourth artillery battery for each division), as well as major units
(entire regimental combat teams and divisions) to reinforce his struggling field army.32
The JCS met these demands by drawing manpower and units out of the General Reserve,
thereby depleting the emergency forces needed to respond to other global threats to U.S. interests,
including those that might arise in Europe. As a result, one month after the North Korean invasion,
the army's General Reserve was drawn down from 140,000 to 90,000 personnel. Within the first
two months of the war, one division, an airborne Regimental Combat Team, eight infantry
battalions, and three tank battalions were sent to Korea. All remaining units in the General Reserve,
30 See, for example, Fautua, "'Long Pull' Army," 110-20; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical
Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 90-126; and
Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat," International Security 4, no. 2 (Spring
1980): 116-58.
31 Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), 108-29, 139-41, 146-
51, and 165-70; T. R. Fehrenback, This Kind of War, (New York: Macmillan, 1963; reprint, New York: Bantam,
1991), 89-152 (page citations refer to the reprint edition); Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New
York: Hippocrene Books, 1986), 46-107; Schnabel, U.S. Army in the Korean War, 80-99 and 111-14; and Blair,
Forgotten War, 89-173.
32 Schnabel, U.S. Army in the Korean War, 86-94.
with the exception of the 82d Airborne, were largely reduced to cadre status to provide individual
and small unit replacements to Korea.33
In addition, Congress quickly moved to grant President Truman authorization to call up a
large number of ORC and National Guard units and individuals to active duty. Among the first
mobilized were individual ORC troops to fill out depleted active-duty units, with first priority going
to reinforcing units in Korea and then to forces in the stateside General Reserve; entire Guard and
ORC units soon followed. Before the truce was signed in July 1953, two National Guard divisions,
fourteen separate ORC battalions and forty separate ORC companies, along with large numbers of
individuals, were rotated through Korea.34 In total, eight Army divisions (active-duty and reserve)
and one Marine division, along with a number of individual regiments and brigades, saw action on
the Korean peninsular during the course of the conflict.35
Forces for the Korean War, however, were just one element of the rearmament program.
The North Korean invasion and subsequent Chinese intervention in the winter of 1950 were seen by
many in the Truman Administration to be the opening gambits in a global Soviet-inspired conflict,
with Korea simply a feint to draw the Western powers' attention away from Soviet preparation for
an invasion of Western Europe. In response, the United States increased the size of the state-side
General Reserve and, in conjunction with its European allies, quickened the pace of NATO
development. The first steps to improve NATO capabilities were undertaken in December 1950
when General Dwight Eisenhower was recalled to active duty as the first Supreme Commander of
NATO. Two months later, Congress granted the President authority to deploy troops to Europe in
peacetime as part of NATO forces. During the remainder of 1951, four additional Army divisions -
including federalized National Guard divisions serving as temporary substitutes for Regular Army
units then being formed - were sent to Europe to reinforce the one U.S. Army division stationed
there since World War 11.36 All U.S. ground forces stationed in Europe were put under the evolving
NATO command structure. Stateside, several Regular Army divisions were formed, four National
Guard divisions activated, and a host of smaller Guard and ORC units called to active duty, all for
use in the United States either as training divisions or to strengthen the general reserve force. By the
33 Ibid., 87-99 and 118-20; Blair, Forgotten War, 121-3; and Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War, 134-35.
34 Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 99.
35 Weigley, United States Army, 508-509; Fautua, "'Long Pull' Army," 112.
36 Ibid., 112-13; and Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 646.
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end of 1952, the Korean mobilization had created an Army of 1.5 million personnel, twenty
divisions and more than fifteen regimental combat teams.37
Although some problems and delays were experienced in getting reserve units to a state of
combat readiness, the major issues facing the Korean reserve mobilization revolved around
questions of equity. First, many of the individual reservists sent to Korea as combat replacements
were from the inactive-duty Reserves, and had received little or no recent combat training. Many
felt it unfair that they should be facing combat while more recently trained Reservists remained in
the United States. More broadly, most of the reservists recalled to active duty, whether individuals
or members of organized units, were veterans of World War II. Many of these reservists,
particularly those in Korea, resented the double jeopardy of being recalled again to military duty,
especially while millions of eligible males who had never served in the military remained in civilian
life. Even those reservists not mobilized often suffered, as many employers began to fire or refuse
to hire members of the reserve for fear of soon losing them to additional mobilization call-ups.38
Despite the rearmament's overall success, Congress failed to approve one critical element of
the Army's buildup. The Truman Administration, concerned about the possible need for a larger
standing army and reserve force following Korea, presented another UMT proposal to Congress in
January 1951. A much watered-down version was approved several months later, which included
the creation of a commission designed to recommend ways for implementing UMT. When the
House rejected the commission's recommendations the following year, however, UMT was once
again defeated.3 9 In its place, Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, detailing the
responsibilities, organization and regulation of the federalized reserves.40
One reason for the ultimate demise of UMT was the public's decreasing anxiety over the
threat of global war as the conflict in Korea stalemated and a Soviet invasion failed to materialize
elsewhere. This feeling eventually reached into the Truman Administration as well, and affected
the Army's plans for the future. In the fall of 1951, the Army, with JCS concurrence, recommended
a fiscal year 1953 budget allowing for an expansion to 1.5 million men and the equivalent of
twenty-seven divisions, growing to the equivalent of thirty-three divisions two years later.41 The
37 Ibid., 651; and Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United
States of America (New York: Free Press, 1984), 491.
38 Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 97-100; and Weigley, United States Army, 508-10.
39 Jacobs and Gallagher, Selective Service Act, 42; Collins, Lightning Joe, 345-6; and Mahon, Militia and National
Guard, 207-208.
40 On the details of the legislation, see Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 100-101.
41 Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 650.
Truman Administration, however, moved to slow down and stretch-out the defense buildup in the
latter part of 1951, approving a fiscal year 1953 military budget only half as large as the services
requested. This pattern was repeated during deliberations over the fiscal year 1954 budget in the
summer of 1952. By the end of the Truman Administration, the Korean War buildup was largely at
an end.42
MASSIVE RETALIATION AND THE EISENHOWER YEARS: 1953-1960
Under the Eisenhower Presidency, Army manpower and force levels were once again
dominated by Administration efforts to constrict military budgets and by a military strategy
emphasizing the centrality of nuclear weapons to U.S. security. For most of this period, the Army
leadership found itself fighting for the very survival of its service.
In security policy, the Eisenhower Administration came into office determined to achieve
two goals it believed central to long-term U.S. interests; both of which, it contended, had been
dangerously overlooked by the previous Administration. The first was the establishment of a proper
balance between military force structure and national economic growth. According to President
Eisenhower, the Soviet Union presented the United States with both a military and an economic
threat, the latter arising from overextended U.S. military budgets. To meet this dual threat required
the maintenance of an adequate, but minimal, level of military force. The Administration's second
and related national security goal was the development of a military program designed to ensure
U.S. security for the "long haul," to eliminate the roller coaster defense budgets of the Truman era.4 3
These goals led to the development, during Eisenhower's first term, of the "New Look",
best known for its substitution of nuclear "massive retaliation" for U.S. involvement in conventional
limited wars. Among the elements of the New Look were the development of continental air
defenses and the continued accumulation of nuclear firepower. To carry out these programs while
simultaneously reducing defense spending, conventional active-duty ground forces or, as President
Eisenhower derisively put it, the "bottle washers and table waiters" bore the brunt of the defense
cuts. Following a November 1953 meeting with Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of the
Treasury George Humphrey, and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, Eisenhower wrote that:
42 Ibid., 650-51.
43 Huntington, Common Defense, 66-69; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years,
1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1963), 173-76.
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It was agreed that the dependence we are placing on new weapons
would justify completely some reduction in conventional forces -
that is, both ground troops and certain parts of the Navy. 44
The Eisenhower Administration argued that the capability to strike at the heart of an
opponent's power afforded by strategic aircraft carrying nuclear weapons lessened the importance
of conventional ground forces. In addition, the Administration contended that the newly-developed
"cheap" tactical nuclear weapons could be substituted for costly conventional manpower; an effort
characterized by Administration spokesmen as obtaining "more bang for the buck." In NSC-162/2,
approved by the President on 30 October 1953, the military was ordered to plan for the use of
tactical or strategic nuclear weapons at any time it became militarily desirable. 45 This position was
restated publicly many times by senior Administration officials; with President Eisenhower, for
example, commenting at the height of the 1955 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis:
Where these things [nuclear weapons] are used on strictly military
targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they
shouldn't be used just exactly as you would a bullet or anything
else.46
In December 1953, the Defense Department, at the behest of President Eisenhower,
announced its intention to reduce the Army's manpower levels down to one million troops by fiscal
year 1957. The first stage of this demobilization saw manpower levels drop from 1.5 million to 1.3
million in the year and a half following the Korean cease-fire in mid-1953. In developing the fiscal
year 1956 budget during the summer of 1954, the Eisenhower Administration accelerated and
deepened these reductions, calling for a force of 1.1 million soldiers by fiscal year 1955 and a
further reduction to approximately 800,000 troops the following year. Congress approved this level
and schedule of Army reductions, while rebelling against the Administration's proposed troops cuts
in the Marine Corps; Congress mandated Corps personnel levels for fiscal years 1956 and 1957 that
were ten thousand above the Administration's goal.47 Ultimately, the Administration failed to
complete the scheduled reductions in Army manpower, reducing the service to an authorized
strength of just over one million men in 1956.
Concurrent with the reductions in active-duty Army manpower levels was a renewed
emphasis on the reserves. In 1954, President Eisenhower announced that "the establishment of an
44 Eisenhower memorandum, 11 November 1953, Eisehnower Papers, Whitman File: DDE Diary, Box 2,
"Nov.53(2)"; quoted in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 148, n. 48.
45 Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," In Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets, eds. Warner R. Schilling,
Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 436-37.
46 Department of State Bulletin 32 (21 March 1955), 459-60; quoted in Huntington, Common Defense, 80, n. 86.
47 Huntington, Common Defense, 79.
adequate reserve .. , will be a number one item submitted to the Congress next year."4 8 This move
too was largely justified as an economizing measure, with Administration spokesmen frequently
pointed out that one active-duty soldier required funding equivalent to ten reserve personnel. The
Administration's National Reserve Plan, submitted to Congress in January 1955, called for
measures to heighten the readiness of Army Reserve units, improve the combat effectiveness of the
National Guard, and strengthen recruitment into the reserves. The subsequent Reserves Forces Act
of 1955, passed by Congress that August, did increase the potential for a larger reserve force, but did
little to improve its combat effectiveness. For much of the Eisenhower era, the reserves - like their
active-duty force counterpart - were to suffer from inadequate recruitment, equipment and
facilities .4 9
While the immediate Korean War demobilization was not as severe as that following World
War II, it did cause considerable consternation and protest from Army leaders. General Matthew
Ridgway, who became Army Chief of Staff in the fall of 1953, argued vociferously with Defense
Secretary Charles Wilson over the prudence and logic of the planned reductions in the active-duty
Army. Ridgway rejected the Administration's assumption that reserve units could adequately
substitute for active-duty forces, owing to the extended time necessary to turn reserves into combat-
ready units compared to the expected rapidity of future wars. He also refuted an Administration
justification for U.S. troop reductions in Europe based on the existence of a future twelve-division
West German army by pointing out that the West German military force did not and would not exist
for several years to come. 50
On the issue of nuclear weapons, Ridgway and his supporters argued that the New Look's
reliance on strategic nuclear weapons left the United States with an all-or-nothing strategy.
President Eisenhower's statements to the contrary, Ridgway also questioned - correctly as it turned
out - the readiness of civilian leadership to grant authority for nuclear use in a crisis or limited
conflict. Moreover, he contended that, given the geographic demands placed on the Army, it was
imprudent to substitute tactical nuclear firepower for manpower as too few of these weapons had yet
been produced and deployed, and that such weapons were too vulnerable to preemptive attack.51
48 
"Strong Reserve to Be Number One Item for Next Congress-Eisenhower," The Army Reservist, November 1954,
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More importantly, the Army Chief of Staff asserted that the advent of tactical nuclear
weapons required more troops, not fewer. First, the complexity of the new weapons would require
more maintenance personnel than older, conventional munitions. Moreover, the increased
firepower of these weapons in the hands of the enemy carried the potential for vastly increased
causality rates, necessitating even larger numbers of trained replacements. Finally, he argued that
the increased pace and depth of combat with nuclear weapons also demanded more troops.5 2
Underlying all of these arguments, however, was the fear on the part of the Army leadership
that many inside and outside the Eisenhower Administration no longer viewed the service as
playing a central role in U.S. national security, that an attitude was prevalent in the country that "the
foot soldier is obsolete." 53 Substantiating these fears were comments such as those of JCS
Chairman Arthur Radford "that atomic forces are now our primary forces ... that actions by other
forces, on land, sea or air are relegated to a secondary role." 54 In response, one of Ridgway's three
"great tasks" as Army Chief of Staff became "to preserve the spirit and pride of an Army which top-
level efforts steadily sought to reduce to a subordinate place among the three great services that
make up our country's shield.. ."55
Another Army response to the Administration's increased reliance on nuclear weapons was
to launch a series of attempts to design a "nuclear army." The first attempt began on 28 December
1953, just three days after Secretary of Defense Wilson approved the JCS plan for carrying out
NSC-162, when Army Chief of Staff Ridgway ordered the head of Army Field Forces to prepare a
study examining "the probable organization of the Army during the period 1960-1970. "56 Ridgway
specified that the future field army should include organic atomic weapons and that the study was to
assume that authorization for their use would be granted. The resulting design - the Atomic Field
Army (ATFA) - was rejected by Ridgway's successor, General Maxwell Taylor, who instead
turned to another on-going nuclear-armed force redesign effort, known as the Pentanna Study. This
latter effort eventually culminated in a set of "Pentomic" division designs announced in October
1956.
52 Ibid., 296-97.
51 Ibid., 212.
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For the senior Army leadership, the real motivations behind these efforts to develop a
division for the nuclear battlefield lay in the realms of budgetary battles and public relations. A
number of academic studies over the years have shown that these design attempts were not the
result of "an objective examination of the actual requirements of the nuclear battlefield," but rather
were efforts to increase the Army's procurement budgets and even to justify its continued
existence.57 New types of tactical nuclear weapons, and the forces needed to support and fight with
them, were felt to be the only method available for justifying an expansion of the Army's
procurement budgets.
For example, though originally focused on the needs of the Army during the latter half of
the sixties, General Ridgway eventually shifted the focus of the Pentanna Study to one of
developing a force consistent with the service's atomic war plans for 1960. By combining a drastic
force redesign with a definite war plan set for only five years hence, the Army thus could argue for a
major weapons development and procurement effort now to meet these needs.58 And, according to
one student of this period, the real reason behind General Taylor's rejection of ATFA lay in the
effort's failure to preempt further cuts to the Army's budget. 59 Likewise, Taylor, in explaining his
acceptance of the unproven Pentomic configuration at a classified briefing for Army school
commandants, stated that mandating that new division structures be developed around future
weapon systems could, in turn, be used to justify new procurement funding. 60
On the public relations side, both Ridgway and Taylor believed that the Army suffered
because of a public perception that the service was out of date. In criticizing the Administration's
over-reliance on strategic nuclear retaliatory capabilities, General Ridgway expressed dismay at an
Army commanders' conference that "you can't get at the American people so easily. So it comes
back again to the question of the public relations problem.. ."61 By developing an "Atomic Army,"
Ridgway hoped the Army could show its continued relevance to American people. Similarly,
57 Midgley, Deadly Illusions, 40. For more on the Pentomic division, see Midgley, Deadly Illusions; A. J. Bacevich,
The Pentomic Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 1986); and Sheehan, Preparing for an Imaginary War, 89-148.
58 This argument is made in Midgley, Deadly Illusions, 60.
59 Ibid., 59.
6o Ibid., 68.
61 Conference Notes of the Commanders Conference held by the Chief of Staff at Fourth Army Headquarters, 6
January 1954 CS 320 Cases 1-3 (Secret) p. 44; quoted in Midgley Deadly Illusions, 35, n. 6.
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General Taylor admitted that the term Pentomic was a "Madison Avenue adjective" created in
response to the view among the public of the Army as an obsolescent force in the new atomic age.62
Unfortunately, the Pentomic design quickly proved unworkable in practice, and the design
was soon abandoned.63 Overall, most observers concluded that the Pentomic divisions were less
capable than their predecessors on a conventional battlefield and no better than these older designs
on a nuclear one. The Pentomic concept was widely and harshly criticized by many officers within
the Army. Indicative of these views were the comments of General Paul L. Freeman, made during
an early 1970's retirement debriefing: "Every time I think of the Pentomic division ... I shudder.
Thank God we never had to go to war with it."64
During Eisenhower's second term of office, some rhetorical changes were made in U.S.
strategy. For example, the recognition of mutual deterrence and its consequences, led the
Eisenhower Administration to reduce the emphasis on mobilization and reserves, and to begin to
acknowledge the need for limited war capabilities. As early as 1955, there was official acceptance
of the need for a "versatile, ready force to cope with limited aggression."65 Nonetheless, the Army's
active-duty forces saw few real changes in either capabilities or force levels in the latter half of the
1950s. Indeed, active-duty Army manpower levels were reduced from one million to fewer than
900,000 over the period from fiscal year 1956 through fiscal year 1958. The need to stabilize
military spending in the face of increasing defense costs led to another round of manpower
reductions during the fiscal year 1959 budget deliberations in the summer of 1957. The
Administration set authorized Army manpower levels for both the fiscal year 1959 and fiscal year
62 General Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 171. General William
DePuy, who at the time of the Pentomic effort was assigned to the Office of the Army Chief of Staff, later
commented that the division was General Taylor's "response to the fact the Army seemed to have been left out of
the atomic age and needed to sound and appear very modern;" see Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen III,
Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired (Washington, DC: Center of
Military History, United States Army and United States Military History Institute, Pennsylvania, 1985), 112.
63 Many of its long list of shortcomings are described in detail in Major Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US
Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976, Leavenworth Papers, No.1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute,
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1960 budgets at 870,000 troops.66 By the end of 1960, the Army was reduced to fourteen divisions,
with only eleven of these combat capable though often not combat-ready. 67
On reserve policy, the Eisenhower Administration actually reversed its earlier ostensible
support for the Army Reserve and National Guard. Each year from 1958 to 1960, the
Administration proposed a ten percent reduction in reserve paid drill strength. Nonetheless, not
only were these and similar attempts to cut the budget of the Army Reserves unsuccessful, Congress
actually increased funding for the Guard and Reserve throughout this period.68
Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor, like his predecessor General Ridgway, argued
vehemently against further cuts in active-duty strength. After the failure of the Pentomic design
effort, however, the logic of the Army leadership's argument shifted from an emphasis on the
manpower requirements of combat operations in a tactical nuclear environment towards the needs
of a limited conventional war capability. According to General Taylor and his supporters, the soon-
to-arrive U.S.-Soviet mutual balance of terror at the strategic nuclear level diminished the deterrent
value of threats to use nuclear weapons in all cases except those where truly vital U.S. interests were
at stake. Yet, the United States would still require a military capability to protect its interests in
lesser contingencies. The only way to do so, Taylor argued, was through the use of conventional
forces designed specifically for limited warfare; retaining tactical nuclear weapons only for those
exceptional cases where their use would be in the U.S. national interest. The Army, as the service
assigned the specific mission of sustained ground combat, should have the primary role in these
limited war situations, naturally with the cooperation of the other services. To fulfill this role, the
Army required sustained or increased force levels maintained at a high state of readiness, both
deployed overseas and as part of a stateside strategic reserve. 69 Unfortunately, as Taylor was later
to admit, the resources required for such wars:
were largely ground forces using unglamorous weapons and
equipment - rifles, machine-guns, trucks and unsophisticated aircraft
- items with little appeal to the Congress or the public."70
Nor did they appeal to the Eisenhower Administration, which both acknowledged the need
for a limited war capability and largely rejected the means prescribed by Taylor to provide it.
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Instead, the Administration increasingly emphasized the use of tactical nuclear weapons to combat
limited wars. John Foster Dulles, in a private meeting with Eisenhower during the second Quemoy-
Matsu Crisis in the fall of 1958, summed up the U.S. defense posture of the latter half of the 1950s.
According to notes taken by Eisenhower's military aid, General Andrew Goodpaster, who was also
present at the meeting,
Mr. Dulles directed attention to the point regarding atomic weapons,
recalling that we have geared our defense to the use of these in case
of hostilities of any size, and stated that, if we will not use them
when the chips are down because of adverse world opinion, we must
revise our defense setup.71
Unable to successfully rebut this view, General Taylor continued to focus on preparing the Army
for battlefield nuclear operations, as well as arguing for improve conventional combat capabilities.
One of few measures taken by the Army during this time to develop a conventional limited
war capability was the 1958 formation of a four-division Strategic Army Corps (STRAC). While
the remaining Army units in the state-side strategic reserve were assigned training missions, the
STRAC was designed to provide a rapidly deployable force for contingencies worldwide.
Continued personnel reductions, however, forced the Army to reduce the Strategic Corps to a three-
division force by 1959. 7 2 Even with this smaller force, the lack of adequate air- and sea-lift, the low
combat-readiness of many of these units, and a host of other difficulties precluded the development
of a true rapid deployment capability.73 General Taylor, who stepped down as Chief of Staff in
1959, was to find a more receptive audience for his arguments, both the need for a "Flexible
Response" strategy and increased conventional force levels, in the next presidential administration.
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THE VIETNAM WAR: 1961-1970
President Kennedy came into office having campaigned against the Eisenhower "Massive
Retaliation" strategy and its over-reliance on nuclear weapons. Kennedy, instead, endorsed a
program very similar to General Taylor's "Flexible Response" strategy, calling for a greater
emphasis on non-nuclear forces and limited conventional war capabilities. The U.S. Army was to
be a major beneficiary of this new strategy. For force planning purposes, the Pentagon adopted a
71 Andrew J. Goodpaster, memo of conference, 4 September 1958, Whitman File International Series, Historical
Materials in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS; quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume
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"Two-and-a-Half War" strategy under which it was to create forces sufficient for two simultaneous
major conflicts against the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, as well as a minor
(limited) war somewhere in the Third World. The Army's eleven barely combat-capable divisions
were woefully inadequate to carry out such an ambitious strategy. For example, upon taking office,
President Kennedy was reportedly "appalled" to discover that shipping ten thousand troops to
Southeast Asia would virtually wipe out nation's the strategic reserve and leave it unable to meet
other emergencies. 74
In response, one of Robert McNamara's first acts as Secretary of Defense was to
recommend procurement of modem forces capable of being airlifted to any spot on the globe, as
well as a host of Army and Air Force conventional weapons systems. Funding also was increased
for research and development on non-nuclear weapons. While only incremental additions were
initially proposed to Army and Marine Corps manpower levels, the Army's Special Forces branch
was to more than double in size. The focus on the Special Forces reflected the Administration's
new emphasis on low-intensity warfare. 75
Beginning with a supplemental budget request in the summer of 1961, brought on by the
Berlin Crisis, and continuing through the fiscal year 1963 budget request, the McNamara Pentagon
lavished attention and funding upon all elements of the active-duty Army. Resources were provided
for procurement of weapons and materiel to equip new and existing divisions. The service received
nearly half of the overall authorized increase in military manpower, increasing from 875,000 to
about 1,000,000 troops over this period. With these additional resources, existing Army divisions,
including the three training divisions, were brought up to full strength and readiness, and five new
fully-capable divisions were added to the force structure.76
Meanwhile, to allow Army regular forces to fight local wars anywhere in the world while
still maintaining a capability to reinforce Europe, McNamara foresaw a renewed role for what was
now called the service's Reserve Component (RC) - the National Guard and Army Reserve. This
led to a series of attempted reorganizations of National Guard and Reserve forces throughout the
early to mid-sixties, designed to better prepared them to support the active-duty component. These
efforts met stiff resistance from the elements of the RC and their supporters in Congress. The
opposition again illustrated the power of the various reserve organizations and the difficulties faced
by any Army effort to "interfere" with its reserves.
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In the Pentagon's initial plans, formulated in early 1961, the reserves would be reorganized
so as to provide a timely replenishment of the U.S.-based strategic reserve in a crisis or local
conflict. Under this schedule, two reserve divisions were to be combat-ready within three weeks of
call-up and a total of ten divisions were to be available after eight weeks. At this time, the Reserve
Component consisted of ten Army Reserve and twenty-seven National Guard combat divisions, all
maintained at no more than seventy percent of their wartime manpower levels; thirteen Army
Reserve training divisions; and a host of smaller Reserve and Guard units.77
The difficulties and inadequacies of the existing reserve policy were to become apparent
only a few months later when, during the height of the Berlin Crisis, McNamara announced the
large-scale call-up of reserve units. Before the mobilization ended, two National Guard divisions, a
number of company-size Guard units, nearly 450 Reserve units, and thousands of individual
reservists were placed on active duty.78 The short-term purpose behind this call-up was to fill-out
existing active-duty units until the selective service could meet this demand. The two mobilized
guard divisions served as replacements in the strategic reserve in case two active-duty divisions
from this force were required for re-deployment to Europe.
Although the mobilization was credited with helping to stabilize the international situation
and with providing time for the buildup of active-duty forces, it also brought to light a host of
problems with the Army's Reserve Component.79 Rather than providing an immediate combat
capability, the Kennedy Administration found that many reserve units required four to six months to
achieve combat effectiveness. Most units were discovered to be not only lacking in requisite
manpower, but also equipped with outdated, inadequate, or nonexistent equipment. Moreover, the
call-up itself created massive confusion, uncovering a number of administrative glitches in the
mobilization system. For instance, the procedure meant to assign individual reservists with
particular specialties to units short of these skills went awry, resulting in mal-distribution of skills
throughout the force. Politically, the most serious problem with the mobilization was the resulting
public protests over the disruption of citizen soldiers' civilian lives in a situation short of actual
conflict. 80 Following this episode, McNamara conceded that the use of reserve units in crises was
untenable, that they could be realistically called to active duty "only when armed conflict is
77 Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 153-55; and Kaufmann, McNamara Strategy, 64.
78 Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 137.
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imminent.. ."81 In response, he and the Army undertook a series of steps designed to reorganize
the reserves and to increase their readiness for mobilization.
Opposition from Congress, state governments, and reserve officer organizations forced the
Pentagon to reverse its initial planned reductions in the RC and maintain reserve paid drill strength
at 700,000 personnel (400,000 National Guard and 300,000 Reserve). Nonetheless, approximately
1,850 obsolete company or detachment-sized reserve units were eliminated and about 1,000 new
units added. By May 1963, when the reorganization was completed, four combat divisions had
been dropped from both the Army Reserve and the National Guard. More importantly, the resulting
reserve force structure was prioritized into two distinct groups. Those designated as high-priority
units - totaling six combat divisions and additional support units - would be assigned the task of
rapidly reinforcing and supporting the active-duty Army in sudden emergencies. These units were
to be maintained at a high-state of readiness, manned at eighty percent or higher of their wartime
strength, and have on hand nearly their entire wartime equipment allotment. The remainder of the
Reserve Component was to be used only in the case of a general mobilization and manned at about
fifty percent of its wartime levels. 82
McNamara's efforts to rationalize the Reserve Components were to culminate a year and
half later in a second major reorganization proposal, involving: a large-scale reduction in Reserve
Component combat divisions; the merger of all Army Reserve units into the National Guard; and
the reconfiguration of the Army Reserve to consist solely of individual Reservists. In part this
reorganization effort was driven by the Army's fiscal constraints: funding was unavailable both to
modernize all active-duty Army units and equip a 29-division Reserve Component. In light of these
constraints, the McNamara Pentagon determined that full modernization could only be achieved
with an active-duty/reserve force structure of twenty-four divisions: sixteen active-duty divisions
and eight reserve combat divisions. 83
As opposition mounted to this latest reserve proposal, McNamara announced in November
1965 that 751 Army Reserve units would be disbanded nationwide. Furthermore, the reserves'
high-priority units once more were to be restructured. Now designated the Selected Reserve Force,
these units would be assigned to quickly reinforce active-duty units in contingencies beyond the
rapidly escalating Vietnam conflict. This new force would consist of three divisions and six
independent brigades from the National Guard along with 232 combat service and combat support
81 Kaufmann, McNamara Strategy, 80.
82 On the details of this reorganization and the battle over its approval, see Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen,
154-61.
83 Ibid., 163.
service Army Reserve units. The peacetime manning levels of these units would be increased to
one hundred percent from their current levels of seventy-five to eighty percent. 84
After two and half years of acrimonious debate, insurmountable opposition to the Army
Reserve/National Guard merger from Congress and from the Army Reserve's Reserve Officers'
Association forced the Pentagon once again to accept a compromise on the composition of the
reserves. In the Pentagon's final version, approved by Congress in the summer of 1967, the
Reserve Component was reduced to eight combat divisions, all in the National Guard. The Army
Reserve, however, was able to hold onto its thirteen training divisions, as well as its combat support
and combat service support units. As an additional sweetener, the Army Reserve also acquired
three of the Reserve Component's twenty-one independent combat brigades. Paid drill strength was
maintained at 400,000 for the National Guard, but reduced to 240,000 for the Army Reserve.
Except for the elimination of the reserve training divisions in the 1970s, the Reserve Component
maintained this basic force structure through the 1980s.85 By 1967, however, the U.S. Army was
already mired in a conflict in Southeast Asia which was to affect both active-duty and reserve force
structures, as well as manpower levels throughout the service, for the next decade.
When President Johnson ordered the first combat units to Vietnam in July of 1965, the
Army was deployed to a number of locations outside the continental United States (CONUS): five
divisions and three independent regiments were stationed in Europe, two divisions were stationed in
Korea, one division was based in Hawaii, an independent airborne brigade was stationed in
Okinawa, two independent infantry brigades were based in Alaska, and an infantry brigade was
assigned to the Panama Canal Zone. 86 The remainder of the Army units were all stationed in
CONUS, including: eight divisions - two armored, two airborne, one mechanized infantry, and
three infantry - as part of the U.S. ground force strategic reserve (two marine divisions rounded out
this force); an air assault test division; two independent brigades, one each of infantry and armor,
which primarily served as training units; and an armored cavalry regiment. 87
By the middle of 1968, total active-duty Army division strength had increased from sixteen
to nineteen divisions, while manpower levels nearly doubled from their early 1960s figures. The
majority of these forces were engaged in the war raging in Vietnam. Prior to the 1968 Tet
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85 On McNamara's merger efforts and their opposition, see Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 163-179; and
Mahon, Militia and National Guard, 231-36.
86 Shelby L. Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 (New
York: Dell Publishing Company, 1985), 24.
87 Ibid.
Offensive, units deployed to Vietnam included seven Army divisions and three independent
brigades or regiments, as well as two Marine divisions. Despite increases in selective service levies,
the Army was able to achieve this build-up only at the cost of seriously depleting its forces
elsewhere.
For example, the U.S.-based strategic reserve force was reduced to only four divisions; the
remaining state-side units consisted of the two training brigades and a single infantry brigade in
Alaska.88 Of these forces, only the 82d Airborne was deemed fully combat-ready and deployable,
with the rest severely skeletonized for replacements to Vietnam. Moreover, all of these units,
including the 82d, found themselves heavily involved in restoring and maintaining order during the
anti-war demonstrations and racial tensions of 1967 and 1968, further reducing their combat-
readiness. 89 The Vietnam War's demands on manpower led to a further reduction in state-side
forces by the middle of 1968, when a brigade each from the 8 2d and the 5th Mechanized divisions
were deployed to Southeast Asia.
Similar activities took place in Europe, where personnel were drawn off as early as 1966 to
fill-out under-strength or newly-activated divisions earmarked for Vietnam.90 By mid-1968, entire
units were being transferred from Europe to the United States, including the remaining two brigades
of the 24 th Infantry (Mechanized) Division, an armored cavalry regiment, and several support units.
This transfer was made, in part, to help shore-up the depleted strategic reserve.9 1 Although
deployed stateside, these units remained committed to a NATO contingency and much of their
heavy equipment remained on the European continent. Nonetheless, by 1969 U.S. forces in Europe
had been reduced by over 100,000 troops from earlier in the decade, with the Johnson
Administration projecting a European troop deployment of only 291,000 by 1970; the number of
divisions earmarked for Europe dropped from fourteen to nine.92
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A major reason for the strain on Army force and manpower levels was President Johnson's
decision, in the summer of 1965, not to order a mobilization of the reserves. This decision was
made despite a recommendation by Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that nearly 235,000 reservists, including approximately 125,000 from the Army RC, be called to
federal service.93 Moreover, as we have seen, it was taken in the face of existing mobilization plans,
wherein any large-scale commitment of military ground forces was highly dependent upon the call-
up of the Army reserves. This dependence was especially acute in the area of basic training, where
Army Reserve training divisions were expected to supply the bulk of units to train any large influx
of draftees, the active-duty Army having already eliminated half of its division-size training units
during its early 1960s build-up. The absence of these reserve divisions for training placed a
disruptive burden on active-duty Army strategic reserve units.
Several reasons have been cited for this failure to call-up the reserves early in the Vietnam
conflict. Throughout the conflict, President Johnson sought to avoid actions that could arouse
public opposition to the war. And, given the unpleasant experiences associated with the Korean and
Berlin mobilizations, the political leadership had reason to fear that a reserve call-up could create
similar domestic political and economic costs. Moreover, Johnson and many of his advisers wished
to refrain from sending dramatically hostile and escalatory signals to North Vietnam and its allies,
as well as to U.S. allies. Reserves also were not called up specifically for Vietnam because of a
desire to retain these units for other contingencies that might arise. But, perhaps most importantly,
reserves were not mobilized for Vietnam owing to President Johnson's fear that such actions would
help bring about a national debate on Vietnam that, in turn, could threaten his "Great Society"
domestic welfare programs.94
A limited mobilization, involving sixty-six Army Reserve Component units, did finally
occur in the spring of 1968. The mobilization was justified as a response to the Tet Offensive in
Vietnam and to increased tensions in Korea, including the seizure of the U.S. spy ship USS Pueblo.
However, only thirty-five of the forty-two Army Reserve support units mobilized were shipped to
93 Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1982), 103-104.
94 Mahon, Militia and the National Guard, 242; Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 193-97; Doris Kearns,
Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Signet, Harper and Row, 1976), 264-67; Lyndon Baines
Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: HEC Public Affairs Foundation, Popular Library Edition, 1971), 149;
Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 1979), 265-67; and Berman, Planning a Tragedy, 122-123;. The failure to mobilize the reserves has
been tied to a broader failure to invoke the "nation will," which, in turn, has been cited by some authors as a prime
reason why the United States failed to achieved victory in Vietnam; see, for instance, Harry G. Summers, Jr., On
Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982; Dell Publishing edition,
1984), 33-43; and General Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington,
KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 190.
Vietnam, with the remainder assigned to the depleted strategic reserve. Of the over 12,000 National
Guard personnel federalized, only 7,000 saw action in Vietnam; of these, 4,000 were detached from
their units to act as individual replacements. 95 By the summer of 1969, all Reserve Component
ground force personnel had been returned to civilian live.
By this time, several elements of U.S. strategy that would directly affect Army manpower
levels and force structure were under revision. First, a new president was in office, committed to
the withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces from Vietnam and the turning over of the war to the South
Vietnamese military. As a result, the United States began the "Vietnamization" of the war during
1969, and the first Regular Army units began to return home. Moreover, the Nixon Administration
expressed its intent to extend "Vietnamization" across the globe. In the Nixon (or "Guam")
Doctrine, President Nixon announced that countries allied to the United States (except those in
NATO and Japan) would from now on have to rely on their own ground forces as a first line of
defense. U.S. naval, air, and nuclear forces would be provided as necessary, but the United States
would no longer so readily provide ground forces for the defense of U.S.-allied Third World
countries. In a third change, in official recognition of the split in the communist world, the
Pentagon was directed to adopt a new "one-and-a-half-war" strategy for force planning purposes.
Accordingly, the military would
maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for meeting a
major communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies
against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a [limited]
contingency elsewhere. 96
These new strategic policies reduced the requirements for Army forces and had an obvious
effect on the service's force structure. As divisions returned to the states from Vietnam, several
were simply deactivated or put into a skeletonized cadre status. By the time the last of the U.S.
ground forces left Vietnam at the end of 1972, this process of deactivation had left the Army with a
mere thirteen active-duty divisions, down from a Vietnam War high of nineteen divisions and three
fewer than before the Vietnam build-up.
THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE: 1970-1980
Army personnel and force levels were driven during the 1970s by the cessation of
conscription, constrained defense budgets, and a reduced role for ground forces in U.S. security
strategy. Adding further to the service's troubles was an underlying public antipathy towards the
95 On the U.S. Army Reserve mobilization, see Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 198-208. On the Army
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military in the aftermath of Vietnam and the social upheavals of the 1960s. These factors combined
to present the service with its most severe personnel problems since the late 1940s. In turn, the
situation forced the service to establish a new and closer relationship between the active-duty and
reserves forces. Two studies early in the Nixon Administration set the stage for Army manpower
issues throughout the coming decade.
First, the President's Commission on All Volunteer Armed Forces (known as the "Gates
Commission") was formed soon after the Nixon Administration came to power, with a mandate to
examine the new president's campaign pledge to end conscription. In the period from the Korean
War through the 1960s, the United States maintained its first extended "peacetime" draft. As the
sixties drew to a close, however, the identification of the draft with the increasingly unpopular
Vietnam War coupled with the perceived inequities of the conscription system led to widespread
calls for an end to the draft.97 The Gates Commission began by arguing that, if the draft was to be
maintained, military pay scales should be made commensurate with those found in the civilian
marketplace in order to partially compensate for the inequities of selective service. If this were
done, however, the Commission claimed that the military services would be able to fulfill their
manpower needs through volunteers alone, removing the necessity for a draft.98 With the
widespread acceptance of this argument, the Army was suddenly, and for the first time in its history,
required to pay for a large active-duty force.
In a parallel effort, and as part of the new Administration's reevaluation of U.S. security
policy, the National Security Council (NSC) undertook an examination of the U.S. defense posture
early in the Administration's first term. The study identified manpower costs as a major driver of
the "staggering" pressures on defense budgets. In addition, given the Administration's commitment
to an all-volunteer military, these personnel costs were expected to escalate rapidly. In light of this
analysis, the study concluded that manpower had to be cut from the military. Moreover, these cuts
had to be made where the bulk of the manpower existed - in the conventional forces and especially
the Army.99
As a result of the move to the All Volunteer Force (AVF), and consistent with the NSC
analysis, the Army found that its active-duty personnel shifted over-night from a relatively
inexpensive resource to a very expensive one, as the service attempted to maintain force levels
while competing with the civilian economy for quality manpower. In pursuing this competition,
increased personnel benefits and the devotion of more funds to recruitment led manpower costs to
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consume well over 50 percent of the Army's budget by the mid-1970s. 100 In response to these
pressures, and with the end of the Vietnam War, the Army's personnel numbers were quickly
reduced. Active-duty end-strength was cut by nearly half from 1969 to 1973 - from 1.5 million
troops down to 785,000.
To make up for the resulting manpower shortfalls, the Army - like all the services - began
substituting civilian workers for military personnel in suitable jobs. The service also began to
increase its recruitment of women: the percentage of female enlisted personnel in the Army grew
from 2.4 percent at the start of AVF to nearly 10 percent by the early 1980s. 01 And, to decrease the
demand for personnel, starting in the early 1970s, the service cut and streamlined headquarters and
management personnel within the Army Headquarters at the Pentagon, at the Army Major
Commands, and at other Army installations throughout the United States. 10 2
Despite these efforts, the Army experienced a host of difficulties filling the ranks of its
newly volunteer force. The media and congressional hearings throughout the 1970s were filled with
rumors and allegations concerning recruiting improprieties and irregularities. 103 Besides a shortfall
in numbers, the Amy also experienced serious shortages in the quality of recruits due to a
combination of events, including an upturn in the civilian economy, a congressional cap on military
salary increases, and the end of the Vietnam-era GI Bill. The service fell below its established
strength objectives in fiscal year 1979, and was able to escape this fate the following year only
through the expedient of recruiting a large percentage of admittedly low-quality personnel. 104
The Army's Reserve Components, on which the potential impact of AVF had never been
examined, were even more seriously affected by the end of conscription. Since the beginning of the
peacetime draft, enrollment in the National Guard (and, to a lesser extent, the Army Reserve) had
been viewed as an outlet for many young men to fulfill their military obligations without unduly
disrupting their civilian lives. This legitimate means for circumventing the draft acted as boon to
Guard recruitment. At no time was this more prevalent than during the latter half of 1960s, the
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height of the Vietnam War, when many Guard units had long waiting lists of applicants. 10 5 Once
the threat of the draft ended, Guard manpower levels began a steady decline as personnel
completing their initial obligations left the organization and recruitment of new troops dwindled. In
the absence of further incentives or pressures to join, manpower levels in the Guard declined from
nearly 400,000 to about 345,000 between 1973 and 1979; the latter figure representing less than 80
percent of its funded strength. 106
Army Reserve manning levels suffered similar consequences with the advent of the AVF,
although the detailed reasons varied. The vast majority of Reserve manpower came from enlistees
or draftees who, upon completion of their required time in the active-duty Army, fulfilled their
military obligation by serving for a specified period in the Reserves. The pool of former draftees
entering the Reserves dried up following the end of conscription. Moreover, many who joined the
AVF did so with the intent of making the military a long-term career, thereby also reducing the
number of former enlistees rotating out of the active-duty Army into the Reserves. As a result, like
the Guard, personnel levels in Reserves units declined from over 235,000 in 1973 to fewer than
190,000 by 1979.107 In the second category of Army Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, whose
members were unassigned to organized units and were intended to fill-out under-manned active-
duty and reserve units in time of war, manning levels fell from 1,059,000 at the end of fiscal year
1972 to 144,000 by January 1978.108
To remedy the situation facing the RC, several small-scale recruitment incentive programs
for the Guard and Reserve were undertaken during the Carter Administration. Nevertheless, reserve
force levels continued to decline to the end of the decade. By 1980, the entire Army Reserve
Component was suffering a shortfall in personnel of twenty-five percent below their peacetime
manning levels. 109 To find the necessary personnel in time of war, discussion even turned to the
merits of reactivating officers and enlisted men from the ranks of the Retired Reserve, consisting of
soldiers who had finished their military careers or had otherwise fulfilled their military obligations.
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The failure to adequately consider the adverse impact of the AVF on the reserves was
especially ironic in that the AVF and the economic constraints accompanying it led the active-duty
Army to rely increasingly on these Reserve Components to flesh out its wartime force structure in
what came to be known as the "Total Force" concept. This increased dependence on the reserves
was presaged in a December 1969 memorandum by then Army Chief of Staff General William
Westmoreland. General Westmoreland, in part as a tacit criticism of the failure to mobilize reserves
during the Vietnam War, ordered that future Army planning be predicated on the use of the Reserve
Components as the initial and primary source of additional units and individuals for the active-duty
component in any future rapid mobilization.' 10 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird made this
reliance on the Reserve Components official DoD-wide policy in an August 1970 memorandum to
the service secretaries."' At about the same time, the first Army experiments with round-out units
- employing reserve forces to bring under-strength active-duty units to full wartime capability -
began with the attachment of an Army Reserve battalion to the 1st Armored Division.
In its initial formulation, the Total Force concept appeared to be a return to the pre-Vietnam
policy of mobilizing the Reserve Component during the open phases of major foreign policy crises,
as in the Berlin Crisis of 1961. And, reminiscent of the early Eisenhower era, both Secretary Laird
and the Army leadership argued for the increased use of reserve forces on the grounds of the
economic advantages of substituting reserves for active-duty manpower. Again, officials cited
figures demonstrating that ten reserve soldiers could be supported for the price of one active-duty
enlisted person." 12 Unfortunately for the Army, as will be seen, this argument would take on a life
of its own, creating a rationale for a seemingly unending series of reductions in and restructuring of
the active-duty Army as Congress sought further cost savings in the defense budget.
Another early-1970s development with long-term implications was the Army's
reconsideration of its support and combat structure. At the time, Army Chief of Staff General
Creighton Abrams and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger concluded that the Army needed to
add three divisions to its active-duty force structure, returning to the pre-Vietnam force level of
sixteen active-duty divisions, in order to demonstrate continued U.S. resolve in the face of the
Vietnam draw-down. However, both Abrams and Schlesinger realized that, for the foreseeable
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future, no additional increases to personnel levels were to be forthcoming from Congress or the
Nixon Administration. The reluctance on the part of Congress to increase Army personnel strength
arose in part due to the fact that many in Congress were beginning to argue that the service's use of
its existing manpower resources was wasteful. Despite its streamlining efforts, influential
Congressmen, in particular Georgia Senator Sam Nunn, claimed that the Army continued to have
far too many personnel in management and logistics positions and far too few combat troops;
resulting in an imbalance in the ratio of combat-to-support forces (known as "tooth-to-tail"). 113
To reconcile these divergent pressures, the Army instituted a policy which it was to repeat
several times over the next ten years: headquarters and support manpower requirements were to be
reduced further, while the freed-up active-duty manpower spaces were used to form additional
combat units. In this way, the service was able to protect its manpower resource base, while
expanding its number of division "flags." 114 This policy was part of a larger deal cut by Schlesinger
and Abrams in late 1973 and known ever since as the "Golden Handshake." As part of this deal,
Schlesinger agreed to support increases in the active-duty Army's combat force structure and to
protect from civilian analysts in OSD the service's number one modernization program - the M-1
tank. In exchange, Abrams agreed not to seek expansion of the active-duty Army's personnel
strength beyond the current level of 785,000 and to rid the service of marginal or redundant support
units. 115
To ensure approval of this force expansion, Abrams and Schlesinger formulated a carefully
crafted scheme. To avoid opposition from the Office of Management and Budget, the Army budget
submitted to Congress in January 1974 indicated only a small increase in force structure, from
thirteen to thirteen-and-one-half divisions. Not until February, during appearances before Congress,
did Abrams announce the service's intention to expand to sixteen divisions. Owing to the support
that the popular Chief of Staff enjoyed on the Hill and the seemingly "cost-free" nature of the
increase in combat capability (more combat divisions for the same number of troops), Congress
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easily approved the Army's plans. Schlesinger then cemented this support by speaking favorably of
the program both publicly and in internal Administration debates."116
Interestingly, in light of subsequent policy, Schlesinger justified increasing active-duty
division strength by criticizing former Defense Secretary Laird's reliance on reserve combat units
for "initial defense mission[s]," describing this decision as "imprudent." While acknowledging that
reserve ground units could be "useful in special circumstances," Schlesinger asserted that active-
duty forces would have to be relied on "where there are only short periods of warning and the most
decisive battles of the war occur during the first days and weeks of conflict;" wars that he claimed
would be the norm for the United States in the future. He concluded that the United States "should
stop pretending that we can use all of [the RC] as full substitutes for active-duty ground forces."
Schlesinger called on Congress to continue encouraging the Army to shift active-duty manpower
from support to combat units. Finally, he urged Congress to maintain a floor of 785,000 troops in
the active-duty force and, if possible, to increase active-duty manpower "so as to reduce still further
our dependence on the Guard and Reserve for our initial defense forces."" 7
While Congress failed to maintain Schlesinger's recommended troop minimum (Army end-
strength would soon fall by another ten thousand troops), it enthusiastically promoted increasing the
service's "tooth-to-tail" ratio. The most visible manifestation of congressional enthusiasm for this
policy came with the passage of the Nunn Amendment to the 1975 Defense authorization bill. The
amendment, embodied in Public Law 93-365, mandated a reduction of support forces in Europe
(principally in the Army and Air Force) of six thousand spaces in fiscal year 1975 and twelve
thousand spaces in fiscal year 1976. The freed-up personnel spaces, in turn, were to be converted to
combat units. The Army fully complied on schedule with this directive, converting 6,000 spaces in
1975 and 6,175 in 1976."8 Similar conversions from support to combat spaces also took place in
Korea without congressional legislation, but consistent with the mandates of the
Schlesinger/Abrams "Golden Handshake" agreement. Following completion of these initial
conversions, however, some elements in the military suggested that the readjustment of the tooth-to-
tail ratio had perhaps gone far enough, and that further conversions might reduce combat
effectiveness and sustainability. 119 The trend was even reversed slightly in 1980, with the addition
116 The Abrams-Schlesinger strategy is presented in Ibid. Both the policy and the manner in which it was approved
was to prove instructive to Schlesinger's senior military assistant, General John Wickham, ten years later as he
sought approval for the Light Infantry Division program.
117 Schlesinger, DoD Annual Report to Congress FY76, pp. III-14, 111-15, and III-16.
118 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1977 (Washington, DC:
USGPO, 1976), 231.
119 See Ibid., 105; and Rumsfeld, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1978
(Washington, DC: USGPO, 1977), 157.
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of some support units to the active-duty force. 120 By the late 1970s, however, the die had been cast:
the notion that active-duty combat capability could be increased through cuts in support had become
firmly rooted in Congress.
Similarly, the process of transferring these support missions to the reserves and the filling
out of active-duty combat divisions with reserve units gained strong congressional support. The
admonitions of Schlesinger and others not withstanding, throughout the remainder of the decade,
the Reserve Components became ever more tightly integrated into the active-duty Army force
structure, at least for wartime planning purposes. In fact, at the same time that Schlesinger was
warning of the dangers of over-reliance on reserve forces, he announced the start of a large-scale
program of affiliating Reserve Component combat brigades and battalions with active-duty
divisions, either as round-out or augmentation units (the latter were designed to increase the combat
capability of full-strength active-duty units in wartime). 121 All three of the new divisions created in
the "Golden Handshake" agreement were assigned round-out combat brigades. By the end of the
decade, every active-duty division, except those stationed in Korea and Europe, had designated
Reserve Component battalions or brigades, either as round-out or augmentation units. While the
combat affiliation task was assigned principally to the National Guard, which contained the bulk of
the combat units in the reserves, the Army Reserve supplied about sixty-six percent of the wartime
support units to the active-duty Army.122 For example, according to the second commander of the
Rapid Deployment Force, General Robert Kingston, a "sizable proportion" of the RDF - ostensibly
designed to be a "quick reaction force" - would consist of Reserve Component forces. 123 The
integration of the reserves with the active-duty duty forces culminated in the CAPSTONE Program,
finalized in 1980. Under this program, every Reserve Component unit, except Guard divisions, was
assigned an active-duty Army affiliate. In addition, discrete reserve mobilization packages were
designed for a wide range of contingencies.124 In short, within ten years the Reserve Component
120 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1982, Part 6: Manpower and Personnel, Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (1981), 783.
121 James R. Schlesinger, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1975 (Washington, DC:
USGPO, 1974), 100.
122 Testimony of General Edward Meyer, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Part 2: Defense Management Report, Army
Programs, Navy-Marine Corps Programs, Air Force Programs, Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (1981), 754.
123 Lt. General Robert C. Kingston, Prepared remarks for delivery to the Reserve Offices Association Midwinter
Conference, 15 February 1982; quoted in Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 264, n. 130. In testimony before
Congress early in 1981, the Chief of the Army Reserve noted that eighty-three Army Reserve units had been
assigned to the RDF; see Maj. General William R. Berkman, Chief, Army Reserve, Hearings before the House
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, 97th Cong. 1st sess. (March
11, 1981); quoted in Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 264, n. 131.
124 Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 255.
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had gone from a backup force to the active-duty Army to one whose units would be among the first
sent into a combat operation.
While perhaps carried further than originally intended, this policy also served another
primary goal of the Army leadership. By making the active-duty forces evermore dependent on the
reserves, these officers were trying to ensure that the Army would never again face a situation
similar to its experience during the Vietnam War, where military forces were committed to battle
without the full mobilization and support of American society. 125
Despite their new mobilization tasks, however, the undermanned Guard and Reserve units
remained frequently ill-trained and unprepared for their assigned combat and support roles. Most
units were either short of critical equipment or equipped with obsolete or obsolescent armaments.
Facilities were either inadequate or simply nonexistent. Moreover, several exercises conducted
during the latter half of the 1970s pointed out severe shortcomings in the mobilization process. 126
Efforts to remedy shortcomings in the Reserve Components, particularly the Guard, became
a major congressional focus - often at the expense of active-duty units. As has been seen
throughout this chapter, Congress long has been a strong supporter of Reserve and National Guard
interests. Traditional congressional interest in reserve matters is understandable given the local
constituency aspect and the historic grass roots strength of the National Guard and Reserve Officers
Associations. The Total Force concept gave a new-found strategic basis to this long-running
concern. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Army Chief of Staff would spend a portion of
his time before Congress explaining why a Guard unit in a particular Congressman's district or
Senator's state was not receiving adequate support or the latest equipment.127 There were frequent
congressional attempts to adjust the Army's modernization procurement schedule so that Guard and
Reserve units would have priority in modern equipment over many of the active-duty divisions.
Suggestions were even made by some in Congress that the numbers of active-duty personnel should
be reduced until Guard and Reserve units were fully outfitted with the latest materiel. 128
125 See, for example, Brig. General Michael W. Davidson, "Vietnam Baggage: The Nonmobilization Option,"
Military Review 69, no. 1 (January 1989): 28-29; and Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-duty-Reserve
Integration in Wartime," Parameters 21, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 42-43.
126 Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 260-61; and Jon P. Bruinooge, "Mobilization for a European War: the
Impact of Habeas Corpus," in The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington,
DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 224-25.
127 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, Department
of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Part 1: Posture Statements, Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (1981),
303-304.
128 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Defense, Department
of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, Part 5: Army Light Infantry Divisions, Hearings, 98th Cong., 2d
sess. (13 September 1984), 16.
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On the larger strategic level, the Army and the country spent the first half of the 1970s
attempting to overcome the legacy of Vietnam. The unsuccessful war in Southeast Asia affected the
U.S. Army in a multitude of ways. Besides those already discussed, the experience brought about a
severe degradation in morale, discipline and readiness of the force, a situation widely recognized
and decried inside and outside the Army.'129 The service's painful experience with
counterinsurgency fighting in the jungles of Southeast Asia and its aftermath led most of its officers
to reject involvement in similar conflicts in the future, and embrace the more traditional form of
warfare found on the plains of Central Europe. Other factors reinforced the Army's turn back to the
European continent.
The Nixon Doctrine, a direct result of the U.S. experience in Vietnam, suggested that U.S.
ground forces would rarely become involved in combat outside of the European theater, and helped
orient the service once again towards the defense of Western Europe. Moreover, the Army
leadership claimed that the focus on the Vietnam War "set back the army ten years," in terms of
research, development, and procurement of weapons designed for the war in Europe.1 30 At the
same time, the Warsaw Pact had continued to improve its conventional forces on the European
continent, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 13 1 Secretary of State Kissinger's announcement of
the "Year of Europe" in 1973 reinforced for the Army the importance of its NATO mission.
Moreover, this mission appeared far less controversial among the public and politicians than did
further interventions in the Third World. The service needed such a non-controversial mission to
maintain funding support during a period of overall budgetary reductions. Finally, the 1973 Yom
Kippur War demonstrated the new requirements and increased lethality of modern weapons in
armored warfare, profoundly influencing the perceptions of the service's force planners and
designers.132 The upshot of all of these factors was the Army's near-total embrace of the NATO
mission following its exit from Vietnam.
129 See, for example, "Cininnatus", Self-Destruction: The Disintegration and Decay of the United States Army
During the Vietnam Era (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1981); William L. Hauser, America's Army in
Crisis: A Study in Civil Military Relations (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973; Ward Just,
Military Men (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970); Haynes Johnson and George E. Wilson, Army in Anguish (New
York: Pocket Books, 1972); Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1978); and Edward L. King, The Death ofAn Army: A Pre-Mortem (New York:
Saturday Review Press, 1972).
130 Lt. Gen. William R. Peers, "Changes in the Military Since Vietnam," in Vietnam Reconsidered: Lessons from a
War, ed. Harrison E. Salisbury (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 291.
131 See, for instance, Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, US Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 6-26.
132 See, for instance, Doughty, US Evolution of Army Tactical Doctrine, 40-41.
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The coming to power of the Carter Administration brought about a second-look at the
Army's focus on the defense of Western Europe. The impetus behind this re-examination began
with an NSC study, similar to the Nixon-era NCS effort eight years before, examining the overall
U.S. military force posture. 133 This new study, completed in mid-summer 1977, concluded that,
while the United States could compete with the Soviet Union politically, economically, and
ideologically, Moscow had the greater momentum in the military arena. The study questioned, for
instance, NATO's ability to withstand a Warsaw Pact attack on the European central front. Just as
important, it characterized the Persian Gulf as a "vital and vulnerable region," and suggested a
requirement for a capability to deploy military forces to this region. 134
Debate over the implications of this study revealed "a sharp dispute" within the Carter
Administration and was indicative of a wider split in world views among its members. On the one
side, led by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, were those who preferred to keep U.S. strategic nuclear
forces at a minimum assured destruction level, wanted to examine unilateral force reductions in
Europe and Korea, and felt that U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf regions could
best be handled through U.S.-Soviet arms control. The other side of the debate, led by National
Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, emphasized the growing global Soviet military threat, the
vulnerability of the Persian Gulf, and "the growing Soviet projection of power in Africa, Southeast
Asia, and possibly even the Caribbean;" all of which needed to be countered militarily by the United
States. 135
In the end, the NSC study led to the signing of Presidential Directive 18 (PD-18) in August
1977. PD-18 accepted the arguments of the Brzezinski faction by reaffirming the tenets of the
NATO forward defense strategy in Europe. It also called for maintaining a "deployment force of
light divisions with strategic mobility" for contingencies worldwide, especially in the Persian Gulf
and Korea. 136 Units designated for this light force included one Marine division and two Army
divisions, the 82d Airborne and the 10 1st Air Assault Divisions. The two Army divisions now
formed what became known as the "Unilateral Corps." 137 It was from this document that, after
overcoming great bureaucratic lethargy, the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was born.
133 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), 51-52.
134 Ibid., 177.
135 Ibid., 177-78.
136 Ibid., 177.
137 Michael R. Gordon, "The Rapid Deployment Force - Too Large, Too Small or Just Right for Its Task?" National
Journal 14 (13 March 1982): 451.
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The early efforts to encourage formation of the RDF met with limited success throughout
most of 1979. In April, for example, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown failed to move the
Pentagon bureaucracy when he instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to study possible command
arrangements for a rapid strike force. He tried again in June by sending a formal request to the JCS
for a study of command arrangements for the Persian Gulf; a study to be completed by 1 September.
The JCS replied to this request at the end of August with an equivocal response, unsure whether
responsibility for such a force should go to the mordant CONUS-based Readiness Command or to a
new independent organization. Brown sent yet another memo to the JCS in October, instructing
them to establish by 1 March 1980 an independent joint task force with security responsibilities in
Southwest Asia as well as globally. This memo, however, failed to specify which military forces
were to be involved, what the relationship of this task force would be to other commands, or what
operational strategies were to be adopted by the task force. More importantly, the memo again
failed to move the bureaucracy to accelerate its efforts. 138
Despite this general lack of enthusiasm for the proposal within the Pentagon, there was
interest expressed from the highest echelons of the Army. In his last press conference as Army
Chief of Staff, in June of 1979, General Bernard Rogers described the forthcoming formation of the
Unilateral Corps using already existing forces. 139 Likewise, the new Army Chief of Staff, General
Edward Meyer, spent part of his first press conference discussing the establishment of a mobile
striking force which "contain[ed] a potpourri of forces all the way from very limited war-type forces
up through a corps consisting of both armored and light infantry units."' 4 0 Nevertheless, the
military as a whole displayed little interest in an RDF concept prior to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979.141
138 Charles A. Kupchan, The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security (Boston, MA: Allen and
Unwin, 1987), 85-86.
139 David A. Quinlan, Role of the Marine Corps in the Rapid Deployment Force (Washington, DC: National
Defense University, 1983), 8.
140 Norman Kemptster," Army's Strike Force on Way to Reality," Los Angeles Times, 18 September 1979; quoted in
Quinlan, Role of the Marine Corps in the Rapid Deployment Force, 8, n. 27.
141 Several reasons may have been behind this indifference. First of all, the Southwest Asian region was split
between two existing U.S. Unified Commands, the European and the Pacific Commands. For both these commands,
Southwest Asia was of peripheral concern. Yet, no one wanted to get involved in the bureaucratic turf battles
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Once this invasion took place, however, the principle threat to the Persian Gulf region was
seen as a conventional attack by Soviet air and ground forces. Now the Pentagon bureaucracy
became fully engaged behind the RDF concept. On 18 February 1980, Secretary Brown ordered the
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) to open its headquarters on March 1 under the
command of Marine Lt. Gen. P. X. Kelly. Although the RDJTF would have no forces permanently
assigned to it, three Army divisions (the 82d Airborne, the 10 1st Airborne (Air Assault) and the 24t
Infantry (Mechanized)), one Marine division and its accompanying air wing, two Ranger battalions,
and two Special Forces groups would be available as ground forces.
Along with the formation of the RDJTF, other immediate military actions were taken in the
region. In April, Oman and Kenya signed base access agreements with the United States in
exchange for military aid; Somalia followed with a similar agreement in August. In the meantime,
seven existing cargo ships were sent to the Indian Ocean with enough equipment and supplies on
board for a 12,000-man Marine Amphibious Brigade and several air squadrons, two aircraft carrier
battle groups were deployed, and a 1,800-man marine landing team was stationed aboard the
fleet. 142 During the fall of 1980, an Army-Air Force contingent of nearly five thousand troops
participated in military exercises with Egyptian forces in Egypt.
The Carter Administration had planned for increased defense expenditures even before
Afghanistan; some of the funding was to go to programs designed to improve the military's
strategic deployability for contingencies outside of Europe. For example, funding requests for a
new multipurpose transport aircraft, termed the CX (later known as the C-5), as well as for maritime
pre-positioning ships were programmed into the fiscal year 1981 budget proposals as early as
November 1979. Eventually, eight fast sealift ships were also requested. The five-year defense
plan announced by the Pentagon in December of 1979 projected a real average annual increase of
4.5 percent in defense appropriations. But, activities in Southwest Asia brought a renewed urgency,
as well as additional funding, to these proposals. 143
Despite these efforts, however, by the end of the decade, the new Army Chief of Staff
Edward Meyer would complain of a "hollow army," with undermanned active-duty combat units
supported by an inadequate active-duty logistics structure, and over-reliant on under-manned and
under-equipped reserve units for critical functions, especially support. Readiness problems in the
active-duty force were especially severe: six of the ten CONUS-based active-duty divisions were
142 The Economist, "Survey, The Gulf: May the Force Be With You," 6 June 1981, 29-30.
143 Kupchan, Persian Gulf and the West, 119-20; and Jeffrey Record, The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S.
Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf, 2 nd ed., Special Report (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, May 1983), 47-52.
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rated as non-combat ready in the summer of 1980.144 The final Carter defense budget attempted to
remedy some of these deficiencies; proposing, for example, an active-duty manpower level for
fiscal year 1982 of 786,000, up from an estimate of 775,000 personnel in fiscal year 1981.145
THE REAGAN BUILD-UP: 1981-1987
The Reagan Administration came into office vowing to confront what it perceived to be
growing worldwide political and military threats emanating from the Soviet Union. Many of its
members also criticized what they felt had been a misplaced, decade-long Eurocentric focus to U.S.
security policy.146 Nonetheless, Administration defense planning and policy documents continued
to list the defense of Western Europe as an American defense priority second only to the defense of
the United States itself. 147 This mission remained the primary focus of the Army.
The Administration, however, also expanded and strengthened the Rapid Deployment
Force, eventually turning it into a unified command, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM),
in January 1983. A number of Army units were put under this command in peacetime, with others
to be made available in an emergency. 148 Unfortunately, most of these army units - along with the
command headquarters to which they were assigned - remained stationed in the United States, over
seven thousand air-miles from the Persian Gulf. RDF-related Army deployments to the region also
began in the early 1980s. The first major RDF exercise, Operation Bright Star 82, began with
144 Senate Armed Services Committee, DoD Authorization for Appropriations for FY82, Part 2, 656.
145 Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1982 (Washington, DC:
USGPO, 1981), p. B-4.
146 One former member of the Reagan Administration noticed that most high-level civilian officials in the Pentagon
at the time showed a marked disinterest in NATO defense issues; Lawrence J. Korb interview with the author,
Washington, DC, 27 March 1989. In addition, growing European anti-nuclear sentiment occasioned by the
Euromissile controversy, American irritation over recurring burden-sharing issues, and annoyance over its European
allies' frequent refusal to follow America's foreign policy lead, created a backlash in Congress against the NATO
commitment during the early 1980s. There were frequent amendments during this time calling for freezing or
reducing U.S. troop strength in Europe. For contemporary accounts, see Hedrick Smith, "Rising Sentiment Against
Europe," New York Times, 7 December 1981; George C. Wilson, "Cut in U.S. Forces in Europe Backed by Senate
Panel, 12-1," Washington Post, 22 September 1982; Washington Post, "Sen. Nunn to Seek a Freeze On U.S. Troops
in Europe," 21 October 1982; Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan Aide Fights Congressional Cuts in NATO," New York
Times, 1 December 1982; Richard M. Weintraub, "Hill Cautioned on Bill Cutting Forces Abroad," Washington
Post, 1 December 1982; Henry G. Gole, "Siren Call to Disaster: The Emerging Campaign for U.S. Troop
Reductions in Europe," Parameters 11, no. 3 (September 1981): 22-30; and "The Nunn Amendment, Burden-
sharing and US Troops in Europe," Survival 27, no. 1 (January/February 1985): 2-10.
147 For U.S. defense priorities during this period, see Richard Halloran, "Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy For
Fighting a Long Nuclear War," New York Times, 30 May 1982; and Richard Halloran, "New Weinberger Directive
Refines Military Policy," New York Times, 22 March 1983.
148 Robert J. Hanks, The U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects (Cambridge, MA:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., December 1982), 43.
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maneuvers involving joint U.S.-Egyptian armed forces in Egypt in November 1981. Eventually,
more than six thousand U.S. troops - including elements of U.S. Army heavy divisions - took part
in the month-long exercise, which included operations in Somalia, Oman, and the Sudan. 149 And, in
April 1982, the Army began rotating battalions from the 8 2d Airborne and 101st Airborne (Air
Assault) to the Sinai Peninsula as part of the Sinai Peacekeeping Force.
But a major thrust of the Reagan Administration security efforts lay in low-intensity conflict
and countering Soviet expansion in the Third World beyond of the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
Rarely, however, did the Administration envisioned using U.S. combat units to carry out these
operations. Instead, the Administration preferred to employ military advisors, Special Operations
units (such as Delta Force and the Green Beret), or semi-private paramilitary forces; and to stress
the provision of financial and military aid for governments battling communist insurgents or
insurgents battling communist regimes.15° When combat units were needed for contingency
operations, the Administration usually turned to the Marine Corps for ground troops. By 1983, U.S.
military forces were deployed overseas more frequently than during any other year since the
Vietnam War; these operations included: operations in and off the coast of Lebanon; deployment of
forces against Libya in support of both Sudan and Chad; re-deployment of naval forces into the
Persian Gulf after Iran threatened oil shipping lanes; increased support for the Contras; Operation
Urgent Fury in Grenada; and large-scale military exercises in Latin America. Of these operations,
however, the Army was involved only in the last two - Operation Urgent Fury and military
exercises in Latin America - and these only required deployments for a week or two per operation.
The personnel and budget pictures for the Army were decidedly mixed during the early
years of the Reagan Administration. Despite carrying out the largest peacetime buildup of military
forces in the nation's history, the coming to power of the Reagan Administration did not greatly
improve the Army's active-duty duty manpower strength. The Army continued to operate under the
constraints of the All-Volunteer Force, and in the face of budgetary restrictions and congressional
reluctance to authorize large-scale increases in Army personnel.
149 Jay Monica, "RDF's 'Bright Star'," Washington Quarterly 5, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 113-116. This exercise had
been planned earlier under the Carter Administration, but had to be postponed for nearly a year.
150 See John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From World War II Through
Iranscam (New York: Quill, William Morrow, 1986), 357-463; and Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the
CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Pocket Books, 1987). For example, successive reports by teams of U.S. and
Salvadoran military officers examining U.S. strategy for El Salvador in the early 1980s limited U.S. military
involvement to training and advisory roles; see A. J. Bacevich, et. al., American Military Policy in Small Wars: The
Case of El Salvador (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.,
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There were definite improvements, however, in certain areas of the Army's personnel
picture during the early 1980s. The service was able, for instance, to fill its manpower spaces with
much higher quality recruits. The educational level of recruits steadily increased during the early
1980s; the percentage of enlistees with at least a high school diploma reached record levels.
Enlistees' scores on the Armed Forces Qualifications Tests (AFQT) also improved, spurred in part
by congressional legislation establishing an annual twenty percent ceiling on the recruitment of
enlistees with marginal test scores. Several additional factors contributed to this overall
improvement in Army personnel, including an across-the-board pay raise; intensified recruiting
efforts; and increased unemployment in the civilian economy.'15
Many of these same factors led to a dramatic increase in manpower levels in the Army
National Guard and Reserve as well. From 1980 to 1983, the paid drill strength of the Reserve grew
from 190,000 to over 266,000, while the Guard expanded by 50,000 troops. At the same time,
complaints continued in Congress and elsewhere over the training, equipping, and readiness of these
Reserve Components. 152
Despite these improvements in the service's personnel picture, remnants of Chief of Staff
Meyer's "hollow army" persisted. Army leadership still complained to Congress that many of the
service's active-duty combat units were maintained at ninety percent, or less, of their requisite war-
time strength and that their sustainability was low. Testifying before Congress in 1981, Chief of
Staff Meyer stated that "[b]efore activating more Army divisions, we must correct major
deficiencies in the reinforcing, sustaining and supporting categories of the Army."'1 53 And, Army
planners projected that additional manpower would be needed for existing divisions over the next
ten years as the Army began to convert its armor and mechanized divisions to the new, larger
Division 86 designs. A typical mechanized infantry division, for example, would grow from 18,500
manpower spaces in the old design to 20,265 under Division 86.154
151 Martin Binkin, America's Volunteer Military, 28.
152 See, for example, Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for FY82, Part 1, 303-304
and 307; and U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense
Appropriations for 1983, Part 1: Military Personnel, Family Housing, Military Construction, and O&M, Hearings,
97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982), 445-47.
153 Senate Armed Services Committee, DoD Authorization for Appropriations for FY82, Part 2, 688.
154 The exact amount of this shortfall is a matter of some dispute, mainly due to controversies over the number of
mobilizable reserve personnel to include. One source stated that the shortfall approached one-quarter of a million
manpower spaces; Lt. Colonel William Higgins (former LID action officer in the office of Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Plans) interview with the author, Alexandria, VA, 7 November. A second source, who
helped arrive at the numbers, has confirmed that TRADOC found that the Army required 1,500,000 personnel to fill
the Army '86/90 force designs in wartime; Robert Keller (former Head of Force Directorate, Army Combined Arms
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These rising manpower demands, moreover, would occur in an environment in which the
prospects for recruiting were looking increasingly poor. Unfavorable projections in demographics
were frequently cited as a major cause for concern in the future. For example, the size of the
eighteen year-old male population was expected to decline over the coming years - after peaking in
1979 - owing to depressed birthrates over the previous two decades. 55 Additional factors further
darkened the Army's recruiting picture: for example, the armed forces greater demand for recruits
with higher intellectual skills as military technology became more complex; expected improvements
in the civilian economy, making military service a less attractive-duty employment option; and
greater competition from higher education for desirable elements in the declining youth
population.156 Just as important, the Army's demand for more manpower competed directly with
the other services' increasing manpower needs as the military buildup of the early 1980s reached its
peak, a competition in which the Army had been traditionally handicapped.
Figure 1 illustrates the Army's historic dilemma. The large-scale rapid Army
mobilization and demobilization brought on by the two wars in Asia are clearly seen. While
each of the other three services witnessed some "bump" in manpower due to these conflicts,
none of them experienced the turbulence witnessed by the Army. Though both the Navy and the
Air Force saw their end-strength reduced following Vietnam, these reductions were fewer in
number and occurred at a much more gradual rate than were Army reductions during this period.
Moreover, while the Army remained essentially flat throughout the remainder of the 1970s and
into the 1980s, both the Air Force and Navy personnel numbers began to rebound beginning in
the late 1970s. Excluding a small Vietnam War-era bump, the Marine Corps, by contrast, has
maintained steady manpower levels of approximately 170,000 to 200,000 marines since 1950.
155 The cohort size is expected to increase again, temporarily at least, beginning in the mid-1990s; see Binkin,
America's Volunteer Military, 29-42.
156 Binkin, America's Volunteer Military, 29-42; and Martin Binkin, Military Technology and Defense Manpower
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986).
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Figure 1: End-Strength by Service, 1948-2005
The Army's failure to expand its personnel levels in the early 1980s was both self-imposed
and a product of congressional actions. To illustrate the former point, in the spring of 1981, the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Forces and Logistics, Lawrence Korb,
approved a five-year expansion of active-duty Army manpower amounting to 100,000 spaces.157
This expansion would have raised manpower levels up to the service's claimed wartime personnel
requirements. 5 8 Army Chief of Staff Meyer, however, rejected this proposal, opting instead for
incremental increases to the service's manpower to bring end-strengths back up to around 785,000.
Underlying Meyer's rejection of the larger Army expansion was the Schlesinger/Abrams "Golden
Handshake" of 1973. While no one, in or out of the Army, considered any element of this
agreement to be still binding, it had become commonly accepted within the service that a personnel
strength of around 785,000 was the largest figure that the Army could justify and - most
157 Korb interview with author.
158 In 1982 congressional testimony, Army officials stated that an end-strength of some 867,000 personnel were
required to fill the then-current wartime levels; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, Part 3: Manpower and Personnel, Hearings, 97th
Cong., 2nd sess. (1982), 1440.
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importantly - afford given other budgetary priorities. And, the affordability issue was becoming
increasingly relevant in the early 1980s in spite of the Reagan build up.' 59
By the time the Reagan Administration came into office, the Army's largest peacetime
modernization effort in its history was just beginning to come to fruition, after a long decade of
struggle. Central to this effort was the "Big Five" modernization program, consisting of the Ml
tank, the M2/M3 infantry fighting vehicle, the Sergeant York air defense gun system, the Apache
attack helicopter and the Blackhawk utility helicopter. Three of these programs were transitioning
into production as the decade of the 1980s began. As a result of modernization, the Army estimated
that procurement expenditures would increase from twenty-four percent of its budget in fiscal year
1981 to nearly thirty percent by fiscal year 1983.160 A less-than-expected increase for Army
procurement in the final proposed Carter defense budget (for fiscal year 1982) had already led to a
stretch-out of these programs. While the Reagan Administration supplemental for fiscal year 1982
restored these systems to their original production schedules, potential problems still lay ahead. For
instance, a General Accounting Office (GAO) report, released in October 1981, cited "substantial
cost growth" in the three modernization systems then transitioning into production.161 It predicted
similar increases in the future for the remaining programs.
These expected increases in the procurement account had to be squeezed into a budget
traditionally constrained by other expenditures. Since the coming of the All-Volunteer Force, the
manpower-intensive Army had witnessed its budget dominated by two types of costs: personnel-
related and O&M. In fiscal year 1981, for instance, these two areas consumed nearly seventy
percent of the service's budget.162 The October 1981 GAO report projected that elements of the
service's modernization program, once fielded, "will require very large amounts of resources in the
late 1980s and beyond" for operations and maintenance (O&M).163In the absence of
congressionally-guaranteed long-term funding increases, General Meyer choose to sacrifice large-
scale personnel increases, and their accompanying greater costs, for protection of the service's
modernization effort. 164 The Army stayed with the much more modest Carter Administration
159 General Edward C. Meyer interview with the author, Arlington, VA, 21 January 1991.
160 House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for 1983, Part 1, 402.
161 U.S. General Accounting Office, Budgetary Pressures Created By The Army's Plans To Procure New Major
Weapon Systems Are Just Beginning, MASAD-82-5 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, October 1981), p.
11.
162 House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for 1983, Part 1, 402.
163 U.S. GAO, Budgetary Pressures, p. iii.
164 Korb interview with author; and General Meyer interview with author.
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personnel program: for fiscal year 1982, an 11,000 increase over the estimated fiscal year 1981
end-strength of 775,000, stabilizing at 787,00 thereafter. 165
Congressional approval of even this modest increase, however, proved to be difficult.
Although the service was able to attain a 1981 end-strength that was six thousand personnel above
its initial estimate, actions during congressional deliberations over the fiscal year 1982 budget
resulted in an approved end-strength for 1982 that was nearly 1,000 spaces below the previous
year's figure. When the Army subsequently requested a supplemental increase for fiscal year 1982
to achieve an end-strength of 784,000, as well as funding to maintain this level into fiscal year 1983,
Congress rejected both requests, holding the service's personnel level at 780,000 for both years.
In contrast to the Army, the other services were quite successful in their plans to
simultaneously increase personnel strengths and modernize their forces. From fiscal year 1981 to
1983, Navy and Air Force authorized end-strengths increased an average of over ten thousand and
eleven thousand personnel, respectively; while the Marine Corps witnessed an average annual
growth of two thousand soldiers in its smaller force. The reasons behind this differential success
rate are complex and vary from service to service, often based on historical congressional biases and
perceptions. However, one factor behind this difference in the early 1980s can be found in the
differing justifications the services gave for their manpower requests. Several patterns emerge from
a review of the services' congressional testimony on manpower issues from this period.
The Navy and Air Force, in requesting incremental increases in their authorized manpower
levels, continually focused on the manning requirements of their latest weapon systems. For the Air
Force, this included crews for new tactical air wings, ground launched cruise missiles, and strategic
nuclear weapons. 166 Likewise, early in the Reagan Administration, the Navy talked of the manning
requirements for two soon-to-be recommissioned battleships and for several smaller ships then
being built. 167 Later on, this justification was expanded to the manning requirements for the "600-
ship" navy, which the service claimed would require at least fifty thousand additional sailors. 168 By
justifying increases to personnel levels based on the manning requirements of particular weapons
systems, both the Air Force and Navy were able to shift the debate to weapons procurement: If
165 Senate Armed Services Committee, DoD Authorization for Appropriations for FY82, Part 6, 3254.
166 See, for instance, Senate Armed Services Committee, DoD Authorization for Appropriations for FY82, Part 2,
96.
167 See U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, Department of Defense
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Part 2: Manpower, Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (1981), 141-42.
'
68 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Manpower for a 600-Ship Navy: Costs and Policy Alternatives (Washington,
DC: Congressional Budget Office, August 1983), 5-12.
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Congress approved procurement dollars for new weapons, then it also must approve the personnel
levels required to manned them.
The Marine Corps presented a somewhat different approach, combining the small
incremental needs of its forces with the increase importance of their missions. In February 1981
congressional hearings, Marine Corps Commandant General Robert H. Barrow testified that the
Marines could manage in fiscal years 1981 through 1983 with the manpower level of 188,100
established in 1980. At the same time, however, he mentioned that the requisite war-time strength
of the Marines was only 210,000 troops; in other words, the shortfall could be easily closed with
little effort. And, in response to a written question concerning whether the Marines could use
additional manpower, the Commandant presented a five-year program of manpower increases. At
these same hearings, the Marine Corps also made a strong case for the increasing relevancy of its
role, maintaining that the Corps' "natural" missions were also those of most present concern to
Washington: show-of-force and crisis intervention in areas outside of Europe. 169 Congress
responded favorably to this approach, quickly approving the Marine's newly-proposed 1981
manpower figure - amounting to a 2,500 space increase - in a supplemental appropriation in March
of 1981. And, within a month, Barrow's unofficial five-year program had become the Marine's
official manpower requests for 1982 and beyond.170
The Army's manpower justifications suffered by comparison. Unlike the Navy and Air
Force, the Army could not point to particular congressionally-approved weapons systems which had
to be manned, but rather to division spaces which had to be filled - divisions which Congress had
little do to in creating and which, unlike weapon systems, rarely generated jobs or dollars for the
constituents back home. Moreover, as we have seen, Congress was skeptical of the need to fill
these division spaces with active-duty manpower rather than the reserves. And, unlike the Marines,
the Army presented a nearly insurmountable manning shortfall and was much less successful at
presenting its role in operations outside of Europe.
In the area of reserve issues, the Army leadership attempted to reduce the active-duty
Army's dependence on the reserves. In their first Force Posture Statement to Congress, Secretary of
Army John Marsh and General Meyer acknowledged that:
The realignment of soldiers from support to combat missions in the
Active-duty Force was accommodated by greater reliance on the
169 Senate Armed Services Committee, DoD Authorization for Appropriations for FY82, Part 2, 860-934. Barrow's
five-year program included: FY1981 - 190,600; FY1982 - 192,100; FY1983 - 193,500; FY1984 - 195,000;
FY1985 - 196,300; and FY1986 - 198,700; Ibid., 934.
170 Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for FY82, Part 2, 188. This hearing was
held on 23 April 1981.
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Reserve Component for logistics in an emergency. In a real sense,
we did rob Peter to pay Paul. 17
Much of the requested manpower increases during 1981 and 1982 were to go towards such
programs as increasing active-duty support forces scheduled for deployment with the Rapid
Deployment Force. 172 These efforts largely failed. The 1983-87 Program Objective Memorandum,
for instance, stated that a significant portion of the support units for the Rapid Deployment Force
would remain in the Reserve Components. 17 3
This failure, in part, stemmed from the lack of concern among most of the civilian
leadership in OSD over any undue dependence on the reserves. In fact, during the early 1980s, the
civilian leadership asserted the need for an even greater integration of active-duty and reserve
forces. In taking the Total Force Concept to its logical conclusion, Secretary of Defense
Weinberger, in a speech before the Congress of the Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers on
9 August 1982, stated that:
We can no longer consider reserve forces as merely forces in
reserve... Instead, they have to be an integral part of the Total Force,
both within the United States and within NATO. 174
Moreover, the view prevailed within OSD that any problems experienced by the services, including
the active-duty/reserve mix in the Army, could be solved through increased expenditures - "a rising
tide lifts all boats." 75
In sum, by the time Army Chief of Staff General Meyer reached the end of his tenure, in
mid-1983, several trends in manpower policy presaged a difficult period ahead for the Army's force
and personnel structure: The Army was preparing to transition to a new force design structure that
required far more manpower spaces than the service could fill, while shortfalls existed even in the
present structure. Meanwhile, future economic and demographic trends suggested an increase in
future personnel recruitment and retention costs. The composition of the service's budget, coupled
with the need to protect its equipment modernization program, precluded any large-scale increases
in manpower levels.
171 Senate Armed Services Committee, DoD Authorization for Appropriations for FY82, Part 2, 754.
172 Senate Armed Services Committee, DoD Authorization for Appropriations for FY83, Part 3, 1476.
173 Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 265.
174 Quoted in Colonel James L. Gould, "The Guard and Reserve: Towards Fuller Realization of the Total Force
Potential," in Mobilization and the National Defense, ed. Hardy L. Merritt and Luther F. Carter (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1985), 120.
175 Korb interview with author.
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The Army's failure to gain congressional approval for the incremental personnel increases it
did request, in the face of well-advertised shortfalls, contrasted sharply with the ready successes of
its sister services. Moreover, both the Air Force and, especially, the Navy were projecting further
manpower demands tied to weapon system procurement schedules. Congress continued to display a
tendency to discount the importance of support functions located in the active-duty Army - the
never-ending call for correcting the "tooth-to-tail" imbalance - in spite of Army complaints that this
process had already gone too far. The Reagan Administration itself was calling for increased
reliance on the reserves, a call which Congress was only too willing to take up.
General Meyer's successor as Army Chief of Staff, General John Wickham, attempted to
address the Army's personnel shortfalls through the Army of Excellence (AoE) program. The dual,
conflicting goals behind this effort was both to reduce the gap between the service's required
personnel spaces and its fixed end-strength, and to generate enough excess spaces to permit the
creation of a new type of division (the Light Infantry Division) in the active-duty duty force
structure. General Wickham gave the Army a mere ten weeks to develop the details of these Army-
wide reductions. The personnel space reductions were brought about through a number of actions.
First, headquarter staffs of non-combat units throughout the service, from the Department of the
Army to the MACOMs and their various sub-components, were once again reduced and personnel
sent back out into the field. The focus then shifted to down-sizing the divisions recently completed
in the Division/Army 86 force design. 176 Despite concerns that the Army had already put too much
emphasis on combat capability versus support functions, the focus of the division down-sizing was
on further reducing support functions in the active-duty duty force. These reductions were
achieved, in part, through the introduction of less-manpower-intensive technologies, by pulling
certain Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units out of the designs and
consolidating these units at corps level, or by simply eliminating perceived inefficient or
obsolescent CSS functions from the divisions. Finally, many CS and CSS functions and their
associated personnel spaces were transferred to the Reserve Component. 177 In the final result, the
Army was able to partially close the personnel shortfall. For example, the Division '86 heavy
divisions, both armor and mechanized infantry, were reduced from over twenty thousand personnel
spaces down to near sixteen thousand.
176 See for example, Brig. General (Ret.) John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, Jr. "The Kaleidoscopic US Army," Armed Forces
Journal International, November 1985, 78-88; and Maj. General Sam Damon and Brig. General Ben Krisler, "Army
of Excellence: A Time to Take Stock, " Armed Forces Journal International, May 1985, 86.
177 General Wickham, who was Defense Secretary Schlesinger's military assistant in 1974, was a close observer of
Schlesinger's and Chief of Staff Abrams' efforts to increase the number of Army divisions with a fixed end-strength
by, in part, moving CSS functions to the reserves; General John A. Wickham, Jr. interview with the author, Fairfax,
VA, 7 November 1988.
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END OF THE COLD WAR: 1987-1992
As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the Army developed plans to transform
itself from an armor-heavy, NATO-oriented force to a lighter, expeditionary force. These plans
included reorganizing the service into three types of units: a largely non-mechanized XVIII
Airborne Corps for the rapid response mission; elite special forces, designed for missions like
counter-terrorism and hostage rescue; and heavy armor and mechanized infantry forces for high-
intensity combat contingencies. These plans called for the Army to shift its force structure in favor
of the XVII Airborne Corps, with further force cuts planned to fall most heavily on armor and
mechanized infantry forces. 178 Nonetheless, the new Army Chief of Staff, General Carl Vuono,
would continually emphasize over the coming months that the Army needed to retain "a mix of
forces - armored, light, and special operations." 179 In addition, the senior Army leadership formed a
"Light Force Modernization" task force to outline future equipment needs for the light forces.
Future procurement would go first to the contingency corps, and only later to the other armor and
mechanized units. However, this task force was not designed to improve the capabilities of the
foot-mobile infantry, but instead to improve the strategic deployability of the dominant intra-service
communities as it emphasized the development of lighter tanks, helicopters, and anti-aircraft and
artillery systems.1 80 Essentially, although their traditional combat units might take cuts in the
immediate future, the dominant communities were seeking to retain their position of pre-eminence
within the service by "lightening up" their weapons platforms.
Secretary of Defense Weinberger retired in November 1987. His successor, Frank Carlucci
adopted a much tougher management style, with tighter control over all the uniformed services.
The new Defense Secretary came into office with a mandate to seek further reductions in service
budgets as a result of a just-completed White House-Congressional budget summit. He soon
directed the Army to cut $9 billion more from its fiscal year 1989 budget proposal.1 81 The service
responded, in part, by ordering the reduction of ten thousand active-duty duty spaces in fiscal year
1988.182 To meet this reduction, the Army initially proposed cutting one brigade each from the 9th
178 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, "Army Facing Cuts, Reported Seeking to Reshape Itself," New York
Times, 12 December 1989, Al.
179 General Carl E. Vuono, "National Strategy and the Army of the 1990s," Parameters 21, no. 2 (Summer 1991):
11; see also General Carl E. Vuono, "The Army of the 1990s: Challenges of Change and Continuity," Infantry 81,
no. 3 (May-June 1991): 13; and General Carl E. Vuono, A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond, Army White
Paper (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Chief of Staff, January 1990).
180 Caleb Baker, "Army Proposal Outlines More Mobile, Flexible Force," Defense News, 11 December 1989, 4.
181 Debra Polsky, "Army Claims Victory Over Budget Cuts," Defense News, 22 February 1988, 9.
182 Included in the ten-thousand figure was a congressionally-mandate 1.5% cut in total active-duty duty officer
strength; see Jim Tice, "10,300 Spaces to Be Sliced From Army Force Structure," Army Times, 14 March 1988, 1.
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Motorized Division and the 6t Infantry Division, turning those brigades' missions over to National
Guard units. While the plans to reduce to the 6th Infantry Division were eventually modified,
thereby restoring 1,400 personnel spaces to the Army, cuts to the 9th Infantry Division went ahead
as planned and reduced the active-duty Army from 780,900 to 772,300 personnel by 1 October
1988.183 These reductions signaled the beginning of a long force restructuring effort by the Army.
The service planned to maintain its fiscal year 1988 end-strength through fiscal year 1989.
By contrast, Congress mandated that the strength of the Army's reserve component increased by six
thousand in fiscal year 1988; although an additional planned increase of nearly three thousand in
fiscal year 1989 was canceled (see Table 1). In the end, the Army was able to restore about half of
the total budget cut originally requested by Carlucci, largely by shifting these reductions onto the
Air Force and Navy. Still, the service's proposed budget share for fiscal year 1989 was only 27% of
the total DoD budget (see Table 2). 184 These budget levels were sustained as the 1989 budget
worked its way through the 1988 congressional session.
A new round of Army budget and manpower cuts began shortly after the Bush Administration
entered office in January 1989. Over the next four years, the active-duty Army's force structure
would find itself under pressure from two sources - steep budget reductions from OSD and
Congress, and pressures from Capital Hill to enhance the role and maintain the size of the service's
Reserve Component. Faced with increasing budgetary pressures at home and in light of the political
changes taking place at the time in Eastern Europe, the Bush Administration moved as quickly as
possible in 1989 to implement further cuts in Army budgets. By the time the fiscal year 1991
budget proposal was presented to Congress in early 1990, OSD had mandated that the Army cut
active-duty personnel spaces by nearly 44,000 through September 1991 (26,900 in 1990 and 17,000
in 1991). These reductions would lead to an Army end-strength of 727,000 personnel by the end of
fiscal year 1991, the lowest troop level since 1950. To meet these cuts, the Army chose to
deactivate the 2d Armored Division and the 9th Motorized Division, as well as taking one brigade
away from the 4 h Infantry (Mechanized) Division.I15 But these cuts were only the beginning.
183 "6th, 9th Infantry Divisions May Lose Active Brigade," Army Times, 1 February 1988, 1; and Larry Carney, "6th
Infantry Deal Saves 1,400 Slots," Army Times, 15 February 1988, 1.
184 Polsky, "Army Claims Victory," 9.
185 James W. Canan, "The Army Signals Danger," Air Force Magazine, July 1989, 56; and Ramon Lopez, "Troop
Cuts to 1950 Level," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 February 1990, 179.
118
FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89
(Proj) (Proj)
Active-Duty Military
Army 781 781 781 772 772
Navy 571 581 587 593 593
USMC 198 199 200 197 197
Air Force 602 608 607 576 576
Total 2151 2169 2174 2138 2138
Reserve Components
Army NG 440 446 453 457 457
Army Reserve 292 310 319 321 321
Naval Reserve 130 142 149 153 153
USMC Reserve 42 42 43 44 45
Air NG 109 113 113 116 116
Air Force Reserve 75 79 80 82 82
Total 1088 1130 1157 1172 1173
Source: Eric Ludvigsen, "The Crash of (FY) '89: Shrinking Budgets and Rising Risks," Army, April 1988, 32.
Table 1: Military Manpower and Defense Civilian Employment, FY85-FY89
(end of year, in thousands)
FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89
(Prop) (Prop)
Army 71.0 73.9 84.5 81.1 79.8 78.3 77.8
(% share) (24.4) (24.3) (26.0) (26.0) (26.5) (26.7) (26.8)
Navy/USMC 99.2 96.5 112.3 106.6 100.8 103.5 96.5
(% share) (34.1) (31.7) (34.5) (34.2) (33.4) (35.4) (33.2)
Air Force 88.6 100.5 112.3 105.1 98.9 91.2 97.2
(% share) (30.5) (33.1) (34.5) (33.7) 32.8 (31.1) (33.4)
Defense/Joint Agencies 32.0 33.0 16.3 19.1 22.1 19.8 19.3
& Functions (11.0) (10.9) (5.0) (6.1) (7.3) (6.8) (6.6)
(% share)
Source: Eric Ludvigsen, "The Crash of (FY) '89: Shrinking Budgets and Rising Risks," Army, April 1988, 22.
Table 2: Defense Budget by Component, Budget Authority, FY83-FY89
(constant FY89 dollars, in billions)
To accommodate the Administration's proposed annual two percent reduction in the
Pentagon's budget through fiscal year 1997, the Army leadership developed a multi-year end-
strength draw-down plan. Through fiscal year 1995, the service planned to reduce its active-duty
duty strength by 35,000 troops annually, for a total reduction of 140,000 personnel through the
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1992-95 time period.'8 6 Aided by the soon to be completed CFE Treaty, the Army proposed
withdrawing one of its two corps stationed in Europe, leaving the service with 150,000 personnel on
the continent. 87 For the moment, the service was projecting a cut of only one additional active-duty
duty division, bringing the service total down to fifteen active-duty duty divisions, with the bulk of
the cuts presumably coming from support and headquarters units.
The size and pace of these reductions were still not enough for a Congress hungry for a
"peace dividend." As Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin described the
situation to General Vuono during congressional hearings on the Army's fiscal year 1991 budget:
I think we are headed for a real disconnect between what you see you
need in the way of time, in order to bring down that force, and what I
see are the political pressures. People are thinking we are going to
get a very significant contribution from defense for the deficit
reduction ... .It is not going to be demobilization, but it certainly is
going to be more accelerated than the type of gradual thing you are
looking at. You are going to have to bring down the size of the
Army a lot faster than 35,000 soldiers a year.. .that is just flat not
going to be adequate. 188
Aspin's assessment would prove prescient, despite events in the Persian Gulf less than six months
later.
In the meantime, the service completed its proposed long-range budget plans through fiscal
year 1997 and presented them to OSD for approval. With small additional cuts in manpower
projected for fiscal year 1996, the Army leadership proposed an active-duty duty end-strength of
580,000 personnel by 30 September 1996, a fourteen-division active-duty component (a reduction
of one division) and an eight-division reserve component.189 However, the Army leadership's
desire to protect force structure persisted in these plans: a twenty-five percent cut in manpower over
a ten-year period (from 780,000 in 1987 to 580,000 in 1997) brought only a twenty percent
reduction in division flags (from eighteen to fourteen).
While largely accepting the Army's projected personnel numbers, OSD quickly rejected its
proposed force structure. As early as June 1990, the Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney,
presented an "illustrative" plan to congressional budget negotiators that called for a 12-division
186 Jim Tice, "Faster Force Cuts Foreseen," Army Times, 19 March 1990, 15.
187 Gordon and Trainor, "Army Facing Cuts," Al.
189 Les Aspin quoted in Tice, "Faster Force Cuts Foreseen," 15.
189 Michael R. Gordon, "Military Services Propose Slashes in Existing Forces," New York Times, 12 May 1990, 1;
Patrick E. Tyler, "Military Chiefs Detail Plans to Cut Troops, Weapons," Washington Post, 12 May 1990, Al.
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active-duty duty Army force structure and an active-duty end-strength of 568,000 troops by 1997.190
By August, this figure would become part of the Pentagon's Base Force for the future. The Base
Force, developed jointly by OSD and the JCS's Joint Staff, presented a notional three-way split in
the military's force structure: an Atlantic Force, a Pacific Force, and a Contingency Force. For the
Army, five active-duty divisions were assigned to the Atlantic Force, with two stationed in Europe
and three in CONUS; two divisions were assigned to the Pacific Force, with one stationed in South
Korea and a second in Alaska or Hawaii; and five divisions - the 8 2d Airborne, 10 1st Air Assault,
24 h Infantry (Mechanized), 7th Infantry Division (Light), and 10th Mountain - were assigned to the
Contingency Force (roughly corresponding to the Army's XVIII Airborne Corp). 191 The three
"Forces" were seen as purely conceptual, designed to aid planners in organizing their thinking, and
were not designed to be actual future military commands. Nonetheless, the force structure - known
simply as the Base Force - was meant to be the Pentagon's outline for the design of the military in
the 1990s as well as the driver of future budget planning.
Shortly after the release of the Base Force blueprint, the armies of Saddam Hussein invaded
Kuwait, setting off the largest U.S. overseas military deployment since the Vietnam War.
Throughout the build-up in the Gulf, however, the service continued its planned draw-down. And,
as Aspin predicted, Congress maintained its call for even faster cuts. Despite pleas from Chief of
Staff Vuono that the service could not sustain faster cuts without "fractur[ing] the Army," the House
passed its version of the 1991 defense budget in September 1990 calling for cuts of 68,500 troops in
fiscal year 1991, while the Senate version mandated reductions of 40,000 troops over the same time
period. In October, Secretary Cheney further undermined the Army's objections that it could not
survive cuts deeper than the planned 17,000 troops, by announcing to Congress that up to 35,000
troops could be cut from the service in 1991 while still meeting the Pentagon's operational needs in
the Gulf. 192 The two houses of Congress finally agreed to an Army reduction of 42,000 troops,
while allowing the Defense Department to exceed in the short term the authorized end-strength
ceiling by up to one percent if this were necessary for Operation Desert Shield.193
As the troops returned home from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait following the war against Iraq,
active-duty Army manpower levels continued to fall. Under pressure from both OSD and Congress
for deeper cuts in Army personnel levels, General Vuono presented a 1992-93 fiscal year plan to
190 Pat Towell, "Cheney's Latest Plan Shows Only Part of Ax Blade," Congressional Quarterly, 23 June 1990, 174-
77.
191 Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan," New York Times, 2 August 1990, A14.
192 Rick Maze, "Pentagon Doubles Troop-Cut Offer," Army Times, 15 October 1990, 4.
193 Rick Maze, "1991 Troop Reductions Eased," Army Times, 5 November 1990, 3; and Rick Maze, "Drawdown
May Be Doing an About-Face," Army Times, 12 November 1990, 16.
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Congress that set active-duty duty troop levels at near 535,000 personnel by 1995 (versus the earlier
plan for 580,000 troops by 1997). Congress willingly accepted this level, setting a figure in the
fiscal year 1992 defense bill of 536,000 troops by 1995. Abandoned also was General Vuono's
cautious schedule for achieving these troop reductions: rather than maintaining annual reductions of
35,000 soldiers, the 1992 defense bill required cuts of 49,800 spaces in 1992 and another 42,000 in
1993.194 As a result of these planned personnel cuts, unspecified future reductions in force structure
would be necessary to prevent the hollowing out of the Army's combat forces.
With General Vuono's retirement in July of 1991, his successor, General Gordon Sullivan,
would be left the task of deciding where further cuts would be made in the service's force structure.
General Sullivan outlined, in part, how these cuts would be made in an August 1991 presentation.
Two of the four divisions stationed in Europe would return home turning fiscal year 1992 and one
of the two U.S. Corps in NATO would be disbanded, reducing Army troop levels in Europe down
to under 100,000 soldiers. Of these forces, the 8th Infantry (Mechanized) Division would simply be
deactivated, while the 3d Armored Division would disband temporarily and reactivate later in
CONUS to replace an (as yet unnamed) stateside division to be deactivated. 195 Additional, smaller
Army units stationed in Europe would also be sent home and disbanded, including the 2d Armored
Cavalry Regiment (ACR).
Later, in its fiscal year 1993 budget proposal, the Army revealed additional details about its
force restructuring efforts. The 19 9th Infantry (Motorized) Brigade, the last remnant of the
disbanded 9th Infantry Division, would be re-flagged as the 2d ACR and converted into the Army's
first light armored cavalry regiment. The unit was scheduled to move to Fort Polk, Louisiana to
operate as the Opposing Force at the Joint Readiness Training Center, when the Center itself moved
from Fort Chaffee during the summer of 1993. The service announced in its fiscal year 1993 budget
proposal that the drawdown in Europe would be completed in 1993 rather than 1995, as previously
indicated. 196
Other details of the Army's 1993 budget also suggested that the service was reorienting
from a European to a rapid contingency perspective. But, it was clear that the composition of any
rapid contingency force had changed since the end of the Gulf War. One of the lessons the Army
194 Greg Seigle, "Reserve Cuts Hit Raw Nerve in Congress," Army Times, 6 January 1992, 32.
195 "US Army Details Major Withdrawal," Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 August 1991, 300.
196 Details on the Army's FY1993 budget proposal are drawn from Katherine McIntire, "Doing the Force-Structure
Shuffle," Army Times, 6 January 1992, 26; Bernard Adelsberger, "Army Takes Fast Track to Contingency Force,"
Army Times, 10 February 1992, 6; Bernard Adelsberger, "1993: Big Step Toward Bottom Line," Army Times, 10
February 1992, 6; and Sean D. Naylor, "On the Fly: Army Scrambles to Assemble Quick-Reaction Light Armor
Force," Army Times, 20 July 1992, 28.
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drew from Operation Desert Storm was that future contingencies likely would involve operations
against heavily mechanized opponents. This insight, coupled with the need for rapid deployability,
led the service to renew its decade-long search for a light Armored Gun System. Work also began
on converting the 2d ACR now stationed at Fort Polk to a new light armored cavalry regiment
design. In addition, an armored division, the 1st Cavalry, was shifted from a NATO-oriented corps
(III Corp) to the contingency-oriented XVII Airborne Corps. Moreover, all heavy divisions in the
XVII Airborne Corps would now be full-up units ready for immediate deployment. 197 By contrast,
all three remaining III Corps divisions, assigned to reinforce forward-deployed forces in Europe,
would now have a National Guard round-out brigade.
Finally, the budget proposed total cuts of nearly 55,000 National Guard and 50,000 Army
Reserve personnel in fiscal years 1992 and 1993. These proposed cuts in the Reserve Component
set the stage for yet another bruising battle on Capital Hill, as the number of reservists from each
state as well as specific units slated for elimination became identified by the Pentagon. Displaying
once again their long-renown political power, the reserve lobbying organizations (the National
Guard Association, the Adjutants General Association, and the Reserve Officer's Association) and
their congressional supporters ultimately prevailed in the ensuing budgetary battle. Congress passed
a 1993 Defense budget mandating nearly 423,000 Guardsmen and 280,000 Army Reservists (for a
total of over 700,000 reserve personnel), and only 575,000 active-duty duty troops by the end of
1993. Active-duty Component Army strength was scheduled to be reduced further, down to
525,000 by 1995 according to congressionally-authorized figures.
SUMMARY
During much of the period from the end of World War II, the peacetime U.S. Army found
itself beleaguered and besieged. Except during times of real or perceived national emergencies, the
Army lost out in the three-way struggle with its sister services for budgetary resources. New
technological trends, arguments of cost-effectiveness, and an American predisposition to substitute
military hardware and firepower for soldiers all led Congress and several Administrations to favor
the hardware-focused Air Force and Navy over the manpower-intensive Army. Public and political
backlash against the Army's involvement in two unpopular wars on the Asian continent served to
197 The Ist Cavalry Division, which had consisted of two active-duty brigades and one National Guard round-out
brigade, would now be a fully active-duty duty division with the addition of the remaining brigade from the
deactivated 2d Armored Division. Likewise, the 2 4th Infantry (Mechanized) Division would absorb the formerly
independent 1 97 th Infantry (Mechanized) Brigade, losing its third-brigade round-out unit as well. In both cases, the
new active-duty brigade and its parent division had been paired during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, while
the abandoned National Guard brigades had been at the center of the subsequent round-out training controversy; see,
for example, Major Craig S. Chapman, "Gulf War Nondeployed Roundouts," Military Review 72, no. 9 (September
1992): 20-35.
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accelerate Army demobilization and funding reductions following these wars, adding further to the
service's woes. Table 3 illustrates, for example, how the service's force structure varied widely
over the first forty years after World War II. With this force structure, the Army was required to
station troops permanently overseas to fulfill U.S. strategic commitments, maintain a strategic
reserve at home for unforeseen contingencies, and still have enough forces available to fight two
major conflicts over twenty years on the Asian periphery.
June Jan
Location 1945 1948 1950 1953 1956 1960 1962 1965 1986 1972 1976 1985
United States 0 2 5 7 13 7 11 12 7 8 11 13
Europe 68 4 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4
Pacific/Japan 20 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea 0 0 0 8 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0
Total 88 10 10 20 20 14 18 19 21 13 16 18
Source: Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, selected years; Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
selected years; Department of Defense Annual Report, selected years.
Table 3: Location of Active-duty Duty Army Divisions, Selected Years
A second, and related, set of constants and constraints revolves around the Army's
relationship with its reserve forces. Congress, for example, has often favored the interests and
budgets of the Army NG and Reserves over those of the active-duty Army. Meanwhile, the
active-duty Army developed a reliance on its reserve component for many functions over the
post-World War II - and especially post-Vietnam War - period. These forces, however, were
often unavailable when needed: the active-duty Army usually (and sometimes unfairly) viewed
these forces as ill-prepared for combat missions, while politicians often have proven reluctant to
mobilize these forces during crises. These conflicting impulses have produced stresses and
strains within the Army during both peace and war. All of these constants and constraints
influenced, either directly or indirectly, the Army's intra-service community politics, as the
following chapters will illustrate.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. ARMY
COMMUNITIES AND FORCE STRUCTURE
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the twentieth century, a number of technological and military
developments have influenced the number, type and relative political position of the Army's
internal communities. These include: mechanization of ground warfare; the development and
employment of aircraft in combat operations; the development of nuclear weapons, especially
tactical battlefield nuclear weapons; the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe against
invasion by a modern, mass army; the American preference for substituting firepower for
manpower; and the U.S. participation in two unpopular infantry-focused wars on the Asian
continent. This chapter will explore the affect of these developments on the U.S. Army's
communities, especially the membership of its reigning oligarchy. One of the most affected
communities has been the infantry branch, which split into several different sub-communities and
witnessed the diminution of its traditional foot-mobile infantry from a once dominant position in the
service's internal political structure. This chapter will illustrate as well how the external constraints
identified in the previous chapter effected the Army's communities and their relative power within
the service.
THE INTER-WAR PERIOD
Up to the eve of the Second World War, the ground Army was dominated by three combat
arms: infantry, cavalry, and field artillery.' Their position was reinforced by the "semi-
autonomous" status granted to the leadership of these branches in the persons of the newly
formed Chiefs of the Combat Arms (artillery, cavalry and infantry) by Congress in the National
Defense Act of 1920.2 Of these three communities, the infantry was by far the dominant branch.
1 Due to the reorganization of the Artillery Corps in 1907, the Army acquired a fourth combat arm - the coastal
artillery - but this branch tended to be much weaker than the other three. As the threat to the U.S. mainland receded
during the course of World War II, the political influence of this branch receded still further. The coastal artillery
was abolished as a separate branch and merged once again with the field artillery in the Army Reorganization Act of
1950.
2 In turn, the Chiefs of the Combat Arms had been created as a means to wrest some power over weapons
development and procurement for the service's various bureaus; see, for example, Daniel R. Beaver, Modernizing
the American War Department: Change and Continuity in a Turbulent Era, 1885-1920 (Kent, OH: The Kent State
University Press, 2006), 198-99; and William O. Odom, After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army
Doctrine, 1918-1939 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 17. For more on the problems of
the Army's bureau system, see Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 3-31; and Beaver, Modernizing the American War
Department. For critical discussions of the role of service chiefs, see Odom, After the Trenches and Johnson, Fast
Tanks and Heavy Bombers .
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The primary type of military combat unit in the Army was infantry-based, with the largest generally
being infantry regiments or divisions. The infantry held the same status in the U.S. Army as it did
in most armies worldwide: i.e., it was considered the "Queen of the battlefield." According to a
1938 War Department General Staff statement, for example: "The infantry division continues to be
the basic combat element by which battles are won, the necessary enemy field forces destroyed, and
captured territory held."3
Up to the end of World War I, all infantry moved to and across the battlefield on foot. The
increasing mechanization of warfare in the period between the two world wars, however, led the
armies of the great powers to experiment with and develop several new types of combat formations
beyond these centuries-old infantry units. Aircraft and self-propelled, armored ground vehicles
(most importantly the tank) radically changed warfare. Their effects on the U.S. Army were to be
manifold: altering the way its ground forces fought battles; changing its arsenal of weapons; adding
new communities to the service and its oligarchy; splintering the infantry branch as a variety of
different types of infantry organizations were formed; and diminishing the power of the traditional
infantry community.
But mechanization in ground forces initially came more slowly to the U.S. military than in
other great power militaries. While public apathy towards the military and tight defense budgets
helped to curb mechanized and motorized innovation in the U.S. Army during the interwar years,
these factors alone are insufficient to explain this trend, as witnessed by the greater success
experienced by other armies of the period operating under similar constraints. A better explanation
can be found within the U.S. Army, where the service's traditional role as a border constabulary and
a focus on protecting the U.S. homeland combined with the opposition and prejudices of the
service's then-ruling oligarchy of three combat branches restrained mechanization and prohibited
the rise of an independent armored service.4
The American Army in World War I developed and employed a Tank Corps during
World War I.5 Armor opponents, however, succeeded in halting this independent armored
organization through restrictions embodied in the basic legislation governing the Army during the
inter-war period, the National Defense Act of 1920. In addition to abolishing the Tank Corps, the
National Defense Act mandated that the tank was an infantry weapon, and restricted its
3 s
t ind. (ltr C/AC to AG, 31 August 1938), AG to C/AC, 5 October 1938; quoted in Wesley Frank Craven and James
Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 6: Men and Planes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1955), 197, n. 7.
4 See Hendrix, "Interwar Army and Mechanization," 78-85.
5 On the U.S. Tank Corps in World War I see Dale E. Wilson, Treat 'Em Rough: The Birth of American Armor,
1917-1920 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990).
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development and use to the infantry.6 Responsibility for tank doctrine and training was
specifically limited to the Chief of Infantry, while the development of tank technology was
assigned to an infantry-affiliated section of the Ordnance Department. In 1922, the Army's
Adjutant General's Office decreed that:
The primary mission of the tank is to facilitate the uninterrupted
advance of the riflemen in the attack. Its size, armament, speed, and
all the accessories for making it an independent force must be
approached with the above mission as the final objective to be
obtained in development.7
Tank development remained firmly under the control of the infantry branch throughout most of
the 1920s. Indeed, Majors Patton and Eisenhower were strongly discouraged from
independently examining the tank while instructors at the Tank School at Fort Meade, Maryland.
Eisenhower was even threatened with court martial by the Chief of Infantry if he persisted in his
independent studies. 8
Efforts were made in the late 1920s to break the grip of the infantry, with mechanized
experiments conducted by an ad hoc Experimental Armored Force, utilizing the Army's large
stockpile of World War I tanks. However, this effort came to a halt in 1931 when the new Chief
of Staff, Douglas MacArthur, citing the severe budgetary constraints imposed by the depression,
disbanded the Experimental Mechanized Force. He decreed that henceforth future tank
developments would be undertaken within the confines of both the infantry and the cavalry
branches. Although small-scale field tests were renewed in 1932, this time under the cavalry
branch, the long struggle of armor supporters in the U.S. Army against the service's budget
restrictions and the entrenched interests of the established combat arms continued right up to the
German invasion of France in the late spring of 1940. 9 In both the infantry and cavalry branches,
6 This legislation followed the recommendation of the Superior Board, appointed by the General Headquarters Staff of
the U.S. Allied Expeditionary Force to examine the lessons of World War I: "...tanks should be recognized as
infantry supporting and accompanying weapons...and...be organized for association with and [engaged in] combat
as part of an infantry command;" Report on Superior Board on Organization and Tactics 1919 (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: Command and General Staff College, 1919), 30; quoted in Hofmann, George F. "The Demise of the U.S. Tank
Corps and Medium Tank Development Program." Military Affairs 37, no. 1 (February 1973): 21, n. 6. For more on
the National Defense Act, see Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany,
1944-1945 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), 8.
7 Quoted in Russell F. Weigley, "Shaping the American Army of World War II: Mobility versus Power," Parameters
11, no. 3 (September 1981): 15, n. 2.
8 Wilson, Treat 'Em Rough, 215-216; Hofmann, "Demise of the U.S. Tank Corps," 20; and Johnson, Fast Tanks and
Heavy Bombers, 75.
9 See, for instance, Martin Blumenson, ed., The Patton Papers, Vol. 1, 1885-1940 (New York: Houghton Mifflin,
1972); Mildred H. Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt: A History of the Development of the Armored Force (Harrisburg,
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tank developments were seen merely as a means to better conduct their traditional roles or, as
one historian of the period, David Johnson, has put: "the tank was viewed as an auxiliary of the
infantry or as a way to modernize the cavalry." 10 This pattern continued until the formation of
the independent Armored Force in July 1940 finally combined all tanks and tank development in
the U.S. Army under a single organization. 1
The development of aircraft offered a novel means for transporting troops to the battlefield
and, in turn, would create a new type of infantry subgroup - the airborne. This development, like
that of armor, had its origins in the First World War. In October 1918, commander of the Army Air
units in Europe, General Billy Mitchell, won approval for a plan to parachute a full division behind
German lines as part of the next U.S. offensive. 12 Only the early termination of the war brought this
plan to a halt. Although airborne forces offered a means for breaking the deadlock of ground
warfare, the U.S. Army showed little interest in the inter-war period. Economic stringency limited
development of airborne forces in the United States to a single experiment in 1929.13 The Army,
however, did develop an independent and very powerful organization devoted to air combat, the
Army Air Corps, which by the end of the 1930s had become a de facto separate military service.
WORLD WAR II
The situation of armor in the U.S. Army changed dramatically with the German
demonstration of the power of concentrated tank and motorized formations during the latter's May
1940 invasion of Belgium and France. This event led almost overnight to a renewed enthusiasm for
PA: Military Service, Pub., Co., 1947), 37-178; Weigley, United States Army, 409-11; Hendrix, "Interwar Army and
Mechanization," 76-92; and House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare, 76.
10 Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, 221; for a similar assessment, see Hendrix, "Interwar Army and
Mechanization," 94-95. In some quarters, opposition to the tank extended to opposition to any form of
mechanization. As late as 1938, the Chief of the Cavalry Arm, Major General John Herr, could argue that "[w]e must
be misled to our own detriment to assume that the untried machine can displace the proven and tried horse;" quoted in
Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 66, n. 16. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Artillery branch, where officers
asserted that field guns should continue to be horse-drawn; see Ibid. For more on the progress/development of
mechanization in the interwar period from a cavalry perspective, see George F. Hofmann, Through Mobility We
Conquer: The Mechanization of U.S. Cavalry (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2006), 77-294; and
Matthew Darlington Morton, Men on "Iron Ponies, " The Death and Rebirth of the Modem U.S. Cavalry
(Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University (Ph.D. diss), 2004), 15-225.
" Hendrix, "Interwar Army and Mechanization," 93-94.
12 Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (Washington, DC: Office of Air
Force History, United States Air Force, 1985), 13.
13 Geoffrey Powell, The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem 1944 (New York: Franklin Watts, 1984), 12. This
pattern of neglect was followed in the armies of most of the major powers with the notable exceptions of Germany and
Russia, where the concept of landing troops behind enemy lines by both parachute and glider were fully developed
during the 1930s.
128
armored formations in the U.S. Army. In July 1940, the "Armored Forces," an organization
independent of any of the traditional combat arms, was created at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The 7t"
Cavalry Brigade and the Provisional Tank Brigade formed the nucleus of its first two new armored
divisions. A second victory for the nascent armor forces came with the reorganization of the Army
command structure and the creation of the Army Ground Forces (AGF) in March 1942. This
reorganization resulted in the wartime abolition of the offices of the Chiefs of the Combat Arms, a
haven for armor opposition, and the transfer of their powers to the AGF command.'14
The July 1943 War Department Troops Basis finalized the total number of Army divisions
to be raised during the war at eighty-eight, of which sixteen would be armored divisions. Ambitious
plans to form whole tank corps and armies, however, failed to materialize. This failure was due in
large part to a more somber reevaluation of the German and British armored formations, to the
shortage of shipping space, and to the newly recognized requirements of modem combined arms
warfare. 15
The armored division designers soon learned that infantry were needed to support and
protect the advancing tanks from certain, especially dismounted, anti-tank threats. These armored
infantry, the precursors to today's mechanized infantry, road into battle on half-wheeled/half-
tracked vehicles, known as "half-tracks," designed to provide them at least some of the cross-
country mobility - though not the armor protection - of the tank.16 While the Armored Forces' first
armored divisions contained three armored infantry battalions, it remained a tank-heavy force with a
total of six tank battalions. Bloody lessons learned during combat operations in Tunisia, led to
changes in the division's organization. The new structure (known as the 1943 Armored Division)
reduced the number of tank battalions to three; thus giving the division equal numbers of tank,
infantry, and artillery battalions and making it easier to form combined arms teams.'7 The armored
14 Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 69; Efforts in 1940-41 to establish a separate armor branch raised strong opposition
from the Chiefs of the Infantry and Cavalry branches; the question was put aside for the remainder of the war; see Kent
Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground
Combat Troops, United States Army in World War II series (Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S. Army,
1947), 62-67.
15 See Weigley, United States Army, 467-68; and Christopher R. Gabel, "World War II Armor Operations in Europe,"
in Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces, eds. George F. Hofmann and Donald Starry
(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1999), 155.
16 Haworth, W. Blair, Jr. The Bradley and How It Got That Way: Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of
Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 17-18. Throughout the war,
the Army consistently failed to provide a enough tracked vehicles with sufficient armor - the half-track was not as
heavily armored on the sides as most tanks and provided no overhead protection to troops riding in the back - to allow
the infantry to keep pace with the tank's mobility when under fire or off-road over most types of terrain; see Weigley,
United States Army, 574.
17 For more on the 1943 reorganization of the armored division, see Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of
Ground Combat Troops, 319-335; and Gabel, "World War Armor Operations," 153. Fourteen of the sixteen armored
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infantry also developed specialized tactics to enable them to fight with and support the armor
divisions. 18
The war did not go as well for the cavalry branch. Horses were very seldom employed
during the war, and then only in the most rugged terrain. Of the Army's two cavalry divisions, the
1st Cavalry was converted to an infantry division early in the war and fought in the Pacific. The 2d
Cavalry never engaged an enemy; instead, its troops were sent to North Africa to build airfields for
a time and then the unit was quietly disbanded. The sole cavalry units to see combat operating as
cavalry were a handful of Mechanized Cavalry Commands: regimental-sized units equipped with
light tanks and scout cars, but no horses. Their missions were limited generally to reconnaissance
and security, as the other traditional cavalry missions, such as shock and exploitation, had been
largely subsumed by the Armored Forces. 19
The interwar promise of air-delivered troops, however, was realized in World War II. The
successful use of airborne units during the German's May 1940 invasion of France, once again,
served to stimulate similar developments in Britain and the United States. In June 1940, Churchill
ordered the immediate formation of a 5,000-man parachute force. A test platoon of airborne troops
was established in the United States, with orders going out three weeks later for the activation of the
U.S. Army's first parachute battalion.20 This was soon followed by the creation of the first airborne
regiment, the Provisional Parachute Group (PPG). An additional stimulus for airborne development
in both the Britain and the United States was the successful German airborne assault against Crete
in 1941. Ironically, and unknown to the allied powers, the extremely heavy losses sustained by the
airborne units led the German Army to largely abandon air assaults throughout the remainder of the
21war.
divisions adopted the 1943 TO&E, while two Armed Forces initial divisions, the 2d and 3d Armored, retained the larger
1942 TO&E design; Ibid., 155.
18 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, 336-37. In addition, the emphasis on the
pursuit role of the tank and the false belief that tanks would rarely engage other tanks stunted the development of U.S.
armor; emphasizing mobility at the expense of armor and firepower. Owing to the opposition of McNair and his
defenders, it was only in the spring of 1945 that a U.S. heavy tank first appeared in Europe; a delay of over two years
from its initial development by the Ordnance Department; see, Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 122-23 and Weigley,
Eisenhower's Lieutenants, 21-22.
19 The 1st Cavalry Division fought as a World War I-era "square" infantry division; while the 2d Cavalry Division
was reactivated later in the war, but just as quickly deactivated. For more on the Cavalry Branch during World War
II, see Hofmann, Through Mobility We Conquer, 295-396; and Morton, Men on "Iron Ponies", 226-451.
20 Powell, Devil's Birthday, 245.
21 Following Crete, the Germans mounted only two battalion-sized airborne assaults throughout the remainder of the
war; see Ibid.; and Williamson Murray, "Crete," MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 3, no. 4 (Summer
1991): 28-35.
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By the end of the war, the U.S. Army had formed five airborne divisions and several
independent regiments. More of these divisions had been planned; as late as April 1943, a twelve-
division airborne force remained in U.S. plans. An early leader of the airborne, General Matthew
Ridgway, described civilian and military leadership's attitude towards the airborne as a "brand new
toy."22 Field commanders, however, complained that airborne divisions, as well as other
specialized units, tied up valuable manpower at a time when critical shortages existed in front-line
troops. Airborne units were generally unsuitable for typical combat operations, lacking the
necessary firepower, although they were frequently misused in this manner. For much of the war,
particularly after the invasion of Normandy, airborne units remained out of combat, preparing for
operations which were continually made obsolete by the rapid movement of the allied armies across
Western Europe.2 3 Moreover, efforts early in the war by the commander of the PPG to make the
airborne a separate combat branch, with control over its own air transport, were successfully
stopped by the infantry branch and the Air Corps. 24
Other attempts were made, generally unsuccessful, to create other types of specialized
divisions. Experiments with a motorized infantry division design were abandoned after they were
found to be too elaborately equipped and too demanding of the limited available shipping space.
Instead, truck companies were pooled at the corps-level and made available to standard infantry
divisions as needed.2 Likewise, efforts to field "light" mountain and desert divisions were halted
after field exercises confirmed the initial impressions of commanders that such units were under-
strength and incapable of sustaining themselves in prolonged combat. 26 One exception to this
retreat from specialized divisions, beyond airborne units, was the fielding of the 10 th Mountain
Division to the mountainous terrain in northern Italy. However, although the 10th retained some of
its specialized alpine character, it was beefed up to the point were it was nearly as heavy as a
22 Ridgway, Soldier, 93.
23 See Powell, Devil's Birthday, 245-52; House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare, 135-38; and Marc DeVore, The
Airborne Illusion: Institutions and the Evolution of Postwar Airborne Forces, SSP Working Paper (Cambridge, MA:
Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2004), 2-5 Despite these problems, the Western
allies maintained a favorable attitude towards airborne units at least until Operation Market Garden starkly revealed the
shortcomings of such operations; see Powell, Devil's Birthday; and Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, 305-319.
24 Devore, Airborne Illusion, 20.
25 Weigley, United States Army, 469-70; Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, 337-
39 and Gabel, "World War Armor Operations," 155.
26 Weigley, United States Army, 470; Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, 342-50;
and Edward N. Luttwak, Historical Analysis and Projection for Army 2000. Volume 1. Part 1. The United States
Army of the Second World War: The Light Divisions (Chevy Chase, MD: Luttwak Inc., 1 March 1983).
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standard infantry division. 2 In general, the decision not to field a large number of specialized
divisions during World War II stemmed from a set of judgments by Army planners. First, it was
felt that, with a shortage of front-line troops expected (and realized in practice) it made little sense to
tie-up valuable combat power in large numbers of units capable of only limited types of operations.
Moreover, with the United States involved in a global war it was impossible to develop separate
divisions specialized for each type of terrain, climate, and operational environment in which U.S.
combat units might find themselves. Instead, Army planners, led by AGF Commander, Major
General Leslie McNair, felt that the most efficient and effective means for fighting a global war lay
in the formation of standard infantry units capable of fighting anywhere, though not optimized for
any particular circumstance.28
And, ultimately, the traditional foot-mobile infantry, who manned these standard infantry
divisions, remained the dominant combat arm in the U.S. Army throughout World War II. Of the
Army's war-time strength of eighty-eight divisions, sixty-seven were standard infantry divisions.
Of the twenty Army divisions that served in the Pacific, all but one were standard infantry divisions;
the lone exception being an airborne division (the 11 Airborne). While all sixteen of the Army's
armored divisions served in Europe, as did four of its five airborne divisions, over twice as many
standard infantry divisions (forty-eight) fought on the European continent during World War II.
Moreover, in a return to the interwar years, tanks frequently were employed to provide fire support
to these standard infantry units; and, consequently, were required to move at the same walking
speed as these forces. Indeed, the need to make available additional tank battalions for employment
as corps-level, pooled assets to be attached to infantry divisions as needed was one of the reasons
behind the reduction in size that accompanied the design of the standard (1943) armored division
and the activation of few armored divisions than initially planned.29 As the war progressed, tank
battalions were frequently attached on a permanent basis to infantry divisions.30 This pattern of
infantry dominance continued after the postwar demobilization.
27 Edward N. Luttwak, Historical Analysis and Projection for Army 2000. Volume 1. Part 2. The United States
Army of the Second World War: The 10th Mountain Division (10th Light Division (Alpine) (Chevy Chase, MD:
Luttwak Inc., 1 March 1983).
28 Though Army planners recognized that some tailoring of the standard infantry division would be necessary for
specific theaters and circumstances, they felt that this could be accomplished given the inherent flexibility in the
division's design; see Weigley, United States Army, 461-65.
29 Gabel, "World War II Armor Operations," 155.
30 The permanent attachment of tank units to infantry divisions was in contradiction to the McNair's principle of
"pooling" assets not always requirement by infantry units. In came about, however, as division commanders
experienced the benefits of these armored units as well as the difficulties inherent in coordinating temporarily attached
formations; see House, Towards Combined Arms Warfare, 107 and 129-30; and Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, 27.
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THE POST-WAR PERIOD
Shortly after the end of hostilities in Europe, the General Board of the European Theater was
formed to examine the lessons learned from the war for the postwar Army. Overall, the Board
found that wartime division designs had been effective and were suitable for the post-war era. One
of its reports, Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment of the Infantry Division, endorsed
the wartime infantry experience with armor, calling for the addition of an organic medium tank
regiment of three battalions to each standard infantry division.3 1 Likewise, the report on the Armor
Division concluded that Army's experience in the European Theater "clearly indicated the necessity
for Armored Divisions distinct from Infantry Divisions." 32 It also found that the tactics employed
by these armored divisions during the war were "correct and resulted in success."33 The Airborne
division report examined alternatives to the division, but found none of them acceptable. It
concluded that: "If our army is to carry out its mission in the future, the airborne division must be
retained." 34 Any shortcomings could be corrected by providing the airborne division with
augmented version of the standard infantry TO&E. 35
Most of the General Board recommendations were accepted by the Army in the 1946
division designs. The Army did modify the Board's specific recommendations concerning the
addition of tanks to the standard division; choosing instead to add a medium tank company to each
infantry regiment and a heavy tank battalion at the division level.36 This design was never put into
practice, however, owing to the rapid demobilization and severe budget constraints following the
war. By early 1948, each of the four infantry divisions stationed in Japan, for instance, contained a
single tank company. Only one of the four infantry divisions stationed in Germany came close to
approaching the authorized division structure. Besides these infantry divisions, all on occupation
duty, the Army consisted of one depleted armored unit (with a single armored brigade-equivalent)
and one airborne division, both stateside as part of the "strategic reserve." Finally, a division-size
31 United States Forces, European Theater, The General Board, Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment
of the Infantry Division, Study No. 15 (December 1945), 16.
32 United States Force, European Theater, The General Board, Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment of the
Armored Division, Study Number 48 (1945), 24.
33 Ibid.
34 United States Forces, European Theater, The General Board, Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment
of the Airborne Division, Study No. 16 (1945) p. 26.
35 Ibid., 30.
36 Philip L. Bolte, "Post-World War II and Korea: Paying for Unpreparedness," in Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The
History of U.S. Armored Forces, eds. George F. Hofmann and Donald Starry (Lexington, KY: University of
Kentucky Press, 1999), 149.
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Constabulary Force was assigned to occupation duty in Germany. 37 By the end of 1948,
deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union brought about a slight
improvement in the Army's Armored Forces: the armored division was enhanced and an armored
cavalry regiment was created in the United States, while the Constabulary Force was converted into
three armored cavalry regiments (essentially lighter versions of the wartime Mechanized Cavalry
Commands) in Germany.
No matter how depleted, however, all three types of divisions - infantry, armor and airborne
- were retained in the postwar Army and became a permanent part of the service's force structure.
Despite their mixed wartime record, the position of the "elite" infantry represented by the airborne
was enhanced due to the mystique and popularity associated with these units in the public mind, and
to the fact that many of airborne officers rose to the top ranks of the service in the decade following
the war. The position of the armor branch was solidified with the passage of the 1950 Army
Organization Act. This congressional legislation established the Armored Force as a separate
branch of the Army, abolished the cavalry branch, and merged its remaining elements into the new
armor branch. 38 The traditional infantry retained their dominant position as seen by the percentage
of standard infantry retained in the force structure. Budget constraints account, in part, for the
emphasis on infantry: it was cheaper to moth-ball tanks and other armored-unit equipment than to
continue paying the operation and support costs for armored divisions. 39 But the service's postwar
missions also account for this infantry focus. During the five years between the end of World War
II and the Korean conflict, the Army was limited largely to an occupation role, better suited (with
the exception of the Constabulary Force) for infantry than armored units.
THE KOREAN WAR ERA
Even more so than World War II, Korea relied on the fighting skills of the infantryman.
While eight Army infantry divisions, and scores of smaller infantry units, were sent to the peninsula,
no armored formations larger than a battalion saw action. Although the North Korean Army
37 The Constabulary Force constituted the last act of the independent horse cavalry branch, containing three brigades
composed of squadrons of a light tank troop, a motorcycle platoon, and a horse platoon. For more on the
Constabulary Force, see Hofmann, Through Mobility We Conquer, 397-456.
38 A number of reports following the war called for the abolition of the cavalry branch; George F. Hofmann,
Through Mobility We Conquer, 464. The 1950 Act also abolished the coastal artillery and merged its remaining
personnel with the field artillery.
39 No new tanks were produced from the 1945 to the start of the Korean War nor were many of the M26 Pershing
tanks, fielded late in the war; see Oscar C. Decker, "The Patton Tanks: The Cold War Learning Series," in Camp
Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces, eds. George F. Hofmann and Donald Starry (Lexington,
KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1999), 300-301; and Anne W. Chapman, The Army: World War II to Korea,
TRADOC Special Historical Study (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, 5 October 1992), 16.
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effectively used small, road-bound tank formations to spearhead their initial attack across the 38th
Parallel, armored engagements generally were rare throughout the conflict, owing both to the lack
of tanks in the U.S. units first deployed to the invasion and to hilly terrain of the Korean peninsula.40
The stabilization of the front after the spring of 1951 turned the conflict into an infantry and
artillery-focused war of attrition characterized by small-unit engagements. In this situation, armor
employment was limited to the emplacement of individual tanks in fortified bunkers along hillsides
to be used as direct and indirect fire support for infantry units, and as carriers of large search-lights
to illuminate nighttime battlefields. 41
The infantry's dominant role in Korea, however, eventually may have proven detrimental to
its political fortunes at home as public frustration with the war steadily rose. To the extent that the
infantry became identified in the public's mind with limited conventional conflicts like Korea, and
as public support for U.S. participation in such wars declined, public and congressional support for
the infantry branch likewise may have waned. Moreover, this situation was reinforced by the
incoming Eisenhower administration's determination not to get involved in such wars in the future.
Two developments during the conflict, however, helped boost other Army communities.
First, the helicopter had its combat premier in Korea, where it was mainly employed in the
evacuation of wounded personnel from the front lines. Between 1951 and 1953, over 21,000
casualties were air-lifted by army medical evacuation teams.42 The Army also conducted a small
number of heli-borne troop movements and supply operations during the war, presaging the
development of the airmobile forces.43 And, ironically, the rapid success of North Korean tanks
early in the conflict has been described as a catalyst for renewed post-war U.S. efforts to develop
armored forces. 44
The Korean War initiated a much broader mobilization of U.S. military might, much of it
focused on the defense of Western Europe and enhancing the role of mechanized forces. Though
the bulk of the forces initially sent to Europe were infantry divisions, this was due to the type of
40 One of the few large-scale armored engagements of war took place during the August 1950 battle in "the Bowling
Alley" along the Pusan Perimeter; see Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1988), 86.
41 Ibid., 272.
42 Bergerson, Army Gets an Air Force, 71.
43 James R. Galvin, Air Assault: The Development ofAirmobile Warfare (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1969),
254-56; and Lt. Col. Cecil B. Currey, With Wings As Eagles: The History of Army Flight from Its Beginnings as a
Branch of Aviation to Its Establishment as Aviation Branch (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1984), 57-65; and Richard
P. Weinert, History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962, Phase 1: 1950-1954 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, Office
of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1971).
44 Doughty, Evolution ofArmy Tactical Doctrine, 15.
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forces the Army could quickly call upon: only a single armored division remained in the U.S. in
June 1950, and no armored forces were available in the National Guard or reserves. During the first
stage of mobilization, in 1951, three infantry divisions (one active-duty and two mobilized National
Guard units) and the service's only armored division were sent to West Germany to reinforce the
single infantry division and several armored cavalry regiments stationed in that country since the
end of World War II. 45 As soon as possible, the two National Guard infantry divisions were
demobilized and replaced with an active-duty armored division.
The build-up in Europe also led to a requirement to produce a large number of tanks very
quickly. As a result, a decision was made in September 1950 to produce the first new tank in five
years, the M47. Based on modifications to the World War II-era M46 tank, the M47 was viewed
merely as an interim solution to the Army's armor shortfall. A decision to produce a brand-new
replacement, the M48, soon followed.46
The new U.S. commitment to NATO, and the defense of Western Europe from Soviet
invasion, suggested that the U.S. Army's reliance on "heavy" mechanized forces would only grow
in the future, especially in response to similar Soviet and Warsaw Pact force developments. The
continued quantitative superiority of Soviet ground forces alone would force the Army to rely on
mechanized forces, as Army planners considered mechanized forces ideal "for conducting a rapid
and violent strike against a numerically superior enemy.
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE "NEW LOOK"
While the Eisenhower Administration and its "New Look" defense strategy had a
deleterious effect on nearly all of the Army's communities, it fell most heavily - at least rhetorically
- on the infantry. The contention that "cheap" tactical nuclear weapons could substitute for
expensive manpower seemed particularly aimed at the manpower-intensive traditional infantry
division, where the bulk of Eisenhower's derisively termed "bottle washers and table waiters" could
be found. The traditional infantry also conflicted with an Army budgetary strategy centered on the
procurement of high-technology equipment. And, the "unglamorous," low-technology, foot-
slogging infantry were an ill-fit with the Army's related public relations campaign designed to
portray the Army as forward-looking, futuristic, and technology suave. By contrast, armor,
aviation, mechanized infantry, and artillery fit quite well with the Army's desired image.
45 Bradley and Blair, General's Life, 646.
46 Decker, "Patton Tanks," 304.
47 Doughty, Evolution ofArmy Tactical Doctrine, 15.
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The Army's emphasis on the atomic battlefield further enhanced mechanized and heli-borne
forces at the expense of the infantry. Tanks and the recently improved armored personnel carriers
were considered essential for protection against atomic effects and for the mobility required of
dispersed atomic forces. Helicopters too were to be utilized extensively for rapid dispersal and
concentration of troops; one of the few innovations of the Pentomic design to survive its demise was
the addition for the first time of helicopter units organic to divisions. While an infantry design was
included in the Pentomic reorganization, there seemed little room for non-mechanized, traditional
infantry on the atomic battlefield of the future. In fact, a major shortcoming of the Pentomic
concept was identified as its failure to provide adequate motorized mobility to its infantry
divisions.4 8 The Army's abandonment of this ultimately unworkable atomic division design helped
at least ensure a future for the traditional infantry community.
The traditional infantry's prospects should have brightened as well with General Taylor's
call for a limited conventional war capability; as the Army had experienced, limited wars were
usually infantry-centered conflicts. In practice, however, the airborne divisions appeared to be the
preferred instrument for these types of contingent operations. Airborne divisions tended to be
lighter (i.e., more easily deployable) than their standard infantry counterparts, were generally
maintained at a higher level of combat readiness, and were perceived to be more imbued with an
elite warrior spirit. The Army's primary organization for responding to limited wars during the late
1950s, the Strategic Army Corps, consisted of two Airborne Corps - each with an airborne and
infantry division - when originally established in 1958. Troop cuts, however reduced this force to
one infantry and two airborne divisions a year later.49
In terms of technology and procurement, the latter half of the 1950's witnessed several
trends favorable to the aviation and mechanized communities. For example, development of the
helicopter continued following its initial use in the Korean War, primarily with an eye towards
increasing mobility on the atomic battlefield. Numerous tests of equipment (including the arming of
the helicopter) and organizations were carried out at the Aviation School at Fort Rucker throughout
the 1950s.50 Improvements were also in armored personnel carriers (APCs) designed to carry the
48 Each Pentomic infantry division was assigned a transport helicopter company and a battalion of armored personnel
carriers (APCs) attached to the division headquarters. However, there were only enough APCs to transport one of the
five battle groups at a time. This lack of transport, combined with problems in cooperation between the semi-
independent battle groups and the APC transport battalion under the command of a sixth organization, proved to be a
major shortcoming of the Pentomic concept; see House, Towards Combined Arms Warfare, pp. 157; and Haworth, The
Bradley, 29.
4 9 Mako, U.S. Ground Forces, 15; and Lt. Colonel Gary H. Wade, Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958,
Combat Studies Institute Research Survey No. 3 (Washington, DC: USGPO, October 1984), 7.
50 See Currey, With Wings As Eagles, 66-78; Lt. Colonel Charles O. Griminger, "The Armed Helicopter Story Part I:
The Origins," U.S. Army Aviation Digest, July 1971, 14-17; John M. Carland, How We Got There: Air Assault and
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armored infantry on the battlefield. The first APCs with overhead protection were deployed in
December 1952, and a cheaper successor was fielded two years later. The M113 program began in
1956 and saw the first of these vehicles deployed in 1960. Finally, a new tank, the XM-60, went
into production starting in 1958.51
While these other communities seemed to be growing in power within the Army, the
traditional infantry remained one of the dominant players within the service. By the end of the
1950s, mandated cuts in manpower led to the deactivation of two of the service's five armored
divisions. While both airborne divisions remained, the traditional infantry could boast of nine out of
fourteen of the Army's remaining divisions.
KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE"
The military build-up instituted by Kennedy Administration led to an Army renaissance,
with all the service's communities benefiting. The election of President Kennedy meant a de-
emphasis on the tactical nuclear battlefield and a greater focus on developing conventional force
capabilities for a wide spectrum of conflicts. While the defense of Europe remained the primary
Army mission, the administration also emphasized conventional forces capable of intervention in
the Third World. In response, the Eisenhower-era Strategic Army Corps was soon combined with
available tactical air and airlift assets to create STRIKE Command. This joint Army-Air Force
command had responsibility for conducting independent operations in the Middle East, Southern
Asia, and Africa South of the Sahara, as well as supporting other geographic commands.52
Another top priority of the new administration was the development of a counter-
insurgency capability; yet another mission that could have been given to traditional, foot-mobile
infantry. In the early Kennedy years, however, this new mission became the primary responsibility
of the Army Special Forces. In an ironic twist, the Special Forces mission was turned on its head, as
it went from a guerilla organization whose major task was the fomenting of insurgency in the
Eisenhower years to an anti-guerilla unit designed to counter insurgencies. Along with the change
in roles, the Special Forces went from a peripheral organization within the service to an elite high-
profile combat unit, much to the chagrin of the regular Army. Despite the Special Forces
the Emergence of the Ist Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1950-1965, Land Warfare Papers No. 42 (Arlington, VA:
Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, May 2003), 3-9; and Richard P. Weinert, History
of Army Aviation, 1950-1962, Phase II: 1955-1962 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, Office of the Chief of
Staff, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, November 1976).
51 On armor and mechanized developments during the 1950s, see Haworth, The Bradley, 24-27; and Decker, '"The
Patton Tanks," 306-12.
52 Haffa, Half War, 93.
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assignment, counterinsurgency interest and training suddenly flourished throughout the Army in the
early 1960s, with a flurry of new courses at service schools and training manuals.53 And this
interest was especially prevalent within the infantry community.
At the same time, the Army's new division design, the Reorganization Objectives Army
Division (ROAD) concept, was finalized, approved and implemented. It was to mark a turning
point among the Army's communities. The ROAD design was a response to the military
shortcomings revealed in the Pentomic division. While the Pentomic concept emphasized nuclear
operations and was designed for transitioning from nuclear to non-nuclear combat, the ROAD
design reversed this order: emphasizing conventional operations and designing divisions for
transitioning from non-nuclear to nuclear warfare. More importantly for intra-service politics, it
introduced mechanized infantry units into the Army's force structure.
The basic ROAD structure - regardless of division type - consisted of a division base to
which were added varying numbers and types of combat maneuver battalions. The ROAD
reorganization included three types of divisions: "heavy" divisions, which were either armored or
mechanized infantry depending upon the ratio of armored to mechanized infantry battalions
(typically, armored divisions contained a ratio of armored-to- mechanized infantry battalions of six-
to-five, while mechanized divisions contained a four-to-five ratio); a non-mechanized infantry
division, and an airborne division. The distinguishing feature of the heavy ROAD design was the
mechanized infantry battalion. This battalion was essentially a ROAD infantry battalion, but
equipped with the APC as organic transport, providing the unit with a high degree of cross-country
mobility and protection from small arms and fragmentation (especially from air-bursting artillery
munitions). In this way, the mechanized infantry were better able to "complement and enhance" the
capabilities of the accompanying tank forces. 54 Helicopters were also deployed as organic assets
throughout the ROAD designs. Both the heavy and the infantry division base included an armored
cavalry squadron equipped with tanks, APCs and troop-carrying helicopters. Additional aviation
assets were provided by an aviation battalion, with fixed and rotary wing aircraft for reconnaissance,
and a separate company of troop-carrying helicopters. Overall, the ROAD design nearly doubled
the Pentomic division's air assets. 55
Before the ROAD design was completed, the infantry branch did gain a crucial victory; a
victory illustrated by the shift from "armored" infantry to "mechanized" infantry. Prior to the
ROAD reorganization, the armor branch was the proponent for infantry found in armored divisions.
53 Krepinevich, Army and Vietnam, 36-55.
54 Doughty, Evolution ofArmy Tactical Doctrine, 23.
55 Ibid., 21-22; and Weigley, United States Army, 540-41.
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The change to "mechanized" infantry signaled that the infantry branch would now be the proponent
for this type of infantry. Though subtle, this change was significant for the infantry branch: had the
armor retained proponency, they would have had direct control over the development of doctrine
and equipment for what would become a very large proportion of the infantry. By obtaining
proponency for the mechanized infantry, the infantry branch retained control over these forces.
In practice, this meant that there would no longer be separate publications relating
specifically to infantry supporting tank-based formations. Instead, the infantry developed a single
set of publications covering all infantry units, making these publications and the doctrines they
contained much less tank-specific and less tightly focused.56 These new field manuals stressed that
the central difference between the varieties of infantry lay simply in their method for arriving on the
battlefield.
Unfortunately, the mechanized infantry battalion represented a significant break from the
"traditional" infantry units of the past. As the armored infantry had demonstrated, an entirely new
set of doctrinal problems presented themselves to mechanized units and their commanders, greatly
increasing the complexity of combat operations over the "traditional" foot-mobile infantry.57
Moreover, the infantry branch was unable to prevent a major split in its community. From now on,
the "heavy" side of the Army would consist of armored and mechanized infantry community, while
traditional infantry would be relegated to a "light" community only loosely associated with the
airborne and airmobile elements.
The formation of the mechanized infantry division largely was prompted by recognition that
the Soviet Army had undergone increasing mechanization throughout the latter half of the 1950s.
As a result, the three infantry divisions stationed in Europe were quickly converted to mechanized
ROAD units, while a number of additional heavy divisions, both armored and mechanized, were
formed stateside. By the end of 1962, less than a year after the ROAD reorganization began, the
ratio of heavy-to-light divisions in the active-duty Army was fifty-fifty (nine divisions each - eight
combat-ready and one training), representing a significant shift in the service's force structure mix.
Besides gaining spaces in the ROAD design, the aviation community was able to develop a
completely new division in the early 1960's, one that fully utilized the capabilities of helicopter on
the battlefield. Despite advances made during the previous decade in helicopter technology and
battlefield employment, many in the defense community were surprised in 1962 when Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara organized the Howze Board and gave it a mandate to increase the
56 Haworth, The Bradley, 29-30.
57 Doughty, Evolution ofArmy Tactical Doctrine, 24.
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Army's rotary-wing aviation efforts. With the support of the Secretary of Defense, the Board's
recommendations to develop air assault divisions and air cavalry regiments were realized in 1964
with the formation of the 1 Ith Air Assault Test Division. Shortly before this unit's 1965 departure
for the escalating conflict in Vietnam it was renamed the 1st Cavalry (Air Mobile) Division.58 The
development of air assault doctrine was to further complicate the "traditional" functions of the
infantry, further splintering the infantry branch, and give additional impetus to the rise of the
aviation community.
THE VIETNAM WAR
Like the Korean War, ground combat in the Vietnam conflict was almost exclusively carried
out by infantry units. By January 1968, seven of the nine U.S. Army divisions deployed in the
Vietnam were regular infantry, with the remainder being airmobile divisions. Once U.S. ground
forces became fully committed, despite a number of multi-division operations during 1966 and
1967, Vietnam was primarily waged by small light infantry units on reconnaissance and patrol.59 In
large part this was due to the method of warfare chosen by the communist forces. One study of the
war found that the enemy rarely attacked with forces as large as a battalion, and seldom chose to
undertake ground assaults of any size, choosing instead to engage in a "war without fronts." 60
Only three US Army tank battalions were deployed to Vietnam, with a few smaller armored
units temporarily sent over as the Army became desperate for forces following the 1968 Tet
Offensive. The M113, however, has been described as "the workhorse of armor in Vietnam."61 It
was employed in a variety of roles, including troop carrier, mortar carrier, bridge launcher, and
ambulance. Small M113-equipped mechanized units were frequently attached to infantry forces as
58 See John M. Carland, How We Got There, 10-15; Weinert, History ofArmy Aviation, Phase II; Lt. Colonel Charles
O. Griminger, "The Armed Helicopter Story, Part II: 'Vanderpool's Fools'," U.S. Army Aviation Digest, August 1971,
14-18; Maj. General Hamilton H. Howze, "The Last Three Years of Army Aviation," U.S. Army Aviation Digest,
March 1958, 2-60; Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool, "We Armed the Helicopter," U.S. Army Aviation Digest, June 1971,
2-6, 24-29; and Major Thomas C. Graves, Transforming the Force: the 1 1 th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963-
1965 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College
(thesis), 1999).
59 General Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War, 155-56.
60 Thomas C. Thayer, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1985), 53.
61 Lewis Sorley, "Adaptation and Impact: Mounted Combat in Vietnam," in Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The
History of U.S. Armored Forces, eds. George F. Hofmann and Donald Starry (Lexington, KY: University of
Kentucky Press, 1999), 330.
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the need arose for additional firepower. So successful were these units, that some dismounted
forces were converted to mechanized infantry.62
The demands of the war, however, took a severe toll on the heavy armor/mechanized
infantry community located beyond Southeast Asia. Most of the armor and mechanized infantry
units in Europe were cannibalized for personnel to fill-out under-strength or newly-activated
divisions earmarked for Vietnam. By the end of the decade, US Army forces in Europe had lost one
mechanized infantry division, an armored cavalry regiment, and over 100,000 troops. The few
remaining heavy units in the United States were similarly skeletonized for the war. Just as
important, the community failed to procure any new weapons systems for nearly a decade due
largely to the budgetary restrictions imposed by the war. While minor modifications were made to
the M60 tank, and a search for a new main battle tank would begin, no new successful tank
acquisition would get underway until the 1970s. Likewise, the Army's Mechanized Infantry
Combat Vehicle (MICV) program, began in 1964, failed to find a replacement for the M113, even
though the which US Army Combat Development Command (USACDC) had decided very soon
after it was first deployed that the M113 was insufficient to accompany future tanks into battle.63
The aviation community, in contrast, had a very good war in Vietnam. Prior to the U.S.
escalation in 1965, helicopters were being widely used in Vietnam for transport and fire support,
providing the aviation community the opportunity to experiment and demonstrate the utility of the
new helicopter technology and tactics on the battlefield. 64 By the time large-scale deployments of
U.S. troops began, airmobile operations had become firmly established and the newly formed 1st
Cavalry (Airmobile) Division was one of the first units sent to Southeast Asia. As the numbers of
U.S. combat troops grew, most long-distance movement by infantry was conducted with
helicopters. A helicopter aviation brigade soon was established in Vietnam, controlling up to one
hundred company-sized aviation units, both gunship and transport. Like the "pooled" tank units of
World War II, many of these aviation units became semi-permanently attached to particular infantry
divisions.65 Similarly, helicopter units were often borrowed from the two air assault divisions
operating in-country for temporary use by the infantry. Overall, the helicopter played a vital role in
62 For descriptions of some of the operations of armored units, see Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army, 97-
99, 141-142, 187, 274-278, 304-305; and Sorley, "Adaptation and Impact," 339-52.
63 Diane L. Urbina, "'Lethal Beyond All Expectations': The Bradley Fighting Vehicle," in Camp Colt to Desert
Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces, eds. George F. Hofmann and Donald Starry (Lexington, KY:
University of Kentucky Press, 1999), 404.
64 Currey, With Wings As Eagles, 83-86; and Lt. General John J., Tolson III, Airmobility, 1961-1971, Vietnam Studies
(Washington DC: USGPO, 1973), 25-62.
65 House, Towards Combined Arms Warfare, 164.
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the success of infantry operations in Vietnam, and its successes there help to firmly establish the
aviation community within the Army hierarchy. 66
In the end, though, both armored forces and helicopters in Vietnam were designed solely to
support the infantry. Vietnam, once again, was an infantryman's war. Even more than Korea,
however, the ultimate failure of the United States to bring the war to a favorable conclusion,
combined with U.S. public's eventual disgust with the conflict, proved detrimental to the Army
community most closely identified with it. Unlike Korea, however, even the Army itself turned
against the traditional foot-mobile infantry as the war drew to a close.
POST-VIETNAM AND THE DECADE OF EUROPE
So painful had been the Army's experience in Vietnam that the service spent most of the
1970s, as one author found, engaged in activities designed to deny its experiences in Southeast
Asia.67 Gone from the service schools' curricula was any discussion of counterinsurgency. The
service sponsored few, if any, studies examining the lessons of Vietnam. 68 Indeed, if the Army
drew any lesson at all from Vietnam, it was a simple one of "never again." And this rejection of the
Vietnam experience led the service, in turn, to reject the non-mechanized infantry community who
fought it. As the forces withdrew from Vietnam, most of the infantry divisions were disbanded
upon returning to the states. By the end of the U.S. involvement in the war in 1973, only one of the
four non-mechanized infantry divisions to fight in Vietnam, the 25 ", remained in the active-duty
force. Of the other divisions remaining in the force structure, the 1 st Infantry reverted back to its
66 The Army's heavy reliance on the helicopter did have some negative consequences, however. While helicopter
transport provided the infantry with an advantageous degree of cross-country mobility in the jungles of Vietnam, once
dismounted, the U.S. infantryman was discovered to be frequently less mobile than his communist counterpart.
Moreover, helicopters were of little use at night, when insurgents frequently operated, as well as in poor weather.
Helicopters also required much support and servicing, adding to the problems of the U.S. military's "bloated logistical
tail" in Vietnam. For more on the operational costs of associated with helicopter use, see David Richard Palmer,
Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 142.
67 John P. Lovell, "Vietnam and the U.S. Army: Learning to Cope with Failure," in Democracy Strategy and
Vietnam: Implications for American Policymaking, eds. G. K. Osborn, and others (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1987), 129. One instructor began a course at Fort Benning Infantry School in 1973, with "Now that the Vietnam
experience is behind us .. .;" recollection of Harlan Jencks; quoted in Cecil B. Currey, "How Different Is the Military
Today Because of the Vietnam War?" in Vietnam Reconsidered: Lessons from a War, ed. Harrison E. Salisbury
(New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 288, n. 14.
68 One author found that in 1976 the service's premier profession journal, Military Review, published only thirteen
articles focused on the Vietnam War or unconventional warfare, out of a total of 124 articles published that year;
while thirty-one articles dealt with NATO-related issues or on World War II in Europe. The situation had changed
little by the early 1980s: during the 1981-82 time period, out of 148 articles published in Military Review, forty-
eight articles focused on NATO, Soviet forces in Europe or the World War II European theater; while only nine
discussed unconventional warfare; see Russell F. Weigley, "Reflections on 'Lessons' From Vietnam," in Vietnam as
History: Ten Years After the Paris Peace Accords, ed. Peter Braestrup (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars and University Press of America, January 1984), 115, n. I and 2.
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mechanized infantry status upon its return to Fort Riley, the 1st Cavalry became an experimental
division for a year or so before converting to an armored division, and the 101st retained its
airmobile status.
While the Vietnam War proved disastrous for the traditional infantry, the experience was a
boon to the aviation community. The numbers of helicopters increased from a few hundreds at
the time of the Howze Board to more than twelve thousand by 1970. At that time, the Army had
more active-duty aviators than did the Air Force, while about 26 Army generals and 230 colonels
were drawing flight pay. 69 By the war's end, the community had become a well-established and
coherent union within the service.
As the service withdrew from Vietnam, the Army refocused its efforts on mechanized
warfare in Europe. Besides simply wanting to put the painful experience of Vietnam behind them
and for a host of externally directed factors described in the previous chapter, a number of intra-
service bureaucratic reasons existed as well for the Army's emphasis on Europe. 70 Only in Europe,
for example, did the Army face the prospect of high-intensity, high-attrition combat against a
heavily armed opponent. In this way, the Army could make the best justification for large-scale
procurement programs, with weapons at the cutting edge of technology. Likewise, the European
contingency served as a justification - perhaps the only one available to the Army - for maintaining
a large standing army in peacetime. Without NATO, the Army would have faced much greater cuts
in manpower and budgets than it did following the withdrawal from Vietnam. Moreover, the Army
was already forward deployed in Europe and so, unlike other locations on the globe, not as reliant
on the other services to get to the theater of combat. Finally, the European contingency served as a
useful planning tool, as Secretary of Defense Harold Brown declared later in the decade: "[I]f we
have reasonable confidence of halting [a Warsaw Pact attack in Central Europe], it would be logical
to assume that we have the basic forces to deal with other contingencies of a less demanding
nature." 71
In practice, the Army's return to a European orientation immediately enhanced the intra-
service position of the armor/mechanized infantry "heavy" community. Only by making armor and
mechanized infantry the center of Army development could the service ever hope to fight
outnumbered and win against the massive tank-heavy armies of the Warsaw Pact. The aviation
community quickly adapted as well to the changing strategic focus. As the Vietnam War was
69 Bergerson, Army Gets an Air Force, 121-22.
70 Some of these reasons are discussed by Builder, Masks of War, 187-89.
71 Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington, DC: USGPO,
1978), 87.
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winding down, the Army aviation community shifted its focus from transporting troops to
attacking tank and other armored vehicles; equipping helicopters with a new generation of anti-
tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and adopting nap-of-earth and pop-up flying tactics. 72 The
impact of the service's European focus can be seen in three areas: procurement and force design,
doctrine, and force structure. All served to enhance further the armor/mechanized infantry and
aviation communities, as well as the ever-present artillery branch.
The service's future modernization and procurement effort, formulated in the early 1970s,
focused on armament required for mechanized conflict in Europe. This effort was symbolized by
the "Big Five" modernization program consisting of tanks, APCs, two types of helicopters, and an
air defense gun; though not part of the "Big Five," new self-propelled artillery were also in the
procurement plans. While many of these weapons could be used to support light forces outside of
Europe, they were designed primarily for the demands of a European battlefield. Similarly, the
major thrust of the service's new force design efforts, culminating in Division 86, concentrated on
restructuring armored and mechanized infantry units to take advantage of these soon-to-be acquired
new weapons. And, the Army began experimenting with new types of helicopter formations. The
new anti-armor, helicopter-heavy air cavalry combat brigade (ACCB), for example, was proving its
value in a series of tests held from 1971 through 1973.73
72 These changes partly were in response to doubts raised within the Army about the applicability of Vietnam-era
helicopter tactics to combat environments like Central Europe (with their abundance of modern anti-aircraft
weapons), especially following their poor showing during the Lam Son 719 operation in Laos during 1971. For
more on Lam Son 719 and its effects on helicopter tactics, see Bergerson, Army Gets an Air Force, 139; Keener,
Helicopter Innovation, 39-46; and Tolson, Airmobility, 235-52.
73 These aviation experiments were part of the TRICAP program. In May 1971, the 1st Cavalry Division (recently
returned from Vietnam) was reformed as the experimental TRICAP division. The division, a variant of the ROAD
design, combined an armored brigade (with tank and mechanized infantry units), an airmobile infantry brigade, and an
air cavalry combat brigade (ACCB) - hence the name TRICAP for its combination of three separate capabilities. The
TRICAP concept was designed to see if the airmobile experiences learned in Vietnam could be transferred and extended
to the mid- to high-intensity environments of the Middle East and Europe. After two and a half years of
experimentation, the Army disbanded TRICAP, concluding that while the division could react more quickly and kill
more enemy forces than a standard armor division, it also took more casualties and had a lesser capability for taking and
holding ground than the standard armor division. However, the attack helicopter-heavy ACCB was judged a success,
with substantial anti-armor capability, and was reassigned to be organized as independent organization at the corps-level.
The ACCB concept returned to the division with the Division/Army'86 redesign. For more on the TRICAP division,
see Lewis Bernstein, Army Experimental Formations and Their Possible Influence on the Establishment of the
Force XXI Experimental Force, TRADOC History Conference Workshop (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAC History
Branch, Research Division, Center for Army Lessons Learned, 23 October 1996), 13-16; Combat Studies Institute
Faculty, Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat: A Historical Trend Analysis, CSI Report No. 14 (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Army Command and General Staff College, December 1999), 34-36;
Pat Ford, Edwin H. Burba, Jr. and Richard E. Christ, Review of Division Structure Initiatives (Alexandria, VA:
Human Resources Research Organization, October 1994), 7-8; and Richard W. Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance:
The U.S. Army Division in the Twentieth Century (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 2000), 53-54.
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A great deal of activity was taking place as well in the area of doctrine for mechanized
warfare. Improvements to Warsaw Pact forces, new technological capabilities, and the lessons of
the 1973 Middle East war led the Army to conclude that changes were required in armored warfare
doctrine; doctrine which had previously been based to a large extent on the lessons of World War
11.74 Throughout the decade of the 1970s, the service was consumed with a series of efforts to
rewrite its doctrine for armored/mechanized forces. The first effort led to the Active Defense
concept embodied in the 1976 edition of the service's premier field manual, FM 100-5 Operations.
The extensive criticism and controversy engendered by this doctrine forced the service to undergo a
second re-evaluation of its doctrinal precepts, culminating in the AirLand Battle concept of the 1982
FM 100-5. 75 Both the 1976 and the 1982 versions of FM 100-5, designed to serve as the "bible" for
describing how the Army intended to fight future wars, focused almost exclusively on the
requirements of heavy forces on a European battlefield.
In contrast to the fervor over armored doctrine, efforts to review light infantry doctrine were
practically nonexistent. The new versions of FM 100-5 had little to say about light infantry or about
combat outside of the European theater. The Army's failure in Vietnam caused little reassessment
of its counter-insurgency or light infantry tactical doctrines. Though a few works by military
personnel criticized the service's performance in Vietnam, the official line took the position that
Vietnam was a failure of political leadership more than military tactics, and the tactics themselves
largely were ignored. The 1981 edition of the service's field manual on low-intensity conflict, FM
100-20 Low-Intensity Operations, has been described as "little more than a restatement of FM 31-
16, Counterguerilla Operations, issued in 1967." 76
This same emphasis on the heavy side of the service was evident in the area of force
structure as well. During the 1970s, the Army undertook to convert many of its light infantry forces
to heavier, mechanized formations. To enable the Reserve Components (RC) to better assist the
active-duty Army in Europe, an RC "mechanization process" began as early as fiscal year 1974. At
that time, four reserve brigades - one airborne and three infantry - were converted to two
mechanized infantry and two armored brigades. The conversion of two more RC infantry brigades
to mechanized infantry was planned for fiscal year 1975.77
74 Doughty, Evolution ofArmy Tactical Doctrine, 42-43.
75 See John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development ofArmy Doctrine, 1973-1982,
TRADOC Historical Monograph Series No. 20. (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command, June 1984), 13-73.
76 Krepinevich, Army and Vietnam, 272.
77 Schlesinger, DoD Annual Report to Congress FY75, 99.
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Of the three active-duty divisions reactivated in the mid-1970s, two were standard infantry
while the third was mechanized infantry; as a result, the total number of light divisions in the
sixteen-division active-duty force temporarily rose to seven. A change in the mix of heavy/light
forces, however, was soon planned. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced in January
1976 that "as soon as funds and equipment availability permit, the intent is to convert two active-
duty Army infantry divisions [the 24th and 9th] into heavy divisions," with conversion scheduled for
no sooner than fiscal year 1978.78 When completed, the light side of the Army would consist of one
division apiece of airborne and air assault, and three non-mechanized infantry divisions, one of
which was deployed in Korea. Under this plan, the percentage of heavy to light Army brigades
would be sixty-one to thirty percent. This five-division light force, according to Rumsfeld, "along
with the three active Marine divisions, should be sufficient to meet foreseeable requirements for
predominantly infantry forces."79
Rumsfeld's successor, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, felt that this program of
"heavying-up" the Army failed to go far enough. He declared in his first report to Congress that
after the previously planned conversions (now set to begin during 1979) "our land forces
'light/heavy' mix will remain too light if our primary orientation is to be NATO."80 Furthermore,
he could foresee "other non-European conflicts requiring armored and mechanized units."81 As a
result, the Carter Administration's first Five-Year Defense Program called for the conversion of the
2d Infantry Division, which the administration planned to removed from South Korea, to a
mechanized infantry unit as its components were redeployed to the states. 82 Army planners,
78 Rumsfeld, DoD Annual Report to Congress FY77, 104. One factor driving this conversion of the Army's lighter
standard infantry divisions to heavier mechanized infantry divisions was the development by OSD of a new approach to
comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces based on standard "firepower units" (FPUs), in which a rifle was worth 1
FPU while a tank might be worth 100 FPUs. According to General Meyer, due to the adoption of this approach by the
mid-1970s, OSD had "decided that armored division equivalents was how you evaluated whether or not a division was
worth having in the Army. They were looking at everything in the context of armored division equivalents. Of course,
that meant that you needed more tanks and more firepower and everything else. The thrust and the pressure from OSD
was clearly to have more and more heavy armored divisions." See General Edward C. Meyer, "High Technology Test
Bed/Army Development and Employment Agency Oral History Interview with General (Retired) Edward C. Meyer,
Chief of Staff of the Army, 1979-1983;" interview by Joe D. Huddleston, 13 June 1984; transcript, High Technology
Test Bed/Army Development and Employment Agency Oral History Papers, Archives, U.S. Army Military History
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2 (hereafter cited as "General Meyer interview with Huddleston"). For more on this
method of comparing forces, see Lawrence and Record, US Force Structure in NATO, 105-25; and William W.
Kaufmann, "The Arithmetic of Force Planning," in Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First- Use Question, eds.
John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 208-16.
79 Rumsfeld, DoD Annual Report to Congress FY77, 104.
80 Brown, DoD Annual Report to Congress FY79, 141.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 141-42.
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meanwhile, were considering converting all of the service's non-mechanized standard infantry
divisions to a mechanized format as funds and equipment became available.83 If all of these
planned conversions had been carried out, the percentage of heavy divisions in the Army would
have approached ninety percent of the force structure (fourteen out of sixteen divisions).
Several factors intervened, however, to halt these plans before they were fully implemented.
The 24t Infantry Division was converted to a mechanized force as planned. But the transfer of the
2d Infantry Division from Korea was stopped following an outcry from conservative elements in
Congress and elsewhere; although before these plans were changed, a few of the division's
battalions were redeployed to the United States and converted to mechanized units. Other elements
of the division remaining in Korea also were mechanized, leaving the 2d Division with an unusual,
mixed "heavy/light" structure. The scheduled mechanization of the 9 h Infantry Division was halted
as well when the new Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Meyer, convinced Secretary Brown to
use the division to test new high-technology concepts for a light, highly mobile unit with anti-armor
capability similar to heavy divisions. 84 If successful, the HTLD would serve as a prototype for
additional units. Although this move still would mean the end of the standard non-mechanized
infantry division in the Army's active-duty force structure - the remaining divisions would be
converted to the HTLD format - it did bring a stop to the "heavying-up" of the service. Despite
agreement to examine the HTLD, the final Carter-era Five-Year Program, issued in January 1981,
included adding twelve additional heavy maneuver battalions to the active-duty Army force.85
By the end of the Carter Administration, only seven years after the last U.S. ground forces
withdrew from Vietnam, the traditional foot-mobile infantry community lay in tatters. The
community had been reduced from eight standard infantry divisions (nearly forty percent of the total
active-duty force) at the height of the Vietnam War down to two under-strength divisions (slightly
more than ten percent of the force structure). These remaining divisions, the 25 t stationed in
Hawaii and the 7 t at Fort Ord, CA, were both composed of fewer than two active-duty brigades,
rounded-out for combat by a combination of National Guard and Army Reserve units. Given the
Army's current plans, neither division could expect to remain a standard division for long. No new
83 General Meyer interview with author; and General Edward C. Meyer "Address to the Annual Convention of the
Association of the United States Army, Washington, DC, 14 October 1980"; in E.C. Meyer, General, United States
Army, Chief of Staff June 1979-June 1983, General Edward C. Meyer (Washington DC: US Army Chief of Staff,
1983), 125 (hereafter cited as Meyer, E.C. Meyer, Chief of Staff).
84 General Meyer interview with author.
85 Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington, DC: USGPO,
1979), 142; Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, DC:
USGPO, 1980), 153; and Brown, DoD Annual Report to Congress FY82, 134.
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foot-mobile infantry units were being designed nor was equipment being purchased for such units.
The community was being neglected doctrinally and its experiences in Vietnam ignored.
By contrast, the armor/mechanized infantry community dominated the service's force
structure, with four armored and six mechanized infantry divisions (over sixty percent of the force).
This community, along with the aviation community and the artillery branch, dominated the
service's procurement budgets. A major division design effort was underway emphasizing all three
of these communities, and, in particular, adding major new aviation organizations to the new heavy
division structures. Likewise, the service's doctrinal efforts were all directed at how these new
heavy divisions, and their communities, would fight against other modem, mechanized armies.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION BUILD-UP
This picture changed but little during the early years of the Reagan administration. Despite
growing anti-NATO sentiment in government circles, the Army's European-focused heavy
modernization efforts continued unabated. The service's Big Five programs were just beginning to
enter the procurement phase. The new force designs into which these weapons were to go was also
nearing fruition, with the completion of the Division 86 heavy force design study in 1981.
Additional design studies examining corps and "echelons above corps" structures were begun in late
1979; although these corps and higher echelon designs could be used in any contingency, their
primary focus was on war in Europe.86 Meanwhile, the position of the aviation community was
strengthened further in 1983 when it became an official branch of the service.
While the modernization of the Army's heavy forces moved forward, the position of the
foot-mobile infantry may have reached its lowest point early in the Reagan Administration. Faced
with a cut-back in proposed funds for fiscal year 1982, the administration recommended, late in
1981, reducing the 7th Division to a 5,000-troop cadre status by fiscal year 1983 .87 Though this
measure was quickly rejected, due to opposition from California's congressional delegation and
from the local community around the division's home base in California, this proposal illustrates the
depths to which the traditional infantry had fallen over the previous ten years. 88
Finally, the introduction of the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle deepened the split
between the mechanized infantry and the foot-mobile infantry community. The M113 APC
86 Keller interview with author; and John L. Romjue, A History ofArmy 86, Volume II: The Development of The Light
Division, The Corps, and Echelons Above Corps, November 1979-December 1980 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office,
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1982), 58 and 89.
87 "Cutback of 7th Inf Div Meets Hill Opposition," Army Times, 7 December 1981, 7.
88 Ibid.; Larry Carney, "7th Div Off 'Chopping Block'," Army Times, 25 October 1982, 12; "7th Inf Div to Be
Reorganized Into Light Division in FY'85," Army Times, 12 December 1983, 4.
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essentially had been a battlefield taxi for infantry troops. Commanders needed to concern
themselves with maintaining these vehicles and with handling them properly on the battlefield, and
troops became somewhat bound to their vehicles, but the main role of the M113 was to support the
dismounted infantry. With the coming of the M-2 Bradley, this role was reversed. First, in order to
have room to equip the Bradley with anti-armor weapons such as the Bushmaster gun and TOW
missiles, the number of infantrymen that the new vehicles could transport had to be reduced from
eleven passengers in the M 13 to six passengers and one vehicle commander/dismounted squad
leader in the M-2; the size of the mechanized infantry squad was similarly reduced. More
importantly, commanders of Bradley-equipped units (down to platoon leaders) now were concerned
with how best to place their vehicles to maximize their anti-armor potential, to best put enemy tanks
into "kill sacks." The role of the dismounted infantry, in turn, was reduced to protecting these
vehicles from dismounted enemy troops. Owing to this new emphasis, mechanized infantry officers
became even more tightly bound with the armored brethren in their heavy community.
SPECIAL CASE OF THE ARTILLERY COMMUNITY
The artillery occupies a unique place in the story of the Army's internal politics. Over the
course of the twentieth century, it remained the one unwavering member of the service's ruling
oligarchy. All elements within the service have recognized the vital importance of indirect fire on
the battlefield, reflected in its ubiquitous position in the service's combat organizations. For
example, every Army division and division design since the square-division of World War I has
included an artillery brigade organic to the division. This has provided an abundance of spaces and
command slots for the artillery branch. Since World War I, the Army has had both self-propelled
and towed guns, enabling artillery to accompany both armor and infantry onto the battlefield.8 9
And, the artillery branch has been very good at its mission over the years; providing massive
amounts of accurate and lethal indirect fire on demand. Indeed, this capability was the one most
feared by the German military during World War II.90 And, this capability fit well with the
traditional U.S. preference for substituting firepower for manpower on the battlefield. Throughout
the period examined in this chapter and the three case studies to follow, the artillery community
maintained its place solidly within the Army's oligarchy.
89 Major Albert C. Bole, Towed Versus Self-Propelled Artillery in the Period Prior to 1955: An Historical
Investigation of the Argument in the United States Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Command and General Staff
College (thesis), 1966).
90 See, for instance, Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, 28.
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SUMMARY
Over the course of the twentieth century, the political structure of the U.S. Army has
undergone considerable change. Some of its once dominant communities have seen their influence
decline until they were abolished (the horse cavalry), while others have been created and have seen
their influence grow (the armor and aviation communities). Table 4 illustrates two of the major
trends in the service's political structure through the early 1980s. First, the infantry branch, which
began the period as a single community, splintered into several different factions - mechanized,
motorized, airborne, heli-borne airmobile, and traditional foot-mobile infantry - each with its own
tactical/doctrinal requirements and procurement needs.91 Second, the "heavy" community -
represented by the armor and mechanize infantry - steadily rose to prominence within the service,
while the once-dominant traditional foot-mobile infantry - represented by the standard infantry
division - underwent a decline. Essentially, because of their critical role in the Army's main
mission during the Cold War, the defense of Western Europe, the armor/mechanized infantry
community has been a dominant player in internal Army politics for much of the post-World War II
era. For similar reasons, the field artillery and aviation branches also have been politically strong.
By contrast, the traditional foot-mobile infantry lost power within the service during this period
(except when required to carry the burden of the fighting during the Korean and Vietnam Wars),
reaching a nadir in the post-Vietnam era.
This chapter suggests the following picture of the service's ruling oligarchy over the course
of the twentieth century: During the pre-World War II period, this oligarchy consisted of the three
then-dominant combat arms: infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Following the war, the cavalry saw its
position in the oligarchy taken over by the armor branch, but the traditional infantry and artillery
remained. This picture changed somewhat with the ROAD division reorganization and the
development of mechanized infantry; while the traditional, foot-mobile may have retained their
place in the oligarchy, the armor and mechanized infantry gradually formed a single community.
Following its successes in the Vietnam War, the aviation community joined the oligarchy in the
early 1970s. However, the traditional infantry, reflecting the trauma of Vietnam, lost its dominant
place in that oligarchy. Since that time, the U.S. Army has been ruled by an oligarchy consisting of
three communities: a "heavy" armor/mechanized infantry community, an aviation community, and
the artillery branch.
91 The tactics used by airborne, air assault and traditional infantry tend to have much in common; their major
difference lies in their means for getting to the battlefield.
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Type/Year 1945 1948 1953 1956 1960 1962 1965 1968 1972 1976 1979 1985
HEAVY 16 1 2 5 3 9 9 9 8 9 10 10
Armored 16 1 2 4 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 5
Armored 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0Trng
Mech 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 5 5
LIGHT 73 9 18 15 11 9 10 12 5 7 6 8
Std. 67 8 16 10 6 6 6 8 2 5 3 0Infantry
Std. Infantry 0 0 0 3 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0Trng
Airborne 5 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Air Assault 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
TRICAP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Mixed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1Heavy/Light
HTLD/ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1Motorized
LID LID 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
TOTAL 88 10 20 20 14 18 19 21 13 16 16 18
% Heavy
Divisions 18.2 10 10 25 21.4 50 47.4 42.9 61.5 56.3 62.5 55.6
Source: Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, selected years; Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
selected years; Department of Defense Annual Report, selected years; and International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance, selected years.
Table 4: Heavy-Light Division Mix Among Active-Duty Army Divisions, Selected Years
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CHAPTER FOUR
CASE 1: DIVISION 86
INTRODUCTION
As the U.S. Army's withdrawal from the Vietnam War neared completion, the service
turned back to its community oligarchy and the service's core mission: the defense of the
European Central Front against a heavily-armored Warsaw Pact attack. In response, the service
began a large-scale integrated program combining new doctrine, combat organizations and
weapon systems. The Division 86 design was part of this integrated solution to the problems
presented by high-intensity conflict against a modem armored opponent, specifically Soviet-style
forces in Europe. The Division 86 design clearly fit in well with the Army's community oligarchy
of artillery, aviation, armor and mechanized infantry. According to the framework of intra-
service politics proposed in the opening chapter, when a tactical organization and its mission fall
under the purview of the existing community oligarchy and its dominant combat concept, the
organizational design process should be a major focus of the service's institutional or
developmental component (i.e., so-called the "sustaining base" in the U.S. Army). The process
will likely succeed, producing an effective combat organization that will be the center-piece of
service doctrine and program development efforts. If the framework described here is correct,
then the Army should have devoted considerable time, effort and financial resources to seeing
the design succeed.
ORIGIN OF DIVISION 86
The Division 86 design effort began as a product of several years of careful study and
analysis by the U.S. Army on the nature and characteristics of modem war. It was one element in
an integrated program designed to improve the service's capability to carry out its core mission -
high-intensity armored combat against a modern ground army. The other two elements of this
program were the development and procurement of a host of new weapons systems and a complete
overhaul of the service's principal doctrine.
New Weapons Programs
As the Army began the slow process of recovery from the material and psychological effects
of the Vietnam War, the service returned to a focus on its core mission: defense of Western Europe
along the inner German border. As it did so, many of its officers came to the view that the Army
had failed to keep up with technological advances in weaponry made by the Soviets and others
during the late 1960s. By 1970, many in the Army believed the service to be ten years behind in the
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acquisition of new battlefield systems. No new tanks, tracked infantry vehicles, or artillery were
developed during the whole of the 1960s, with nearly all funds, manpower and equipment going to
the war in Vietnam. As General William DePuy later explained it: "Because of the cost of a
preoccupation with the Vietnam War, the Army lost a generation of modernization."' This
failure to modernize that was so widely decried within the service involved, for the most part,
weapon systems associated with the Army's pre-war dominant communities - armor,
mechanized infantry, and artillery.
The Army did attempt to rectify this situation during the 1960s, but without much success.
Secretary of Defense McNamara helped initiate the joint U.S.-German MBT-70 tank program in the
early sixties, but this effort was terminated in January 1970 amid cost overruns, technical difficulties
and management issues. To replace the MBT-70, Congress began a U.S.-only program, the
XM803, which lasted only one year before being cancelled due to cost and technical concerns. 2
Similarly, the Army began a slow, on-again off-again effort to find an infantry fighting vehicle (also
known as the Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle or MICV) to replace its M113 armored
personnel carrier; an effort that began almost as soon as the M113 began entering the service in
1960.
The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies, meanwhile, engaged in a massive conventional
rearmament effort during the 1960s and early 1970s. They added five new divisions to their forces
in Eastern Europe and moved these forces to bases closer to the Warsaw Pact-NATO border. They
replaced older T-54 and T-55 tanks with modern T-62 and T-72 tanks, and increased the numbers of
tanks in their motorized rifle divisions. The quality and quantity of their self-propelled artillery
improved as well.3 The Soviet army also successfully developed and deployed an infantry fighting
vehicle, the BMP-1, with characteristics nearly identical to those desired by the U.S. Army in its
struggling MICV program.
As the withdrawal from Vietnam began, the Army and its dominant communities attempted
a new round of weapon development programs. In late December 1971, for example, the Army
directed the establishment of a task force to develop the design requirements for a new tank. The
1 General William E. DePuy, "The U.S. Army: Are We Ready for the Future?" Army, September 1978, 24.
2 For more on the Army's struggle with weapon development programs in the 1960s, see Robert J. Sunell, "The
Abrams Tank System," in Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces, eds. George F.
Hofmann and Donald Starry (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1999),432-33; Haworth, The Bradley,
37-56; and Urbina, "'Lethal Beyond All Expectations'," 404-407.
3 Major Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM
100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Papers No. 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, Army Command
and General Staff College, 1988), 5-6.
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task force completed its work the following summer, just as the service officially began its new
tank development effort, known as the XM-1. 4 Progress also occurred in the MICV program,
spurred in part by the Soviet deployment of the BMP-1. In November 1972, the Army awarded
a contract to the FMC Corporation to build seventeen pilot MICV vehicles. At the same time,
the service announced that the MICV program would transition into its engineering development
phase, a stage just short of testing and procurement. 5 Army aviation, meanwhile, continued the
steady progress it had made throughout the 1960s. For example, after one false start, the service
announced a new attack helicopter program, the Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH) in August
1972.6
These and other development efforts eventually generated proposals within the Army for
nine major weapon systems by 1972. In an attempt to coordinate the service's programs before
Capital Hill in the face of shrinking budgets, then Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, General William
DePuy, assembled six general officers - the heads of the Army's materiel command, combat
development, research and development, logistics, operations and aviation organizations - for a
secret, off-site meeting in January 1972. Over the course of several days, these officers debated
and bargained over the service's acquisition programs for the decade of the 1970s. The result
was an agreement to focus on five major weapons programs, known afterwards as the "Big
Five": a tank (XM-1), an infantry fighting vehicle (MICV), a self-propelled (SP) air defense gun
and two helicopters (a troop transporter and an attack helicopter, the AAH). A sixth program
entailed the development of a new 155mm SP howitzer. These programs mapped to the
dominant communities within the service and were to become the central elements of the Army's
effort to fight and win on the modern armored battlefield of Europe. In addition to these
programs, the Army would continue to develop a host of lesser programs, ranging from improved
counter-battery radars to new radios, again designed largely for the high-intensity conflict of the
European battlefield (See Figure 2).
4 Orr Kelly, King of the Killing Zone: The Story of the M-1, America's Super Tank (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1989), 89-109 and 132; and Sunell, "Abrams Tank System," 435.
5 Urbina, "'Lethal Beyond Expectations'," 407.
6 The announcement was made on the same day, 10 August 1972, that the previous attack helicopter program,
known as the Cheyenne, was canceled due to a combination of cost, technological concerns, and Army-Air Force
rivalry. On the Cheyenne program, see Bergerson, Army Gets an Air Force, 122-40; and Robert Donald Snyder,
The Politics of Close Air Support (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (thesis), 1989), 65-84.
7 These systems would eventually be named the M-1 tank, the M-2/M-3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the
Sergeant York air defense gun, the Apache helicopter and the Blackhawk helicopter; see Kelly, King of the Killing
Zone, 87-88.
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* Infantry
- Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle with
Bushmaster (M-2)
- Squad Automatic Weapon
- Improved TOW Vehicle
- Thermal Sights
- Improved 81mm Mortar
* Field Artillery
- TPQ-37 Artillery Locator Radar
- TPQ-36 Mortar Locator Radar
- Cannon-launched Guided Projectile w/ ground laser
designator (COPPERHEAD)
- TacFire Directional System and Battery Computer
- Improved ranges via 155mm M109A1E1/XM-198
and 8-inch gun M11OA1
- Munitions: Scatterable mines and improved anti-tank
conventional munitions
- General Support Rocket System (MLRS)
* Armor
- XM1 Tank
- M60A3 Tank
- Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle Scout (Cav)
(M-3)
- Thermal sites
* Engineer
- Surface Launched Unit, Fuel-Air Explosive
- Rocket-Delivered Mine System
- Combat Engineer Vehicle
- Universal Equipment Tractor
- Ground Emplaced Mine System
- Farmly of Military Engineer Construction Equipment
* Air Defense
- STINGER Missile
- ROLAND Missile
- Air Defense Gun (DIVAD)
- Surface to Air Missile Development (PATRIOT)
- TSO -73 Missile Minder (Radar)
* Aviation
- COBRA/TOW
- Scout w/ Target Acquisition and Designation system
(OH-senes)
- Advanced Scout Helicopter (killed late 70's)
- Advanced Attack Helicopter w/HELLFIRE Missile
(AH-64)
- Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System
(BLACKHAWK)
* C3
- Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
(SINCGARS)
- Tactical Operations System
- TRI-TAC (Joint Tactical Communication) Systems
* Reconaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition,
and Electronic Warfare
- RPVs
- Stand-off Target Acquisition System
- Remotedly Monitored Battlefield Sensor System
- Mohawk Data Transmission System
- Mobile Army Ground Imagery Interpretation Center
- Tactical Jammer
- Multiple Target Electronic Warfare System
Source: John A. Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Volume I: The Development of The Heavy Division (Fort Monroe, VA:
Historical Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1982), 3.
Figure 2: New Army Weapons in Development or Acquisition Mid-1970s
New Doctrine
One of the first goals of the newly-formed TRADOC and its first commander, General
William DePuy (fresh from his assignment as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff), was to provide a better
justification for these weapons development programs before the administration and Congress by
embedding them in a more rational combat development process. In this way, DePuy intended to
make clear the importance of these programs to the Army's ability to win future wars.8 A second
concern for DePuy was the need to improve training within the service, especially for high-intensity
armored combat, which (like most elements of the service) had declined during the Vietnam years.
Both of these factors led TRADOC, in turn, to examine the Army's doctrine, which would serve
both as a justification for these acquisition programs and as a guide for how these new weapons
8 Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 100.
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would fight on the battlefield. Indeed, revising the service's doctrine was TRADOC's first order of
business. Prior to assuming command of TRADOC in May 1973, General DePuy held a meeting
with the Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton Abrams, to prioritize TRADOC's near-term tasks.
At that meeting it "was decided was that TRADOC first would sort out the doctrine for the
Untied States Army." 9
1973 Yom Kippur War
Both the Army's weapon development programs and TRADOC's doctrinal design work
received a major impetus from the service's intensive study and analysis of the 1973 Yom Kippur
War. The war was described by DePuy as "provid[ing] a marvelous excuse or springboard, if you
will, for reviewing and updating our own doctrine." 10 Shortly after the conflict ended, Army
Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams directed TRADOC to examine the war and derive
lessons learned from it concerning the modem battlefield. The official Army study, completed in
the summer of 1974, suggested that modem technology had greatly increased the lethality of direct
fire weaponry (particularly man-portable, anti-tank weapons), the tempo of battle, and the
consumption of materiel. These, in turn, required better training, newer tactics, and improved
combined arms coordination if the Army was to defend successfully against a Warsaw Pact attack
on the plains of Central Europe."
General DePuy wrote a briefing on the implications of the Yom Kippur War nearly six
months prior to the completion of the official study. 12 In his briefing, DePuy was much more
explicit regarding the implications of the war for the Army's Big Five and other acquisition
programs, finding in its lessons a justification for most of the Army's programs:
The fact of the matter is, the tank today is the single most
important weapon on the mechanized battlefield. There is not
doubt about it. ... However, the tank can't do it alone. 13
9 Colonel Edwin G. Scribner, "Doctrine Development by TRADOC, May 1973 - December 1979," unpublished
manuscript, TRADOC Historical Office (THO), Fort Monroe, VA; quoted in Sheehan, Preparing for an Imaginary
War, 167, n. 23. Also present at the meeting was Major General Donn Starry, who was to soon play major roles in
both the development of doctrine and in the Division/Army 86 design process.
10 Brownlee and Mullen, Changing an Army, 190.
11 John L. Romjue, A History of Army 86, Volume I: The Development of The Heavy Division (Fort Monroe, VA:
Historical Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1982), 2.
12 DePuy's results differed little from the official lessons learned published nearly six month later, leading some
scholars, such as Kevin Sheehan, to suggest that the entire exercise was nothing more than a confirmation of
DePuy's already established beliefs on modern warfare; see Sheehan, Preparing for an Imaginary War, 170-71.
13 General William E. DePuy, "Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine and Systems,"
[n.d.] in Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy, General William E. DePuy, compiled by Colonel Richard
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And later,
... along with the tanks, we must have infantry [specifically
mechanized infantry and a MICV], and along with the tanks we
must have artillery, either to fire on and destroy targets or to fire
smoke for obscuration. We need air defense weapons along so that
our tank attack will not be destroyed by enemy air. 14
He went on to describe in detail how the war demonstrated the need for the XM-1 tank, the
MICV, the improved 155mm SP howitzer, and the SP air defense gun. And when the war failed
to provide evidence supporting a specific Army program, or even contradicted the need for such
a program, DePuy simply asserted that the battlefield system would necessary in the European
context. For example, in the case of the attack helicopter, which played no role in the 1973 War,
DePuy wrote:
We are convinced that the high mobility of the attack helicopter
equipped with an anti-tank guided missile system may prove to be
critical to the execution of that kind of an active and mobile
defense I have just described. 15
The Army's study of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, therefore, served several purposes. First, it
was used to provide a justification for weapons programs the Army already had decided to
purchase. Second, it was yet another factor leading the Army to rewrite its tactical doctrine or, at a
minimum, it was used by the Army for justifying this activity. 16
The combination of new weapons and new doctrine gave rise, in turn, to the need for a new
combat organization. But before turning to this new organization design, we must first examine the
development of the doctrine with which it was so closely integrated.
Active Defense
Elements of a new doctrine can be seen prior to the 1973 War, but the effort to develop such
a doctrine truly got underway in 1974, resulting in the rewriting of the Army's key doctrinal
manual, FM 100-5, Operations. An initial draft of the manual by TRADOC's officially-designated
doctrinal development organization, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,
proved unacceptable to General DePuy. In response, he personally took the lead in rewriting FM
M. Swain, and edited by Donald L. Gilmore and Carolyn D. Conway (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
Institute, Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), 86. (Hereafter cited as DePuy, Selected Papers)
14 Ibid., 88.
15 Ibid., 94.
16 See Saul Bronfeld, "Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur War on the U.S. Army," The Journal
of Military History 71 (April 2007): 488-89.
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100-5, with the help of a small coterie of officers. The resulting document, which laid out the tenets
of what would become known as Active Defense, focused solely on the proper application of
firepower on the NATO battlefield. Among its key points, the doctrine declared that the Army
needed to prepare to fight and win in Europe while outnumbered. Moreover, the next war would
likely be a "come as you are" affair, requiring the Army to be ready to successfully fight the "First
Battle." The concentration of combat power was, according to the doctrine, the key to success on
the modem battlefield. It was in this context that maneuver and mobility became important; these
qualities allowed armies to concentrate combat power and move to best deliver firepower. While
not excluding offense, it stressed the advantages provided by modem weaponry to the defender.
Indeed, FM 100-5 stated that one purpose (and a new one for the U.S. Army) of the defense was to
"force the enemy to mass so that he is more vulnerable to our firepower."' 7 Just as important as the
details of the doctrine is the process by which that doctrine was written; specifically, the issue of
who was included in and who was excluded from the doctrine-writing process. In short, the process
was dominated by the armor community.
Ironically, in light of what was to come, the earliest effort at a post-Vietnam doctrinal
revision was undertaken by the Infantry School. During the period 1972-73, the Infantry School
developed a doctrine for Europe that attempted to extend the experiences of Vietnam onto the
European battlefield and to maintain a dominant role for infantry on that battlefield. Known as the
"force-oriented" defense, it called for using small infantry units to draw enemy forces into kill
zones, and then withdrawing to the next set of kill zones before the units were decisively engaged
with the enemy - described as "trading space for casualties." Only after the enemy forces were
depleted enough that they no longer possessed superior combat power were armored forces to be
brought in to conduct successive counterattacks. Heavily promoted by the Infantry School, this
concept was rejected by DePuy, "who declared that it had 'no standing in TRADOC." '' 8 It
contributed to DePuy's view that the Infantry School was stuck in the past, tied too closely to a foot-
17 U.S. Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual (FM) 100-5 (Washington, DC: Headquarters
Department of the Army, 1976) p. 5-1.
18 Quoted in Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 79. Herbert describes one article on the force-oriented
concept as "a none-too-subtle message to the armor community that the infantry 'forms the nucleus of the Army's
fighting strength around which the other arms and services are grouped';" Ibid., n. 1; and Maj General Orwin C.
Talbott, "The Role of Mechanized Infantry," Armor 82, no. 2 (March-April 1973): 9-12; quoted in Ibid. For more
on the "force-oriented" concept, see Doughty, Evolution of Army Tactical Doctrine, 42-43; Lt. Colonel Robert
Carmichael and Major Joseph Keyes, Carmichael, Lt. Colonel Robert and Major Joseph Keyes, "Defense Requires
Mobility," Infantry 62, no. 2 (March-April 1972): 40-42; Lt. Colonel Robert Carmichael, "Force-Oriented
Defense," Infantry 62, no. 3 (May-June 1972): 20-22; Major Joseph Keyes, "Tactics for the Force-Oriented
Defense," Infantry 62, no. 4 (July-August 1972): 23-27; and Captain Robert B. Killebrew, "Force-Oriented
Defense," Infantry 63, no. 3 (May-June 1973): 40-43
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mobile infantry tradition, and unable to adjust to the new combat situation facing the Army in
Central Europe.
In response, as early as March 1974, DePuy began shifting more responsibilities for
mechanized infantry development to the Armor School and its commandant, General Donn Starry.
DePuy began giving the Armor School the task of developing the plans and orders for both armor
and mechanized infantry brigades to be used in combat modeling efforts directed towards the
writing of new training circulars. When the Infantry School protested that they were thereby losing
proponency for mechanized infantry, DePuy responded with a letter in early May laying out the two
schools' responsibilities. While the Infantry School retained responsibility for writing training
circulars for infantry, airborne, and airmobile battalions, and were to assist Fort Knox in
mechanized efforts, DePuy specifically assigned the Armor School the task of writing training
circulars for both armor and mechanized infantry brigades. DePuy's explicit rational for this
assignment was that the Armor School was the Army's "repository of professionalism on the
employment of brigades composed mainly of tracked vehicles." 19
When the effort to write new training circulars turned into the development of new Army
doctrine a short time later, the armor community retained its primacy in the process. General Starry
and the U.S. Army Armor Center were given the lead role among the small group of officers
rewriting FM 100-5. In part this occurred because DePuy believed that future wars in the Central
Europe and the Middle East would be primarily tank battles and that tankers, therefore, should have
the leading role in developing the doctrine. But, the Infantry School and Center also were perceived
by DePuy as being unable to disengage completely from a ten-year experience with infantry-
dominated war in Vietnam. As General DePuy stated in a later interview:
I wanted the Infantry School to get away from the 2 V2 mph
mentality, but they were in the hands of light infantrymen...they
didn't do the mech infantry well at all. They didn't understand
it...that is why I took these draconian measures with them. To
shake them out of that lethargy."2 0
19 DePuy to Commandant - USAARMS, Commandant - USAIS and Commandant - USACBSC, "Brigade
Proponency," 8 May 1974, DePuy Papers; quoted in Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 40, n. 7. For more on
this, see Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done, 39-41. Essentially, DePuy was returning to the days of the
armored infantry.
20 DePuy interview with Major Paul H. Herbert, West Point, NY 1 June 1984; quoted in Herbert, Deciding What
Has to Be Done, 41. n. 9. For more on the problems of the Infantry School and mechanized infantry during this
period, see Urbina, "'Lethal Beyond Expectations'," 410.
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By the fall of 1975, a draft of the new doctrinal manual was ready. As a product largely of
the armor community, it focused exclusively on armored warfare. As DePuy wrote in a letter to the
Army Chief of Staff, General Fred Weyand:
Basically, we are involved in moving from a 'Dismounted
Infantry' oriented doctrine to an 'Armored' doctrine, with the
Infantry, Artillery and Air Defense in support of tanks in both the
offense and defense. 21
The combined "heavy" community of armor and mechanized infantry lay at the heart of this
effort. As DePuy described in the letter just quoted:
The Tank/Mech Infantry team, supported by SP Artillery and SP
Air Defense weapons, is the core element of Army fighting power.
It is the Army's equivalent of the Navy's Carrier Task Forces.22
However, while the manual and the doctrine it described had no role for traditional foot-
mobile infantry, it did find room for the aviation community. In the October of 1975, TRADOC
conducted a conference with Forces Command (FORSCOM) to gain their acceptance of the new
doctrine. FORSCOM, with responsibility for most of the infantry, airborne and airmobile units
within the Army, complained about the absence of helicopters and heli-borne tactics. FORSCOM's
displeasure, perhaps combined with a recognition that two of the Big Five systems were helicopters,
led TRADOC to include aviation and airmobile tactics in the final version of the manual - the 1976
edition of FM 100-5 Operations. Indeed the manual went so far as to state that: "The airmobile
concept is the most dramatic organizational advance in the U.S. Army." 23
The Active Defense doctrine's emphasis on armored warfare and the delivery of
maximum firepower to the battle drove the key elements of its associated combat organization
design, the prelude to Division 86. Moreover, the characteristics of the doctrine design process -
development by a small group of officers, largely drawn from the armored community and
personally led by General DePuy; a very constrained role for the infantry branch in the process;
and operating on a very rapid schedule - were to be repeated in the development of the new
division design.
21 Letter to Army CoS General Frey Weyand from DePuy dated 29 April 1975 (letter no. 11) in DePuy, Selected
Papers, 161.
22 Ibid., 162.
23 FM 100-5, Operations (1976), p. 2-30. For more on this episode, see Roger J. Spiller "In the Shadow of the
Dragon: Doctrine and the US Army After Vietnam," RUSI Journal 142, no. 6 (December 1997). 50-51.
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Division Restructuring Study
The development of new weapons and a new doctrine for employing them led to an
examination of new combat organizations and structures. The process began when the Army Chief
of Staff, General Fred Weyand, suggested to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans (DCSOP) that the ROAD division structures needed to be reviewed in light of new
technologies. Weyand specifically was concerned that weapons recently had been added to the
ROAD divisions in an ad hoc manner, increasing the divisions' weight and complexity while
reducing their flexibility. The suggestion was passed on to General DePuy for review. 24 After
six month of analysis by DePuy and (again) a small group officers within TRADOC
Headquarters, DePuy wrote back to General Weyand in October stating the need for a new
division structure based on weapon systems expected to be deployed during the 1970s and
utilizing the newest tactics and doctrine (i.e., Active Defense). Other factors driving the need for
a new division design which DePuy spoke of later, included lessons learned from the 1973 War
and the observation that the current organization placed too great a burden on company
commanders.
A further discussion of this last point is warranted, because it became a key driver of
several elements of new division design. In the then current ROAD division design, the
company was the lowest point at which different types of arms were combined; e.g., a company
task force might be formed by attaching a tank platoon to an infantry company. Moreover,
companies typically contained maintenance units as well. DePuy felt that this was a very heavy
burden to place on inexperienced company commanders with very little staff support,
particularly for officers coming out of the Reserve Component side of the Army (recall this was
the time of the initiation of the Army's Total Force program). This problem was only expected
to become worse as new, more complex weapons systems entered the Army's inventory. Based
on these concerns, designers decided to make the battalion the lowest level of combined arms
organization (the battalion commander having more experience and staff support than his
company-level counterpart) and to move maintenance and other support functions up a level to
the battalion. 25
The Army formally authorized TRADOC to begin the resulting Division Restructuring
Study (DRS) in March of 1976. As was typical of DePuy, the DRS was undertaken by a small
24 John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, Army Lineage
Series (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1998. Reprint, Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 380.
25 Brownlee and Mullen, Changing an Army, 175-79; Combat Studies Institute Faculty, Sixty Years of Reorganizing
for Combat, 38; and Ford, Burba and Christ, Review of Division Structure Initiatives, 8.
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group of officers at TRADOC's headquarters under his personal control. Similar to the process by
which FM 100-5 was written, General DePuy solicited little outside input from other elements of
the Army or TRADOC. In line with the developing Active Defense doctrinal concepts, the DRS
emphasized bringing maximum firepower forward at the proper place and time on the battlefield. In
addition, the study assumed that the greater dispersion found on the modem battlefield required
greater mobility, and that the combination of greater mobility and greater firepower (as
demonstrated during the 1973 October War) required greater command and control. 26 The study
only examined armored and mechanized divisions, recommending a single heavy division type to
replace both divisions. Some of the changes recommended by the study were carried over into the
Division 86 effort; these included: smaller-sized and single-purpose companies, smaller but more
numerous battalions, and the integration of combined arms at the battalion rather the company
level.27 All these changes were aimed at making maximum use of the vast increase in firepower
expected soon to be available to the Army's heavy divisions with the introduction of the new
weapon systems in the inventory.
Oddly, however, given the overall emphasis on increasing firepower, the study also
recommended cutting the number of tanks within the tank platoon from five down to three and
reducing the number of personnel in the mechanized infantry companies. The former action was
recommended in the interest of improving command and control. The latter cut was necessitated by
the reduction in available passenger space afforded by the new M-2 infantry fighting vehicle. DRS
planners felt, however, that the additional firepower carried by the M-2 vehicle itself (versus that
found on the M113) would more than make up for the loss of dismounted infantry.
A preliminary DRS design (see Figure 3) was completed in less than two years and
approved by Army Chief of Staff General Bernard Rogers in January 1977. At the same time,
General Rogers approved designating the 1st Cavalry Division as the test unit for the new concepts.
A two year test and evaluation process was established, known as the Division Restructuring
Evaluation (DRE). A final review of the division concept was scheduled for October 1979. 28
26 Romjue, History of Army 86, Vol. 1, 4 ; Combat Studies Institute Faculty, Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat,
40; and Ford, Burba and Christ, Review of Division Structure Initiatives, 8. On the elements of Active Defense, see
Doughty, Evolution of Army Tactical Doctrine, 45-46; and Sheehan, Preparing for an Imaginary War, 154-64.
27 Major Glenn M. Harned, The Principles of Tactical Organization and Their Impact on Force Design in the US
Army, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College
(thesis), 1985), 18; and Ford, Burba, and Christ, Review of Division Structure Initiatives, 9.
28 The final schedule for testing was not approved until September of 1977; see Romjue, History of Army 86, Vol. 1,
10.
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Source: Division Restructuring Study, Phase I Report, Vol. 1 (1 March 1977), p. A-2; quoted in Romjue, History of
Army 86, Volume I: The Development of The Heavy Division (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, United States
Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1982), 5.
Figure 3: Conceptual Heavy Division/Division Restructuring Study
However, the DRS design swiftly came under attack from a variety of quarters after it was
unveiled for service-wide review. It was criticized for failing to utilize the capabilities of the new
weapons to their fullest, as well as for being too fragile for modem warfare.29 Indeed, the 1 st Cav
testing program quickly revealed that the DRS design was not robust enough for sustained combat
in a European scenario. 30 The Active Defense doctrine underlying the design also was roundly
criticized both inside and outside the service for purportedly promoting a static defense posture over
offensive maneuver, for focusing too heavily on tactics (what with the doctrine's emphasis on
"servicing" targets with maximum firepower) at the expense of the operational level of war. Critics
also claimed that the doctrine focused on deferring defeat rather than assuring success; it was said
29 See, for instance, Ibid., 9-10; and Capt Stephen N. Magyera, Jr., "Troubleshooting the New Division
Organization," Military Review 57, no. 7 (July 1977): 53-60.
30 Harned, Principles of Tactical Organization, 18.
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that the doctrine focused so exclusively on the "first battle" that the Army was likely to lose the
second or third battle. 31 Perhaps as important for the immediate future of the DRS design, General
DePuy retired from the service shortly after its development stage was completed.
Indeed, some of the biggest doubts were raised by General DePuy's successor at TRADOC,
General Donn A. Starry, who came to question the entire DRS design as well as the much criticized
doctrinal concepts underlying it. In particular, the new TRADOC commander was concerned about
the failure of the Active Defense doctrine to emphasize attacks on Soviet second echelon forces. By
attacking these forces, Starry hoped to provide U.S. ground forces with an opportunity to maneuver
against attacking forces, and to move away from the more "static" elements of Active Defense. In
addition, General Starry criticized the manner in which Active Defense and DRS had been
designed. He felt that they lacked support within the Army overall because they had been produced
too quickly by a small group of officers isolated at Fort Monroe (TRADOC Headquarters) and,
consequently, that the initial concepts had been inadequately analyzed and tested. And, because it
had been developed without input from the service's schools and centers, DRS - like Active
Defense - had failed to develop sufficient political backing within the Army. 32
As a result of these criticisms, the DRS project soon took a back seat to a new heavy
division design effort - Division 86. However, testing of the DRS design continued at Fort Hood
until mid-1979. And the DRS design work was not wasted; besides adapting some of the DRS
concepts, Division 86 used the DRS design as a baseline for comparing new designs. 33
DESIGNING DIVISION 86
AirLand Battle Doctrine and Division 86
Operational Concepts
Between his tenure as head of the Armor School and becoming commander of TRADOC,
General Starry spent a tour in Europe as commander of the Army's V Corps. He brought his
experiences from that command to bear in both the fields of doctrinal development and force
31 The fledging civilian Defense Reform Movement was a particularly vociferous critic of Active Defense. For
more on these criticism, see Romjue, From Active Defense, 13-21; Richard Hart Sinnreich, "Strategic Implications
of Doctrinal Change: A Case Analysis," in Military Strategy in Transition: Defense and Deterrence in the 1980s,
eds. Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 45-49; Shimon Naveh, In
Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory, Cummings Center Series (London: Frank
Cass, 1997); and Spiller, "In the Shadow of the Dragon," 51-52.
32 Romjue, From Active Defense, 11. Starry's criticism was somewhat ironic given the fact that he had been one of
the leading figures in that small coterie of officers; see Spiller, "In the Shadow of the Dragon," 48-51.
33 Keller interview with author.
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design. Indeed, the efforts to develop a new doctrine, which eventually became known as AirLand
Battle and led to another revision of FM 100-5, went hand-in-hand with the new heavy division
redesign work under Division 86. Although the manual was completed a year after Division 86
received formal approval, the concepts developed for and which underlay the new doctrine also
formed the basis for the division design work.
Consistent with his criticism of the Active Defense and DRS development processes, Starry
strove to make both the doctrinal and division redesign efforts as inclusive as possible; moving
much of the work outside of TRADOC Headquarters, and including all the TRADOC organizations
and much of the remainder of institutional Army early on in both efforts. Starry's ambitions in
force development, moreover, went beyond simply designing a new type of heavy division.
Instead, he developed and attempted to institutionalize a new permanent force structure design
process. 34 According to Starry, doctrine writers and force designers needed to be guided by a
common vision of the battlefield, a vision defined by operational concepts and battlefield functions.
Consequently, both the doctrinal and the division redesign work were driven by a pair of operational
concepts: Central Battle and Force Generation.
From the beginning of his tenure as TRADOC commander, Starry had frequent discussions
with his staff on the concept of the Central Battle. This notion, enlarging on the Active Defense's
concept of the "First Battle," was initially developed and examined by Starry and his staff at V
Corps in Europe. Seen as the location on the battlefield where all combat and combat support
systems interacted, the Central Battle was defined as
the collision of battalions and brigades in a decisive battle....It
consists of tank-antitank, mechanized, and dismounted infantry
combat, supported by artillery, air defense, close air support,
helicopters, engineers, electronic warfare, command-control-
communications, and essential logistic support. It is characterized by
the integration of all air and ground systems and the decisiveness of
the outcome.35
Early on, Starry gave TRADOC the task of delineating and describing the elements of the Central
Battle. To begin, he had his planners in the Combat Development Analysis Directorate develop a
framework for envisioning a combat operation, and create a methodology for both the doctrinal and
combat development processes.36
34 The process eventually became known as the concept based requirement methodology.
35 Ltr ATCD-PD, TRADOC to distr, 17 Nov 78, subj: Battlefield Development Plan (SECRET -Info used is
UNCLASSIFIED); quoted in Romjue, History of Army 86, Vol. 1, 15, n. 6. Also see Romjue, From Active Defense,
23-24; Harned, Principles of Tactical Organization, 18 and Naveh, Pursuit of Military Excellence, 291.
36 Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Vol. 1, 13; and Naveh, Pursuit of Military Excellence, 290.
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The second concept, Force Generation, arose from the Directorate's attempt to development
a conceptual framework for future combat, as planners confronted the problem of what to do after
the initial Central Battle had been successfully fought. Specifically, how could NATO commanders
prevent the Warsaw Pact from continually throwing wave after wave of combat units into the
Central Battle, until friendly forces simply were overwhelmed? NATO might be able to win the
first Central Battle, but what about the second, third or fourth Central Battle? Force Generation
confronted this problem by interdicting enemy second echelon forces before they reached the
battlefield, and by preparing friendly forces to engage successfully in the next Central Battle.
According to TRADOC planners, while
"Central Battle focuses on combat effectiveness, Force Generation
concentrates combat power at the decisive time and place in order to
win Central Battles. It also impedes the enemy's ability to do the
same thing.37
By the close of 1977, the Combat Development Analysis Directorate had completed its
second task - the development of doctrinal and force design methodology. Known as the
Battlefield Development Plan (BDP), its purpose was to develop a set of concepts about future
warfare which could be used to guide doctrinal development, procurement, and division force
design over the short, medium and long-term. As outlined, the process began by determining the
operational implications of Central Battle and Force Generation. Employing a multi-attribute utility
model, the BDP then examined the differences between the close-in (Central Battle) and deep
battles (Force Generation) as well as indicated means for integrating the two battle areas into a
unified operational maneuver plan. The process assisted doctrinal development by identifying
operational and tactical opportunities provided by new technologies. At the same time, planners
hoped that it would aid the acquisition process by suggesting preferred directions for technological
development and help set acquisition priorities. Finally, it set out the functions and tasks required of
combat organizations, considered by Starry to be the initial step in any division design effort. Once
these functions and tasks were identified, organizations could be developed to carry out these roles,
and the organizations then combined into a coherent division design. Through the BDP process, the
Army would be able to make periodic adjustments to any of its division structures, build support for
these new designs throughout the service, and allow TRADOC headquarters to maintain ultimate
control over the process. 38
37 Ltr ATCD-PD, TRADOC to distr, 17 Nov 78, subj: Battlefield Development Plan (SECRET -Info used is
UNCLASSIFIED); quoted in Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Vol. 1, 15, n. 7. Also see Romjue, From Active Defense,
26-27; and Harned, Principles of Tactical Organization, 19.
38 Naveh, Pursuit of Military Excellence, 290; Romjue, History of Army 86, Vol. 1, 16-17; and Combat Studies
Institute Faculty, Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat, 42. The BDP process was very similar to the Force
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The Directorate would spend most of the first half of 1978 fleshing out the BDP, which
would become the conceptual framework for Division 86 and its associated studies. The main result
for division design purposes was the identification of ten functions or critical tasks of battle, five for
each of the two operational concepts. Consistent with its emphasis on combat effectiveness, the
tasks identified for success in the Central Battle were:
1. Target Servicing - Destruction or neutralization of enemy firepower in the
central battle, with special emphasis on countering tanks and antitank guided
missiles;
2. Suppression/Counterfire - Destruction or neutralization of enemy indirect
fire systems, command-control and communications, and support systems;
3. Air Defense - Destruction or neutralization of the enemy air threat;
4. Logistical Support - Provision of supplies and services necessary to support
the forces in the central battle;
5. Command-Control and Communications/Electronic Warfare.
Reflecting the deep attack nature of Force Generation, the tasks under this concept were:
1. Interdiction - Attack of enemy second echelon forces, including first and
second divisions and their supporting elements not involved in the central
battle;
2. Surveillance/Fusion - Provision of target information both for interdiction
operations and for use in the main battle;
3. Force Generation - Movement designed to concentrate or reallocate
firepower on the battlefield;
4. Reconstitution - Preparation for the next central battle through the
regeneration of forces and the materiel resources required by those forces;
5. Command-Control and Communications. 39
TRADOC planners envisioned that all aspects of combat could be encompassed by these ten tasks.
They were to serve as the functions around which the Division 86 designs were organized.
Division 86 Study Directive
With a methodological framework in place, Starry announced the initiation of the Division
86 Study at the August 1978 TRADOC Commander's Conference. It was scheduled for completion
Development Plan (FDP) developed in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development before that
office was eliminated in the early 1970's. General Starry had been the Director of Plans and Programs in the Office
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, and had been assigned to develop the FDP; Brownlee and Mullen,
Changing an Army, 119.
39 These ten functions are described in more detail in Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Vol. 1, 30-34.
168
by October 1979. The study was presented as an extension of DRS design process and would build
on the results of that effort. Consequently, the main testing portion of the DRE, which was then
entering its second phase (i.e., testing at the brigade level), would continue. So too would the third
and final phase of the DRE, involving extensive wargaming and evaluation of the complete DRS
division by TRADOC's Combined Arms Command (CAC) and the others; scheduled for
completion by the end of 1978. The target year of 1986 was chosen for the new study for
essentially three reasons: it was the last year for which reasonable estimates could be made of the
Soviet threat, it best fit with the Army's budgetary planning, and it was the year in which it was
expected that most of the Big Five and other currently programmed weapons acquisition programs
would be nearing completion.
Using the BDP as a basis, Division 86 got underway in October 1978. Task forces were
formed around the BDP's ten functional areas (i.e., the "critical tasks"), involving all elements of
TRADOC's schools and centers, as well as representation from the Army's materiel and research
and development communities under DARCOM. CAC performed the role of overseeing and
merging the multifarious results from the various task forces. TRADOC's Systems Analysis
Activity (TRASANA) was assigned responsibility for aiding CAC with a complex set of analytical
tools. Through systems analysis and wargaming, alternative divisional component designs could be
compared to access their capabilities for performing the ten "critical tasks," with shortfalls identified
and corrected.
On 31 October, TRADOC issued the Division 86 Study Directive laying down the general
principles for the division redesign. According to this document the objectives of the study were
six-fold:
1. Develop operational concepts which will take advantage of the increased
combat power of new materiel systems.
2. Build a balanced division team: develop effective combined arms
interdependence.
3. Organize to facilitate management control and execution of the division's
central battle and force generation tasks: reduced and simplify the tactical,
technical, and training responsibilities of all echelons of the division.
4. Organize to exploit the new systems: provide skilled teams to handle the
division's new equipment and to integrate combat functions of systems
and units.
5. Develop sub-element and/or personnel redundancy for critical control
functions or for key combat tasks.
6. Plan the transition to the new division.40
40 Ltr ATCD-AN, General Starry to Cdr, USACAC, 31 Oct 78, Subj: Cmbt Dev Study Directive: Div 86; quoted in
Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Vol. 1, 21.
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The directive also specified that the service's officially sanctioned "European Scenarios" would be
the only scenarios used for testing the resulting Division 86 organizations.
The first of three Division 86 general officer workshops was held on 29-30 November 1978
at Fort Leavenworth. The overall purpose of these workshops was to review and assess progress on
the design effort, approve study products and recommend changes, and help sort out conflicts and
outstanding issues between CAC and the task forces. The operational concept for the design,
developed by CAC over the previous two months, was approved at this first meeting, as was the
outline of the analytical approach to be taken in the study. According to the approved Operational
Concept, the Division 86 Study was
the force development and modernization process that will develop
the organization and doctrine needed to integrate into the force the
new weapon systems of the 1980s and to optimize their
employment. Division 86 will provide an organizational base
against which to measure the relative effectiveness of follow-on or
improved weapons systems/mix. The development will include
tactical concepts upon which to base future doctrine, a base to
develop training programs, and a framework within which to
perform force structuring trade-off analysis. Division 86 is the
beginning of the process to bring concepts, organizations, tactics,
training, and weapons systems together in a functional manner."41
The operational concept made clear that the division was to be focused on the defense of Western
Europe from attack by Warsaw Pact forces. The main mission of the resulting heavy division was
to carry out its offensive and defensive tasks as part of a Corps
committed to CENTAG [Central Army Group] or NORTHAG
[Northern Army Group] within the NATO Alliance. In this
context the Heavy Division 86 must be able to destroy its share of
the enemy weapons systems committed to the central battle within
the Corps sector. More specifically, Division 86 must be able to
accomplish the following:
a. In the offensive: Destroy enemy security and main
defensive belt forces within its zone of attack.
b. In the defense: Destroy enemy 1st and 2 nd echelon
divisions entering the battle area.4 2
41 Ltr ATCD-D-A, General Donn A. Starry to distr, 13 November 1978, subj: Operational Concept for Division 86
(CONFIDENTIAL - Info used is UNCLASSIFIED); quoted in Romjue, History of Army 86, Vol. 1, 25-26, n. 13.
42 Operational Concept for Division 86, 13 November 1978 (CONFIDENTIAL - Info used is UNCLASSIFIED);
quoted in Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Vol. 1, 26, n. 14.
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Based upon the results of this meeting, the task forces began designing their respective
organizations.
Division 86 Study and Analysis Plans
A Division 86 study plan published on 15 December 1978 again laid out the basic
methodology to be followed: the breakdown and design of individual components of the division
around specific functions and sub-functions as defined by the BDP, and then the recombining of
those elements back into a full division. The effort was divided into three phases. During the
development phase, lasting from December 1978 to May 1979, the task forces would develop the
component organizations and assess their performance against the respective battlefield functions.
CAC, in turn, would take the inputs from the task forces and conduct force structure trade-offs of
the individual components, followed by the analysis of complete divisions. During the evaluation
and synthesis phase, scheduled for June to September 1979, the main activities involved the conduct
of division wargames intended to examine supportability, cost and relative effectiveness. The
approved organizational inputs (the structure of subunits, their number, and the types of personnel
and equipment contained in them) for these wargames were to be provided by the task forces.
Finally, a transition planning phase was scheduled for October 1979 through December 1980 during
which the elements of TRADOC would determine, among other things, how and when units would
be manned, equipped and restructured for the approved Division 86.
Underlying all phases of this work was an intensive and elaborate series of analytical efforts,
described as "unprecedented in the Army's reorganizations of its field units."43 These efforts
were described and refined by TRADOC's Combat Developments Analysis Directorate in late
1978. They included a variety of analytical methodologies, computer modeling, wargaming and
field testing at every level of the division organization. The models employed ranged from those
examining weapon system effectiveness to communications to logistics. Cost-effectiveness
analyses were performed comparing the ROAD division to the proposed Division 86 structures. 44
Eventually, facilities at Britain's Royal Armaments Research and Development Establishment were
employed as well in modeling elements of the division. The analysis effort was so extensive that a
separate subgroup was formed simply to coordinate and review the models and analytical
methodologies employed during the study. The subgroup, with a wide-ranging membership
including TRADOC Headquarters, all the TRADOC schools, CAC, Army Materiel Systems
43 Romjue, History of Army 86, Vol. 1, 41.
44 See, for instance, Gerald Martin, Cost/Cost Effectiveness Analysis Division 86. Presentation to the Sixteenth
Annual Department of Defense Cost Analysis Symposium, 4-7 October 1981 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army
Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, 1981).
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Analysis Agency, DARCOM, the Department of the Army, and the Air Force, met four times over a
six-month period. Figure 4 illustrates the complexity of the analysis program for the Division 86
design process.
Designing Division 86
During the first quarter of 1979, CAC and the task forces developed and refined the
Division 86 operational concept and developed an initial set of organizational concepts. These were
first presented at the second general officer workshop, held 4-5 April 1979. Among the conceptual
features of the heavy division outlined at this conference were:
* Maximize firepower forward
* Enable the division to attack second echelon regiments of
enemy divisions engaged and second echelon divisions not
yet engaged
* Improve command and control through a variety of means
including increase the 'leader-to-led' ratio
* Improve combined arms integration
* Improve indirect fire support and air defense
* Employ smaller, less complex and single-arm companies and
platoons45
Also introduced was the innovative concept of "Robustness-Resiliency-Redundancy" (R3). This
concept derived from the view of the designers that modem technologies would now require that
combat units be capable of fighting around the clock. R3 was defined as "the ability of a unit to
withstand attrition and take part in continuous operations and still fight effectively in the central
battle." 46 Losses due both to fatigue and combat casualties were included in the concept. The types
of staff and support personnel critical to permit up to forty-eight hours of continuous combat were to
be identified and their numbers appropriately enlarged within each division. The workshop
approved the various concepts presented, which became the basis for the detailed design work
carried out over the next several months.
45 Briefing Handout, General Officers Workshop II, Fort Lee, VA, 4-5 April 1979; quoted in Romjue, History of
Army 86, Vol. 1, 66-68; and Ford, Burba, and Christ, Review of Division Structure Initiatives, 10-11.
46 The R3 requirement ultimately added a relatively small number of personnel to each division, although division
designers considered it to be critical capability; Keller interview with author. The R3 personnel requirement
included 52 staff personnel, 47 fuel-ammo drivers, 102 ammo handlers, and 53 equipment operators, all required in
order to maintain 48 hours of continuous combat based on fatigue alone; and 30 target designation personnel, 29
recovery vehicle operators, 3 medics to replace critical losses due to combat; Romjue, History of Army 86, Vol. 1,
109. For more on R3 see Ibid., 107-109.
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Fixed Brigade
Source: HQ U.S. Army TRADOC, Studies and Analysis Directorate; quoted in Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Volume I.
The Development of The Heavy Division (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command, June 1982), 39.
Figure 4: Division 86 Analysis Methodology
In the summer of 1979, a number of events occurred that directly or indirectly influenced the
Division 86 design process. First of all, in June the new Army Chief of Staff, General E.C. Meyer,
called for a formal revision of the 1976 version FM 100-5, largely incorporating many of the
operational concepts that had been used to drive the development of Division 86. The next month,
General Starry and the task force planners briefed General Meyer on Division 86. The Chief of
Staff endorsed the division structure in general terms and formally authorized the absorption of the
DRE into the Division 86 design process. In addition, the next phase of the overall work, now
known as Army 86, was informally begun in August when General Starry sent the new Corps 86
study directive - including the study objectives - to CAC. And finally in late August, the third and
final general officer workshop was held. In addition to briefing the combined corps/division
battlefield concept as the first element of the new Corps 86 study, the TRADOC planners
presented the complete objective heavy division structures for approval (see Figure 5). General
Starry agreed to the division designs, with a few modifications to be made prior to briefing
General Meyer in October.
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Source: In-Processing Review of Div 86, briefing for General Meyer, 18 October 1979 (Confidential-information used is
unclassified); quoted in Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Volume I: The Development of The Heavy Division (Fort
Monroe, VA: Historical Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1982), 112.
Figure 5: Objective Heavy Division/Division 86 Organization, October 1979
The objective heavy division designs were formally briefed by TRADOC to General
Meyer on 18 October 1979. While recognizing that some additional revisions were required,
General Meyer agreed in principle to these designs, and authorized the continuation of the
evaluation and analysis phase of the effort, as well as the start of the transition planning phase
when appropriate. However, he conditioned his acceptance of the final design, scheduled for
presentation in June 1980, on successful outcomes to three additional studies: the ongoing Corps
86 study as well as two new studies, the Light Division (Infantry 86) and Echelon Above Corps
86.
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Special Design Issues and Community Politics
1. Aviation
Over the course of the Division 86 effort, two organizations proved particularly difficult to
design: the Air Cavalry Attack Brigade (ACAB) and air defense. And while both involved
identifiable communities in the Army by the late 1970s, neither was yet a separate official branch of
the service. The problems faced in developing the ACAB stemmed in large part from the newness
of its key weapon system - the attack helicopter. While the airmobile aspects of the unit could rely,
in part, on the Army's experiences in the Vietnam, capabilities represented by the attack helicopter
were so new and unique that much in the way of tactics and organization had yet to be worked out.
Contributing to the difficulties was the absence of a single organization within the Army with
proponency for and expertise in aviation (although the Aviation School did contain a large share of
such expertise). With the designation of aviation as a separate branch was still a year or more off,
aviation officers and expertise were scattered among several branches. As a result, the Armor
Center, with assistance from the Aviation School, was assigned to lead the ACAB design effort.
But, in parallel with this effort, TRADOC Headquarters developed and modified its own, smaller
ACAB design. Eventually, General Starry approved the TRADOC version as an interim
organization and the larger Armor version as the long-term solution. Refinements continued on the
ACAB even after the basic division design was approved in October 1979; the major change
involved the integration of a ground-based reconnaissance organization into the ACAB. Despite
these problems, the aviation community clearly benefited from the important new division role
given to it by Division 86 - essentially, aviation units formed a fourth maneuver brigade within each
heavy division, with accompanying command slots for aviation officers. 47
2. Air Defense
Benefiting as well from its new role in Division 86 was the air defense community.
Although not yet a separate branch, the air defense community was at least contained within a single
branch - the artillery. The problems faced by the task force (headed by the commandant of the Air
Defense Center) developing the air defense organization included combining and integrating a
variety of anti-aircraft missiles and guns, both short- and long-range systems. The mobility and
survivability of the new short-range STINGER missile proved particularly problematic. However,
the biggest difficulty in designing the air defense organization, and one never completely resolved,
involved establishing a command and control system for an organization essentially fighting two
simultaneous but distinct battles: one at the front and one in the division rear area.48 Nonetheless,
47 The ACAB was a modified version of the ACCB first tested in the TRICAP division experiment.
48 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepowe, 389.
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the prominence given to the new organizational design within the division (expanding the air
defense organization from a company in the ROAD division to a battalion in Division 86),
combined with the new big ticket weapon systems, likely contributed to the air defense
community's emergence as a separate branch in the early 1980s.
3. Infantry School and Mechanized Infantry
Following General DePuy's departure, the Infantry School eventually retained control over
mechanized infantry doctrine and organizational design developments. However, a lingering sense
remained at TRADOC Headquarters and among some of its subordinate elements that the Infantry
School had not yet shaken loose of its experiences in Vietnam and continued to be more the
proponent for the traditional or light infantry community. As a result, the school's role in the
Division 86 process to be much more constrained and less independent than was the case, for
example, with the Armor School/Center's role in defining tank doctrine and organizations.
Numerous cases can be found where TRADOC Headquarters or its surrogate, CAC, ignored, over-
ruled or simply dictated outcomes to the Infantry School.
For example, on 11 December 1978, CAC provided specific guidance to the Infantry School
concerning the mechanized infantry battalion: i.e., it was to contain 816 men and share a common
base with the tank battalion. In another case, the 12-TOW antitank company, a carry-over from the
DRS organization, was added to the mechanized infantry battalion at the suggestion of General
DePuy. CAC incorporated this suggestion into new guidance for the Infantry School along with a
reduction of one squad per mechanized platoon to make up the difference in personnel and
equipment without first consulting the Infantry School.4 9 In yet another case, the Infantry School
commandant, still unsatisfied with the TRADOC-authorized addition of a fourth infantry company,
complained that supporting the fourth infantry company would necessitate adding two more 107-
mm mortars and a fire direction center to the battalion. He furthermore recommended taking all the
mortars and scouts out of the battalion's headquarters company, into which they had recently been
placed per a CAC directive, and combined with the twelve Improved Tow Vehicles (ITVs) in a new
combat support company. This request was simply ignored by CAC and TRADOC Headquarters. 50
The infantry community also expressed concerns regarding the M-2 infantry fighting
vehicle. In particular, many infantry officers found irksome the argument that any negative
implications arising from the reduction in dismounted troops occasioned by the transition from
M113-equipped mechanized infantry platoons to M-2 Bradley-equipped platoons (the passenger
49 Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Vol. 1, 51.
5o Ibid., 76.
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compartment of the M-2 was smaller than that of the M113 to make room for additional anti-armor
weapon systems on the former vehicle) could simply be ignored because of the obvious increase in
firepower available with the Bradley. These officers felt that such an argument treated dismounted
troops as simply another provider of firepower, and ignored the special qualities of the infantryman
(e.g., maneuver through difficult terrain and initiative) on the battlefield. As a result of such
thinking, argued these infantry officers, too few dismounted infantry now were available for the
fight.5 1 This argument too was largely ignored within the Army. Reinforcing the view that the M-
2 developers were more interested in supporting armor than in infantry was the fact that, throughout
the latter half of the 1970s, the program managers for the M-2 (supposedly the infantry premier
combat vehicle) were all armor officers rather than infantry officers.
But, Bradley system development was not the only area where the infantry community took
a backseat to the armor community. It was the Armor School/Center rather than the Infantry School
that was given the lead in developing the ACAB. This occurred despite (or perhaps because of) the
fact that the Infantry School recently had spent ten years of development, training, and combat
experience with helicopters in Vietnam, while the Armor School had no experience with such a
force.
Corps 86 and EAC 86
By the fall of 1979, Division 86 had become just the first in a series of planned Army 86
studies. One of them, the Light Division Study (Infantry 86), was a separate effort and will be
discussed in more detail in the next case study. But the Corps 86 and Echelons Above Corps (EAC)
86 studies were directly related to the Division 86 effort. All three studies - Division, Corps and
EAC 86 - essentially were intended to looked at the problems faced by the Army in NATO and
Western Europe (though Division 86 had a secondary mission in the Middle East), and all three
51 This argument continues up to the present day. The Infantry School has made adjustments over the years to the
Bradley mechanized infantry platoon to add more dismounted infantrymen; see, for instance, Haworth, The Bradley,
139-40. For the infantry side of this argument see Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Richard Scholtes, "Where Have All the
Infantrymen Gone?" Armed Forces Journal International, October 1986, 92-97; Major Rod A. Coffey, Doctrinal
Orphan or Active Partner? A History of United States Army Mechanized Infantry Doctrine (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Army Command and General Staff College (thesis), 2000); Major Edward G. Gibbons, Jr. Why Johnny Can't
Dismount: The Decline ofAmerica's Mechanized Infantry Force (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced
Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis), December 1995); Major Hugh F. T. Hoffman,
Making the Most of What We Have - Combat Power and the Bradley Dismounted Infantryman (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis), 1990); and Major
Stephen E. Hughes, The Evolution of the U.S. Army Infantry Squad: Where Do We Go From Here? Determining
the Optimum Infantry Squad Organization for the Future (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military
Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis), December 1994). General DePuy offered a defense of
Division 86 Bradley platoon during a talk at the Infantry School, see General William E. DePuy, "Infantry Combat,"
Infantry 80, no. 2 (March-April 1990): 8-13.
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were closely inter-related. Corps 86 was to be structured to fight on a European battlefield in
support of and largely composed of Division 86 forces. EAC 86 was to look at the NATO theater-
level organization. And, potential trade-offs and interrelationships between Corps 86 and EAC
were to be explicitly examined throughout the process. 52 Separate CAC task forces completed most
of the Corps 86 and EAC 86 studies in the first half of 1980. The respective study groups briefed
the details of the operational concepts, missions and organizations at the corps and EAC level to
General Starry at a Corps-EAC workshop held on 19-20 May 1980. Starry complained that both
approaches were lacking and called for further analysis. But, after an additional month's work,
Starry approved both the Corps 86 and EAC 86 study recommendations for review by General
Meyer, subject to the resolution of final details and minor changes.
Division 86 Final Approval and Transition Planning
Details of the Corps 86 and EAC 86 studies were formally briefed to General Meyer in
August 1980. He approved the recommended objective corps design and the EAC design concepts
for a theater-level army. Likewise, he approved the final Division 86 objective heavy division
design (see Figure 6), and formally began the transition planning process for this organization. At
the October Army Commanders Conference, Meyer directed TRADOC to conduct the transition
planning "as quickly as possible in order to get the army standardized." 53
In January 1981, the Army outlined a complex transition effort, involving the complete
over-haul of eleven of the service's sixteen divisions to the Division 86 objective design. In
addition, TRADOC would need to undertake an extensive revision of many of its doctrinal
manuals and training programs. Meanwhile, the objective designs required over forty new
weapons systems and other equipment, some of which remained in development. Transition to
the new designs would be on an interim basis until the units were fully equipped with the new
material. It was expected that new equipment would begin arriving in 1983. Plans called for
nearly all tank battalions to be converted to either the interim or final organizations around
March 1983, with most mechanized infantry battalions converting later in the year. 54
The Division/Army 86 designs presented the Army with a fairly substantial shortfall in
personnel. While TRADOC estimated that 836,000 troops were required to field these designs,
Congress only authorized 780,000. Yet, the Department of Army chose not to request additional
personnel, but to instead spend resources on modernizing the forces. At the time, the service was
52 Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Vol. II, 61.
53 Ibid., 21
54 Wilson Maneuver and Firepowe, 389; and Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Vol. II, 21.
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willing to accept risk in maintaining a peacetime shortfall, expecting that the gap would be
closed in a crisis or war time situation through several potential mechanisms: e.g., reassignment
of active-duty troops, use of draftees, or the call-up of reserves. 55
Source: Army 86 Briefing, presented to General Meyer CSA, 1 August 1980; quoted in Romjue, History ofArmy 86,
Volume II: The Development of The Light Division, The Corps, and Echelons Above Corps, November 1979-December
1980 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June 1982), 14.
Figure 6: Heavy Division (Armored)/Division 86 Organization, August 1980
CONCLUSION
Following the end of the Vietnam, the Army shifted its focus back to its dominant combat
concept: high-intensity combat against a Soviet-type foe on the European continent. And as the
war wound down, the Army's intra-service community politics re-asserted itself as well. But the
now dominant oligarchy of armor, mechanized infantry and artillery had to make way for an
55 See, for example, George C. Wilson, "Army Opts For Weapons Over Troops," Washington Post, 5 August 1982;
and Senate Armed Services Committee, DoD Authorization for Appropriations for FY83, Part 3, 1845.
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additional community. For, as World War II thrust the armor community into a position of power
within the Army, so to did the Vietnam War provide a boost to the aviation community. As the
1970s began, each of these communities had major weapon development programs underway.
Meanwhile, the foot-mobile/light infantry and the lessons derived by this community in Vietnam
were systematically ignored.
The 1970s witnessed a major upheaval in Army weapons, doctrine and combat
organizations. And each area was closely inter-related with the others: New weapons required new
organizations and new doctrine. New doctrinal concepts became the framework for the
organizational design. New organizations and doctrinal concepts were used to embed the new
technologies and justify their requirement before outside audiences (OSD, Congress, etc.), while
pointing the way towards new technology requirements. In all three areas, the Army's intra-service
community oligarchy play the key roles. In terms of the design of combat organizations, the
Division 86 - encompassing the oligarchy and their major procurement programs - was a major
undertaking, requiring eight years (from concept development to final design) to complete. At the
time of its completion, the Division 86 design was described as "the most systematic
transformation the Army has ever undergone."5 6 A later reviewer judged it to be "the most
extensive and thorough organizational redesign study the Army had ever conducted." 57 The
design process involved most of the institutional Army, either working on the design or developing
and procuring the weapons that were to go into it. The Division 86 design and its associated studies
were at the heart of the Army's combat development and acquisition efforts during the 1970s and
early 1980s.
Once complete, and having received Army-wide input during the design process, Division
86 quickly met with wide acceptance within the service." The new divisions were seen as a
tremendous advance in firepower, mobility and armored protection over their ROAD predecessors.
And the organization was generally judged a successful one in practice: The service's armor and
mechanized infantry divisions successfully implemented the design, although due to budgetary
difficulties in the mid-1980s, on a deferred scheduled. The Army retained the basic Division 86
structure for its heavy divisions for nearly fifteen years, with the exception of minor revisions in the
mid-80s (mainly cuts as a result of the Army of Excellence project, to be discussed in Chapter Six),
56 Quote from Jim Tice, "Heavy Division Conversion Plan OK'd" Army Times, 24 August 1981, 1.
57 Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance, 35.
58 Although there was some concern expressed later about the weakness of the corps level structures; see Brig.
General (Ret.) John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, Jr. "The Kaleidoscopic US Army," Armed Forces Journal International,
November 1985, 82.
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and successfully fought the first Gulf War with this design. All of these conclusions are consistent
with the propositions suggested by the framework outlined in Chapter One.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE 2: HIGH TECHNOLOGY LIGHT DIVISION
INTRODUCTION
A few months after become Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Meyer announced a new
division design program, eventually known as the High Technology Light Division (HTLD)
concept. This division concept was designed to provide a high technology solution to the Army's
need for effective forces capable of rapidly deploying to crises and conflicts outside the NATO area.
Through innovative organizations and tactics, combined with cutting edge technologies, the HTLD
was intended to be highly mobile - both strategically and tactically - while at the same time
providing a highly lethal anti-armor capability. The High Technology Light Division (HTLD)
was proposed specifically as a counter to the prevailing emphasis on heavy forces; i.e., as a
counter to the reigning intra-service community oligarchy in the Army of that time. The HTLD
program was outside of the purview of the Army's reigning intra-service oligarchy as described in
the opening chapter. Absent any natural constituency in any of the service's communities, the
HTLD appeared to be solely design concept promoted by the service's weak senior leadership, in
particular the Army Chief of Staff. If the intra-service political framework described in Chapter
One is true, then the HTLD design concept should not have been a success.
ORIGIN OF THE HTLD
As described in the previous chapter, the view prevailing within the Army and its dominant
intra-service communities in the 1970s held that the Army needed to focus on preparing for high-
intensity combat against Soviet-style militaries. Mechanized forces (tanks and mechanized
infantry) were at the heart of such an opponent's capabilities and the dominant view held that only
similarly mechanized forces could defeat them. The Army, as a result, developed plans to convert
all of its remaining non-mechanized regular infantry divisions to mechanized infantry units; a policy
which received strong backing within OSD during the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations.
General Meyer, with a background in light infantry and air assault forces, had long resisted this
view, and consistently sought to protect what he referred to as the "Other Army": i.e., that portion
of the force designed for contingencies outside of Europe.'
1 See General Edward C. Meyer "Address to the Annual Convention of the Association of the United States Army,
Washington, DC, 14 October 1980"; in Meyer, E.C. Meyer, Chief of Staff, 125; and General Meyer interview with
author. As Army DSCOPS, General Meyer had been instrumental in the development of the service's Unilateral
Corps in the mid-1970s, designed for deployment to contingencies outside of the dominant European scenario. This
force later became the Rapid Deployment Force; see General Edward C. Meyer, "Pentagon Press Conference;
Washington DC, 17 September 1979"; in Meyer, E.C. Meyer, Chief of Staff, 16.
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General Meyer was provided an opportunity to adjust the Army's mechanization policy
when, shortly after beginning his tenure as Army Chief of Staff, he was asked to present the
service's fiscal year 1980 budget program to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Also in
attendance at this August 1979 meeting were the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering,
William Perry, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for PA&E, Russell Murray. Murray and his
office had long been one of the prime proponents in OSD for the Army's mechanization program.
During his presentation, General Meyer argued strongly against the conversion of the next division
scheduled for mechanization - the 9t Infantry Division station at Fort Lewis, Washington.2
Realizing that he was losing the argument by focusing solely on the need to retain forces capable of
fighting non-mechanized opponents, and under pressure to come up with a self-described "brilliant
idea," General Meyer shifted his approach and suggested that there were other ways besides
mechanization to improve combat capability against armored forces. Instead, he proposed
improving the 9t Infantry's anti-armor potential through the use of high technology while retaining
the unit's strategic deployability - and, its utility for the "Other Army." Although Meyer had been
thinking along these lines for quite some time, no serious study had yet been undertaken, and the
Chief of Staff had not entered the meeting with this specific solution in mind. Nonetheless, while
PA&E chief Murray continued to resist the notion, both Secretary Brown and his chief technologist
enthusiastically approved.
Thus, the High Technology Light Division (HTLD) concept was born in a quite ad hoc
manner with essentially no prior analysis as to its need or potential, and absent any consultation
with other Army officers. 3 The official announcement of the HTLD design program awaited the
October 1979 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual convention. A White Paper
issued by General Meyers in January of 1980 (although written in October of the previous year) laid
out the rationale for a balanced force of heavy and light divisions in Europe, and the development of
light, medium and heavy force packages for non-NATO contingencies. The light force packages
2 The 9 th saw service in both World Wars I and II, and had been used as a training unit from 1947 to its temporary
deactivation in 1962. As the build-up for the war in Southeast Asia continued, it was reactivated in 1966 and
thereafter had a unique history of experimentation. Shortly after its arrival in South Vietnam in early 1967, the
division was restructured into the Army's only "triamphibian" organization, composed of three different types of
brigades: air-mobile infantry, mechanized, and riverine. It retained this structure until returning to the United States
over the course of 1969 to 1970, after which it was temporarily deactivated once again. After its reactivation in May
1972 as a regular infantry unit, the division was the service's first to be formed entirely of volunteers as the Army
began conversion to an all-volunteer force; see History of the 9th Infantry Division (Fort Lewis, WA: Public Affairs
Office, 9th Infantry Division, 1981).
3 General Meyer interview with author. This account of the origin of the HTLD concept was repeated in a number
of Meyer interviews; see "General Meyer interview with Huddleston," 3-4; and Larry Carney, "Ex-Chief Gen.
Meyer Warns of 'Hollow' Army," Army Times, 2 February 1987, 8. Meyer characterized the birth of the HTLD as
"essentially a spur of the moment decision;" "General Meyer interview with Huddleston," 4.
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were described as essentially existing air cavalry and airmobile, while the medium force packages
required rapid deployability combined with an effective anti-armor capability; the latter sounding
very much like the eventual HTLD.4
DESIGN EFFORT WITHIN TRADOC
The initial vehicle chosen by General Meyer for developing this new division concept was
the Army 86 process. General Meyer announced the new light division study, known as Infantry
86, at the Division 86 workshop of 22-23 August 1979. While plans called for all three types of
light infantry (non-mechanized, airborne, and air assault) to be examined through the Infantry 86
process, the initial focus was to be on the non-mechanized infantry, with study of the latter two put
off until some time after 1980. General Meyer's directive to TRADOC was to develop a light
infantry division capable of deploying rapidly to the European theater as well as to contingency
operations worldwide, but with the combat power to destroy enemy armored forces and to control
land areas.5 In both contingencies, however, the light division was envisioned, by General Starry at
any rate, as in a supporting role to the heavy division resulting from the Division 86 design process.
In his study plan for Infantry 86, forwarded to CAC in late October 1980, General Starry foresaw
two sets of missions for the light infantry division. The first mission was to reinforce the heavy
division in Europe and to be capable of being incorporated into the heavy corps. The second
mission set involved initial entry into out-of-NATO contingencies worldwide, seizing airheads and
beachheads, defending against counterattacks, but all the while preparing them for the arrival of
heavy, mechanized divisions. A separate role for the light division seemingly was not explicitly
described.6
The Infantry 86 study began with a methodological approach similar to that used in the
Division 86 design, built around the Battlefield Development Plan (BDP) process, and including
intensive war-gaming and detailed analysis. 7 Responsibilities and assignments were also similar to
the Division 86 design approach. Task forces, with representatives from all relevant TRADOC
schools, centers and commands, once again were formed around the ten functional areas defined in
the BDP. The Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth was assigned overall
4 General Edward C. Meyer, White Paper 1980: A Frameworkfor Molding the Army of the 1980s Into a
Disciplined, Well-Trained Fighting Force (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 25 February 1980)
5 Romjue, A History ofArmy 86, Volume II, 26.
6 Ltr ATCD-AN, GEN Donn A. Starry to Cdr USACAC, 29 Oct 79, subj: CD Study Directive: Light Divisions for
the Next Decade (LD 86); Ltr ATZLCA-FS, LTG William R. Richardson to distr, 29 Nov 79, subj: Cmbt Dev
Study Plan: Light Division 86 (LD 86); Ltr ATZLCA-FS, CAC to distr, 21 Dec 79, subj: Cmbt Dev Study Plan:
Light Division 86 (LD 86), Change 1; cited in Romjue, History of Army 86, Vol. II, 26-27, n. 5.
7 Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Vol. II, 26
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coordination of the task forces. TRADOC headquarters meanwhile would aid in the development
of an operational concept, set planning constraints, and lead the overall design effort.
However, the TRADOC planners were to have a much harder time developing an adequate
design for the new light infantry division. First of all, unlike the heavy divisions with their clearly
defined mission and threat in Central Europe, this new light division had an ambiguous, wide
ranging set of missions against an equally diverse set of threats, making it difficult to fit into the
planners' carefully calibrated methodology. As the official history of Army 86 put it:
•. .about the relatedness of the threat, mission, and structure of the
light division, agreement was slow in coming. Until late in project
planners found it difficult to deal with the structural and strength
implications that were present in the threat and mission imposed
upon the light division of Army 86.8
A yet bigger obstacle was the extremely tough design goals set forth by General Meyer: a
division with enough combat power to survive against Soviet-style armor and mechanized units,
and yet with enough strategic mobility to be deployed in contingencies outside of Europe. To
ensure strategic mobility, the various task forces initially were directed to design a division with no
more than fourteen thousand personnel, although allowance would be made for up to one thousand
more troops if this led to a demonstrable increase in combat effectiveness. They were told to ignore
equipment and cost constraints, and to search instead for innovative operational concepts and
cutting edge technology to provide the necessary combat capability. 9 And yet, the TRADOC
planners were unable to simultaneously satisfy the need to remain within the mandated personnel
ceiling while providing the division the requisite anti-armor power. 10
The first TRADOC design, ready by January 1980, was rejected by TRADOC Commander
General Starry both because it failed to meet the division's stated operational goals and because it
was more than four thousand troops over the stated personnel ceiling." To reinforce the latter
point, Starry declared that the personnel-constrained Army could not rely on additional troops alone
to generate combat power. And he reiterated his view that, for out-of-NATO contingencies, the
division needed sufficient combat capability to spearhead the entry into a secured landing zone,
seize and hold terrain, and prepare for the arrival of heavy mechanized units. A second design (see
Figure 7) was readied for General Meyer's review three months later, on 3 April 1980. This design
8 Ibid., 25-26
9 Ibid., 26-28.
10 The official Army history of the Army 86 effort makes frequent reference to this problem and the frustration it
induced in the TRADOC planning community; see, for instance, Ibid., 30, 40, and 56-57.
" Ibid., 33.
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too was rejected, this time by the Chief of Staff himself, for three reasons. First, with only sixty
TOW launchers per brigade (along with assorted smaller anti-tank weapons), Meyer felt that the
design did not have the anti-armor capability necessary for a central European scenario. Second, the
division lacked tactical mobility, with two of three infantry brigades still forced to travel on foot.
Finally, the division was still nearly sixteen hundred troops over the stated manpower ceiling. 12
Source: CAC Briefing, Army 86, Presented to CSA on 2 April 1980 (Secret Information Used is Unclassified); quoted
in John A. Romjue, History ofArmy 86, Volume II: The Development of The Light Division, The Corps, and Echelons
Above Corps, November 1979-December 1980 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, United States Army Training and
Doctrine Command, June 1982), 39.
Figure 7: Infantry Division 86, TRADOC's Second Design, 4 April 1980
Before the month was over, General Starry added a new set of contingencies for which the
division was to be designed. The turbulent fall and winter of 1979-80 had witnessed the fall of the
Shah of Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the declaration of the Carter Doctrine, and the
seizure of the American Embassy and its personnel by militant Iranian students. Prompted by these
crises, the Carter administration soon announced the formation of the Rapid Deployment Force. On
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12 Ibid., 36-40.
30 April 1980, General Starry approved an amended operational concept for the Light Division
which declared contingencies involving the Rapid Deployment Force to be a part of the division's
mission.13
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Source: CAC Briefing, Army 86, Presented to CSA on 1 August 1980; quoted in John A. Romjue, History ofArmy
86, Volume II: The Development of The Light Division, The Corps, and Echelons Above Corps, November 1979-
December 1980 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June
1982), 45.
Figure 8: Infantry Division 86, TRADOC's Third Design, 1 August 1980
TRADOC planners, meanwhile, drew up a third light division design (see Figure 8), this
time consciously sacrificing combat capability in an attempt to drive manpower requirements below
the mandated ceiling. In particular, the new design had weakened air defenses, poor maintenance
and engineering capabilities, and little or no capability to delay armored forces on open terrain.
Although a capability to defeat heavily-armored forces had been one of the two major requirements
for the new division, General Starry got around the problem by announcing that the division simply
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13 Ibid., 41
was not designed for such a purpose. Following an intensive four month analytical effort, and
despite these sacrifices in capability, the TRADOC planners remained 855 personnel above the
desired 14,000 personnel ceiling. Improvements had been made in the division's tactical mobility,
with two vehicle-borne infantry brigades and one air assault brigade. The effort required to support
this mobility, however, was a major reason the division remained above the manpower ceiling.14
Not surprisingly, given its acknowledged weaknesses, General Meyer rejected this design as
well when it was presented to him on 1 August 1980 as one element of the larger Army 86
presentation. In calling for a fourth design attempt, Meyer removed the manpower ceiling from the
planning requirements, stating that the size of the division should instead be driven solely by the
required capabilities: i.e., high battlefield mobility and sufficient anti-armor punch. He reiterated
that the division had to be capable of successfully stopping an armored force. Over the next two
weeks, General Meyer became heavily involved in the design effort. He suggested a nine or ten
battalion division, with seven or eight battalions to be highly mobile, motorized infantry and two to
be equipped with a new air-transportable protected heavy gun system capability of defeating T-72
tanks. The search for a light anti-armor, mobile protected gun system was to remain a priority goal
throughout the HTLD process, but would prove to be an elusive one. 15
Thus freed by General Meyer from the manpower constraints, the TRADOC planners
produced a 17,773-man division (See Figure 9). Beefing up all elements of the design, the planners
arrived at a division with eight motorized infantry battalions equipped with eleven-man light
armored wheel combat vehicles (LAWCV) armed with a 25mm automatic cannon. Each motorized
battalion also contained an anti-tank company equipped with sixty TOW launchers. Planners
rounded out the division with two mobile protected gun battalions, each with fifty-eight Mobile
Protected Gun systems (MPGs) with a projected capability to defeat T-72 tanks.16
During TRADOC's presentation of this new division design to General Meyer, on 18
September 1980, the designers recommended its approval as the objective Infantry Division 86
(ID86) design for the Army's three remaining non-mechanized infantry divisions: the 9th, 7 h, and
25 t . Moreover, they suggested accelerated acquisition of the new equipment required by the
division, noting especially the need for four vehicles: the light armored wheeled combat vehicle, a
light air defense gun, the mobile protected gun, and a combat engineer excavator. General Meyer
approved this division design for planning and testing purposes only; he did not authorize
14 For a discussion of the third redesign effort, see Ibid., 43-46.
15 Ibid., 46-48.
16 Ibid., 48-55.
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programming the equipment in the Army's budget or the development of schedules for transitioning
the remaining non-mobile divisions to the new design. Instead, Meyer mandated that the division's
concepts and organizations be tested by the 9th Infantry Division and its newly formed High
Technology Test Bed (HTTB).' 7 His decision was to mark a departure from the Infantry Division
86 design.
Source: CAC Briefing, Inf Div 86, Presented to CSA on 18 September 1980; quoted in John A. Romjue, History of
Army 86, Volume II: The Development of The Light Division, The Corps, and Echelons Above Corps, November 1979-
December 1980 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, June
1982), 49.
Figure 9: Infantry Division 86, TRADOC's Fourth Design, 18 September 1980
SETTING UP AN INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
General Meyer was clearly dissatisfied with infantry design effort up to that point. Again,
TRADOC, like the other Army institutional organizations, was an arena for intra-service
community politics and, reflected the dominance of members of the service's oligarchy. General
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17 Ibid., 55.
Meyer viewed all these institutional organizations as ponderous, tradition-bound creatures of the
armored, heavier side of the service. 18 As he later explain to an interviewer:
I felt that if we wanted to push on we had to be able to cut through
DARCOM, TRADOC, the Army staff and everybody else or it
would take forever. 19
In response, General Meyer sought to develop a design effort outside of this official structure. His
intent was to create a development organization patterned along the free-wheeling style of the
innovative 11th Air Assault Test Division, to which General Meyer was assigned as the action
officer on the Department of the Army's staff during the early 1960s.20 Like the HTLD, the 11h Air
Assault Test Division focused on developing an innovative concept that was outside of the then
powerful set of intra-service communities. 21 General Meyer looked to the 9t Infantry Division and
the HTTB be the prime developers of the HTLD. In this manner, he hoped to remove the HTLD
from the intra-service community influences. He hoped that with the new development process
ideas could "bubble up from below;" that the new division's organization, tactics and equipment
could be developed and tried out by the men who would have to fight with them. However, creating
this independent organization would generate a host of conflicts between it and the Army
MACOMs. This conflict, in turn, added to the intra-service community oligarchy's opposition to
the HTLD concept.
18 General Meyer interview with author.
19 "General Meyer interview with Huddleston," 5.
20 General Meyer interview with author. General Meyer also served in the 101st Air Assault Division during its first
year in Vietnam in 1965. He gave a similar account regarding the origins of the HTTB in "General Meyer interview
with Huddleston," 6. Indicative of his efforts to pattern the HTTB on the 11 th Air Assaults experiences, among the
personnel General Meyer sent out to check on the efforts at Fort Lewis were retired Generals Douglas W.O. Kinnard
and Hamilton H. Howze, both of whom had been intimately involved in the development of army aviation and the
Air Assault test division in the 1950s and 1960s; see Joe D. Huddleston, The High Technology Test Bed and the
High Technology Light Division: Inception Through 30 September 1983, Draft (Fort McPherson, GA: Military
History Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces Command, 1987), 114-15 (hereafter cited as
Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD).
21 Unlike the HTLD, however, the 1 1th Air Assault already had the backing of broad group of officers within the
Army and the support of powerful external actors (e.g., Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and an existing
aviation industrial base), as well as meeting the needs of an impending war. Moreover, the Air Assault division was
developed within an established, if renegade, portion of CONARC (TRADOC's predecessor) - at Fort Rucker's
Army Aviation School. On the development of Air Assault division, see Howze, "The Last Three Years of Army
Aviation," 2-60; Griminger, "The Armed Helicopter Story Part II," 14-18; Vanderpool, "We Armed the Helicopter,"
2-6 and 24-29; Currey, With Wings As Eagles, 78-82; Tolson, Airmobility, 51-62; and Shelby L. Stanton, "Lessons
Learned or Lost: Air Cavalry and Airmobility," Military Review 69, no. 1 (January 1989): 74-86. For an
interpretation of this innovation as one where civilian outsiders came to the aid of Army rebels, see Bergerson, The
Army Gets an Air Force, 110-17; for a slightly different view on the role of civilians see Rosen, Winning the Next
War, 71-75 and 85-95.
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General Meyer chose the 9 h Infantry Division to be the testing division for the new infantry
design for several reasons. As mentioned earlier, the 9t Infantry was originally the next infantry
division scheduled to be "heavied up" to a mechanized unit. In addition, its location next to a major
air base and its geostrategic positioning half way between Europe and Asia were both considered
ideal for a unit designed for worldwide deployments. The 9 " Infantry also had suitable training
facilities at its home base, Fort Lewis, as well as at the nearby Yakima Range, the latter with its
wide variety of different environmental conditions (desert, mountains, etc.). Finally, the 9th Infantry
had a well-deserved reputation, thanks to the emphasis of a number of previous division
commanders, for focusing on light infantry tactics. All of these factors made the 9th Infantry, in
General Meyer's view, the ideal unit for a role in the development of the new light division
concept. 22
The official beginning of the HTTB dates from a telephone call on 19 June 1980 to the
Division Commander of the 9" Infantry, General Howard Stone, from a member of the Department
of the Army staff directing him to organize the Test Bed.23 On that same day, a meeting was held
involving the service's top uniformed leadership to finalize how responsibilities were to be divided
amongst for the Test Bed, the 9r Infantry Division, and the MACOMs. Among those present at the
meeting were General Meyer, his Vice Chief of Staff, General John Vessey, and the commanders of
TRADOC, DARCOM and FORSCOM. The results of this meeting were announced publicly in a
Department of the Army (DA) message to the service's chief agencies announcing the formation of
the HTTB on 18 July. This message became the basic guidance for the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) completed later that summer detailing the responsibilities of the three
MACOMs, the Department of Army Staff, and the 9th Infantry Division in the HTLD development
process.
According to the MOU, responsibilities were to be divided in the following manner:
FORSCOM would continue to command the 9th Infantry Division, while the commander of the 9th
would also act as the HTTB's Test Director. As Test Director, the 9th Infantry's commander would
develop detailed test plans, conduct the actual tests, and write the test reports for submission to the
TRADOC commander. TRADOC, in turn, would provide a Deputy Test Director for the Test Bed,
establish "a small permanent test group" at the Test Bed, and develop "outline test plans,
organizational and operational concept alternatives and doctrine" for the HTLD. DARCOM would
supply the Test Bed with a Deputy Test Director for Support, who would be in charge of a small
22 "General Meyer interview with Huddleston," 9.
23 Word that the division would create such a Test Bed had been unofficially sent to General Stone as early as the
previous April. A single officer from the division's staff had been assigned to work on organizing the Test Bed at
that time; see Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD, I and 8.
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materiel development support team stationed at the Test Bed, and would provide "advice on
materiel related items" for the HTLD. In addition, a High Technology Coordination Office would
be established within the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) at
the DA-level to provide "a channel for Chief of Staff guidance." 24 The MOU presented two major
problems that would plague the HTLD throughout its development. First, the 9th Infantry was given
the dual responsibility of developing and testing a new division design concept while
simultaneously maintaining its readiness for deployment under FORSCOM. Second, TRADOC
and DARCOM were tasked with giving up a major portion of their responsibilities (organizational
design and materiel development, respectively) to a new independent organization, and asked to
cooperate fully with the activities of this new organization.
Confusion over the precise function of this composite organization, the 9t Infantry/H'TB,
only added to its first year woes. Specifically, was the HTTB and the 9th Infantry Division expected
to merely test the ID86 concept already developed by TRADOC? Or, was it to develop a wholly
new division concept? Despite General Meyer's clear and early preference for the latter, the 18 July
DA message on the HTTB was vague on this point. In describing the purpose of the HTTB, the
message stated:
Given the standard infantry division as a base, and employing the
emerging results of the Light Division 86 study effort as a guide, the
activities associated with the High Technology Test Bed will be
directed toward developing a light division designed to facilitate
rapid deployment, exploit technological opportunities, and meet the
requirement for lean, hard-hitting forces.2
The commander of CAC, General William Richardson, whose organization remained the
action agency within TRADOC for HTTB matters, clearly saw the HTTB as a testing organization
for ID86 concepts. In an October message to the TRADOC commander, General Richardson
wrote:
We need to push the planning effort for the 9ID HTTB to ensure that
the overall plan fully incorporates near-term enhancements, the field
testing of ID86 concepts and organizational designs, and eventual
conversion of the 9th ID to ID86 organizations. 26
24 Message, HQ Department of the Army to dist, Subject: 9ID High Technology Test Bed, 181555z July 1980;
quoted in Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD, 10-12, n. 11.
25 Ibid., 9.
26 Message, Cdr CAC to Cdr TRADOC, subject: 9ID HTTB Plan, 081700z October 1980; quoted in Huddleston,
HTTB and HTLD, 44, n. 3.
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The 9th Infantry Division commander, General Stone, saw his mission quite differently, as
one of developing an entirely new design. His view as much more in line with General Meyer's
desire for a design process in which "ideas bubbled up from below." During the summer of 1980,
while the MACOMs were reaching consensus on the MOU, General Stone was busy writing down
his own thoughts on the direction of the HTTB. In his view, the 9 th Infantry Division and the HTTB
were to undertake: "[o]rganizational rather than equipment testing, which would include DA,
FORSCOM and 9th ID ideas and initiatives."27 Following this view, in early September, General
Stone formed several committees at the 9th Infantry Division headquarters, and gave them the task
of "developing candidate organizational arrangements and operations concepts." The reason for
creating these committees, according to General Stone, was that:
The Chief of Staff of the US Army expects that many of the
operational and organizational concepts to be evaluated as part of the
High Technology Test Bed Program will emanate directly from the
9th Infantry Division.28
This conflict of views, responsibilities and purpose was to be fought out at Fort Lewis itself
once a Deputy Test Director for the HTTB was assigned by TRADOC. The officer personally
selected by General Richardson to fill this position, Colonel Harold C. Van Meter, was given clear
marching orders by his commander. When later asked by an interviewer what had been his
understanding of the HTTB's initial mission, Colonel Van Meter responded:
That was very clear to me, and it was made very clear to me by
General Richardson.... HTTB was to examine, in the field, the
organization that had been charted and approved by the Pentagon and
by TRADOC Headquarters. ... Division 86 was clearly the
structure from which we were to launch the test.29
Clearly, Col. Van Meter felt his responsibilities were to TRADOC. He commented in the same
interview:
I was wearing a TRADOC patch on my left shoulder. General
Richardson's comment to me was that I was to look at structure and
run tests against the Infantry Division 86 organization. General
27 Memo, 9th Infantry Division to FORSCOM DCSOPS, subject: HTTB MOU, 27 June 1980; quoted in
Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD, 43, n. 2. (Emphasis added).
28 MG H. F. Stone, Letter to dist, subject: High Technology Test Bed, 3 September 1980; quoted in Huddleston,
HTTB and HTLD, 44, n. 2.
29 Colonel Harold C. Van Meter, "High Technology Test Bed Oral History Interview with Colonel (Retired) Harold
C. Van Meter, Chief, High Technology Test Bed, October 1980-August 1981;" interview by Dick Grube, 23 August
1984; transcript, High Technology Test Bed/Army Development and Employment Agency Oral History Papers,
Archives, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2 ((hereafter cited as "Van Meter interview
with Grube").
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Stone felt that this was an opportunity for he and his Division staff to
take whatever they wanted out of Division 86, and structure it as they
saw fit.30
Adding to the ambiguity of Col. Van Meter's position was the fact that he was being
evaluated in his position by General Stone, his commander at the HTTB, but then "senior rated" by
General Richardson at CAC/TRADOC. These personal and professional conflicts led quickly to the
development of an "us-versus-them" attitude between the 9th Infantry Division and the HTTB. This
feeling was heightened by the fact that the bulk of General Stone's HTLD development activities
were taking place at the 9 th Infantry's headquarters, while the HTTB's facilities were located three
miles away across Interstate 5 which cut through Fort Lewis.
During December 1980 through January 1981, General Stone, frustrated at the slow
progress of the division redesign, began organizing informal meetings in his quarters in an attempt
to jump-start the process. Known as the "kitchen cabinets," these meetings were held largely with
9 th Infantry Division staff members; Col. Van Meter and others from the HTTB were rarely invited.
One outcome of these meetings was the formation of "Task Force Stone," headed by the 9th
Infantry's recently retired Operations Officer (G-3) and tasked with acting as General Stone's
personal "Think Tank." Task Force Stone was followed in mid-May by the formation of the
Concepts Group, again within the division headquarters. This unofficial, off-line group, staffed
with division officers and headed by the division's Executive Officer, Col. Courtney Prisk, was
tasked with developing a new structure and operational concept for the 9th Infantry Division. Both
of these moves were described by Col. Van Meter as
smacks in the face of the High Technology Test Group. Both of
those organizations were formed to place the direction of the 9 th
Infantry Division directly under Colonel Felter [the division's Chief
of Staff] and General Stone, as opposed to allowing the High
Technology Test Bed to do what we felt we had been sent there to
do.31
In the midst of this confusion, General Meyer again attempted to make clear his intentions
for the 9th Infantry Division and the HTTB. In a message to the MACOMs and the 9th Infantry on 9
March 1981, General Meyer stated that:
The prime responsibility for execution of the High Tech Test Bed
efforts rests with the Test Director - MG Stone. I am convinced that
the fundamentally important and critical contributions to this project
will be made by the leaders and soldiers at Fort Lewis.... .The
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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 5.
pinpointing of responsibility is not intended to obviate the traditional
roles performed by the combat developer - TRADOC, the material
developer - DARCOM or the readiness agent - FORSCOM, but to
place squarely the prime responsibility for success and execution.
Concerning the relationship between the ID86 and the efforts at Fort Lewis, General Meyer
described ID86 "as a guide. I see ID 86 as a well-thought out point of departure but not as a
constraint." 32 At the next quarterly Interim Program Review (IPR) for the HTTB, held at Fort
Lewis in April 1981, General Meyer took this point even further, commenting that General Stone
was "not obliged to do anything with regard to ID86 as a start point if it does not make sense." 33
Besides the Concept Group, the 9th Infantry/HTTB undertook a series of other innovative
steps to streamline design and procurement procedures and practices, and to circumvent the normal
Army development community. These steps were taken in order to free the HTLD from the "old
style" of thinking and to hasten its deployment. Previously, divisions were converted to new
concepts in a sequential process, requiring that concepts and equipment be first tested and validated,
and only then were divisions converted to the approved design; a process that could require up to
fifteen years to complete. With the HTLD, testing and conversion of the division occurred
concurrently, with the intent of reducing the time required for completing the transition of the
division to the new design down to as little as five years. Moreover, due to the high priority
attached to the HTLD by the Army Chief of Staff, the time required to produce doctrinal manual for
the HTLD components also was drastically reduced from the typical 24- to 36-month timeframe
down to as little as 120 days.34
Many of the new division's design and operational concepts relied in many instances on
equipment and weapon systems which were not yet fielded or readily available off the shelf. To
speed the testing process for the division's design and war-fighting concept, surrogate equipment
often was used until the actual weapon systems were available; the assault gun being the prime
example. Fort Lewis also had its own "skunk works" facility to adapt and experiment with
currently existing equipment. Reminiscent again of the efforts undertaken in the 11 th Airmobile
Division development, the skunk works facility, staffed by military and civilian engineers, was an
element of the Installation Maintenance Office at Fort Lewis. Among its efforts was the
modification of the service's new utility vehicle, the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
32 Message, HQ Department of the Army to dist, Subject: 9th ID High Technology Test Bed, 092257z March 1981;
quoted in Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD, 48-49, n. 7.
33 Message, HQ Department of the Army to dist, Subject: Illegible, 221800z April 1981; quoted in Huddleston,
HTTB and HTLD, 49, n. 7.
34 Lt. General R. L. Wetzel, and Lt. Colonel Raney M. Price, "Helping the Soldier 'Break the Mold' at Ft. Benning,"
Army, September 1983, 38.
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(HMMWV), to accommodate six to nine soldiers and the addition of a weapons mount atop the
vehicle. The facility also developed and tested the palletized load concept, which was later adopted
throughout Army. Another effort was the modification of commercial dune buggies for combat use
(known as Fast Attack Vehicles or FAVs), which included adding a weapons mount and improved
suspension system to allow the firing of TOW missiles and other weapon systems from the
vehicle. 35
The Department of the Army also provided the HTTB Director with a small pool of
discretionary funds (several hundred thousand dollars) to purchase small amounts of off-shelve
items or for other types of expenses to facilitate testing. Known informally as "screw around"
funds, the idea also had originated with the 11 lth Air Assault Test Division.3 6 While successful at
moving along the testing program, these funds eventually raised questions in Congress over their
authorization, proper use, and oversight. 37
Procurement was sped up in other ways as well. As early as the summer of 1981, General
Stone had come to recognize that the materiel acquisition process operated by DARCOM would be
far too slow to meet the HTLD's equipment needs for a 1985 initial operating capability. As a
result, he requested, and General Meyer approved, the development of a Quick Response Program
(QRP) to eliminate many of the cumbersome steps in this process. Eventually a QRP program was
initiated, although it took another six months after General Meyer's approval before the program
could be put into place.38 Despite this program, officers at the HTTB were never satisfied with the
participation of DARCOM. The quality of personnel sent by the command to liaison with the
HTTB was often questioned by members of the HTTB. And, even with the QRP program in place,
the view among HTTB participants was that DARCOM was generally unwieldy and unresponsive
to the needs of the 9t Infantry/HTTB.39 For example, there were many instances where the HTTB
35 See 9th Infantry Division Public Affairs Office, "'Skunk Works' Aids in Development of New Light Division,"
Army Research, Development & Acquisition Magazine January/February 1983, 11; "New Concept Focuses on
Speed, Firepower," Army Times, 27 September 1982, 24; and Gerard Turbe and Paul Turk, "The US Search for a
Vehicle for the Light Divisions," International Defense Review 18, no. 7 (1985): 1106-1107.
36 General Edward C. Meyer, "Interview with the Pentagon Press Group, 13 June 1980"; in Meyer, E.C. Meyer,
Chief of Staff, 100.
37 "General Meyer interview with Huddleston," 15-16.
38 For more on the QRP see Wetzel and Price, "Helping the Soldier," 38; Jack R. Tate, "The High Technology Light
Division," Army Research, Development and Acquisition Magazine, January/February 1983, 9; and Huddleston,
HTTB and HTLD, 65-66.
39 These views can be found in Ibid., 52.
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mounted and tested a weapon system on a vehicle long before the proponent element at DARCOM
had been able to complete the lengthy process required to grant approval for such a test.40
Several personnel and organizational changes occurred at Fort Lewis during August 1981
that eventually helped to clear up some of the conflict between the 9" Infantry Division, the HTTB,
and Fort Leavenworth. First, the conflict between Col. Van Meter and the senior officers of the 9th
Infantry finally came to a head. For many months, in addition to the struggle over competing goals
for the HTLD project, General Stone and his officers felt that Col. Van Meter had failed to keep
them informed of his communications with TRADOC, had intentionally kept them out of the loop
in his dealings with other elements of the Army, and had failed to cooperate with the Concepts
Group. By mid-August, Col. Prisk had gone to General Stone complaining that the situation had
become intolerable, and that he or Col. Van Meter or both officers should be asked to leave.
General Stone choose to relieve Col. Van Meter of his duties, and the Colonel soon thereafter
retired from the service. 41
General Stone, himself, soon left Fort Lewis to take over responsibilities as head of CAC at
Fort Leavenworth from General Richardson, who in turn was promoted to DSCOPS by General
Meyer. After this change, relations between the 9th Infantry Division and Fort Leavenworth
improved dramatically, though the same would not often be the case between the 9t Infantry and
other elements of TRADOC. 4 2 Back at the Fort Lewis, the incoming commanding general of the 9t
Infantry Division, Lt. General Richard Elton, was given permission to choose his own successor to
Col. Van Meter as deputy director of the HTTB. Not surprisingly, the new deputy, Col. Paul
Cerjan, was fully in agreement with the senior leadership of 9t Infantry Division on the HTTB and
the HTLD.4 3 At the same time, the Concepts Group moved into the HTTB spaces and the two
40 The best examples of this related to the various configurations of the Fast Attack Vehicle; see, for example, Ibid.,
79-80.
41 "Van Meter interview with Grube," 5-8; and Colonel Courtney E. Prisk, "High Technology Test Bed Oral History
Interview with COL Courtney E. Prisk, Concepts Group Director May-August 1981; Acting Chief, High
Technology Test Bed August-November 1981;" interviewed by Joe D. Huddleston, 16 September 1982; transcript,
High Technology Test Bed/Army Development and Employment Agency Oral History Papers, Archives, U.S. Army
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 8-9.
42 Ibid., 4-5; and Major (P) Robert L. Testerman, "High Technology Test Bed Oral History Interview with MAJ (P)
Robert L. Testerman, Member, Concepts Group, July 1981-July 1982;" interview by Joe D. Huddleston, 13 October
1982; transcript, High Technology Test Bed/Army Development and Employment Agency Oral History Papers,
Archives, U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle, PA, 10 (hereafter cited as "Major Testerman interview with
Huddleston").
43 Colonel Paul G. Cerjan, "High Technology Test Bed/Army Development and Employment Agency Oral History
Interview with COL Paul G. Cerjan, Chief, High Technology Test Bed October 1981-Present;" interview by Joe D.
Huddleston, 17 February 1983; transcript, High Technology Test Bed/Army Development and Employment Agency
Oral History Papers, Archives, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA; 3-4 (hereafter cited as
"Colonel Cerjan interview with Huddleston").
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elements became fully integrated by the end of the 1981. Conflict between the 9" Infantry and the
HTTB soon came to an end.
Members of FORSCOM also opposed the 9t Infantry/HTTB throughout the HTLD design
process because of concerns over readiness issues. They only reluctantly allowed elements of the
9t Infantry Division to test and transition to HTLD equipment and organization, and were always
concerned that FORSCOM was losing one of its divisions for an indefinite period of time. Also,
they opposed General Meyer's decision to give the 9" Infantry Division highest priority for new
equipment coming into the service, for example the HMMWV. 44 Instead, they felt that new
equipment should first go to units most ready of combat and most likely to be deployed.
Later comments made by General Starry about the 9th Infantry/HTTB - which he had
described as a "hobby shop" - sum up the views of many in the institutional side of the Army and
within the service's dominant communities:
I was opposed to it, although I didn't fall on my spear. In an Army
our size, we can't afford to have a whole division that is a test
activity....There were some good ideas that came out of it, I'm not
denying that. I'm just saying there's a better way to do it.45
In the spring of 1983, a final decision was made on establishing the HTTB on a permanent,
formal basis. For several years, General Meyer had been receiving complaints from Congress about
the unusual funding arrangements for the HTTB (such as the director's discretionary fund). In
response to these pressures, as well as owing to a desire to see the effort continued after his
retirement, General Meyer decided to reorganize the interim HTTB as the permanent Army
Development and Employment Agency (ADEA). In the future, ADEA would perform testing not
just for the 9th but Army-wide. This led to yet another battle with the MACOMs concerning where
the ADEA should reside organizationally within the Army. In a view shared by TRADOC and
DARCOM, the FORSCOM commander wrote: "We don't need ADEA, but if we must have it,
ADEA should be organized under the TRADOC Combat Developments umbrella." 46 Reflecting
these views, the memorandum from DSCOPS establishing the ADEA recommended that it be made
an agency within TRADOC. General Meyer rejected this choice and, in a hand-written comment
on the memorandum, set up ADEA as a separate Field Operating Agency directly under the
44 These issues are discussed in more detail in Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD, 139-43.
45 Bernard J. Adelsberger, "Motorized Burnout: A Decade of Innovation Ends at Fort Lewis," Army Times, 10 April
1989, 15.
46 Msg, Cdr FORSCOM to DA, 251310z March 1983, subject: Organization of the Army Development and
Employment Activity (ADEA); quoted in Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD, 35, n. 6.
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Department of the Army.47 In General Meyer's view, having ADEA report directly back to the
Chief of Staff was the only way to ensure "revolutionary/evolutionary changes." 48 The full
transition to the ADEA was set for October 1983.
DESIGNING THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY LIGHT DIVISION
In the spring of 1981, the Concepts Group began its design efforts by examining the ID86
design, but quickly came to realize that the TRADOC-developed force was far too heavy for the 9th
Infantry Division's stated mission. Instead, under the direction of General Stone, the Concepts
Group turned to designing a completely new type of division. This effort was given further impetus
following General Meyer's admonishment at the July 1981 IPR that the 9h Infantry Division must
focus on force structuring, tactical and deployment concepts rather than on equipment alone.
Most of the Concepts Group's early design efforts involved three 9 th Infantry Division
officers - Col. Prisk, Lt. Col. James Channon, and Major Robert Testerman - and one civilian - Mr.
Thomas Rorstad - who acted as the group's scientific advisor.49 Given General Meyer and General
Stone's directive after the July IPR to focus on a new division design, the group went into an intense
period of work. After roughing out the new structure, which with its 10,000-troop objective was
seen as simply a starting point for the division, Major Testerman was assigned the role of fleshing
out this design for a "Contingency" or "Quick Strike" division. Over an intense seven to ten day
period, Testerman, in coordination with other members of the group, completed a task normally
requiring the efforts of major portions of TRADOC's development community many months to
perform.
The resulting Quick Strike Division contained an ACAB and two maneuver brigades. Each
of the latter brigades contained two Light Attack (then known as Quick Kill Vehicle) battalions
equipped with FAVs and one heavier Assault Gun (then known as a Mobile Protected Gun)
battalion equipped with light, tank-killing assault guns. Failure to acquire a suitable version of this
latter weapon would become one of the major stumbling blocks for the division. At the same time
as they were developing the division's design, the Concepts Group also was devising a deep strike
47 Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD, 35.
48 "General Meyer interview with Huddleston," 15.
49 Lt. Col. Channon had been recently assigned to the 9th after completing a tour of duty with the motion picture
industry. Some the division's more innovative concepts came jointly from Lt. Col. Channon and Major Testerman.
The former officer's excellent skills as an illustrator also were used extensively by the Concepts Group; see "Major
Testerman interview with Huddleston," 2. Mr. Rorstad, who had been assigned by TRADOC to be the scientific
adviser for the HTTB, was diverted to the Concepts Group; see Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD, 106.
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war-fighting concept for the division, one consistent with the Army's emerging AirLand Battle
doctrine.
General Stone tentatively approved elements of the new division design shortly before his
departure from the 9 th Infantry at the end of August 1981. He authorized the testing of some of the
division's war-fighting concepts and organization as well as the procurement of the FAV for testing
purposes. Work continued, meanwhile, to complete the HTLD design. By the end of 1981, an
initial HTLD division design was ready, with a troop strength set at approximately 15,500
personnel. This organization was to be the starting point for more detailed design work.
It was only at this time that elements of the Army's design community were brought back
into the HTLD's development process, but even now the 9t Infantry Division and HTTB retained
tight control over the process. Working groups were formed, each headed by a HTTB project
manager, with representatives from a variety of TRADOC and DARCOM organizations. Also
participating in the working groups were the battalion commanders of the 9th Infantry, or their S-3s
(operations officers), whose units were already identified as test battalions for the emerging design.
Each working group was assigned a specific unit, and tasked to flesh out the operational concept
and structure outlined by the Concepts Group and the HTTB.
During 3-5 March 1982, an off-site conference was held to evaluate the efforts of these
working groups, with attendance limited once again to the senior officers of the 9t" Infantry Division
and the HTTB. Known as the Alderbrook Conference (named after the inn on Puget Sound where
the meeting was held), the HTTB design teams presented a new division structure consisting of
three different types of maneuver battalions: the assault gun battalion, the light attack battalion, and
a new battalion of motorized infantry known as the light motorized battalion. By this time,
however, the division had also grown far beyond the original December 1981 design of 15,500
troops to over 17,700 personnel. Similarly, the number of sorties required to deploy the division
had grown as well. One objective of the conference was to whittle these numbers down to an
interim level of 16,000 troops and 1200 sorties.50 While the former goal was reached (at 15,977
personnel), the conference ended with the division still requiring 1347 sorties to fully deploy. The
teams also presented operational concepts for these units at the conference, paralleling very closely
the original concept developed the previous summer by the Concepts Group. The division, being
fully motorized, would be able to keep up with accompanying mechanized and armored units.
Moreover, it would be trained to fight along a wide front and in a fluid, highly mobile style of
warfare (ranging from deep within the enemy's rear areas to deep within its own). The division was
to use its tactical mobility to best advantage by attacking unsuspecting enemy forces from the flanks
50 This sortie level remained 200 flights above the division designers' desired 1000-sortie ceiling.
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Contain Enemy Strength:
* Fix enemy with minimum combat power
* Shape enemy penetrations - terrain, obstacles
* Deny enemy front line success
* Conduct dynamic defense/delay
* Position defense only: to hold critical terrain and to protect vital installations
* Prevent/counter enemy tactical envelopment
* Capitalize on superior mobility
Fight As Deep As Possible
* Engage early with highly mobile force
* Strip away recon elements
* Force early deployment/expenditure of POL, ammo, time
* Prevent forward elements from securing critical point
* Degrade enemy combat effectiveness
Attack Critical/Vulnerable Subsytems
* Achieve real time ID of high value targets
* Employ superior mobility/lethality
* Conduct rapid (EW, indirect fire, USAF, aviation, maneuver elements) constant
flank/rear attacks throughout area of influence
* Penetrate forward combat echelons through: stay behind, ground infiltration, helicopter
insertion, and USAF insertion
* Organize strikes to cause complete system collapse
Fight In Own Rear Areas
* Screening/surveillance - intelligence system must see rear area also
* Competent DC3I, C3CM for rear area
* Highly mobile lethal rear area elements
* Degrade enemy capability to attack our rear
Deceive The Enemy
* Provide a myriad of deceptive images
* Integrate deception operations
* Frustrate enemy acquisition
* Blind or destroy sensor systems we can not deceive
Sustain The Force
* Support fluid ope rations/non-linear battlefield with flexible logistics structure
HTLD/Air Force Integration
* Deployment of the force
* Joint C3I-preparation of the battlefield
* Joint targeting: SEAD, attack of second echelon and EW
* Integration/complementary employment of firepower
* Sustainment of the force
Source: 9" ID/HTTB, "9" Inf Div 'Old Reliables'," HTLD IPR brief to General Meyer (1 April 1982), 6-13.
Figure 10: HTLD Operational Concept
and rear. Utilizing speed and mobility to surprise the enemy, the division's widely dispersed units
would move rapidly and then concentrate quickly for strikes against the opponent's weak points
(see Figure 10). With a few minor changes, General Elton approved these structures and concepts.
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Source: 9t h ID/HTTB, "9th Inf Div 'Old Reliables'," HTLD IPR brief to General Meyer (1 April 1982), 22.
Figure 11: High Technology Light Division, April 1982
The HTLD design (see Figure 11) arising from the Alderbrook Conference was presented
to General Meyer at the next IPR, in April 1982. It consisted of five light motorized infantry
battalions, two light attack battalions, and two assault gun battalions. All the ground maneuver
brigades were fully motorized and most units were able to fight mounted. Each light motorized
infantry battalion contained three light motorized infantry companies, equipped with enough of
HMMWVs, to mount the battalion's entire complement of infantry. Each motorized battalion
also included one anti-armor company of TOW-equipped HMMWVs. Each light attack
battalion contained three light attack companies equipped with light attack vehicles (the FAV).
The FAV could mount one of four types of armament: TOW anti-tank missiles, 30mm cannon,
.50 caliber machine guns, or grenade launchers. The assault gun battalions contained three
assault gun companies each, equipped with some (as yet undetermined) version of an assault
gun. A fourth brigade, the Cavalry Brigade (Air Attack), a version of the heavy division's
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ACAB, consisted of two attack helicopter battalions and a cavalry squadron. The cavalry
squadron was made up of two troops of airmobile ground forces and two air cavalry troops.5 1
Other division assets included an artillery brigade containing forty-eight M198 towed 155mm
howitzers and eighteen MLRS rocket artillery systems. Because deception was a key operational
concept of the division, the division also contained a unique 21-troop Deception Detachment, which
included a "Special Effects" section. Overall, the division design made innovative use of computers
for battle management and command-and-control. However, unable to meet the mandated
personnel and sortie levels, HTTB officials hoped to reduce personnel levels to 13,698 and
requisite sorties down to 1093 in the next round of cuts. 52
At this IPR, General Meyer approved the 16,000 interim design as well as a number of
recommendations set forth by the 9 t Infantry/HTTB. These included:
* "Approv[al of] the operational concept/structure [of the HTLD] for planning,
programming, evaluation and transition;"
* "Authoriz[ing] the provisional reorganization of three current battalions into
assault gun, light attack, and light motorized battalions commencing 1 Jul
82;" and
* "Authoriz[ing] the lease of surrogate equipment for the three maneuver
battalions. .. "53
Overall, the April IPR proved a turning point for the HTLD development process.
INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO THE HTLD
With the Chief of Staff's approval for transitioning the 9th Infantry into the HTLD design
and for putting the division into the Army's planning and programming cycle, elements throughout
the Army at last understood the depth of General Meyer's commitment to the HTLD program. As
one participant in this process later put it:
[General Meyer's] actions sent one tremendous shudder of signals
throughout the United States Army, particularly at DA staff level. It
is at that time they started to realize that the Chief was serious about
this. For the first time, I might add - for the first time. Up until that
point, I got the feeling that people thought they would wait the Chief
out ... 54
51 The 9th's air combat brigade was formed in December of 1980, and through the HTTB had helped validate the
ACAB approach for Army-wide use.
52 The details of the division design are taken from the 9th Division/HTTB 29 April 1982 IPR Briefing Slides
presented to General Meyer, in Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD 195-96.
53 Ibid.
54 "Colonel Cerjan interview with Huddleston," 5.
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As will be seen, however, this awareness of the seriousness of the Army Chief of Staff's intent
failed to prevent continued opposition to the HTLD from many quarters in the Army. The
opposition serves to illustrate the weak position occupied by the Army's senior leadership.
Immediately following the April IPR, the TRADOC elements finally were given their first
chance to independently review the HTLD design. Led by CAC, the proponents for the division's
various units and functions, represented by the TRADOC Centers and schools, critiqued and
identified a variety of "weaknesses" in the design. For the next year, the 9th Infantry/HTTB was
engaged in a constant struggle to prevent these TRADOC elements from inflating the already too
high personnel levels in each functional area or unit, as nearly all the "fixes" identified by
TRADOC led to increases in troop strength. By the August 1982 IPR, the division design had leapt
to 17,742 troops and required 1,356 C-141 sorties to deploy.55 While the ultimate decision for
design changes rested with General Elton (with General Meyer's concurrence), various proponents
centers were continually criticizing and attempting to stonewall efforts by the 9th Infantry/HTTB to
downsize the division by eliminating personnel or entire units from the design. By December, the
Department of the Army issued yet another set of personnel guidelines, raising the HTLD personnel
limit to 16,000 troops.
The 9t Infantry/HTTB held a second Alderbrook Conference in March 1983, where the
HTLD personnel levels again were cut, now down to 16,142 soldiers. 56 Also during the spring of
1983, the first brigade-size exercise was held of the HTLD design. While the 9 h Infantry/HTTB
evaluation of the exercise was very positive, TRADOC observers were less enthused. Both the
chief of CAC's Force Development, Test and Evaluation Division and the exercise observer from
the Infantry School issued biting critiques of the brigade's organization, training, and
performance.57
Internal service opposition to the HTLD concept also can be seen in the problems the HTLD
developers had in acquiring many of the division's unique weapons and equipment. The 9th
Infantry/HTTB was widely derided within the Army as the "Toy's R Us" gang.5 8 Many officers
55 Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD, 209.
56 Ibid., 226.
57 Ibid., 234.
58 Esther M. Bauer, "Army High-Tech Unit Shows Prowess Against Tank Forces," Boston Globe, 14 April 1985, 24.
A February 1983 Defense Science Board task force examining the HTLD concluded that "[t]imely procurement of
equipment is the toughest problem faced by the Director of the HTTB...;" see U.S. Defense Science Board, Task
Force on Application of High Technology for Ground Operations, An Assessment of Units States Army High
Technology Test Bed (Made During the Period July 1981-May 1982) Final Report (Washington, DC: The Defense
Science Board, February 1983) p. i.
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feared that the costs of equipping this division could easily take resources away from the Army's
Big Five and other programs favored by the service's dominant communities. 59 Unfortunately for
the HTLD, responsibility for identifying requirements and specifications for much of this equipment
resided in the organizations controlled by the service's dominant communities, especially
DARCOM's armored-dominated Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM). The fate of two of
the HTLD's key weapons systems illustrates the issue.
The light attack battalions, equipped with the Fast Attack Vehicle, turned out to be the
division's most innovative organization. And, the FAV, basically an armed version of an all-terrain
dune buggy similar to those ridden by weekend vacationers in the deserts of Southern California,
quickly became the symbol in the public's mind of the exciting possibilities of the HTLD.60 Several
of these vehicles were obtained by the 9t Infantry Division on loan from the Navy, and eventually a
battalion's worth of vehicles was purchased from the manufacturer, Emerson/Chenowith. During
1984 and 1985, CAC was assigned the task of identifying an Army-wide requirement for such a
vehicle.61 In the end, TRADOC's schools and centers, and elements of DARCOM were unable to
agree on any requirement, leaving the 9h Infantry Division as the lone FAV-equipped force. By
1985, the division retained only half the required inventory of FAVs (MP units as well as elements
of the artillery were also equipped with these vehicles). But with such a small number of vehicles
required, the unit cost would have been at least one and half times higher than the division's
commander (now Major General Donald Pihl) felt Congress would approve. Rather than spread the
FAVs throughout the division, it was decided for maintenance and logistics reasons to retain these
vehicles in one Light Attack Battalion and equip all the other units with the HMWWV.62 By 1988,
the last of the FAVs had been removed from the division, and both light attack battalions were
59 Higgins interview with author; and General Meyer interview with author.
60 Lt. General Robert W. RisCassi, "Army Development and Employment Agency Oral History Interview with
Lieutenant General Robert W. RisCassi, Commander, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), and Commander, Army
Development and Employment Agency, 27 May 1983 - 30 May 1985;" interview by Joe D. Huddleston, 15 July
1985; transcript, High Technology Test Bed/Army Development and Employment Agency Oral History Papers,
Archives, U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2 (hereafter cited as "Lt. General RisCassi interview with
Huddleston"). The vehicle's popularity, however, also caused problems for the HTTB developers as they sought
outside support and understanding for the overall effort at Fort Lewis; see "Colonel Cerjan interview with
Huddleston," 11. The use of dune buggies in the attack role was purportedly the brainchild of a Lt. Col. Channon,
who had recently been assigned to the HTTB design group following assignment as Army liaison to the Hollywood
film industry; "Major Testerman interview with Huddleston," 2.
61 "Lt. General RisCassi interview with Huddleston,"2.
62 Maj. General Donald S. Pihl, "Army Development and Employment Agency Oral History Interview with Major
General Donald S. Pihl, Commander, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) and Army Development and Employment
Agency, 30 May 1985 - Present;" interview by Joe D. Huddleston, 31 March 1986; transcript, High Technology
Test Bed/Army Development and Employment Agency Oral History Papers, Archives, U.S. Army Military Institute,
Carlisle, PA, 4-5 (hereafter cited as "Maj. General Pihl interview with Huddleston").
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similarly equipped. Each of the company's three platoons contained three TOW II launchers and
five Mark 19 40-mm grenade launchers mounted on HMMWVs. The new light attack battalions,
with no dismounted infantry capability, were designed to act as a covering or flank force, or to
operate deep behind enemy lines in a concept similar to the original HTLD design. 63
A similar fate befell the division's armored gun system. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,
the search for an AGS focused on the joint Army-Marine Corps Light Attack Vehicle (LAV)
program. However, the armored community, mainly represented by TACOM, was assigned this
task with the Army. Given their backgrounds and community interests, this group naturally decided
on the necessity for a light tank. Much time was spent arguing with the Marines over whether the
vehicle should be tracked or wheeled, and on the size of the gun that should be mounted upon it. In
the latter case, the Army insisted on a 105mm gun, quite heavy for a light vehicle, while the
Marines were willing to examine a 75mm automatic cannon and 90mm guns. Once a 105mm gun
was successfully fired from an LAV, the Army's tankers complained that this too was inadequate;
the turret was unable to slew to the right or left, requiring the vehicle to move instead. As an
interim solution, the Marines and the 9t Infantry/HTTB were willing to look at mounting the 25mm
Bushmaster gun on a version of the Marine's LAV (the LAV-25), and then "up-gunning" as
technologies allowed; TACOM, however, refused to agree to this option. For the next several years
thereafter, the AGS program was dead within the Army.64 The importance of the AGS to the fate of
the HTLD design was described later by General Elton:
If we could have gotten an assault gun.. .if we could push the
technology to give us light stuff and in doing so, retain the lethality
of the heavy divisions, I think we would have been farther along and
would have kept the concept.65
63 For more information on 9th's final motorized division structure, see Lt. Col. Stephen L. Bowman, "The 'Old
Reliables': One of a Kind." Army, February 1988, 26-34.
64 General Wickham attempted and failed to revive an armored gun system in the mid-1980s, with the intent of
replacing the aging Sheridan tanks in the 82d Airborne and providing his Light Infantry Divisions with additional
anti-armor capability. Later in the decade, the AGS again became a "top priority" for the Army; but, by the mid-
1990s, the service once again had dropped the program from its procurement budget. In the meantime, and in
contrast to the Army's failures, the Marines acquired a family of LAVs, including the LAV-25. By the early 1990s,
technology had advanced enough to allow the Corps to examine a 105mm gun for its anti-armor version of the LAV.
For more on this tortured history, see: Benjamin F. Schemmer, "9th Infantry Works Toward 1986 IOC as High
Technology Light Division, Armed Forces Journal International, October 1983, 80; Jim Tice, "Improved Sheridans
Will Roll Once More With 9th Inf Division," Army Times, 29 April 1985, 27; "Armored Gun System to Give Light
Units Antiarmor Punch," Army, July 1987, 57; and Adelsberger, "Motorized Burnout," Army Times, 15.
65 Ibid. General Meyer expressed similar sentiments; General Meyer interview with author.
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LACK OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT
In the face of this internal opposition, General Meyer and the HTLD supporters failed to
generate much support for the concept outside of the Army. Although, with the exception of the
Carter-era OSD PA&E office, the HTLD generated little open opposition within the Pentagon
during either the Carter or Reagan Administrations, it also generated little open support. 66
Elsewhere in the executive branch, the program was largely seen as an internal Army experiment
and an internal Army concern. However, the opposition from the service's ruling communities and
the resulting inability of TRADOC and DARCOM to decide on appropriate requirements, functions
or missions for HTLD was a further factor in lukewarm response to the concept outside the service.
Confusion within the Army over the HTLD also led to a lack of strong congressional
support for the concept. Although generally supportive of Army efforts to experiment with combat
organizations like the HTLD, Congress frequently withheld or reduced funding for elements of the
HTLD in favor of better justified programs. Such was the case, for example, with the AGS system
on Capital Hill. And, as already mentioned, Congress frequently expressed concerns with the
unorthodox financial arrangements at Fort Lewis. Few members of Congress raised their voice in
protest when the HTLD was replaced.
FALL OF THE HTLD
The final HTLD IPR for Generals Meyer and Stone was held in mid-May. General Elton
was scheduled to be reassigned later in the month, with Col. Cerjan having already left the HTTB in
the previous February. Likewise, General Meyer was set to retire from the Army in June 1983. At
the IPR, the 16,000-troop level was reaffirmed, as was an eventual deployment goal (by 1990) of
1000 C-141 equivalent aircraft sorties. An interim level of 1200 sorties was approved by General
Meyer, based on the recommendation of General Elton. And, the transition date for the full division
was moved back to 1986, apparently due to equipment procurement delays.67 This was General
Meyer's last official action involving the HTLD. While many problems remained, especially in
regards to identifying and procuring a suitable armored gun for the division, General Meyer left the
66 According to General Meyer, PA&E opposed the HTLD because "the 'bean counters' down there said 'It doesn't
have the same fire power effectiveness as a heavy division';" see "General Meyer interview with Huddleston," 16.
The February 1983 Defense Science Board task force found that the HTLD effort was not well understood by and
lacked necessary support from people in OSD or Congress; see Defense Science Board, Assessment of High
Technology Test Bed, 40.
67 Huddleston, HTTB and HTLD, 227.
207
Army feeling that the HTLD was well in place. He, therefore, was surprised and disappointed -
bordering on a sense of betrayal - by what happened next.68
His successor, General Wickham, had very different views on the future of the light
divisions. In a July 1983 interview, given shortly after his ascension to the position of Army Chief
of Staff, General Wickham expressed doubts that the 9th Infantry Division would serve as a
prototype for future units:
Whether or not the actual structure of the 9th Div becomes the basis
for replication in other light divisions, we're not sure.. .if we are in
the mold of innovation, we need to be willing to look at other
changes.69
He later expressed concern that the division was too large and lack an adequate "teeth-to-tail"
ratio.70 Confusion within the Army continued as well over the service's requirement for the LAV,
leading to a multitude of errors in its presentations to Congress. Deciding that the service was not
serious enough about the effort, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees zeroed out
Army participation in the LAV program in the fall of 1983.
Also by the fall of 1983, development work on the HTLD design had largely ceased within the
Army. Consistent with other mandated cutbacks in division troop strengths, the Army of
Excellence study cut the authorized strength of the HTLD down to 14,500. The sortie limit,
however, was raised to 1400 C-141 equivalents. 7 1 To avoid confusion with General Wickham's
own Light Infantry Divisions, the name of the High Technology Light Division was changed to the
"High Technology Motorized Division" or HTMD. And, rather than have a worldwide mission
profile, the division was given a single primary mission of defending Southwest Asia as part of the
force assigned to Central Command. General Wickham's lack of interest in the HTLD is best
illustrated by the fact that no Chief of Staff-led IPRs were held for the division after he assumed
office. By the following spring, the Army declared that the 9th Infantry/HTMD would serve simply
as "a test bed for evaluating emerging technologies and new operational, organizational, and
68 General Meyer interview with author.
69 General John A. Wickham, Jr., "Wickham Discusses Changes, Issues, Plans During Interview," interview by
Larry Carney, Don Hirst and Jim Tice, Army Times, 25 July 1983, 4.
70 Schemmer, "9th Infantry," 80.
71 Berry, F. Clifton, Jr. "The US Army's 9th Infantry Division." International Defense Review 17, no. 9 (1984):
1228-1229.
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equipment concepts applicable to" other types of divisions within the force, but that no other
divisions would be converted to the HTMD design.72
Source: Lt. Colonel Stephen L. Bowman, Lt. Colonel John M. Kendall, and Lt. Colonel James L. Saunders, eds.,
Motorized Experience of the 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington, 1980-1989 (Fort Lewis, WA: HQ 9th
Infantry Division (Mtz), 1989), Figure 9.
Figure 12: Motorized Division, December 1984
Following one more design change in the fall of 1983, this one instigated by the new 9 h
Infantry/HTTB commander, General RisCassi, the final division design for the High Technology
Motorized Division was set (see Figure 12). 73 This design once again consisted of four maneuver
brigades - three ground brigades and one combat aviation brigade. However, rather than "pure"
battalions as before, the ground units now were composed of five heavy combined-arms battalions,
two light combined-arms battalions, and two light attack battalions. The heavy combined-arms
72 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Defense, Department
of Defense Appropriations for 1985, Part 3, Hearings, 98th Cong., 2d sess. (1984), 85-86.
73 Huddleston, HTLD and HTTB, 240.
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battalions contained two assault-gun companies and one light motorized infantry company, while
the light combined-arms battalions contained one assault-gun company and two light motorized
infantry companies.
Over the next year, as work on an assault-gun ground to a halt within the Army, the nearly
obsolescent Sheridan tank, then assigned to elements of the 8 2d Airborne, was considered for use as
a substitute for a heavy anti-armor system. This idea quickly was vetoed by the Army Vice Chief of
Staff General Max Thurman on the grounds that the Army did not have enough spare parts in its
inventory to support additional Sheridan-equipped units, while the original manufacturers had long
since stop producing this equipment.74 In the end, the 9th Infantry Division was left with a "heavy"
anti-armor capability consisting of HMWWVs armed with TOW II launchers. Each assault-gun
company contained twenty TOW II launchers atop HMWWVs, while the infantry companies were
armed with SAW light machine guns and Dragon anti-tank missiles.
After its official transformation, the High Technology Motorized Division never left its
home at Fort Lewis. As the Cold War drew to a close and defense budget began to fall dramatically
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 9t Infantry was one of the first of the Army's divisions to be
deactivated. In the first round of reductions, one of the division's three maneuver brigades was cut
from the active-duty force structure in fiscal year 1988, to be replaced by a National Guard
brigade. 75 The last of the division's units was inactivated in late 1991.76 Ironically, many of the
operational concepts central to the HTLD were embraced many years later by the Army's heavy
communities as they attempted to adapt to a new expeditionary role in the post-Cold War era.
CONCLUSIONS
General Meyer was disappointed in the design developed by TRADOC, which is not
surprising given the opposition to the concept by the very communities dominating TRADOC. He
responded by building a separate, independent organization, the 9th Infantry Division/HTTB hybrid,
to design and test the HTLD concept. This organization, not surprisingly given its mission and
structure, found itself in frequent conflict with the Army's MACOMs, in particular TRADOC and
DARCOM. This situation, in turn, merely increased the opposition to the HTLD among
TRADOC, DARCOM and their dominant communities members. As a result, when the 9th and the
HTTB had to turn back to these organizations for help in developing the HTLD design and
74 "Maj. General Pihl interview with Huddleston," 1.
75 Tice, "10,300 Spaces to Be Sliced," 1.
76 One of the division's brigades remained as an independent brigade, the 19 9 th (Motorized), until it was converted
to the 2d ACR and sent to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana in the summer of 1993; see
Naylor, "On the Fly," 28.
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procuring the necessary equipment, obstacles and criticism inevitably arose. Examples of such
problems include the 9t Infantry/HTTB's friction with DARCOM over cumbersome materiel
development procedures, and the inability or unwillingness of TACOM to establish requirements
for key HTLD vehicles. The confusion and conflict over requirements, concepts and missions for
the HTLD within the service led to equal confusion among potential supporters outside the service.
It caused, for example, frequent congressional cutbacks in funding for crucial HTLD weapon
systems. No where is this better illustrated than in the case of the armored gun system (AGS).
Several reasons can be put forward for the ultimate failure of the HTLD concept; many
related to intra-service politics. First, the HTLD originated with the service's weak senior
leadership, it was clearly a top-down initiative. The concept had no natural constituency within the
Army's existing communities, nor did it develop any base of support outside the service. Moreover,
the technologies needed to implement the division's war-fighting concepts - in particular the
information systems - may have been beyond the then current state of the art. Finally, the concept
began as a means for countering a trend supportive of the interests of the reigning intra-service
oligarchy: the "heavying-up" of the remaining Army infantry divisions. And the HTLD was seen
as a direct competitor with the dominant communities for resources. Specifically, the heavy,
armored community within the service feared that HTLD would compete for funding dollars and
priorities with its Big Five and other modernization programs. As a result, this dominant intra-
service community, in particular, opposed the HTLD program and succeeded in the blocking the
efforts of the service's senior leadership.
According to the framework of intra-service politics proposed in Chapter One, when a
combat organization and its missions fall outside the purview of the community oligarchy, the
design effort will fail. The more expensive or otherwise disruptive such an organizational design
and its associated programs are to the reigning community oligarchy, the more likely it will be
that the overall effort will simply fail. The HTLD clearly fell outside the purview of the
members of the community oligarchy. Indeed, it was proposed specifically as a counter to the
prevailing emphasis on heavy forces; i.e., as a counter to the reigning intra-service community
oligarchy in the Army of that time. In fact, the design had no natural constituency in any of the
service's communities. The HTLD was not an initiative that "bubbled-up" from the midst of the
Army, but was instead a "spur of the moment" suggestion by the senior Army leadership. It was
proposed and promoted by the Army Chief of Staff, and was widely (and correctly) seen as his
favored project during his tenure.
In the end, the HTLD program was a failure. The Army failed to procure any of the major
weapons systems considered crucial to the success of the concept. Only a single division was ever
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activated, and that only a pale imitation of the original design. The division was considered unfit for
combat and never deployed after its activation. Within a year or two after its activation, the 9th
Motorized Division was one of the first units sacrificed to budget reductions of the post-Cold War
era. Again, the outcome of this division design effort, given its relationship to the intra-service
dominant communities, is consistent with the propositions suggested by the framework outlined in
the opening chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
CASE 3: LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION
INTRODUCTION
General John Wickham became Army Chief of Staff on 23 July 1983, following a short-
term appointment as the service's Vice Chief of Staff. Less than a month later, at a mid-August
conference of senior Army commanders, General Wickham stunned many inside and outside the
service when he ordered the immediate creation of a new type of foot-mobile infantry unit - the
Light Infantry Division. The Light Infantry Division was to be very light and strategically
deployable. It was to contain approximately ten thousand troops and be capable of deploying in
about five hundred C-141 sorties. The division was to be a primarily foot-mobile infantry
organization, with at least fifty percent of its strength consisting of infantrymen. This effort was
designed to revitalize the service's moribund non-mechanized infantry by enhancing its image and,
more fundamentally, by emphasizing long-neglected basic dismounted infantry skills. The senior
Army leadership specified that the division was to be optimized for the lower end of the conflict
spectrum, but would also have utility in the NATO environment. Like the HTLD, the LID program
was outside of the purview of the Army's reigning intra-service oligarchy as described in the
opening chapter. Indeed, in this view, it directly promoted the interest of one of the service's
weaker communities - the traditional, foot-mobile infantry. Moreover, again like the HTLD, it
appeared to be a design concept originally promoted by the service's weak senior leadership, in
particular the Army Chief of Staff. If the intra-service political framework described in Chapter
One is true, the light infantry design effort should have failed as quickly and obviously as did the
HTLD.
CREATION OF THE LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION
The first years of General Wickham' s tenure as Army Chief of Staff were a time of triumph
for the Light Infantry Division and their chief benefactors, the foot-mobile infantry. The apparent
success of this initiative, in terms of fielded divisions, contrasts starkly with the failure of the High
Technology Light Division. However, the creation of the Light Infantry Division also exposed the
intra-service weaknesses of the non-mechanized infantry, molding the development and shape of
the LIDs.
General Wickham was uniquely qualified to oversee the creation and implementation of a
concept like the Light Infantry Division. His professional experience gave him a credibility and
wide familiarity with issues pertaining to light infantry. Except for an assignment as commander of
a mechanized infantry brigade in Europe and numerous "political" assignments, General
Wickham's career had been spent on the light side of the Army's infantry branch, including stints as
213
commander of the 101 st Airborne (Air Assault) Division and battalion commander of an airmobile
unit in Vietnam.' Such a career path undoubtedly instilled in the Wickham a strong sense of loyalty
to this community. During his Vietnam command, General Wickham was severely wounded by
grenade fragments, further enhancing his prestige and combat credentials within and outside the
service.2
Besides his light infantry background, General Wickham possessed an unusual perspective
on the political side of low-intensity conflict, having served as Deputy Chief of Staff for economic
affairs to the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam and as U.S. representative to the Four-
Party Joint Military Commission on Vietnam in 1973. Extensive tours in the Joint Chiefs of Staff
secretariat and a three-year assignment as military assistant to the Secretary of Defense during the
1970s provided General Wickham with considerable insight into the politico-military workings of
Washington. Of particular value to the LID program, Wickham was able to observe at first hand the
negotiations and results of the fabled Schlesinger-Abrams "Golden Handshake." All of these
experiences were to serve him well has he fought for the LID concept.
Finally, General Wickham came into office with a clear vision of the management style
required for a successful Chief of Staff. According to his view, the first year of a Chief's four-year
term was crucial for initiating his chosen programs. During the second and third years, time would
be spent overseeing and pushing along the implementation of the elements of this program. The
fourth year was seen by General Wickham as essentially a useless "lame-duck" period.3 This view
of the time-constrained nature of the Chief of Staff's power to successfully embed initiatives within
the service was a major driver of the LID development deadlines.
Origin Of The LID Concept
The surprise expressed throughout the Army over the formation of the LID was
understandable - like the HTLD, the concept was very much a top-down initiative. There had been
little or no groundswell from within the service for such a concept nor had most civilian agencies
within DoD ever pushed for an organization similar to the LID. Moreover, this effort largely
ignored the immediate problems then facing the service, as identified by a number of Army internal
studies.
1 Biographical material from William Gardner Bell, Commanding Generals of Chiefs of Staff: Portraits and
Biographical Sketches (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), 152.
2 Wickham himself viewed these experiences, including his wounding in Vietnam, as enhancing his prestige over the
LID within the service; author interview with General John A. Wickham.
3 Ibid.
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For example, prior to becoming Army Chief of Staff, General Wickham tasked a young up-
and-coming Brigadier General at Fort Leavenworth, Colin Powell, to form a study team to look at
Army force structure issues. Known as Project 14, this study summarized the growing imbalance in
the Army's force structure in the early 1980s, and the mismatched relationship between manpower
and force structure. On the heavy side of the equation, the study concluded that the service
maintained an efficient two division-type force: armor and mechanized infantry. On the light side,
however, there were far too many different kinds of divisions: a heavy/light (the 2d Infantry), a
high-technology light, non-mechanized infantry, airborne and air assault. The study concluded that
the light divisions needed to be normalized and standardized, especially the 2d, 7t , 9', and 25th
Infantry Divisions. Moreover, while the Army should try to maintain its current number of
divisions (sixteen), the study stated that - due to manpower constraints - it would be unwise to add
more divisions to the Army's force structure.4
Confusion persists, therefore, over the birth of the LID concept. We will begin by tracing
the origins of this concept.
A requirement for light infantry divisions did not originate from a government sources
outside of the Army. Many in the national security apparatus of the Reagan administration
expressed a desired to shift the American military away from its strong focus on Europe towards
what were viewed to be equally vital U.S. interests elsewhere around the world. However, the
preferred instruments for protecting and promoting these interests appeared to be naval forces
(witness the fanfare given to the Maritime Strategy and the 600-ship Navy), proxy forces (the
Contras in Nicaragua, UNITA rebels in Angola, and the Muhjahadeen in Afghanistan), or - if the
use of U.S. ground forces was unavoidable - the Marine Corps (involved in 1982-1983 in an
ostensible peace-keeping mission in Beirut). The need to add capability to the Army in order to
meet these threats was rarely considered. The March 1983 Defense Guidance, for example, sent to
the services for preparation of the fiscal year 1985 defense budget, did not mention a requirement
for additional light divisions within the Army.5
Nor prior to Wickham' s announcement was there a hint from the Army itself that it was
preparing to develop light infantry divisions. The service's fiscal year 1985 program objective
memorandum (POM) drafted in May of 1983 failed to mention light infantry divisions, as did the
service's initial proposed 1985 budget, first circulated in the Pentagon the following September.6
4 General Colin Powell interview with the author, phone, 26 April 1989.
5 Michael R. Gordon, "The Charge of the Light Infantry - Army Plans Forces for Third World Conflicts," National
Journal 16 (19 May 1984): 969.
6 Gordon, "Charge of the Light Infantry," 970.
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This is understandable as both documents were prepared wholly or in part under the guidance of
General Meyer. 7 There is no evidence, moreover, for suggesting that the Army, prior to General
Wickham's tenure as Chief of Staff, saw any requirement for light infantry divisions. According to
members of the Army's force design community, there was never any requirement identified during
the eight-year Army 86 study for forces with the characteristics of the Light Infantry Division.8
Already existing "contingency" forces, in particular the 82 d Airborne, and special operations forces
(Special Forces and Ranger units) were considered sufficient to meet the Army's low-intensity
conflict requirements. The initial response of many individuals within the service's force design
and plans/operations communities to the announcement of the LID concept was one of shock and
surprise to learn that such a force was suddenly required.9 Indeed, an ardent supporter of the LID
concept has admitted that
the decision to create light infantry divisions caught the Army as a
whole largely by surprise. Except for some consultation among
the Army's most senior leaders, there had been little prior
consideration given to the project by the Army staff or by the
various branch schools.'l
Finally, despite suggestions to the contrary, General Wickham's transition study, Project 14, did not
call for the creation of the Light Infantry Divisions." Instead, as we have seen, among the
conclusions of the study were that the Army, as then structured, required more personnel spaces
than it could hope to support and that the light side of the force was too diverse. The development
7 However, as late as 1985, nearly two years after Wickham's LID announcement, one author noted that: "A review
of the primary PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) documents provides no concrete analysis or
reason for the five light infantry divisions the Army has publicly stated it is pursuing. ... Nor is there a means to
logically track from the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) to the Army Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) a requirement for light infantry divisions in terms of what, where, or how many." Major Richard R. Babbitt,
The Light Infantry Division: How Many Are Needed? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military
Studies, United States Command and General Staff College (thesis), 1985), 55.
8 Keller interview with author.
9 General Powell interview with author; Keller interview with author; and Higgins interview with author. Note that Lt.
Col. William Higgins was the former LID action officer in the office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
and Plans (DCSOPS). The Army essentially admitted to the failure to identify formally a LID requirement when it
stated in its official history of the LID design effort that "the initial impetus for the Light Infantry Division requirement
was provided as a result" of the August 1983 Commanders' Conference, in which General Wickham first formally
presented the LID proposal to the Army community; Captain Timothy Hassell, Army of Excellence Final Report,
Volume II: The Light Infantry Division (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Force Design Directorate, Army Combined Arms
Combat Development Activity, Department of the Army, 1 October 1984), 1-3.
10 Lt. Colonel Timothy A. Wray "The Army's Light Infantry Divisions: An Analysis of Advocacy and Opposition,"
Washington, DC: National War College, 1990, 5.
" For speculation on Project 14 as the source of the LID concept, see, for instance, Michael J. Mazarr, "The Light-Heavy
Debate Rears Its Head Again," Armed Forces Journal International, October 1989, 100. General Colin Powell, the
study's leader, vehemently denied that this was the case; General Powell interview with author.
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of the LID failed to deal with the issues raised by the study, and, in fact, helped to exacerbate many
of them.
Many Army officers were proposing new force designs with increased strategic
deployability during the early 1980s. Indeed, there was a deluge of force designs involving some
combination of infantry and light armored/mechanized forces, including General Meyer's HTLD.
Designed to be lighter and more strategically deployable than the service's armored and mechanized
divisions, such units emphasized tactical speed and anti-armor punch. However, all of these
proposals and programs were oriented and optimized towards mid- to high-intensity conflict such as
one might find in Europe or around the Persian Gulf region, not the low-intensity conflicts that were
the purported focus of the LID. 12 And, under the rubric of "low-intensity conflict" (LIC), many
national security experts expressed increasing interest in maintaining capabilities for use in military
operations other than in Europe, Korea, and Southwest Asia. These alternative missions included
counter-terrorist and counterinsurgency operations in the Third World. While much of the thrust for
counterinsurgency came from academics or retired military personnel, there was interest in this
subject as well within the U.S. Army, particularly among those officers with responsibilities in the
U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom). 13 Counter-terrorism, spurred by the Desert One debacle,
also gained supporters within the Army and was of particular interest to General Meyer.14 Both
counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency, however, were viewed within the Army as the province of
Special Forces or other elite units.
Foot-mobile light infantry were receiving increasing attention outside of the U.S. Army in
the early 1980s. Officers in several Western militaries were writing about infantry and, specifically,
12 For a flavor of these proposals, see Maj. General Jack Galvin, "The Heavy/Light Concept," Armed Forces Journal
International, July 1982, 66-80; Colonel Jerome L. Haupt, "Heavy/Light Operations - An Added Viewpoint," Armed
Forces Journal International, May 1983, 85; Maj. General Rowley S.N. Mans, "Light Armor in the Rapid Deployment
Force," Armed Forces Journal International, July 1981, 49-53; Charles W. Bernard, "A More Rapidly Deployable
Force," National Defense, October 1980, 33-36, 74; Lt. General (Ret.) James F. Hollingworth and Maj. General (Ret.)
Allan T. Wood, "The Light Armored Corps - A Strategic Necessity," Armed Forces Journal International, January
1980, 20-24; and Major David J. Ozolek, "Infantry in Desert Armor Operations," Armor 92, no. 5 (September-October
1983): 26-29. General Meyer often spoke of the need for having additional non-mechanized infantry in Europe, with
the HTLD being his proposed solution; see, for example, General Edward C. Meyer, "Interview with the Pentagon
Press Group, 13 June 1980," in Meyer, E.C. Meyer, Chief of Staff, 100.
13 See, for instance, N. C. Livingston, "Fighting Terrorism and 'Dirty Little Wars'," in Defense Planning for the 1990s,
ed. William A. Buckingham, Jr., 165-96 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984); Edward N.
Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare," in Ibid., 197-209; and Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully, eds., U.S.
Policy and Low Intensity Conflict: Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s (New York: Transaction Books,
1981).
14 General Meyer had been instrumental in the early formation of the Army's counter-terrorist Delta Force unit in the
mid-to-late 1970's; see Colonel (Ret.) Charles A. Beckwith and Donald Knox. Delta Force (New York: Dell, 1983),
133-35 and 158-59.
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light infantry at this time.' 5 Likewise civilian defense analysts within the United States, some under
contract from the Army, were writing both on the light infantry and on low intensity conflict.16
Evidence (or absence thereof) suggests, however, that the LID concept, like the High-
Technology Light Division before it, was borne of the initiative of the Army's senior leadership in
15 For example, Canadian Army Major John English's 1981 book On Infantry, made a forceful argument for giving
increased prominence to foot-mobile infantry; see English, On Infantry. Similarly, current and retired officers within
the West German military were arguing for greater use of light infantry units in the increasingly urbanized landscape of
Western Europe, such as Major General Franz Uhle-Wettler, whose book Battlefield Central Europe, though not
published in English until later in the decade, was translated and widely circulated informally throughout the U.S. Army
during the early 1980s; see Major General Franz Uhle-Wettler, Battlefield Central Europe. Danger of Overreliance
on Technology by the Armed Forces. (Gutersloh: 1980; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General
Staff College, 1987). German defense analyst Otto Munter similarly wrote in 1980 about the utility of light infantry
in Central Europe given the percentage of close terrain such as forests, mountainous areas, and increasing
urbanization; Otto Munter, "Do We Need the Light Infantry," Europaische Wehrkunde, February 1980, 2-11. Also
see a series of papers, some from U.S. Army officers, presented at a symposium sponsored by the Royal United
Services Institute (RUSI) and the Commander ACE Mobile Forces (Land) on the "Employment of Non-mechanized
Infantry" in April 1980; these were subsequently published in the RUSI journal: Brig. General G. Brugmann,
"Setting the Scene - The European Battlefield," RUSI Journal 125 (December 1980): 56-59; General Sir William
Scotter, "A Role for Non-Mechanized Infantry," RUSI Journal 125 (December 1980): 59-62; General Frederick J.
Kroesen, "The Ultimate Weapon of War," RUSI Journal 125 (December 1980): 62-64; Lt. General William R.
Richardson, "Light Infantry," RUSI Journal 125 (December 1980): 64-67; and Brig. General G. Brugmann, "The
German View of the Role of Infantry on the Battlefield," RUSI Journal 125 (December 1980): 67-69.
16 As early as 1980, Steven Canby began arguing for the use of specialized "classic light infantry" designed to fight
optimally in terrain where heavier forces found their mobility severely constrained: i.e., closed terrain, such as jungles,
cities, mountains and heavily forested regions. In particular, Canby argued that such forces would be useful in mixed
terrain such as Europe, where the ability of these forces to defend in cities and forests would free up armor forces,
enabling NATO commanders to marshal these latter forces for decisive counterattacks. He later criticized the Army's
LID concept for not adopting the classic light infantry style. For Canby's work, see Steven L. Canby, Classic Light
Infantry and New Technology (Arlington, VA: C&L Associates, Study for DARPA, December 1981); Steven L.
Canby, "Territorial Defense in Central Europe," Armed Forces and Society 7, no. 1 (Fall 1980): 51-67; Steven L.
Canby, "Light Infantry in Perspective," Infantry 74, no. 4 (July/August 1984): 28-31. Canby's colleague and business
associate, Edward Luttwak, likewise advocated the development of light infantry. In the concluding volume of a multi-
volume work written under contract for TRADOC, Luttwak outlined the need for light infantry units in the U.S. Army,
focusing largely on their utility in mid to high-intensity conflicts such as the European theater; see Edward N. Luttwak,
Historical Analysis and Projection for Army 2000. Volume 2. Analysis and Conclusions (Chevy Chase, MD:
Luttwak Inc., 15 May 1983). Turning to the opposite end of the conflict spectrum, Robert Kupperman led a study
effort, again under TRADOC tasking, that concluded that the main threats against which the U.S. Army would have to
plan in the coming decades would arise from low-intensity conflicts (LICs) throughout the Third World. The study
recommended that the Army begin the development of a "large LIC combat organization" that included light forces
organized as light infantry brigades, each tailored to a specific regional environment and a specific narrowly defined set
of scenarios. It also stated that the requirements for such an organization were "sufficiently specialized to warrant a
separate, independent R&D program." Kupperman and Associates, Low Intensity Conflict, Volumes 1: Main Report
(Washington, DC: Kupperman and Associates, Inc., 30 June 1983), 47 and 50. Also see supporting documents in
Kupperman and Associates, Low Intensity Conflict, Volumes 2: Appendices (Washington, DC: Kupperman and
Associates, Inc., 30 June 1983). A similar assessment on the future threat posed by LIC can be found in Robert H.
Kupperman, and William J. Taylor, Jr., eds. Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000 (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 1982. Reprint, Cambridge, MA: Lexington Books, 1984).
This latter study had originally been prepared for the Army's DCSOPS; Gordon, "Charge of the Light Infantry," 968.
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the person of its Chief of Staff, General Wickham.17 He has told several interviewers that, upon
taking over as Chief of Staff, he felt that the Army was too heavy and inflexible for the potential
missions it might be called upon to perform.18 Whether General Wickham entered office with some
vague notion of improving the foot-mobile infantry is difficult to assess at this date, although
subsequent events may shed some light on his earlier thinking. The specific events which
ultimately led to the decision to create the LID, however, can be described.
The story begins, ironically, with Brigadier General Colin Powell and Project 14. Although
the Project 14 study team did not contribute directly to the LID concept, other efforts directed by
General Powell might have inadvertently done so. The Project 14 study concluded that the Army
faced two problems: its current force required more manpower spaces than the service could
sustain, and there were too many different light division force designs. 19 In an attempt to deal with
both of these shortcomings, Powell, then head of the Army's Combined Arms Combat
Development Activity (CACDA) at Fort Leavenworth, presented General Wickham with a tentative
force design for Army light divisions a week or so after completion of Project 14.20 This rough
design, which Powell and a few subordinates had been working on informally outside the
framework of the Project 14 study and the regular design directorate hierarchy, 2 1 consisted of a
10,000-man force. However, this division was structured very differently from the eventual LID
design and was not sized according to an airlift-sortie constraint as would be the LID effort. Its
main goal was simply to bring manpower space reductions to the "over-structured" Army - i.e., to
17 Despite the timing of these studies and the fact that many were performed under contract from TRADOC, it is
unclear what influence, if any, they played within the U.S. Army. While both the Luttwak and Kupperman studies
were begun under TRADOC Commander General Morelli, by the time they were completed, General William
Richardson had become the new TRADOC Commander (Morelli retired early due to ill-health and died in July
1984). And, while the new commander may have had some informal discussions with the two studies' principal
authors, General Richardson maintains that the first that he heard of light infantry divisions was from General
Wickham himself. General Meyer, then in his final months as Army Chief of Staff, had apparently heard of
Luttwak's work, though he was far from supportive; author interview with General Meyer. General Wickham too
denies that the LID concept came from any source outside of the Army; author interview with General Wickham.
There is no evidence that General Wickham was briefed by Dr. Luttwak or the Kupperman study participants prior
to the August 1983 Commanders' Conference. Moreover, according to several persons familiar with the situation,
personal relations between General Wickham and Dr. Luttwak have been described as having never been warm.
18 Mazarr, "Light-Heavy Debate," 102.
19 General Powell interview with author.
20 This meeting probably took place on 30 June, while General Wickham was visiting Fort Leavenworth to address the
Pre-Command Course at the Command and General Staff College; see General John Wickham, "Remarks to Pre-
Command Course, Ft. Leavenworth, KS," delivered on 30 June 1983; Box 9/Contents: June83-Feb85 CSA Files;
John A. Wickham Papers; Archives, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
21 The then-head of the force design directorate, Robert Keller, a civilian who reported directly to General Powell, knew
nothing of Project 14 or the light infantry division effort prior to General Wickham's public announcement of the latter
in August 1983; Keller interview with author.
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reduce the shortfalls created by Division/Army 86. The design represented a considerable reduction
from the 14,000 to 17,000-man light divisions then existing in the Army, and was meant as a
possible template for all divisions on the light side of the force. The object of Powell's briefing was
merely to give General Wickham some sense as to how personnel spaces might be reduced on the
light side of the Army while simultaneously standardizing these forces.22
The one idea General Wickham apparently took from this briefing was the notion of a light
division composed of ten thousand troops, as a week or so later he informally suggested to the
TRADOC Commander, General Richardson, that his agency begin to examine a light infantry
division of just that size.23 In addition, in a 7 July 1983 interview, Wickham spoke of the
need to do a better job of resourcing on the light side of the force,
and give more attention to organization and structure that will be
consistent with the nature of warfare that the light forces are likely to
be involved in.24
He went on to state that:
It's not inconceivable that we may be examining smaller divisions
that would be more highly deployable and more potent in terms of
tooth-to-tail than we have thought of previously. This means, if you
make them more potent in terms of tooth to tail, somebody's got to
provide the tail and the tail might have to come from corps support.25
When asked if this meant "a smaller and lighter" 82 d and 10 1st Divisions, Wickham responded in
the affirmative, but added mysteriously "[o]r other light divisions." 26
In a backchannel communication to General Wickham, dated 12 July 1983, General
Richardson indicated that TRADOC's initial efforts on the LID were "moving ahead". 27
Richardson noted that concept development and force design would proceed serially and would use
the identical BDP development process involved in the Division 86 design; both of these notions
were soon to be sacrificed to the overriding need to complete the design process quickly. Two
22 General Powell interview with author.
23 General William R. Richardson interview with the author, Arlington, VA, 22 July 1991; and General Richardson,
"The Force Structure and Army 86," Backchannel Communication to CSA General Wickham, 12 July 1983; Folder:
Backchannels-Incoming-July 1983; CSA Box 5: CSA Backchannels Jun83-Dec86 Incoming-Outgoing; The John A.
Wickham Papers; Archives, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereafter cited as Richardson,
"Force Structure and Army 86").
24 Wickham, "Wickham Discusses Changes," 4.
25 This last comment was a hint of the LID's soon to be developed "corps augmentation" concept. Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Richardson, "The Force Structure and Army 86."
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additional things should be noted about this message. First of all, Richardson explicitly states that
TRADOC assumed a sixteen division Army force structure; the notion of adding additional
divisions had not yet been raised. Second, the only LID design constraint mentioned in the message
was the personnel limit of ten thousand; the sortie limit apparently had yet to be set.
Both elements were to change a few days after Richardson's message was sent. On
Saturday morning, July 16th, General Wickham, General Maxwell Thurman (the newly-installed
Vice Chief of Staff), and Army Secretary John O. Marsh, Jr. met at Fort McNair.28 The meeting,
which was the first for the uniformed participants in their present roles, was initiated by Secretary
Marsh in order to lay out the "major thrust areas" for the service over the next four years. As the
meeting began, General Wickham quickly discovered allies for his emerging LID concept.
Secretary Marsh had long been favorably predisposed to light infantry. The Secretary had
served as an infantry officer in both the active-duty Army and, for many years, in the Virginia
National Guard. 29 Moreover, he had long been a promoter of light infantry-type units; he was an
enthusiastic supporter, for example, of the Vermont National Guard's efforts to create a ski-borne
alpine battalion. 30 General Thurman too came into the meeting already convinced of the need for
improvements to the service's dismounted infantry; indeed, General Thurman later claimed that it
was he was who first brought up the light infantry concept at the meeting. Though he rose through
the ranks of the artillery branch, General Thurman recently had visited facilities throughout the
service in his capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, providing an opportunity to observe
the state of Army training and readiness up close. Through these travels he gained the impression
that the infantry had lost the ability to fight effectively when dismounted from their vehicles. He
felt, moreover, that the Army - and especially its two remaining active-duty standard infantry
divisions (the 7 th and 2 5t ) - had become too heavy.31
General Thurman made three arguments that day for why the Army needed to create light
infantry. First, if the Army was to become a truly "world-class, premier" military force, it needed
both effective armor and infantry forces. At that time, the M-1 tank was just coming on line - this
would make the armor force very capable. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle would be coming
28 The only other person present at the meeting was a note-taker, Lt. General Art Brown, Director of the Army Staff in
the Army Chief of Staff's Office; General Maxwell R. Thurman interview with the author, Arlington, VA, 29 May 1992;
and Desk Calendar 1983, Box Title: "Day-at-a-Glance' Desk Calendars 1983-1987," The Maxwell R. Thurman Papers,
Archives, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
29 John O. Marsh, Jr. interview with the author, Washington, DC, 15 May 1992.
30 Ibid.; and General Meyer interview with author.
31 This account of the meeting is from General Thurman interview with author.
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soon as well, but the system would only help the mechanized part of the infantry.32 The foot-mobile
infantry also had to be effective; but in General Thurman's view this force needed much work,
having lost the necessary dismounted infantry fighting skills. Indeed, according to General
Thurman, the infantry generally had become over-burdened with mechanization and, as a result, had
lost much of its field prowess and strategic mobility. Finally, elements of United States Army,
Europe (USAEUR ) had in the past argued for additional infantry to fight in the forest, cities and
urban sprawl of Europe, tasks for which light infantry would be well suited.33
Thurman's assessment was readily accepted by Secretary Marsh and General Wickham, and
a two-part response was decided upon. First, the Army would add a third Ranger battalion and
create a Ranger Regimental HQ. Both of these actions (taken on behalf of an elite sub-element of
the infantry) were done with the intent, according to General Thurman, of "increasing the el1an" of
the Army's infantry forces overall. Second, the participants agreed that it was necessary to change
the character of the Army's non-mechanized infantry divisions. To undertake this change required
redesigning these divisions, which in turn meant, in the view of the participants, reducing the weight
of these divisions.
There are several things to note about this meeting, later described by Thurman as the "birth
of the light infantry division." First, the arguments for enhancing the foot-mobile infantry related
largely to internal Army concerns: the poor shape of this community relative to the heavy side of
the service, and the loss of basic foot-mobile infantry skills. Absent from these discussions, if
General Thurman's account is complete, was any talk of the alternative externally-directed
motivations often ascribed to the service for creating light infantry divisions: e.g., to counter
Marine Corps efforts to capture the Third World missions, or the need by the Army for a politically
popular program to secure a larger share of funding from the other services. 34 Second, despite the
initial public rationale for the Light Infantry Divisions - their need in and suitability for low-
intensity conflict missions in the Third World - there was no mention of the Third World
contingencies during this meeting. Instead, the only strategic need purportedly raised by the
32 During his 7 July interview with Army Times, General Wickham had stated a similar view concerning the state of the
Army's heavy forces: "The heavy side of the Army is very healthy. We have a number of organizational changes that
are already under way in Europe. We have solid acquisition programs - the M-1 tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the
Cavalry Fighting Vehicle, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, self-propelled artillery, FAASV [Field Artillery
Ammunition Support Vehicle] and FIST-V [Fire Support Team Vehicle], all designed to create a solid heavy side of the
force." See Wickham, "Wickham Discusses Changes," 4.
33 Indeed, as early as 1979, the chief of U.S. Army forces in Europe Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen reportedly was telling
Army leaders that he needed "additional light infantry" in Europe; see "Light Infantry Boosted," Army Times, 3
December 1979, 40; and Kroesen, "Ultimate Weapon of War," 62-64.
34 See, for example, Gordon, "Charge of the Light Infantry," 969; and Damon and Krisler, "Army of Excellence,"
86-87.
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participants at this meeting was for additional foot-mobile infantry in the Army's main theater and
"organizational mission" - Europe. Finally, the existence and results of this meeting were kept very
quiet.35 Not even such a key participant in the LID's creation as General Richardson could recall
hearing of such a meeting.36 By keeping the true source of this decision hidden, the LID effort
could later be made to appear as a wider Army initiative, one with a more solid basis of support
within the Army.
A few days after the 16 July meeting, General Wickham again met with General
Richardson. General Wickham now stated a preference, if enough personnel spaces could be made
available by reducing the size of the non-mechanized standard infantry division to ten thousand
troops, for creating an additional seventeenth division within the active-duty Army's force structure
while maintaining the service's fixed end-strength. General Richardson responded that this could
be done, but only if he were empowered to look at the overall Army force structure and manpower
requirements. 37 Wickham agreed, and yet another Army-wide design effort, the Army of
Excellence (AoE), was born.
The question remains: "Why add an additional division to an already over-structured
force?" Although no adequate answer to this question has been provided by the Army senior
leadership, three factors may have combined to drive this decision. First, division strength had long
been a key figure of merit in comparisons of ground armies; this was particularly true of the U.S.
Army. So, any effort that would lead to additional division "flags" would be welcomed. Second,
creating new light infantry divisions would increase the proportion of the light infantry within the
overall force structure and, perhaps, enhance the power the foot-mobile infantry community within
intra-service Army politics. Increasing the number of light divisions also increased the number of
command slots available for light infantry officers. Finally, adding more divisions to the Army's
force structure would require congressional approval. While this latter strategy might prove risky
(e.g., Congress might reject adding more divisions), requesting such approval provided an
opportunity to garner external support for the light infantry division concept, support which might
proved useful against any internal Army opposition to the concept.
To flesh out the required changes to the infantry division, a study group was formed in
Washington under the leadership of Lt. Col. Wesley Clark and with the active participation of
35 When told that the birth of the LID was a mystery to most observers, General Thurman chuckled and said, "I not am
surprised;" General Thurman interview with author.
36 General Richardson interview with author.
37 Ibid.
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Generals Wickham and Thurman. 38 This group's efforts eventually would produce the Army's
1984 "White Paper on the Light Infantry." 39 The group drew up a set of tight design criteria for the
new divisions which would serve as the basis for TRADOC's LID development concept: a 10,000-
man force, half of which would be combat soldiers, capable of deploying anywhere in the world in
five hundred C-141 sorties. These criteria, however, were not arrived at through any detailed
analysis. The ten thousand-troop figure, for instance, had already been settled on by General
Wickham, and was accepted without further analysis. The sortie figure was arrived at by the
simple, though arbitrary, assertion that the new division should be capable of traveling to trouble
spots with one-third fewer flights than the approximately fifteen thousand sorties then required for
standard infantry divisions.40 The group also decided to refocus LID operations on low-intensity
conflict, carving out a special niche for the new organization and making it independent of the
stronger Army unions whose principal focus was Europe.
With the experience of the HTLD fresh in his memory, Wickham recognized the need to
garner early support for the LID concept from the Army's dominant intra-service communities. As
a first step, he carefully chose the proper moment to announce the project to the Army: the August
Four Star Commanders' Conference. The conference, bringing together the senior commanders of
the Army's three MACOMs - TRADOC, DARCOM, and FORSCOM - provided Wickham with
the opportunity to make his case for the light infantry concept before the service's senior uniformed
leadership and within the principle arenas of intra-service politics. In so doing, he could gain the
institutional assent of the very same organizations that had impeded General Meyer's HTLD. Such
a move also would help lift the label of the "Chief of Staff's pet rock" from the LID concept, again
making it appear to be a wider Army initiative. The effort, in part, worked; later Army publications
referred to the LID concept as actually having been initiated at this August Conference.41
According to General Wickham, the light infantry concept received unanimous and enthusiastic
support from those present. With this support in hand, the effort could now begin to develop the
detailed concepts by which the LID would fight and to design the division's internal organization.
38 Lt. Col. Clark had been the principal deputy under Gen. Powell on the Project 14 Study. This assignment might have
given rise to the inaccurate perception that it was Project 14 itself that recommended developing light infantry divisions.
39 General John Wickham, Jr., Light Infantry Divisions, Army White Paper (Washington DC: U.S. Army Chief of Staff,
April 1984). Though the white paper was eventually released under General Wickham's name, its principal author was
Lt. Colonel Wes Clark; General Thurman interview with author.
40 Ibid.
41 See, for instance, Hassell, Army of Excellence, 1.
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Developing the Light Infantry Division Design
The emphasis throughout the LID development process was on speed: develop the concept,
create a force and get it into the field quickly before effective opposition to it could crystallize
within the service. Foremost in his mind, General Wickham wanted the process well underway
while his political capital was still high and early enough in his term of office to enable him to see it
through to completion.42
Also, unlike the HTLD, the LID design and development process would take place within
the heart of the Army's force design community (i.e., TRADOC), requiring early and intimate
cooperation between the dominant unions (rather than against or outside these unions) on the design
and detailed contributions from the various schools and centers concerned with the division's
diverse elements.43 The Infantry School, for example, helped design the rifle battalions, while the
MP School led the design of the division's MP units. At all stages in the process, the views of these
TRADOC organizations were sought and deference paid to their opinions.44 Undertaking the
design process in this manner served several purposes. First, it helped ensure its speedy completion
by going to the agencies with prior knowledge and experience with the division's organizational
elements. It also ensured that those agencies assigned the responsibility for developing LID training
and instruction, specifically the schools, would have a good working knowledge of the LID concept
and design, and, as co-developers of the organization, the enthusiasm to see this training
successfully carried out. Thus, this development structure also served the senior Army leadership's
goal of enhancing Army training in foot-mobile infantry skills. Finally, this structure helped to
ensure support for the LID concept within the Army, at least among those branches and agencies
closely involved in its development.
The LID design and development process was one half of General Wickham's Army of
Excellence (AoE) initiative. The other half consisted of cutting manpower spaces from the
Division/Army 86 force designs. The goal behind this effort was both to reduce the gap between
the service's required personnel spaces and its fixed end-strength, and to generate enough excess
spaces to permit the creation of a new LID division in the active-duty force structure. The
42 And, the fate of General Meyer's HTLD at the hands of his successor likely served as a useful reminder to Wickham
of the cost of allowing a division design process to drag out beyond the tenure of its creator.
43 This was identified by a chronicler of the LID development as one of the explicit strategies used by the senior
Army leadership to generate internal support for the concept; see Wray, "Army's Light Infantry Divisions," 6.
44 For example, when the Commandant of the Infantry School complained that the original, and innovative, three fire
team structure of the light infantry's rifle squads ran counter to established infantry doctrine, Wickham immediately
ordered the squad's organization returned to the traditional two fire team structure; see Hassell, Army of Excellence, p. 3-
7.
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identification of space reductions and the initial LID design both were to be completed in time for
review by the Chief of Staff at the mid-October Commanders' Conference, a mere ten weeks from
initiation of the effort.
The personnel space reductions were brought about through a number of actions. First,
headquarter staffs of non-combat units throughout the service, from the Department of the Army to
the MACOMs and their various sub-components, were once again reduced and personnel sent back
out into the field; a move reminiscent of Army actions during reorganizations in the early 1960s and
1970s. The focus then shifted to down-sizing the divisions just created in the Division/Army 86
force design. 45 Cuts were made to the divisions in part by pulling certain Combat Support (CS) and
Combat Service Support (CSS) units out of the designs and consolidating these units at corps
level.46 Other CSS functions were simply eliminated from the Division/Army 86 designs, reflecting
General Wickham's believe that CSS had become too large and had not been examined for potential
inefficiencies and waste since World War II.47 A capability unique to the Division 86 designs also
was eliminated: i.e., "Robustness, Reliability, and Redundancy." 48 Manpower reductions were also
achieved through the use of new technologies in a variety of areas, including CSS. 49 Finally, many
45 See for example, Bahnsen, "Kaleidoscopic US Army," 78-88; and Damon and Krisler, "Army of Excellence," 86.
46 While some overall space reduction was subsequently achieved by cutting back on the capabilities of these units once
moved to the corps-level, the biggest savings were gained simply by eliminating the now "redundant" overhead of staff
and support personnel formerly associated with these units when they were within the divisions. Among the types of
units centralized at the corps level were 8-inch howitzer batteries, Chaparral air defense units (formerly the division's
principle air defense gun) and medium-lift transportation helicopters. This centralization was later justified by senior
Army leadership and others as a means for bringing Army force design more in line with the dictates of the service's
new AirLand Battle doctrine which stressed greater control by the corps commander over maneuver units and the
direction of combat. Critics of the AoE, however, viewed this doctrinal justification as secondary to the push for
manpower reductions; see, for example, Damon and Krisler, "Army of Excellence, " 87; and John W. Wild The Army
of Excellence: How Ready? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 23 March 1987).
47 General Wickham interview with author. Indeed, OSD officials were repeatedly (and inaccurately) told that AoE
simply involved the elimination of "grave diggers" and other anachronisms; Korb interview with author.
48 The elimination of these personnel spaces put at risk the ability of the division to operate continuously beyond the
initial 72-hour limit; Keller interview with author.
49 General Wickham forcefully pushed the search for "product enhancement technologies" to enable fewer soldiers to
perform the same tasks Army-wide. Many of these new technologies failed to work as advertised. Palletized loading
systems, for example, were being explored at Fort Lewis to allow a single soldier to unload a truck load of ammunition
or supplies; in principle, providing the opportunity to eliminate many personnel spaces per supply unit. However, the
palletized loading system was still undergoing testing as late as 1993 and the program was coming under heavy criticism
by the General Accounting Office; see U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Acquisition: Palletized Load System
Acquisition Quantity Overstated, GAO/NSIAD-92-163 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, April 1992).
Another change involved the substitution of 5,000-gallon fuel tankers for 7,500-gallon tankers, resulting in savings of
one truck driver for every 15,000 gallons of fuel transported. This plan has subsequently been criticized because it failed
to consider the Army's increasing demands for fuel as M-1 tanks and Bradley's were brought into service. In addition,
the plan failed to address practical problems such as the difficulties faced by the larger and longer 7500-gallon tankers
when attempting to negotiate roads narrower than major highways; see Lt. Colonel John M. Vann, "The Forgotten
Forces," Military Review 67, no. 8 (August 1987): 14. These and similar savings arising from logistic unit productivity
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CS and CSS functions and their associated personnel spaces were transferred to the Reserve
Component; a long-standing Army practice, which also would become crucial to the LID design
process. 50 In the final result, the Division '86 heavy divisions, both armor and mechanized infantry,
were reduced from over twenty thousand personnel spaces down to near sixteen thousand.
The personnel space down-sizing effort was completed within the mandated ten-week
timeframe. Because of the severe time constraints, however, the designers found it impossible to
conduct field testing or perform dedicated analyses on the effects of the mandated force reductions
on combat performance. Nonetheless, their previous eight years of work on the earlier division
designs were not in vane, as they provided the designers with at least a sense of the type and degree
of risks involved in making these cuts."5 General Wickham approved the space reduction plans at
the mid-October's Commander's Conference, and implementation of the new designs began
immediately. In practice, the approved personnel cuts took several years to complete, and, in case
of some non-divisional units, were never accomplished. Nonetheless, force planners immediately
used the anticipated savings to develop additional light infantry divisions.
Concurrent with the AoE manpower reductions, work began on the new force design for the
light infantry divisions. In his instructions to the Army at the end of the August Commanders'
Conference, General Wickham stipulated three parameters, derived from the Lt. Col. Clark-led
study effort. The division was to be composed of at least fifty percent infantry in nine maneuver
battalions, be deployable within four hundred to five hundred C-141 sorties, and contain
approximately ten thousand troops. The last two constraints, in particular, were imposed to prevent
the unit from becoming a "wish list" for force designers and operational users, an organization filled
with innumerable "bells and whistles." 52 As the process was getting underway in late August,
General Richardson provided further guidance for designing the LID, emphasizing innovation in
organizational design as well as the ceilings on manpower and airlift requirements. In addition, the
studies were projected to reduce 30,000 manpower spaces overall from the CSS functions. Outside the CSS area, ways
were also sought to substitute modern technologies for manpower. For example, new communications technologies,
symbolized by the Mobile Subscriber Equipment, were expected to reduce manpower requirements in signals units; see
Hassell, Army of Excellence, p. 2-9.
50 General Wickham, who was Defense Secretary Schlesinger's military assistant in 1974, was a close observer of
Schlesinger's and Chief of Staff Abrams' efforts to increase the number of Army divisions with a fixed end-strength by,
in part, moving CSS functions to the reserves; General Wickham interview with author.
51 Keller interview with author.
52 This tendency, General Wickham believed, had proven fatal to the earlier HTLD concept of strategic deployability;
General Wickham interview with author. But note that, once again, the force designers were told explicitly to consider
the Army's resource constraints, defined for the LIDs in terms both of manpower and airlift. For the LID concept, the
latter constraint was to prove the most severe.
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guidelines specified that only materiel expected to be fielded by 1986 or earlier could be considered
for the initial Light Infantry organizations. 5 3
From the start, like the AoE manpower reduction effort, the emphasis in the LID design was
placed on rapid completion of the process. As a result, the Army's formal development process
again was circumvented in designing the LIDs. For instance, rather than begin the process with an
analysis of threats and the construction of a Battlefield Development Plan characterizing the
expected battlefield (the now standard TRADOC force design methodology), the LID designers
simply took as a given General Wickham's stated requirement for such a division and his
specification that be designed for low-intensity threats as well as NATO contingencies. To further
speed the process, General Richardson directed that the next steps in the standard TRADOC design
process - concept development and force design - be conducted in parallel; as a result, the groups
designing the various elements of the LID division had to work very closely with the agencies
undertaking concept development, continually revising their force designs as the tactics of
employing these forces became clearer. 54 More seriously, efforts to formally test and analytically
assess the capabilities of the division's sub-components were eliminated entirely from the design
process. s5 Instead, reliance was placed on the experience and intuition of the agencies and schools
designing individual elements to provide an estimate of the risks and vulnerabilities of their
respective designs.
The first major, and continuing, conceptual problem facing the developers was deciding
exactly what threat the LID should be designed to meet. The designers had been told by the senior
Army leadership to optimize the division to the low-end of the conflict spectrum. 56 However, there
was little consensus or clear notion within the service over exactly how to define the concept of
low-intensity conflict. By 1983, low-intensity conflict primarily had come to mean guerilla and
anti-guerilla warfare; the threshold between low and mid-intensity conflict being the introduction of
organized mainline units to the threat environment. In the absence of better guidance, the
development community chose to design the LID specifically for the break-point between low and
mid-intensity conflict, an environment similar to Vietnam where the threat consisted of both guerilla
53 Hassell, Army of Excellence, p. 1-4.
54 Hassell, Army of Excellence, p. 1-3. According to the design process developed by TRADOC during Army 86, the
responsibilities, functions and tasks of the division overall and of each of its sub-components were typically described
during the concept development phase; including the general organization of each element, its required capabilities and
unavoidable limitations. The bulk of the concept development for the LID design process was undertaken by the
Concept Development Directorate (CDD) of CACDA; TRADOC schools and centers, however, also provided input in
their areas of responsibility.
55 Ibid., p.1-4; and Higgins interview with author.
56 At the same time, ensuring that the unit had some utility in a NATO environment.
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forces (Viet Cong) and some mainline units (the North Vietnamese Army).57 Even after this
assumption was made, the force designers' confusion over low-intensity conflict did not end.
According to one participant, no consensus was ever achieved concerning how the LID would fight
in such a low-intensity scenario. 58 In the end, these differences were merely glossed over, with light
infantry units assumed to go into a conflict early to be followed up by heavier units. Alternatively,
and consistent with TRADOC instructions to emphasize a "rapid-in/rapid-out" capability, LID units
could be used as a show of force, moving rapidly to a region where their very presence was
expected to change the military balance and an opponent's risk calculus, to be followed just as
quickly by a rapid withdrawal. 59
Despite the difficulty of deciding against whom and how the LID forces would fight, the
development and design process hurried on.60 In late August, a working group convened at the
Combined Arms Center to discuss the desired capabilities of the LID and to develop initial
alternative configurations. At a September General Officers' Workshop, the Commander of the
Combined Arms Center, Lt. General Carl Vuono instructed the assembled commanders of the
service's schools and centers that the "normal study time-lines would be severely shortened" and
that their organizations were to provide same-day, or at most two-day, responses to taskings from
the Combined Arms Center.61 Throughout September and into October, a series of "action officer"
workshops, consisting of participants from all the schools and centers led by representatives from
CACDA, were held to develop the various units and organizations which would go into creating a
Light Infantry Division.
As scheduled, General Wickham was able to approve a preliminary LID design at the next
Four Star Commanders' Conference, held on 20 October. Again, the venue lent an appearance of
an Army-wide initiative. This light infantry division design generally met the original criteria,
containing 10,023 troops and requiring fewer than 500 sorties of C-141 aircraft to deploy.
57 Keller interview with author.
58 Higgins interview with author.
59 Keller interview with author; Higgins interview with author; and Maj. General John W. Foss, "An Exclusive AFJ
Interview with Maj. Gen. John W. Foss, USA, Chief of Infantry," interview by Millard Barger and Deborah G. Meyer,
Armed Forces Journal International, October 1985, 82.
60 The following chronology is derived from Hassell, Army of Excellence, pp. 1-3 to 1-4.
61 Ibid., p. 1-3.
229
(10,023 personnel)
Source: Briefing presented to Army Commanders' Conference, HQDA, 20-21 October 1983, the Army of Excellence,
by HQ USACACDA, Force Design Dir. (SECRET - Info used is UNCLASSIFIED); quoted in John L. Romjue, The
Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series (Fort Monroe, VA:
Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), 153.
Figure 13: Light Infantry Division, October 1983
The preliminary design (see Figure 13) consisted of three brigade headquarters and nine rifle
battalions, with 544 troops per battalion. Reflecting the expected absence of enemy armor from the
LID's low-intensity conflict mission, the rifle battalions consisted of only three rifle companies
each. The fourth rifle company and the anti-armor company of the Division/Army 86 mechanized
infantry and non-mechanized infantry designs was replaced by a single anti-armor platoon of four
TOW launchers, located at battalion headquarters. This platoon was the sole anti-armor capability
organic to the battalion.62 The division included a combat aviation brigade (CAB) with the same
62 To reduce personnel spaces further, dining and immediate maintenance functions for maneuver forces were
concentrated at brigade headquarters, rather than, as more typically the case, down at the battalion level. The battalion's
only indirect fire systems consisted of four towed 107mm mortars contained in the battalion headquarter's heavy mortar
platoon; company level mortars, as found in other Army ground combat units, were eliminated to reduce personnel and
weight. The battalions had little tactical mobility, as their transportation assets were concentrated in a support platoon at
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general design as that found in Division/Army 86 divisions.63 However, reflecting the need to limit
the division's weight (and the required number of sorties), the CAB was limited to a single combat
aviation company with fifteen UH-60 aircraft for moving troops and supplies by air. The division's
artillery brigade was also severely constrained due to weight and transportation concerns. Unlike
heavier divisions, with general and direct support artillery battalions, the LID artillery brigade
consisted solely of three artillery battalions, each designated to provide direct support to one of the
division's brigades. 64 The firepower available in the artillery battalions was reduced further by
keeping the size of individual batteries down to six howitzers each (rather than the Division/Army
86 design of eight), again on the grounds of weight and personnel costs. The division design also
contained an austere engineer battalion and a much reduced Combat Service Support organization.65
A slightly larger, revised design of 10,212 men was approved on 10 November 1983 (see Figure
14). Again requiring fewer than five hundred sorties to deploy the basic force, the major differences
between this design and the October design were the addition of one more Combat Aviation
Company (CAC) and increases in the size of the division band and signal battalion. General
Wickham ordered the additional aviation company to enable the division to move by air the assault
battalion headquarters consisting of twelve HMMWVs and nine motorcycles. Out of this pool, one HMMWV was
dedicated to each rifle company commander for such uses as a radio carrier or to conduct re-supply. The rifle companies
themselves were provided with no organic transportation other than foot power. See Ibid., p. 3-6.
63 The CAB included including an attack helicopter battalion containing twenty-one TOW-armed AH-iS attack
helicopters and thirteen OH-58 observation helicopters. In a change from Division/Army 86 designs, however, all of the
division's reconnaissance and intelligence assets, ground and air, were contained in the CAB's reconnaissance battalion.
See Ibid., p. 4-9
64 Moreover, the towed 155mm howitzer (the M-198), which required a 5-ton truck to move and whose basic
ammunition load required a significant support structure, was replaced with the nearly obsolescent M102 (105mm)
howitzer. The reasons for choosing the shorter-range M-102 lay in its smaller deployability profile, its ability to be
towed across the battlefield by the HMMWV and carried through the air by the UH-60, and its reduced support
requirements. Similar considerations led to the elimination of the general support artillery battalion, consisting of
155mm howitzers and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) found in heavier divisions. See Ibid., p. 5-7.
65 The engineer unit contained only eighteen Small Emplacement Excavators and six M-9 Armored Combat
Earthmovers (ACE) for preparing positions and creating obstacles. The tracked earthmovers, the division's only
armored vehicles, were initially left out of the LID design, only to be included after CAC determined that some heavy
digging capability was required and after the Engineer School stated that no wheeled vehicle existed that could
satisfactorily perform the task. Engineers themselves were so few in number that, when supporting infantry, these
personnel simply were to provide technical expertise to the troops; all the heavy lifting and muscle power were to be
provided by the infantry themselves. The division's Combat Service Support was designed to allow the division only to
operate for up to forty-eight hours in a low-intensity combat environment without external support. Reflecting this limit,
and given the dearth of ground vehicles, the maintenance and supply units contained within the division's DISCOM
were small in terms of personnel and vehicles. Less manpower-intensive logistical capabilities and extensive use of
microcomputers were expected to further reduce personnel requirements. To cut down further on the weight
requirements, many trailers and vans had no dedicated haulers. This was identified as a risk by the LID designers and
necessitated "echelon" or phased movement of this equipment: a tractor trailer, for example, would first move one van
to a new designated location and then go back for a second. This situation obviously put a severe constraint on rapid
movement of many of the division's CSS vehicles. See Ibid., pp. 6-3, 6-5, 8-1 and 8-14.
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elements of one infantry battalion.6 6 The October design contained a 29-man divisional band as part
of the headquarters company. Upon the recommendation of the Soldier Support Center, General
Richardson brought the band up to forty-one personnel and made it a separate organization. Band
members were also given the secondary mission of aiding the division's MP company in securing
the division's tactical operations center.67 Finally, the signal battalion underwent an increase of
eighty personnel when it became clear that manpower-saving equipment contained in the earlier
design would be unavailable within the mandated 1986 time frame.68
Source: Captain Timothy Hassell, Army of Excellence Final Report, Volume II: The Light Infantry Division (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Force Design Directorate, Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, Department of the
Army, 1 October 1984), 2.
Figure 14: Light Infantry Division, November 1983
66 A battalion's "assault elements" consist of three rifle companies, a scout platoon, and a small command and control
element; see Ibid., p. 4-9.
67 Ibid., p. 2-8.
68 Ibid., p. 2-9.
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The drive to keep lift costs down led the LID designers to create a division weak in many
areas of modem combat. Like the U.S. Army divisions of World War II, the LID was designed to
contain only personnel and equipment that would normally be required by the division in its
principal threat environment - i.e., low-intensity conflict. But this led to a number of limitations
and vulnerabilities in the organization's design. For example, because of the limited numbers of
ground and air transport vehicles, the division had limited tactical mobility beyond the foot power of
the infantrymen; bringing to bear all available ground transport allowed for the movement of a
single infantry battalion, while less than a battalion could be moved at one time by air. The
division's limited air defense capabilities were designed solely for an air threat consisting of
helicopters and low-performance close support aircraft. 69 The dearth of anti-armor capability
(basically limited to the four TOW-equipped HMMWVs at each battalion and the CAB's twenty-
nine AH-1 attack helicopters) made the division very vulnerable to attack by armor and mechanized
forces, particularly if an engagement took place on open terrain. Whether these limitations posed a
threat in a low-intensity conflict were questionable; in a mid to high-intensity conflict they could
prove lethal.
The combination of these limitations with the directive to give the division some usefulness
for the higher intensity battles in Europe, led the LID designers at CACDA, again harkening back to
the Army's World War II experiences, to the concept of corps augmentation. Under this concept,
less-frequently used organizations would be consolidated at the LID's parent corps and would be
attached to the division as the situation warranted. To permit rapid integration of the augmenting
units, headquarters within the division's relevant sub-components would maintain the capability to
accept these forces, allowing them rapidly to "plug" into the division. Among the common types of
augmenting forces were armor, mechanized infantry, anti-armor battalions, aviation, artillery, air
defense, engineers, medical, and transportation units. Interestingly, given the division's focus on
low-intensity conflict, neither civil affairs nor psychological operations were part of the division's
organic assets, but were instead part of the division's corps-level CSS augmentation forces.70
69 The division's primary air defense capability was provided by a limited air defense battalion, consisting of eighteen
Vulcan guns and forty Stinger missile teams. To increase the density of air defenses on the ground, fifty additional
Stinger systems were allocated to personnel in other units throughout the division; for example, each infantry battalion
heavy mortar platoon would have a Stinger assigned to it. Personnel operating these systems, however, would have
other primary responsibilities and would only fire in self-defense of their unit. Such a minimal air defense capability was
considered sufficient by the developers (though criticized by others) as the low-intensity air threat was by definition
assumed to come from helicopters and low-flying close support aircraft. Should more sophisticated aircraft become
involved in the fighting, according to the LID developers, the intensity level of the conflict would "automatically"
escalate, requiring the deployment of additional augmenting air defense units - hardly an immediate comfort to the
troops on the ground; see Hassell, Armnny of Excellence, pp. 7-1, 7-2, and 7-4.
70 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Operational Concept for the Infantry Division (Light) (Fort
Benning, GA: U.S. Army Infantry School, 1984), 8.
233
In practice, many of these augmentation forces resided in the reserves, enhancing the value
of the reserve components but also raising serious questions about the speed at which they could be
made available to augment the LIDs. In the case of the 7th Infantry Division, the first division to be
converted to the LID design, many of these units had been round-out elements (and, in a few cases,
active-duty component units) of the division in its standard infantry division configuration. They
were simply transferred to the division's parent corps during the conversion to the LID format.
While the basic LID configuration could be flown to a trouble spot within the five hundred C-130
sorties limit, even active-duty augmenting forces required additional time and sorties for
deployment. Heavier augmenting equipment, such as tanks and APCs, would have to arrive by sea,
further negating the LID's vaunted rapid deployability.
The division's Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) were presented to review
boards in January and February of 1984. The boards quickly approved the LID organization.
Though additions and modifications continued for several years, the basic design and structure of
this division was firmly established within the initial six-month time frame. 71
Conversion of the 7th Infantry Division to the light infantry format began even as the LID's
initial overall structure and equipment holdings were still being approved by TRADOC's TO&E
Review Boards.72 Although the Army now had an operational concept and initial design for the
LID, actual doctrine detailing how the division would fight, as well as final details of its
organizational structure, would be written concurrently with the conversion of the 7th Infantry
Division. As a result, while the TRADOC schools and centers officially were assigned the key
tasks of developing the light infantry concept, members of the 7th Infantry Division played a crucial
role in this stage of the development process, presenting their own ideas to the TRADOC elements
as the division's sub-components underwent initial field exercises. Unlike the HTLD, however,
TRADOC remained firmly in control of the doctrine development process, just as it had retained
control of the LID design process.
71 Finally, in an effort to reduce further the required manpower spaces in the Army overall, the force designers were
tasked to examine the degree to which the Airborne and Air Assault divisions could be drawn down and repackaged
in a manner similar to the LIDs. Their rather tepid conclusion was that some standardization among the light forces
was possible but that "the Light Infantry Division derived designs are not capable of doing all those things that the
current divisions can do." In the end, the Airborne and Air Assault divisions were reduced by about two thousand
spaces each, but both retained most of their specialized equipment and functions; see Hassell, Army of Excellence,
pp. 9-6 to 9-7.
72 Colonel (Ret.) David H. Harris, "Light Infantry Division Oral History Interview with Colonel (Retired) David H.
Harris, Commander, 2nd Brigade and Chief of Staff, 7th Infantry Division (Light), 1982-1 May 1986;" interview by Joe
D. Huddleston, December 1986; transcript, Light Infantry Division Certification Oral History Papers, Archives, U.S.
Army Military Institute, Carlisle, PA, 1.
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In late December 1983, General Thurman convened a conference whose purpose was to
identify the issues to be examined during the "concept validation" or certification phase of the LID
design implementation. Certification was yet another "innovation" intended to speed-up the LID
design process: The overall LID concept and structure never was to be fully field tested to see if it
could effectively meet the threat against which it was designed.7 3 Rather, the division and its
individual components were to be tested and assessed, using the 7t Infantry Division as a test unit,
with the objective of merely refining the division design; the basic structure and concept were
assumed to be sound. The December conference developed a set of ninety-one questions, based
upon information gathered by TRADOC from the schools and major commands, which the
certification process was designed to answer. The questions were divided among combat (twenty),
combat support (thirty), combat service support (forty), and training (one) issues, and included
broad as well as very specific matters.74 Among the broader issues dealt with were the number of
aircraft sorties required to deploy the division and the sufficiency of the infantry battalions'
firepower capabilities. More specific questions concerned the ability of individual components to
perform their assigned missions: for example, the capability of the air defense units to provide
sufficient protection against expected enemy air threats, or the ability of the division's maintenance
battalion materiel section to manage the division's maintenance tasks.
As soon as the first units of the 7th Infantry Division completed their conversion to the LID
format, they began undergoing the certification process. Begun in the summer of the 1985 with the
division's smallest units, the certification process culminated in a May 1986 field exercise, known
as Celtic Cross IV, involving the complete newly-converted division. This would prove to be the
only exercise in the entire certification process in which all elements of the light infantry division
fought together as a single unit. Following another set of minor tests involving separate division
elements in the fall of 1986, the certification process was judged complete. Again, TRADOC and
the various branch schools and centers were intimately involved at every step of the certification
process, including the conduct of the exercises themselves, providing subject matter experts to
observe and report on the certification exercise results. Unfortunately, such involvement in the
approval of the LID organization by those who had helped design it left little room for an
independent evaluation of the merits of the LID program. The lone certification organization not to
73 Peter G. Nelson (analyst in Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense)
interview with the author, The Pentagon, Washington DC, 8 November 1988.
74 The description of the certification plan is taken from U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army Needs
to Further Test the Light Infantry Division, GAO/NSIAD-88-115 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, April
1988), 13; and John L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army, TRADOC Historical
Monograph Series (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
1993), 62-65.
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have been involved in the development of the LID, TRADOC's Independent Evaluation Directorate
(TIED), did write the final evaluation report based on it own independent observations as well as
those of the other participating organizations. This report pointed to another set of problems with
the certification process: the field exercises involved similar combat situations and all were
conducted at single location (Fort Hunter Liggett, CA) where terrain and weather were favorable to
the division's design. As a result, the TIED report noted that the testing did not provide the
opportunity to identify shortcomings in the division's design or operational concept that might occur
in other combat situations or climates.75 As part of its separate evaluation of the certification
process, GAO criticized the process for failing to test the performance of corps "plugs" and to
examine the rapid deployment capabilities of units composed of a mix of active-duty and reserve
forces.76
Nearly four thousand changes in organization and equipment were suggested as a result of
the certification process. Almost half of these changes, in turn, were accepted by TRADOC in the
final division design (see Figure 15). The changes, many of which involved sacrificing strategic
mobility for firepower, brought the total manpower requirements for the division to 10,778 and
airlift requirements to 516 C-141s.77 Among the more important modifications, the division's short-
range indirect fire support capabilities were strengthened in a number of ways: older mortars were
replaced with lighter, more accurate versions; the total number of mortars were increased (from
seventy-two to ninety); and the lightest mortars (the 60mm M-224) were brought back down to the
company level. The division's longer range indirect fire capability also improved with the
scheduled replacement of the M-102 (105mm) towed howitzer by the soon-to-be acquired lighter,
more accurate, and longer range M-119 (105mm) howitzer; as well as with the addition of a battery
of eight long range M-198 (155mm) towed howitzers. 78 Finally, the division's anti-armor capability
was enhanced through the substitution of the Swedish-designed, short-range AT-4 anti-armor
missile for the older Light Anti-armor Weapon (LAW); the addition of eight more medium-range
75 See Government Accounting Office, Army Needs to Further Test, 14.
76 Ibid., 18-22. Moreover, as another critic of the process has pointed out: "The subjective and unquantifiable nature
of the data collected left the argument open as to whether or not the data collected was valid and, thus, did not lead
to clear and concise conclusions." TRADOC's Combined Arms Test Activity (TCATA) complied and summarized
the certification test results in a report subsequently used by TIED in its final report. However, "[t]he
recommendations and findings [of the TCATA report] did not necessarily agree with what was reported by either the
test evaluators or other TRADOC schools." See Major Lauren S. Davis, Jr. The Light Infantry Division Regionally
Focused for Low Intensity Conflict (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command
and General Staff College (thesis), 1990), 11.
77 Scott R. Gourley, "US Light Infantry Division Update," Defence, no. 1 (1990): 38.
78 The 7th Infantry Division (Light) took possession of its first M-119 in December 1989; see Gourley, "Light Infantry
Division," 40.
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TOWs to the division's arsenal; and the expansion the HMMWV fleet to allow all the division's
TOW launchers to be vehicle-mounted.7 9
(10,778 personnel)
X3
HHB 15MM 105MM
X3
X9
HHC TAMCI I ~
X2
Source: U.S. Department of the Army, Light Infantry Division Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), TOE
77000L000 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1987).
Figure 15: Light Infantry Division, June 1987
Official Army publications describing the Light Infantry Division, both in the wake of the
certification process and long afterwards, identified a number of limitations in the LID design,
including: the dearth of tactical mobility; the lack of redundancy; the scarcity of intelligence assets;
the shortfall in indirect fire, anti-armor, and anti-air assets; and the absence of force entry
capabilities. As a result, the documents recognized that the divisions were particularly vulnerable to
NBC attack, indirect fire attacks, attacks by armor and mechanized forces, attack from enemy
aircraft. In addition, they identified the need for external combat service support after forty-eight
hours of operations. While acknowledging these limitations and vulnerabilities, the documents
79 All of these changes are described in David Segal, "Army Light Infantry Divisions: Are They Fit to Fight?" Armed
Forces Journal International, October 1988, 84-86.
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would occasionally offer solutions; for example, when light infantry units were to be deployed in a
"hostile environment," they would "normally require local air superiority and naval gunfire if
available." 80
With its final design in place, the 7 Infantry Division (now officially designated as the 7 th
Infantry Division (Light) or 7th ID(L)) prepared for its first rotation through the new Joint Readiness
Training Center (JRTC), at Fort Chaffee Arkansas. 81 But the actual design of the new division was
only the initial, and easiest, step in the LID development process.
Efforts to Build Internal Support for the LID Concept
The rapidity of the conversion to the LID format was consistent with General Wickham's
management views: i.e., he only had a limited amount of time to push his initiatives through the
service's bureaucracy and to oversee their implementation. This view suggests that Wickham
anticipated a lack of support within the service for his initiative, especially since it was outside the
purview of the dominant intra-service communities, and that he hoped to gain the initiative before
effective opposition could arise. He also feared that, unless it was solidly entrenched before he
stepped down, the LID concept - like his predecessor's HTLD - might not survive beyond his
tenure as Chief of Staff.
It should also be noted that, with the exception of removing personnel spaces from
Division/Army 86 designs, a move that may have taken place regardless of the existence of the LID
concept due to the Army's personnel constraints and earlier budgetary decisions, the heavy side of
the force along with such political heavy-weights as the aviation branch and the reserves were little
effected by the development of the Light Infantry Division. The acquisition programs for these
forces, in particular, the service's Big Five modernization program, were scheduled to continue
unimpeded by the LID program. And, the heavy divisions retained their overall force structure and
80 U.S. Department of the Army, Light Infantry Battalion, Field Manual (FM) 7-72 (Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 1987), p. 1-6. Other official publications describing these limitations
and vulnerabilities include: U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Independent
Evaluation Directorate, Independent Evaluation Report for Certification of the Light Infantry Division, Vol. I (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Independent Evaluation Directorate, September 1987), 4; quoted in Lt. Colonel David H. Wayne,
Can the Army Support the Light Division? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 15 March 1989), 9-10, n. 5;
and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The Light Infantry Division, Field Circular (FC) 71-101 (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 31 July 1984), pp. 1-6 and 1-7.
81 The JRTC, designed to be the light counterpart to the National Training Center, opened in September 1987 and
signaled further the Army's renewed commitment to foot-mobile infantry training. The center, expected to cost $154.8
million over its first six years of operation, was designed to prepare light infantry and other forces specifically for low
intensity conflict; see Walt Morrissette, "Joint Training Center to Open at Fort Chaffee," Army Times, 17 November
1986, 3.
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numbers after an early proposal to convert a mechanized division to the LID formation was quickly
scrapped. 82
Indeed, the Army's leadership seemingly went out of its way to reassure the dominant
communities, as well as Congress, that the LID program would not affect previous plans nor entail
new expenses. At the Association of the United States Army's 1983 convention, held in October of
that year, General Wickham noted that
the Army is enthusiastic about adding several new light divisions to
its structure but doesn't want the effort to slow the distribution of
new equipment to the heavy divisions committed to NATO or to the
Reserve Components. 83
Likewise, in 1984 testimony before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Army
DCSOPS General Fred K. Mahaffey, referring to the LID initiative, stated that:
Based on the analysis that we have done to date...we see no
reductions in the major procurement programs for the major items of
equipment that previously have been presented to the Congress.8 4
Later on, he added that "the light infantry division will be equipped primarily with items that are
standard throughout the Army."85 General Wickham reiterated this last point a year later, in
testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee:
[The Light Infantry Division] does not require appreciable new
equipment. We tried to design light divisions to capitalize on the
generic equipment coming into the Army....If there are any new
items, it deals with night vision capability.8 6
Night vision equipment, primarily goggles and scopes for rifles, could hardly be described as a
major new expense.
Although elements of the armor/mechanized community may have feared future cuts in
procurement programs, especially as funding levels began to fall starting in fiscal year 1985, there
were no explicit resource trade-offs between the light infantry and this community before March
1987. The senior Army leadership, in fact, strongly emphasized during this period that such trade-
offs would not take place: The Army could have its expensive heavy modernization program and a
82 "DoD OK's Light Division For FY'85," Army Times, 5 December 1983, 1 and 30.
83 Larry Carney, "Wickham Says 'Time Is Right' to Create Light Divisions," Army Times, 31 October 1983, 24.
84 House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for 1985, Part 3, 62.
85 Ibid., 67.
86 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Army's Light Division, Hearings, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (20
June 1985), 23-24.
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"cheap" light infantry program too. And, in the bargain, these light infantry would be made
available to the heavy forces as needed. This reticence to have the LID be seen as infringing on
other union's programs can be ascribed to General Wickham's desire not to "upset the apple cart,"
and garner further opposition to the LIDs, by taking resources away from the more powerful
communities.
Moreover, the light infantry went even further to accommodate the dominant communities
by being drawn into a support role for these communities' primary mission - the defense of Europe.
Despite the light infantry's purported focus on the low-intensity conflict, attention swiftly returned
to the NATO mission. Following a summer 1985 article by General Wickham describing the utility
of light forces in a NATO context, most of the LID-related articles in service journals were devoted
to examining employment of light infantry units in European contingencies. 87 General Wickham
made clear his preferences in comments about the division-level certification field training exercise
in May 1986. First, he stated that the division's mission did not include going around "chasing
VC," and he further stated a preference for reorienting the exercise scenario to bring in the
"tentacles of mid to high intensity technology...from the very beginning."8 8 Justifying light
infantry by pointing to their utility for heavier forces did help to quell opposition from this latter
87 General John A. Wickham, Jr. "Light Infantry Divisions in Defence of Europe." NATO's Sixteen Nations 30, no. 1
(1985): 100-7. The Wickham article was actually ghost-written by Lt. Colonel Higgins, who later decried the
article and its impact; Higgins interview with author. Other examples of articles and monographs discussing LID
employment in NATO include Brig. General Wayne A. Downing, "Light Infantry Integration in Central Europe,"
Military Review, 66, no. 9 (September 1986): 18-29; Major James K. Greer, "A Light/Heavy Covering Force in
Europe," Military Review, 68, no. 7 (July 1988): 10-19; Lt. Colonel Robert B. Killebrew, "NATO, Deterrence and
Light Divisions," Military Review, 65, no. 5 (May 1985): 2-15; Captain David H. Petraeus, "Light Infantry in Europe:
Strategic Flexibility and Conventional Deterrence," Military Review, 64, no. 12 (December 1984): 35-55; Major
Raymond R. Drummond, Light Infantry: A Tactical Deep Battle Asset for Central Europe (Fort Leavenworth, KS:.
School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis), 1985); Major Gregory C.
Gardner, A Concept for the Tactical Employment of Light Infantry in Central Europe (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis), 1986); Major Donald E.
Kirkland, Offensive Operations in Urban Europe: The Need for a 'Heavy' Light Infantry Force (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis),1985); Major Melvin
E. Richmond, Jr. Corps Stay-Behind Force - A Role for the Light Infantry Division on the Central European
Battlefield (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff
College (thesis), 1987); Major Joseph O. Rodriguez, Jr. David and Goliath - Can Airborne Infantry Defend Against
Armor in Central Europe (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and
General Staff College (thesis), 1986); Major Lloyd Sherfey, Light Infantry in Defense of Urban Europe (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis),
1986); and Wass de Czege, Col. Huba. NATO Interim Report: Employment Concepts for Light Infantry in Europe
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 26 August 1988).
88 General John A.. Wickham, taken from a letter written to the commanders of each light infantry division in the
spring of 1985, included in Major Ben Harvey's, "Feedback from Visits and Conversations with United States Army
Light Infantry Divisions" (Memorandum for the Commanding General, Fort Benning, Georgia, 15 October 1986),
Al; quoted in Major Michael E. Haith, Thickening the Light Division: The Need for a Fourth Rifle Company in the
Light Infantry Battalion (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and
General Staff College (thesis), 1990), 12-13, n. 32.
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community. A number of exercises combining heavy and light forces were conducted at the
National Training Center (NTC), elements of both the newly LID-converted 25th Infantry and 7th
Infantry Divisions participated in heavy-light exercises during the annual U.S.-Korean Team Spirit
program, and elements of the light infantry divisions participated in NATO exercises through the
latter half of the 1980s. While these exercises pointed to a number of problems with heavy-light
forces, the armor/mechanized community appeared enthusiastic over the prospects of acquiring
more infantry. 89 A review of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) revealed that "nearly all..
.[light force] (JSCP) missions reflect employment in Europe, Southwest Asia or Northwest Asia in a
mid to high intensity conflict."90 Upon assuming command of TRADOC in 1988, General
Thurman began a "Heavy/Light Assessment" designed to improve the LID's capabilities for
fighting in Central Europe and other mid- to high-intensity operations. 9 1
However, if all else failed, the senior Army leadership was not reticent about trying to stifle
dissent within the service. According to officers in the service at that time, word was sent down
through the ranks that this initiative was special to the Chief of Staff, so that everyone had better
"get with the program." 92 Or, as one LID supporter later described it more diplomatically, the
senior Army leadership "ordered" officers to advocate for the LID concept, with the DA putting out
a series of talking points in support of the concept for officers' use, and with Generals Wickham and
Richardson "enjoin[ing] officers throughout the Army to defend the light divisions from their
detractors." 93 The resulting pressures for conformity could lead to some comical situations:
89 See, for instance, Peter F. Herrly, "Middleweight Forces and the Army's Deployability Dilemma," Parameters,
19, no. 3 (September 1989): 54; Maj. General Howard G. Crowell, Jr. and Lt. Colonel Jared L. Bates, "Heavy-Light
Connection: Division," Infantry 74, no. 4 (July/August 1984): 15-18; Lt. Colonel Jack B. Wood, "Heavy-Light
Connection: Brigade," Infantry 74, no. 4 (July/August 1984): 19-22; Lt. Colonel Clayton R. Newell, "Heavy-Light
Forces: Divisions or Brigades?" Infantry, 75, no. 1 (January/February 1985): 12-13; James B. Motley, "Heavy-Light
Forces: Assessing the Challenge," Infantry, 75, no. 1 (January/February 1985): 13-14; Colonel William W. Hartzog,
"Heavy/Light Operations," Military Review 67, no. 4 (April 1987): 24-33; Major Charles C. Campbell, Light Infantry
and the Heavy Force: A Marriage of Convenience or Necessity (Fort Leavenworth, KS:. School of Advanced
Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis), 1985); and Major Benjamin R. Mixon, Light
and Heavy Forces in a Desert Environment: Considerations for Employment in Defensive Operations (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis),
1988).
90 Major William A. Godwin III, "Discrepancy in Light Infantry Missions and CSA Directives," Infantry Conference
Booklet (Fort Benning GA: US Army Infantry School, 1987); quoted in Major William B. Caldwell IV, Not Light
Enough to Get There, Not Heavy Enough To Win: The Case of US Light Infantry (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of
Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis), 1987), 27, n. 65.
91 Haith, Thickening the Light Division, 2 and 19.
92 Higgins interview with author; Keller interview with author; Nelson interview with author; and Damon and Krisler,
"Army of Excellence," 87.
93 Wray, "Army's Light Infantry Divisions," 7.
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Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, the commanding general of III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, for
example, was reprimanded by senior Army staff when a jocular comment of his regarding stationing
a LID at Fort Hood was taken by visiting Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Taft, as a criticism
of the LID concept. 94 Such pressures also forced two active-duty general officers to use
pseudonyms when writing a biting critique of the Army of Excellence and the LID concept for a
leading defense journal in 1985.95
Opposition Within the Army
Despite the LID promoters' best efforts, the concept became a major point of dispute among
the Army's officer corps.96 General Wickham later identified three sources of opposition to the LID
program - the armor/mechanized community, the Combat Service Support (CSS) community, and
an amorphous group of so-called "doctrinaire resistors of new ideas." 97 Criticism centered around
the specific capabilities of the light infantry division, the philosophy underlying the light infantry
concept, the missions assigned to these units, and its deleterious effect on the Army overall. Much
of the criticism came, as Wickham noted, from the service's other communities, though original
LID supporters also criticized aspects of the concept as it began to evolve away from its initial
tenets.
Among the specific criticisms of the LID capabilities were many acknowledged by the
Army as mere limitations, but seen by critics as fatal flaws in design. For example, many critics
94 According to LTG Ulmer, in a message to DA that was "CCed" to General Sennewald, the FORSCOM Commander,
when asked by someone at the lunch given to Secretary Taft whether a LID would be coming to Fort Hood, the general
jokingly responded: "We don't have any at Hood and don't need any at Hood." Then, aware of the sensitiveness of this
issue within the Army, General Ulmer's message goes on to state: "Then in slow and careful words, being mindful of
what the Army is trying to do, I stated the need for a balanced force wherein light forces were absolutely essential, and
noted that the Army's current move in that direction was timely." While the message goes on to discuss other issues
raised during the Secretary's visit, General Ulmer returns finally to his LID comments: "Querying other attendees here
regarding the lunch conversation, none can understand how any portion of the discussion could be taken as non-support
of light forces. I called MG Lary and asked him how any such interpretation could be derived, and at least in
conversation with me he indicated that to the best of his knowledge our negative response was to the FT Hood stationing,
and that my comments on the need for a mix were remembered. Give me a call if you want more. Upset, I am. And I'll
be glad to go eyeball to eyeball with Sec Taft if there is any doubt remaining about what was said, implied, or conveyed
about light forces. (But, I don't have room for any of them being stationed at FT Hood right now.)" Communication for
LTG Brown, Dir Army Staff, OCSA, Wash DC; Info for GEN Sennewald, CG, FORSCOM; from LTG Ulmer, CG III
Corps and FT Hood; Subj: Visit of Dep Sec Def, 29 June 1984; Folder: Backchannels - Incoming - June 84; Box:
Backchannel Messages, CSA, June 1983-March 1985; The John A. Wickham Papers; Archives, U.S. Army Military
History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
95 Damon and Krisler, "Army of Excellence," 86-94.
96 A student at the Army War College during the mid-1980's claimed that: "Almost every senior leader speaking at the
Army War College during 1986-1987 has been asked about the light infantry issue;" see Lt. Col. Keith Kellogg, On
Light Infantry, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1 May 1987), 1.
97 The three sources were identified in General Wickham interview with author.
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pointed to the division's limited firepower capabilities. 98 In terms of indirect fire capabilities, the
original design was described as dangerously weak in indirect fire support, with only seventy-two
out-dated mortars (81mm and the heavier 107mm) in the entire division and all at battalion level,
backed by a company of obsolescent M102 (105mm) towed howitzers, the latter easily out-ranged
by the type of Soviet artillery prevalent throughout Third World armies. 99 Another later critic
pointed out that the general support artillery battery, with two platoons of four towed 155mm guns,
was unable to simultaneously support the division's three brigades.' 00 It was also widely
acknowledged that the division was woefully deficient in armor-killing weaponry. 101 While
supporters claimed that this simply constrained the division - in the absence of augmenting anti-
armor units - to fight against armor-weak opponents, critics agreed but pointed to the ubiquitous
nature of such armored forces in Third World armies. One critic pointed out that a light infantry
battalion could only fire a total of 140 anti-tank missiles from their basic load, but would face 160
armored vehicles if attacked by a Soviet-style motorized rifle regiment. In response to the anti-
armor shortfall, a search continued for an adequate replacement for the Dragon anti-tank weapons,
as did the on-again, off-again program for a light anti-armor vehicle.' 02 The ADA battalion also
was criticized for having only two Stinger batteries, but responsibility for covering three combat
brigades.10 3 Critics also pointed to dangers arising from the effort to reduce personnel slots in the
division, and to resulting shortfalls in infantry squads as commanders tried to correct some of these
problems by stealing personnel from such squads for use in other units. 104
98 According to one critic: "The limited firepower of the ID(L) is probably the strongest and most frequently voiced
argument against employment of the ID(L) in Central Europe;" see Lt. Colonel Gerald E. Thompson, The Infantry
Division (Light): Did We Read the History Book? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 22 March
1987), 7.
99 The range for the M102 was 11,600 meters versus, for instance, 15,300 meters for a Soviet 122mm D-30 howitzer.
100 Captain Allen L. Tiffany, "A 'Light' Infantry Division with More for the Fight," Military Review 71, no. 8
(August 1991): 50.
101 According to one author: "The consensus of critics and supporters alike is that the LID needs improved
antiarmor capabilities;" see Haith, Thickening the Light Division, 2. Other criticism of the divisions lack of anti-
armor can be found in Major Charles T. Crenshaw, Volume of Fire as an Effective Measurement of Infantry
Performance in Battle - The Impact on the U.S. Army Decision to Organize Five New Light Infantry Divisions (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis),
1986); and Captain Steven J. Eden, "Letters: Light Infantry is Too Light!," Military Review 71, no. 2 (February
1991): 86-88.
102 See, for instance, Foss, "Exclusive AFJ Interview," 84.
103 Tiffany, "'Light' Infantry Division," 50.
104 For example, according to one critic, the reduction by one soldier from the four-man HMWWV-mounted TOW
squad, had "seriously degraded the operational effectiveness" of this unit; Tiffany, "'Light' Infantry Division," 48.
Infantrymen also were being pulled out of rifle squads to perform other tasks. In some cases, they were being used
to make up for shortfalls at the various unit headquarters; one survey of 81 squads in one light infantry division
found that, on average, each squad contained only 6.75 troops rather than the authorized nine. In other cases,
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Another general set of criticisms revolved around the division's lack of tactical mobility
beyond foot-power. Many critics feared that the division could be easily out-maneuvered on any
modem battlefield, assuming it could even reach the battlefield in the first place.10 5 In a European
scenario, critics charged that the division's lack of organic transport meant that they could not
deploy from their aerial ports of debarkation to their assigned assembly areas, nor would enough
inter-theater transportation immediately be available to permit such a move.106 In any scenario,
aggregating all of the division's ground and air transportation assets would allow at most for the
simultaneous movement of two battalions by ground and one battalion by air. The dearth of
vehicles meant as well that soldiers had to carry nearly all of their supplies and equipment
themselves, leading to excessive loads on the backs of already overburdened individual
infantryman. 107
Cuts in the division's combat service support capability were criticized for leading to an
inadequate logistics tail, with the division's dependence on corps-level CSS after forty-eight hours
often seen as particularly risky. 108 Shortfalls and inadequacies were found as well in the division's
engineer units and its reconnaissance and intelligence assets. 109 And, the division's increased
reliance on reserves, both as round-out and augmentation units, was deemed inappropriate for units
infantrymen were being given secondary tasks as Stinger gunners or being used to provide security for austerely
resourced support forces; Tiffany, "'Light' Infantry Division," 49-52.
105 PA&E analyst Greg Nelson claimed that any light infantry unit could easily find itself stranded at the airfield to which
it was ferried; Nelson interview with author.
106 Major Richard L. Elam, The Soviet BTR on the Modern European Battlefield: Does It Have a Place in the U.S.
Army's Light Infantry? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General
Staff College (thesis), 1990), 3.
107 Caldwell, Not Light Enough to Get There, 43. One disgruntled light infantry soldier commented to a reporter that:
"[t]he light division only means that they've taken away our vehicles and now we have to hump all that fool stuff;"
quoted in Richard Halloran, "U.S. Army Puts the New Foot Soldier Back on His Feet," New York Times, 3 January
1988, E4.
108 For more criticism of the CSS, see Major William A. Godwin III, The Operational Employment of the Light
Infantry Division (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff
College (thesis), 1986), 124; Thompson, History Book, 8; Wayne, Light Division, 48; and Major Robert J. Reese,
Operational Considerations for the Employment of a Light Infantry Division in a Contingency Scenario (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis),
1987), 33.
109 On problems with the engineer assets, see Godwin, Operational Employment, 123; Tiffany, "'Light' Infantry
Division," 50; and Frank P. Janecek, Improving Light Infantry Divisional Engineer Agility - The Key to Enhancing
Their Mission Capability (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and
General Staff College (thesis), 1986). On reconnaissance and intelligence shortfalls, see Major Albert Bryant, Jr.
Blind Man's Bluff? A Look at the Tactical Reconnaissance Capabilities of the U.S. Army's Light Infantry Division
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis),
1987) and Major Nathen W. Noyes, Assessment of the Adequacy of the Reconnaissance and Security Forces in the
Infantry Division (Light) (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and
General Staff College (thesis), 1985).
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designed for rapid and early deployment. Some critics also pointed out that the political leadership
would be very hesitant to mobilize reserves for low-intensity conflict operations, and that would it
be very difficult to train reserves up to the high standards required of light infantry. 110
Criticism was also leveled against the LID's "corps plug", or augmentation, concept. 111
Citing both the Army's experiences during World War II as well as his own experiences during the
1970s, General Meyer consistently voiced the view that augmentation was unworkable short of
"some very, very strong training relationships.""112 However, evidence for the absence of such
relationships was found by the U.S. Army Training Board, which reported that
[light infantry] divisions.. .indicated uneasiness about the
[augmentation concept] because they do not know who the "plugs"
are, where they are locate, how long it will take them to get there,
and in case of CSS assets who has control over them when they
arrive.113
Finally, officers derided the LID concept for its low-tech emphasis on modem warfare.
From retirement, General Starry derisively termed the approach: "a manpower-intensive solution in
an era of manpower shortages." 114 More charitably, General Meyer agreed that infantry divisions
110 On the misuse of the reserves, see Damon and Krisler, "Army of Excellence," 92; Major Peter N. Kafkalas, '"The
Light Divisions and Low-Intensity Conflict: Are They Losing Sight of Each Other?" Military Review 66, no. 1 (January
1986): 21-22; General Edward C. Meyer, "Ex-Chief Gen. Meyer Warns of 'Hollow' Army," interview by Larry Carney,
Army Times, 2 February 1987, 8; Captain Jeffrey A. Jacobs, "The Use of Light Infantry in RC." Army, December
1989, 16-17. and Major Donald A. Osterberg, Reserve Component Round-Out of Light Infantry Divisions (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis),
1990).
"'Among the many criticisms of augmentation, see, for example, Reese, Operational Considerations, 10 and 32-33;
Tiffany, "'Light' Infantry Division," 46; Kirkland, Offensive Operations in Urban Europe, 35; and Major William
K. Sutey, Light Infantry, Augmentation, and the MI 13A3 Armored Personnel Carrier: A Step in the Direction of
Versatility (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff
College (thesis), 1992).
112 Gordon, "Charge of the Light Infantry ," 971. General Meyer expressed a similar view during the author's interview
with him as well as in Bernard J. Adelsberger, "Light Fighters: Built on a Doctrine of Small-Unit Actions," Army Times,
13 June 1988, 16. Moreover, it was a view he held as far back as 1979; see Caldwell, Not Light Enough to Get There,
15. During the 1970's, General Meyer was involved in efforts to develop air defense augmentation units for the 1st and
5th Infantry Divisions. The effort was abandoned, and units organic to the divisions were created instead, when
exercises reveal that the augmented parent divisions were "terrible in knowing how to operate in air defense
environments"; General Meyer quoted in Gordon, "The Charge of the Light Infantry," 971. During World War II, the
effort to pool tank battalions at the corps level for use by infantry divisions on an "as-needed" basis also failed; in the
end, tank battalions oftentimes became permanently attached to the infantry divisions. For more on the World War II
experience, see Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, 273, 293-97, 307-12, and 331-
34; and Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, 22-23.
113 Major Ben Harvey, "Feedback from Visits and Conversations with United States Army Light Infantry Divisions,"
(Memorandum for the Commanding General, 15 October 1986), 2; quoted in Caldwell, Not Light Enough to Get There,
27, n. 66.
114 General Donn Starry quoted in Army, "Armored Gun System," 57.
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needed to be made lighter, but ". . .that you have to offset heaviness with some kind of high
tech.""'15
On a more general level, debate arose concerning the philosophical underpinnings of the
LID concept. Specifically, were "true" light infantry divisions fundamentally different from
conventional infantry forces (as Steven Canby argued) or, if given the proper augmentation, could
these forces perform missions identical to those undertaken by conventional infantry? In a 1987
monograph, Army Major Scott R. McMichael criticized the Army for improperly thinking about
and developing the light infantry division as simply a standard infantry division minus the heavy
equipment. He cited, in particular, Field Circular 71-101, Light Infantry Division Operations,
which he claimed described the light division as "essentially" a general purpose force. 116 Major
McMichael argued, instead, that a light infantry ethos existed that was "unique and distinct" from
standard infantry. He asserted that "true" light infantry possessed
a distinctive tactical style.. .a special attitude toward the
environment.. .a freedom from dependence on fixed lines of
communications, and.. .a strong propensity for self-reliance." 17
To bolster his argument, McMichael's study examined several historical cases where light infantry
had been mistakenly employed as standard infantry, with fatal results. Other studies during the
latter half of the 1980s also spoke of the catastrophic consequences of misusing light infantry. One
officer, after examining Army plans to employ light infantry divisions in a NATO context,
concluded that: "If we persist in our belief that the light divisions are just general purpose forces we
may pay with the lives of our soldiers on the battlefield of the future."" 8
Controversy also arose over the dual nature of the light infantry mission: a primary focus on
low-intensity conflict (LIC), but with a capability to operate in mid to high-intensity conflict as well.
Early on, some LID supporters became concerned with what, in their view, had become an over-
emphasis in the service on LID employment in higher intensity scenarios at the expense of the LIC
115 General Edward Meyer quoted in Gordon, "Charge of the Light Infantry," 971. This view is consistent with General
Meyer's approach to the HTLD (see chapter five).
116 Major Scott R. McMichael, A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, Research Survey No. 6 (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: Combat Studies Institute, Army Command and General Staff College, 1987), p. xi.
117 McMichael, Perspective on Light Infantry, p. xii. This view of "true" light infantry was originally espoused by
Steven Canby; see Canby, "Light Infantry in Perspective," pp. 28-31. Like McMichael, Canby and other outside
observers criticized the LID program for failing to develop into a true light infantry; Steven Canby interview with
the author, Potomac, MD, 11 November 1988; David Gates, Western Light Forces and Defence Planning, 3. The US
Light Divisions, Centre Piece 10 (Aberdeen, Scotland: Centre for Defence Studies, Autumn 1986), 1-3 and 23-25;
Gardner, Tactical Employment of Light Infantry, 4; Godwin, Operational Employment, 125-26; and Haith, Thickening
the Light Division, 2.
118 Gardner, Tactical Employment of Light Infantry, 36.
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mission.119 Other Army officers argued, in contrast, that too much emphasis still remained on
employing light infantry units in low-intensity conflict - an area where sufficient Army force
already resided in the Special Forces and Rangers. Instead, light infantry should be focused solely
toward mid- and high-intensity conflict environments; environments where, in these critics' view,
the potential of the LID might be high, but its shortcomings possibly fatal. 120 One study, for
example, claimed that official Army publications provided little doctrinal guidance for LID
employment in mid- to high-intensity environments.121
Finally, some Army critics took a broader view, attacking the LID and the AoE program for
its deleterious effects on the Army overall. For instance, critics derided the AoE program for
disrupting the service just as it was in the midst of undergoing its largest modernization program in
decades.122 Others dismissed the effort as a mere shell-game, giving the false impression of
improving combat capabilities by adding more divisions while holding manpower constant. 123
Many would have agreed with General Meyer's assessment that, without additional manpower, the
119 See, for example, Kafkalas, "Light Divisions and Low-Intensity Conflict," 18-27; and Major Louis D. Huddleston,
"Light Infantry Division: Azimuth Check," Military Review 65, no. 9 (September 1985): 14-21. Major Huddleston,
who was coordinating officer for the Army's Light Infantry Division Operations Field Circular 71-101, stated that "[t]he
light infantry division was not intended primarily to fight in Europe," but rather that its "stated purpose and intent" was
"employment in undeveloped theaters and contingency areas at the lower end of the threat spectrum;" see Ibid., 16-17.
One piece of evidence for the LID's focus on mid- to high-intensity conflict cited by Major Kafkalas was the then
current "Low-Mid Intensity Scenario" developed by the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of
Tactics. According to the department, the purpose of the scenario was "to help clarify emerging doctrinal principles
which explain how to fight.. .the light infantry division. .. in a contingency environment;" U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, Department of Tactics, "Low-Mid Intensity Scenario," Briefing Packet (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
US Army Command and General Staff College, 10 April 1985), 1; quoted in Kafkalas, "Light Divisions and Low-
Intensity Conflict," 22, n. 17. Major Kafkalas criticizes this scenario because the major opposing force is a motorized
rifle division, while operations against guerrilla forces were only considered in terms of local security. True, this is not
necessarily a low-intensity conflict scenario; however, it mirrors precisely the type of scenario against which the
Combined Arms Command Development Activity (CACDA) developed the light infantry division - at the break point
between low and mid-intensity conflict - in lieu of a consensus view within the community of low-intensity conflict;
Keller interview with author. Interestingly, during the 7t Infantry Division's Celtic Cross IV certification exercise,
opposition guerrilla forces played havoc with the division's rear area and lines of communications. Ask to comment by
an Army Times reporter, the division's officers brushed off "guerilla raids as little more than a persistent irritant." The
division's 2d Brigade commander comment: "You've got to protect against the situation that can defeat you - the armor.
The guerrillas harass, but they aren't going to beat you." Celtic Cross IV quotes in Daniel Greene, "Light Fighters Train
for Battles of Future," Army Times, 8 September 1986, 14.
120 See, for instance, Bahnsen, "Kaleidoscopic US Army," 78-88; and Brig. General (Ret.) John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, Jr.,
"The Army's in Third Place - It Better Try Harder," Armed Forces Journal International, May 1987, 74-82. Its
interesting to note, in light of his caustic comments about the LID program, that General Bahnsen's Army career was
spent in the armor branch.
121 According to one author, the light infantry division Operational Concept ".. .sheds no light on details of employment
in mid to high intensity combat;" Gardner, Tactical Employment of Light Infantry, 1.
122 Damon and Krisler, "Army of Excellence," 86.
123 Ibid.; and Higgins interview with author. One, overly dramatic, critic even described it is print as "the Rape of Army
86;" see Bahnsen, "Kaleidoscope US Army," 78.
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Army risked creating another "hollow army" by attempting to fill the two new LID divisions
without adding to the service's overall personnel levels. 124 Even elements of FORSCOM agreed
with this assessment. In the spring of 1985, citing manpower shortages, FORSCOM requested that
only five of the six scheduled active-duty battalions for the fourth light infantry division, the 6t
Infantry Division, be manned with active-duty personnel.' 25
Meanwhile, some of the Army's politically weakest communities, under the general heading
of Combat Service Support (CSS), continued to argue that the Army overall lacked adequate
support capabilities and that the service's AoE and LID programs merely exacerbated this problem.
The Army of Excellence program mandated deep cuts in CSS across all the service's combat
divisions. The LID concept itself called for a radical restructuring of support functions, favoring
combat spaces over support. LID supporters argued that the service would always lack adequate
"tail" for a long war, and that maintaining as much combat strength ("teeth") as possible was far
more important for deterrence.126 Members of the CSS communities countered that the "teeth-to-
tail" pendulum had definitely swung too far.127 They received renewed support for their view from
a number of senior active-duty and retired officers. During a December 1985 Senate Armed
Services Committee hearing, for example, then NATO Commander General Bernard Rogers stated
that U.S. ground forces in Europe lacked sufficient combat service support. When asked where
spaces could be found for CSS, General Rogers suggested that some of the LID personnel could be
suitably sacrificed. 128 Testifying again on Capital Hill a year and a half later, this time before the
House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, General Rogers again stated his preference for
additional CSS manpower over light infantry:
Nor, in my opinion, with a fixed end-strength, should we continue
creating additional Army combat units - badly needed though they
may be - until we can provide adequate support for the Army units
that already exist.129
124 Meyer, "Meyer Warns of 'Hollow' Army," 8.
125 Larry Carney, "Cut in Active Strength of Light Division Sought," Army Times, 6 May 1985, 6.
126 General Wickham interview with author
127 See, for instance, Vann, "Forgotten Force," 2-17.
128 General Bernard W. Rogers, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, Hearings before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on the Organization and Decision-Making Procedures of the Department of Defense and Congress,
99th Cong., 1st sess. (12 December 1985); quoted in Ibid., 2, n. 1.
129 General Bernard W. Rogers, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, Hearings before the House Committee
on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, 100th Cong., 1st sess. (26 March 1987); quoted in Bahnsen, "Army's in
Third Place," 74.
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Similarly, General Paul F. Gorman, former SouthCom commander, commented in a public forum
that "he would rather have four more engineer battalions than four light divisions and that the Army
needed combat service support far more urgently than shooters."130 General Meyer expressed
particular concern over the potential future effects on CSS, recognizing long-standing congressional
preference for combat over support services:
Once you have a division, with a location and a flag, it's difficult to
take it out. The first thing Congress will cut out when you go about
having reductions in end strength is combat support. So you run the
risk that you will have an unbalanced combat support structure.'31
Building External Support in the Executive Branch
General Wickham recognized early on the need to garner support for the LID effort from
outside the service, as a hedge against internal opposition. He found his first key supporter outside
of the Army in early August 1983, when, after being briefed on the concept, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Thayer approved up to five light infantry divisions. Thayer was to play an important
role in stifling early efforts to scuttle the program within OSD. The Deputy Secretary's motives
behind his endorsement of the LID concept, however, had little to do with the substance of the
project. Instead, Thayer, who felt that the Navy's programs were over-funded relative to those of
the Army, had sought to transfer tens of billions of dollars from the Navy to the Army since coming
to the Pentagon in January 1983.132 Thayer's approval of this new Army program was in
preparation for a renewed assault on the Navy's budget during the summer Defense Resources
Board (DRB) meeting, held during the first two weeks of August. Thayer's DRB offensive against
the Navy ultimately failed, but Wickham now had the imprimatur of the number two civilian at the
Pentagon to continue with the LID program.
Despite Thayer's support, opposition arose to the concept on the civilian side of the
Pentagon from two sources: the Policy Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) office, headed by David
Chu, and the office of Forces, Manpower, and Reserves (FM&R), headed by Assistant Secretary of
Defense Lawrence Korb. The Army's intentions to develop the LID concept and create a
seventeenth division first officially surfaced in its September 1983 budget submission for fiscal year
1985, hidden under an otherwise innocuous budget heading. 133 Simply converting already existing
130 General Paul F. Gorman, Presentation to Executive Leadership Seminar on Priorities in US Defense Policy,
Brookings Institution, 8 April 1986; quoted in Vann, "Forgotten Force," 13.
131 General Edward Meyer quoted in Gordon, "Charge of the Light Infantry," 971.
132 Lehman, Command of the Seas, 192.
133 So "innocuous" was the heading that one PA&E analyst claims that his office would have failed to recognize its
significance had he not been informally tipped-off before as to the Army's LID program; Nelson interview with author.
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divisions to a new format - without the need for more authorized personnel spaces or substantial
new spending on equipment - was a purely internal Army matter, one not requiring OSD
approval.134 A move to increase the Army force structure, however, was a matter of OSD concern.
Both PA&E and FM&R immediately rose up to oppose the LID.
Consistent with its mission, PA&E argued against the concept from both a force structure
and a capabilities standpoint. 135 First, it examined past cases of intervention, noting that most
required less than one division and that oftentimes the Marine Corps was called upon to provided
those forces. In the rare instances where mixed Army and Marine Corps forces were deployed,
again less than one division of each was typically used. Turning to the present force structure for
contingency operations, PA&E argued that the seven divisions available (three Marine and four
Army divisions) were wholly adequate to meet any foreseeable threat. It also noted that, given the
amount of airlift available, at most two divisions could be deployed by air within a minimum of two
weeks. After that time, heavier forces could begin arriving by sea. Finally, the office questioned
whether the LID, lacking in tactical mobility and anti-armor punch, would be effective in many
potential scenarios. One critic was anonymously quoted as declaring that: "[The LID] was not a
very good division against anything but Zulu nations."' 36
Korb's office made the case against a seventeenth division from a manpower standpoint. 137
Korb had long argued that the Army had a manning shortfall in support services. In light of the
Army of Excellence program, the addition of a new ten thousand-troop division obviously would
come at the expense of support spaces in other divisions, further exacerbating this problem in his
view. Both Korb and PA&E suggested a go-slow approach: convert and test the LID concept with
one or both of the Army's current, under-strength non-mechanized infantry divisions (the 7 and
2 5 th), while abstaining from adding a new seventeenth division.
For a variety of reasons, however, neither Korb's office nor PA&E were in the best position
to argue against the Army's case for the LID program. To begin with, one of the tenets of the
Reagan Administration since it entered office, and championed by Secretary of Defense Weinberger
throughout his tenure, was that civilians in the Pentagon and at the Office of Management and
Budget for too long had meddled in areas best have been left to military decision-makers.
134 Indeed, when asked why he chose not to beef up the light infantry divisions by asking for additional personnel spaces
in the Army overall, General Wickham commented that to do so would have required OSD approval; Korb interview
with author.
135 Nelson interview with author; and Gordon, "Charge of the Light Infantry," 970.
136 Quoted in Ibid.
137 Ibid.; and Korb interview with author interview.
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Weinberger came into office determined to increase the power of the individual services in the
budget process at the expense of civilian officials in OSD; in his words:
people with the responsibility for a particular activity should have the
authority to participate actively in the budget process, as well as in
the allocation of any funds that may be appropriated for the activities
for which they were responsible.138
Under Weinberger's decentralized management style, senior civilian defense officials provided little
guidance or oversight to military programs. Service preferences over budget decisions generally
won out over arguments presented by civilian offices such as PA&E and FM&R. 139
Moreover, PA&E, as the direct descendant of former Secretary of Defense McNamara's
Office of Systems Analysis, had become a special target of the Republican Party's wrath against
alleged civilian micromanagement of the military. Indeed, the 1980 Republican Party platform had
called for its elimination. Although PA&E survived the entry of the Reagan Administration to
power, Weinberger downgraded the agency's head from an assistant secretary down to a mere
director shortly after assuming office.
Further hindering OSD efforts to oppose the LID was a directive from the senior OSD
leadership prohibiting PA&E and FM&R from exchanging views on the program. 140 The source of
this directive was most likely Deputy Secretary Thayer, who was at the time the senior civilian
supporter of the concept within OSD. The effect of this prohibition was to inhibit the two offices'
analysts as they struggled to develop an effective strategy against the LID. Again, General
Wickham's early efforts to gain support for his light infantry initiative paid off.
In order to head off further OSD criticism, Army Secretary Marsh and General Wickham,
armed with the preliminary results of the Army's LID design effort, met with Weinberger on 21
October to seek his approval for the program. After much effort, PA&E director David Chu too
was allowed to attend this meeting. Any arguments he was able to make, however, had little effect,
as Weinberger ended the meeting by accepting the service's proposal for the tentative LID design
and for the organizing of the first LID unit in fiscal year 1985.141
138 Caspar S. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books,
1990), 43. In one of his first acts as Secretary of Defense, Weinberger added the three service secretaries to the
aforementioned Defense Resources Board, which was assigned the task of resolving budgetary disputes between the
services and making final funding recommendations to the Secretary; Ibid., 44.
139 Korb interview with author; and Stubbing, Defense Game, 392-93.
140 Nelson interview with author.
141 "DoD OK's Light Div for FY '85," Army Times, 5 December 1983, 1.
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Despite this victory for Wickham, PA&E and FM&R continued to argue against creation of
the seventeenth division. Their arguments may have had some influence on Deputy Secretary
Thayer. In early or mid-December, he began having second thoughts and reportedly suggested to
General Wickham that the service needed to go back and carefully study its proposed plans. 142
Fortunately for General Wickham, this recommendation could be safely ignored: Thayer shortly
thereafter went home to Texas for the Christmas holidays and, days after his return, was forced to
resign as a result of a Security and Exchange Commission's investigation into insider trading.
While Thayer and others took time off to enjoy the holidays, General Wickham was
preparing to lock in his LID program. The final days of the year are always a hectic time at the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and nowhere more so than in its national security
division, as last minute decisions are made on the national budget to be submitted to Congress the
following month. General Wickham chose this moment, late in December, to introduce the Army's
plans for the LID and the seventeenth division into the budget process. As one White House official
put it: "It happened late in the budget season and was never really fully examined here."143
Initially, OMB argued that the LID proposal had foreign policy implications and, therefore,
could not be included in the fiscal year 1985 budget proposal without President Reagan's explicit
approval. 144 As a result, during the last week of December, with few other OSD officials aware of
the meeting or even in town, General Wickham and Secretary Weinberger went to the White House
to present the LID program to the President. Not surprisingly, President Reagan quickly approved
and the program was inserted into the budget.
Suddenly made aware of the President's approval, Korb and Chu wrote one last set of
memos to the Deputy Secretary of Defense urging a go-slow approach to the LID program. Despite
his previous caution regarding the LID proposal, Thayer rejected these arguments and signed the
program into the Proposed Budget Document for submission to Congress, just days before he
resigned. 145 The conversion of an existing division (the 7 th Infantry) to Light Infantry Division
design and the activation of a fully manned seventeenth division to a LID design were now
officially part of the Army's fiscal year 1985 budget. At the same time, the service announced that
142 Nelson interview with author.
143 Gordon, "Charge of the Light Infantry," 970.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.; and Nelson interview with author.
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a second existing active-duty division (the 25t Infantry) would be converted to the LID design in
later years and that a light infantry division would be formed in the reserves. 146
The budget also made clear that the new division would be added to the Army's active-duty
force structure while the service maintained a constant end-strength. As far back as the previous
summer, General Wickham had made clear to General Richardson his view that the service would
likely be unable to garner additional manpower resources; indeed, such concerns lay behind the
AoE effort.147 General Thurman also was intimately aware of the Army's difficulties with
increasing its personnel resources, given his recent tenure as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel. An October 1984 internal Army "Information Paper" identified the rationale behind the
decision to keep end-strength constant: Congress was unlikely to support future increases in active-
duty component end-strength because of their cost. And, continuing to program growth in end-
strength only to have it later fail to win approval from Congress "created unnecessary turbulence" as
the service worked to allocate resources and determine its future force structure. 148 Therefore, the
fiscal year 1985 defense budget finally submitted to Congress maintained a fixed Army end-
strength of 780,800 through fiscal year 1989.149 The decision-making arena now shifted to
Congress, where many of the details of the LID program would be dramatically altered as General
Wickham sought a new source of external support for his light division effort.
Building External Support in Congress
Light Infantry Divisions and Home Basing Politics
Simply converting the two existing under-strength divisions to the Light Infantry Division
format, as recommended by Korb and Chu, likely would have generated little notice in Congress.
For example, General Wickham testified to Congress that the new division design would require
few new funds, and would not affect any ongoing Army procurement programs. Those
congressmen with a strong interest in defense issues would probably have applauded General
146 Larry Carney, "Army Seeks 2 New, 2 Converted Light Divisions," Army Times, 9 January 1984, 2. Finally, there was
some discussion of converting the 193rd Brigade, stationed in Panama, to a light infantry format at some later date; see
Larry Carney, "193d Inf to Become Light Div.," Army Times, 16 January 1984, 1.
147 Richardson, "Force Structure and Army 86."
148 DAPE-MBC, "Strength of the Total Army C-2-84," Information Paper, October 1984; Folder: #17; CSA Box
1/Contents: CSA Subject Files; The John A. Wickham Papers; Archives, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, PA.
149 However, the initial 1985-89 Army POM, developed earlier in 1983, programmed an active service end-strength of
784,600 in fiscal year 1985, rising to 792,600 in fiscal year 1989, while the comparable figures in the OSD budget
initially submitted to OMB were 788,200 and 796,200; DAMO-FDF, "Active Army End Strength," 23 January 1984;
Folder: #17, Insert A-1; CSA Box 1/Contents: CSA Subject Files; The John A. Wickham Papers; Archives, U.S. Army
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
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Wickham's efforts to reinvigorate the service's two remaining, poorly equipped, and under-strength
infantry divisions. Moreover, the overall AoE effort placed ever greater responsibilities on the
Army's reserve component, always a favorite move within Congress.
The activation of a new division, however, provided Wickham the opportunity to achieve
strong support for the LID project from elements within Congress, support which might prove
crucial in overcoming further opposition inside and outside the service. This opportunity arose
because the activation of a new division gave rise to the requirement to decide on a location for the
division's basing. The potential economic benefits to the region which acquired this base brought
strong attention to bear on the LID concept, and led to an all-out political struggle within Congress
over the rights to the division's home. General Wickham later was to describe this episode as
"building a base of support" for the LID program on Capital Hill. 150
The strategy of using basing decisions as a means for gaining congressional support for a
particular program or a service overall was hardly a new one. The Navy, under its Secretary John
Lehman, had been adding new naval facilities through its "strategic home porting" program since
the start of the Reagan administration. 51 And the strategy had a long tradition within the Army as
well. 152 As early as 1820, for instance, Army Major General Jacob Brown suggested in a letter to
Military Secretary John C. Calhoun that the army should consider "stationing additional troops in
Maine in order to make that state's congressional delegation more favorable to the army."'153
Returning to the case of the LID, FORSCOM headquarters was assigned the task of
examining alternate sites for the new division, with environmental impact statements to be
generated by the Corps of Engineers. A final decision on the division's new home would be made
by senior Army leadership. Among the factors considered by FORSCOM in assessing alternative
basing sites were proximity to airfields, the amount of training area available, the availability of
150 General Wickham interview with author.
151 Through this program naval surface ship groups were newly based in such places as Staten Island, New York;
Everett, Washington; Corpus Christi, Texas; Pascagoula, Mississippi; Lake Charles and New Orleans, Louisiana; Mobile
Alabama; and Pensacola, Florida; see Lehman, Command of the Seas, 183. Local economies in these regions were
enhanced through dispersal of construction contracts, hiring of civilian personnel to carry out these contracts, and long-
term employment of local civilians both on and off-base in support of these facilities.
152 Besides boosting local economies, stationing of divisions could strength grass-root support for the service and, if
accompanied by promises to new recruits of deployment to the local post, also improve regional recruiting efforts. This
argument was made by two Army officers in a 1979 article, with particular emphasis on recruiting and stationing efforts
in the Northeast; John R. Witherall and Andrew P. O'Meara, Jr. "The Army and the 1980's," Parameters 9, no. 4
(December 1979): 50.
153 Army Major General Jacob Brown to John C. Calhoun, 14 November 1820, Jacob Brown Papers, Library of
Congress, quoted in William B. Skelton, "Officers and Politicians: The Origins of Army Politics in the United States
Before the Civil War," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall 1979) p.37, n. 40.
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housing and family facilities, and the potential effects on the surrounding community and
environment. The alternatives considered by FORSCOM in the first round of the basing decision,
begun in January 1984, included Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Drum,
New York; Fort Ord, California; Fort Lewis Washington; and Forts Richardson and Wainwright in
Alaska. 154
By the time of a mid-March 1984 appearance by the Army DCSOPS, Lt. General Fred
Mahaffey, before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, the Army had indicated that
the list of sites had been narrowed down to three alternative basing schemes: a West Coast basing,
with the division divided between Forts Lewis and Ord; and a pair of options on the East Coast
consisting of dual basing at Forts Campbell and Drum, or basing the complete division at Fort
Drum.' 55 These four sites (Forts Lewis, Ord, Campbell and Drum) remained in the running as each
was "near big airfields" and each contained "good training areas."' 5 6 General Mahaffey went on to
declare that the sites in Georgia and Alaska "just don't look as good as" the remaining four posts. 15 7
He stated that FORSCOM would be completing its basing study soon, with recommendations to be
forwarded to the senior Army leadership for a final decision. A final determination of the basing
scheme for the seventeenth division was expected, according to Mahaffey, by the end of April. 158
Despite these claims by the Army's DCSOPS, the Army, on 4 April, announced that a total
of eight posts still were in the running for hosting the new division: Fort Campbell, Fort Drum, Fort
Lewis, and Fort Ord, as well as Fort Benning in Georgia, and Forts Greely, Richardson and
Wainwright, all in Alaska. Moreover, instead of making a decision by the end of April, the Army
Corps of Engineers now would not be able to release environmental impact statements on the eight
sites until May, with public hearings to follow in June near each of the eight posts to gain local
input.159 A final basing decision now was put off until September. 160
154 Initial indications suggested that the Army was likely to base the new division somewhere in mid-west, which was
revised a few weeks later to dual-basing at Fort Ord, California (home of the 7th Infantry Division) and Fort Lewis,
Washington; see Carney, "Army Seeks 2 New," 2; and Carney, "193d Inf," 1.
155 House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for 1985, Part 3, 80.
156 Larry Carney, "Four Posts Left in Running for Light Division Site," Army Times, 26 March 1984, 15.
157 Ibid. Interestingly, in light of subsequent events, these comments by Lt. General Mahaffey appear in the Army Times
article but not in the final, published version of the House Appropriations Subcommittee hearings.
158 House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for 1985, Part 3, 80.
159 "Eight Posts Are Being Considered For New Light Division's Home Base," Army Times, 30 April 1984, 3.
160 Larry Carney, "Public Hearings in June Will Consider Locations for New Light Divisions," Army Times, 14 May
1984, 4.
255
According to "Army sources," the Fort Benning and Alaska sites were again under
consideration "only after pressure from legislators in the states concerned."' 6 1 According to one
Army official at the time:
There's an awful lot of political pressure being brought to bear on
the Army on where to locate the new division. The Army is going to
be extremely cautious on where it stations the new division because
of this interest.162
Given the personalities and the key positions occupied by members of the state congressional
delegations, the pressures for and potential rewards of basing the new division were strongest from
Alaska, Georgia, and New York. Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens (R), then head of the Senate's
Defense Appropriations subcommittee, long had been an especially forceful advocate of Alaskan
interests. 163 His personal intervention in the basing decision was to become the deepest and most
public of any member of Congress. In the Georgia delegation, Senator Sam Nunn, the ranking
Democrat on the Senate Armed Service's Committee, was a well-respected and influential leader in
his party on defense issues. The New York delegation contained a host of potentially powerful
supporters of the LID project. On the House side, the congressman for the district surrounding Fort
Drum, David Martin, was the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee's
Defense Investigative Subcommittee, while Rep. Joseph Addabo (D) was the powerful chairman of
the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. In the Senate, Alfonse D'Amato (R) (who had
earned the nickname "Senator Pothole" for his focus on garnering federal projects for his home
state) was a member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. In the case of Fort
Drum, moreover, the potential political rewards extended beyond the New York delegation.
Congressional delegations from all over the Northeast and Midwest had long complained about the
dearth of military installations and military spending in their region, especially as the failing
economic fortunes of the 1970s led to the growth of the region's "Rust Belt." 164 Basing the new
161 "Eight Posts Are Being Considered," 3.
162 Ibid.
163 In the late 1980's and early 1990's, Senator Stevens was at the forefront of inserting last-minute amendments to
defense spending bills for projects of local interest that had failed to be considered or approved by the appropriate
committees of Congress (in this case Armed Services and Defense Appropriations), so-called "earmarks." In Senator
Stevens' case the projects, usually designed to aid Alaskan institutions of higher learning, were technical projects of
dubious scientific merit; see Susan Cohen, "Pork in the Sky," Washington Post Magazine, 10 November 1991, 15-17
and 36-39. When asked about his reputation for garnering questionable funds for Alaska, Senator Stevens responded, in
a manner suggestive of its actions on behalf of the LID basing issue as well, that "I am the senator from Alaska
[emphasis in the original]." Ibid., 38.
164 The Northeast-Midwest Institute, a non-profit think tank serving the Northeast-Midwest Congressional and Senate
Coalitions (representing Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin), first
published a report in 1977 decrying the relatively small amount of defense dollars and the paucity of defense bases and
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division at Fort Drum provided the opportunity to answer the concerns of this broader audience as
well.
The economic rewards to the locale awarded the new division's base were potentially
substantial. In the economically depressed area surrounding Fort Drum, the Corps of Engineers, for
example, estimated that the annual total business volume in the region would increase by 11.9
percent and that annual local personal income would increase by 21.9 percent. Stationing the
division at Fort Drum was estimated to create almost 5500 total permanent jobs, including direct
hires on the base and indirect hires throughout the community. 165
The Corps' public hearings on the basing issue illustrated the strong congressional and local
interest in the decision. Senator Nunn appeared at the hearings in Columbus, Georgia, where he
strongly made the case for basing at least a portion of the new division at Fort Benning.
Meanwhile, Congressman David Martin attended the Fort Drum hearings in Watertown, New York.
New York Governor Mario Cuomo also attended the hearing, and declared the appointment of an
executive committee to help plan, finance and expedite additional off-post housing in the Fort Drum
area. Pushing strongly for the division, Governor Cuomo declared: "What you need, we can
provide." 66 Strong letters of support for basing the new division in New York were also read at the
hearing from Senator Daniel Moynihan (D), Senator D'Amato, and Rep. Addabo.
The Corps of Engineers' May environment impact statement concluded that due to housing
and training space constraints the seventeenth division would need to be split between different
sites. Among the options being considered were split basing at Forts Wainwright and Lewis, at
Forts Lewis and Ord, at Forts Drum and Campbell, or at Forts Drum and Benning. Only Fort Drum
was considered by the Engineers to be of sufficient size to base the entire division, although even at
Fort Drum the housing situation would be tight.167
other facilities in this region of the country. A second, follow-up, report, published in August 1980, noted that the
Northeast-Midwest region contained only 25 percent of all defense facilities, contained no major combat divisions, and
yet had suffered 43.6 percent of all base closings during the ten-year period from 1969-1979. In fiscal year 1981, this
region was scheduled to receive only 16.1 percent of all military construction funds; California, by contrast, alone
received 18.4 percent of the construction dollars in the same year. The report concluded with a recommendation for a
stronger federal effort to coordinate defense spending with regional economic objectives. Data are derived from
Jacqueline Mazza and Dale E. Wilkinson. The Unprotected Flank: Regional and Strategic Imbalances in Defense
Spending Patterns (Washington, D.C.: Northeast-Midwest Institute, August 1980), 5, 7, 24, and 35.
165 Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for FY85, Part 5, 38.
166 Don Hirst, "A Tale of Two Cities: Vying for Army's New Light Division; Few Oppose Bringing New Division to
Fort Drum," Army Times, 25 June 1984, 4.
167 Ibid.; and Larry Carney, "Light Division May Have More Than One Home," Army Times, 25 June 1984, 4.
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Faced with strong congressional pressure from the triad of the Alaska, Georgia and New
York delegations, the Army decided on a three-way solution, seemingly the better to garner the
widest possible congressional support. In early August, the service sent to the Secretary of Defense
a plan for basing not one, but two, new divisions: the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum,
beginning in early 1985, and the 6th Infantry Division at Forts Wainwright and Richardson, in fiscal
year 1986.168 The Georgia delegation would be compensated with assignment of the third Ranger
battalion and the new Ranger regimental headquarters to Fort Benning. In addition, until housing
could be made available at Fort Drum, the 10th Division's second brigade would be based
temporarily at Fort Benning.
Sacrificing LID Capability for Congressional Support
The Army was able to create two new divisions from the original single new division by
falling back again on the reserves. Despite the claim by General Wickham in his April 1984 White
Paper on the Light Infantry that a new LID division must be fully manned to performed its rapid
deployment missions, the 10th Mountain Division lost its third active-duty brigade. 169 The resulting
substitution of a round-out brigade from the New York National Guard meant that the complete
division would never be able to achieve a short-notice, rapid deployment capability. It would,
however, enhance the role of the Army's reserves. The active-duty personnel spaces of the 10 th
Mountain Division's lost brigade were reassigned to the 6th Infantry Division and combined with the
separate 17 2 d Brigade, long stationed in Alaska, to become the active-duty component of the
Army's eighteenth division. The eighteen division was completed with the addition of an Army
Reserve Brigade based in Minnesota, which had previously been assigned to the defense of Alaska.
As a result, this division too would never be capable of a short-notice, rapid deployment of the
entire division. 70
Conflicting rationales were offered for the new Alaskan-based division, many of which ran
counter to the original LID mission presented to Congress (i.e., providing a quick reaction force for
low-intensity conflicts in the Third World). 171 The Army officially claimed that the need for an
168 Larry Carney, "Army Asks Defense For 2 New Divisions," Army Times, 20 August 1984, 1.
169 Wickham, Jr., Light Infantry Divisions, 3.
170 Carney, "Army Asks Defense," 41. Even General Richardson was to admit later that the addition of the 6th Infantry
Division (Light) "was not necessary." He went on to state that: "I don't think from a strategic standpoint, from a war
plans or war fighting standpoint that the 6" Division was needed at all. We had sufficient forces in Alaska to take care of
any threat there. The brigade then did not need to be increased to division size." General William R. Richardson,
"General William R. Richardson: Senior Officer Oral History Program Interview," Project 1987-18; interview by Lt.
Colonel Michael W. Ackerman (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1987), 356 and 357.
171 See Lt. General Fred E. Mahaffey's testimony in House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Army Light
Infantry Division, 54-56.
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eighteenth division arose from a review of the service's force structure vis-a-vis the world situation
conducted by the Army staff earlier in the summer of 1984. Out of this review, it "became
apparent" that an additional division was needed to meet the service's required missions.172 And
yet, the service's explanation of the 6 th Infantry's mission made it appear that the sole additional
requirement identified by the service during this review was the defense of Alaska.
In later congressional testimony, Lt. General Mahaffey specifically identified the defense of
Alaska and the Aleutian Islands as the division's primary mission, stating that it would be "tailored
to facilitate the theater defense" of this region. 173 Specifically, the division would be employed to
counter one of the two Soviet conventional threats against Alaska: specifically, the defense of sites
such as civil and military communications, early warning stations, airfields, and power generation
facilities against small Soviet special forces teams infiltrating Alaskan territory by sea and air.
While this had long been the mission of the 17 2d Brigade, the addition of second active-duty brigade
in Alaska would increase the number of sites that could be defended, as well as improve response
times, according to the DSCOPS. 174
In his defense of the 6th Infantry, Senator Stevens likewise cited the division's primary role
as being the defense of Alaska, and often spoke as if a new Soviet menace to Alaska had recently
appeared. 175 Yet, no evidence existed for this claim. In fact, Army officials disputed Stevens'
contention, asserting that the Soviet threat had not increased in recent years. 176 Even an aide to
Senator Stevens disputed the notion that the Army's basing decision was driven by perceptions of
an increasing Soviet threat to the region, concluding that "I can't see that as much of a factor."' 77
And, while the 6th Infantry Division might improve the Army's capability to meet one of two Soviet
172 Testimony of Lt. General Mahaffey in Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for FY85,
Part 5, 4; and Carney, "Army Asks Defense," 1.
173 Testimony of Lt. General Mahaffey in Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for FY85,
Part 5, 5. In announcing to Pacific region military commanders the Army's decision to base a LID in Alaska, General
Wickham also identified "early defense of Alaska and the Aleutians" as the division's mission; CSA General Wickham,
"Army Light Infantry Divisions," Backchannel Communication to CINCPAC/Adm Crowe; REDCOM/Gen Nutting;
FORSCOM/Gen Sennewald; WESTCOM/LTG Lee, 10 September 1984; Folder: Backchannels-Outgoing; CSA Box
5/Contents: CSA Backchannels Jun83-Dec86 Incoming-Outgoing; The John A. Wickham Papers; Archives, U.S. Army
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
174 U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Information on Stationing Army's 6th Infantry Division,
GAO/NSIAD-86-216FS (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, September 1986), 6-7.
175 See, for example, Senator Ted Stevens, "An Exclusive AFJ Interview with Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman of the
Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee," interview by Millard Barger and Michael Ganley, Armed Forces
Journal International, July 1985, 36-42.
176 Government Accounting Office, Stationing Army's 6th Infantry, 6.
177 Wally Burnett, quoted in Michael Gordon, "Army's Third World Strike Force Finds a Home - In Alaska of All Cold
Places," National Journal 17 (6 April 1985): 730.
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conventional threats, the larger and more likely threats to Alaska lay in Soviet nuclear options,
which a LID obviously could do nothing to counter.
Senator Stevens also presented a second rationale for Alaskan basing, arguing repeatedly
that it would provide the best strategic location from which troops could be deployed to either
Europe or Asia. In a 1985 interview, Stevens stated that
we are capable of deploying troops stationed in Alaska both to the
Far East and to the European theater as quickly as those troops that
would be deployed from anywhere else in any state.178
Later in the interview, he commented that "I think we'd even get our people to the U.S. Central
Command area from Alaska as quickly as you could from anywhere other than Maine."179
However, the supposedly unrivaled deployability advantages of the Alaskan basing
seemingly failed to enter into Army calculations. While service officials acknowledged that the
division would be available for deployments beyond Alaska, the Army neglected to examine the
amount of airlift needed to move this division outside of the state. 180 And such "out-of-Alaska"
operations for the 6h Infantry were considered far down on the list of Army priorities. An Army
spokesman proclaimed that:
The 6t will be keyed on Alaska itself. If we have a worldwide
situation, the other light divisions will be sent before the 6th.We
retain the option to send the 6th if we are really up against it. But it is
not their first responsibility.' 8'
Finally, to properly operate in the Arctic conditions of Alaska, the Army provided the 6h Infantry
Division with equipment unique to its cold weather mission. In particular, the division would be
equipped with Swedish-made Small Unit Support Vehicle, designed specifically for movement over
snow and ice, rather than with HMMWVs like other LID units. 182 While the division could be re-
equipped for operations outside of Alaska, this would be time consuming and further negate any
quick reaction capability.
178 Stevens, "An Exclusive AFJ Interview," 38.
179 Ibid.
180 On the potential for deployment outside Alaska, see Government Accounting Office, Stationing Army's 6th Infantry,
7. The absence of an airlift study can be found in Gordon, "Third World Strike Force," 730. This statement, however,
applies only to TRADOC and FORSCOM activities prior to the activation of the 6th Infantry Division (Light); once up
and running, the division headquarter's staff would have conducted an assessment of airlift sortie requirements as part of
its routine planning.
181 U.S. Army spokesman quoted in Ibid.
182 Bernard J. Adelsberger, "Equipment Adapted to Tundra Makes Movement Possible," Army Times, 2 May 1988, 10.
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A final rationale for the Alaskan basing was simply to provide the Army with additional
cold weather training opportunities. Again, this was an unusual requirement for forces like the LID,
whose ostensible primary missions would take it to the warmer weather climes of most Third World
countries.'8 3 Should cold weather training prove necessary for LID operations, the 10th Mountain
Division in upstate New York would receive plenty of opportunities for such training. In the end,
the best motivation behind the Army's decision to base a LID in Alaska was summed up by one
Pentagon official: "I can put the answer in two words: Ted Stevens."' 84
Despite the questionable capabilities thus created and the dubious mission of the Alaskan
division, the twin basing decision worked in Congress. In his subcommittee's hearings on the LID
concept, Senator Stevens bluntly stated his reason for supporting for the concept: "I am one in
support of the decision to create three divisions [two active-duty and one reserve] since the third one
is going to my State." And later in the hearing, Senator Stevens acknowledged his role in the
establishment of the eighteenth division, congratulating the Army for deciding to create two new
divisions and noting that it was "a matter I urged sometime ago in discussion with the Defense
Department." 86
One more decision needed to be reached in Alaska: where to base the division headquarters.
Senator Stevens' choice was clearly Fort Wainwright, near Fairbanks, Alaska. Once home to the
173 d Brigade, Fort Wainwright had most recently been home to the small army of construction
workers building the Alaskan pipeline. With the pipeline complete, the base currently housed a
handful of units from the 172 d Brigade. Completion of the pipeline had also resulted in decreased
economic activity in the Fairbanks area surrounding the base. By contrast, Anchorage, near Fort
Richardson, was then in the midst of an economic and building boom. With a scarcity of other
available real estate in the area for further civilian economic development, Fort Richardson was
being greedily eyed by some of the region's developers. Given the facilities already existing at Fort
Richardson, however, the Corps of Engineers determined that locating the division's headquarters
and headquarters' personnel at this site would be the least expensive option. The Army's senior
leadership failed to accept this recommendation. Instead, in a highly unusual action, the service
announced that the basing of the 6" Infantry Division's headquarters would be left for the members
183 Gordon, "Third World Strike Force," 731.
184 Ibid., 728.
185 Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, DoD Appropriations for FY85, Part 5, p.1.
186 Ibid., 21.
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of the Alaskan congressional delegation to decide.1 87 Not surprisingly, Fort Wainwright was
eventually chosen as the home of the division's headquarters.
Also during the summer of 1984, the Army chose a location and designation for the reserve
component Light Infantry Division. Never one to miss a public relations opportunity, General
Wickham had Defense Secretary Weinberger announce that the 29 th Infantry Division would be
reactivated as a National Guard LID at a 6th of June commemoration of the Normandy D-Day
landings. The 29th Infantry, composed of elements of the Maryland and Virginia National Guard,
fought on the beaches of Normandy exactly forty years to the day of the LID announcement.
Interestingly, Army Secretary Marsh had been an officer of the Virginia component of the 29t
Infantry Division for many years, as well as a five-term member of the U.S. congressional
delegation from Virginia.1 88
Adding a reserve division to the LID force package again was seemingly at odds with the
LID's central goal of rapid deployability. Such a unit, however, would have utility as a follow-on
force in a NATO scenario. More importantly, it served a number of political functions. Adding a
National Guard division to the LID mix would further increase the role of the reserves in the overall
Army force structure, enhancing the program's attractiveness to reserve supporters in Congress.
And, once again, the basing of the division would bring economic benefits to the locale(s) chosen.
By choosing the 29th Infantry Division, the Army secured a two-for-one deal: re-activating a
National Guard division composed of units from two states doubled the number of state
congressional delegations which benefited from this decision. Finally, the 29t Infantry would be
headquartered in Virginia, home of the second-ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Senator John Warner. During 1985 Armed Services hearings on the Light Infantry,
Senator Warner commented to Secretary Marsh that on the subject of the 29t Infantry Division:
"We cannot look at this with total objectivity, neither you nor I."189 Such a remark could apply with
equal force to the members of the congressional delegations from Alaska and the Northeast as well.
'~1 Ibid., 29; Gordon, "Third World Strike Force," 731; Larry Carney, "Housing Crunch at Drum May Slow 10th Inf
Div," Army Times, 31 December 1984, 4; and Larry Carney, "Alaskan Senators Asked to Place 6th Div HQ," Army
Times, 11 March 1985, 15.
188 The 29h Infantry Division was originally formed in World War I and nicknamed "the Blue and Gray Division," as the
division's Virginia regimental units had fought for the Confederacy during the Civil War, while its Maryland regiments
fought on the Union side; see John W. Listman, Jr., Robert K. Wright, Jr., and Bruce D. Hardcastle (eds.) The
Tradition Continues: A History of the Virginia National Guard 1607-1985 (Dallas, TX: Taylor Publishing
Company 1987). Secretary Marsh described himself as delighted when told of the Army's choice for the LID reserve
division; Marsh interview with author.
189 Senate Armed Services Committee, Army's Light Division, 42.
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DECLINE OF THE LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION
In a little more than year, General Wickham seemingly had been able to firmly embed the
Light Infantry Division into the Army's force structure. By modifying and constricting the service's
design process, the LID operational concept and organization had been created in record time. The
conversion of the first active-duty division to the new design was proceeding apace. Approval had
been granted at the highest levels of the Reagan Administration for one reserve and four active-duty
Light Infantry Divisions. As part of this effort, the Army would increase its active-duty force
structure by two new divisions and add a new National Guard division to its reserve component.
Four of the Army's eighteen active-duty divisions now would be Light Infantry Divisions, as would
one out of ten National Guard divisions. All of this had been achieved without increasing the
service's end-strength. And outside the Army, General Wickham seemingly had built a powerful
political base of support for the LID effort both within the Reagan Administration and on Capital
Hill.
Within a few years, however, just as the creation of these units came to completion, two
developments took place which would bring about the first serious opposition within the military to
the LID concept: the sudden end of the Reagan-era rise in defense budgets and the gradual demise
of the Cold War. Both developments would lead the Marine Corps to target the Army's light
infantry concept as the former began its search for a new mission in the changing budgetary and
security environment. More serious still, these developments would lead the heavy side of the
Army to scramble for its share of funds and to jealously guard its dominant role in the service. In
the end, the light infantry concept would fall well short of its creator's original vision.
Despite the criticism, the LID program maintained its steady course under General
Wickham's watchful eye. By mid-1987, the LID certification was complete and the final
organization of the division set. General Wickham gave final approval to the division design in
May 1987, shortly before his retirement - meeting the four-year deadline he had set as the LID
program got underway. By making a few further minor modifications to the TRADOC-approved
design, the division Wickham approved brought total personnel down to 10,778 and airlift
requirements down to 516 C-141s. 190 By this time as well, all five light infantry divisions were
activated, though most were a long way from being fully manned. Up to 1987, the LID program
had been kept carefully isolated within the infantry community, developed largely within the
service's normal design organizations, and had, as yet, not seriously threatened the resources or
plans of its stronger fellow communities. However, construction costs, the only potentially big-
ticket item in the LID program, had already begun to fan renewed debate in Congress and OSD over
190 Gourley, "Light Infantry Division," 42.
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the wisdom of the service's approach. This debate would intensify as defense budgets continued to
fall.
Falling Budgets and Rising Opposition in Congress
General Wickham and Secretary Marsh took advantage of every opportunity to build on the
congressional support for the LID program. For example, when the 6th Infantry Division was
reactivated on 23 March 1986, both Marsh and Wickham were present, as were Alaskan Senators
Stevens and Frank Murkowski. Likewise, both officials were in attendance with Senator John
Warner during the 29th Infantry Division's reactivation ceremony on 5 October 1985.191 The
activation date of the 1 0 th Mountain Division was made dependent on the schedule of its most
famous alumnus, Senator Robert Dole.192 But, while the Army Secretary and the Army Chief of
Staff were busy entertaining Senators, trouble was brewing on Capital Hill.
By 1987, increased concern with the mounting federal budget deficit, passage of the
Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction act in 1986, lessening Cold War tensions, and the resulting
decline in military spending combined to force the Army and Congress to make some hard choices
among competing service programs. The process was kicked off by an unusual presentation from
Army Vice-Chief of Staff, General Thurman, to a Senate Armed Services subcommittee in March
of 1987.193 General Thurman began by restating the service's long-held position that manpower
levels and force structure (including the LIDs) would be held constant in future years, but he went
on to note these goals now would be the service's top priority. He stated, however, that achieving
these goals, however, would require sacrifices in the Army's Big Five modernization program;
leaving the service $77-billion short of the funds required over the next five years to re-equip the
service's entire 28-division force. Specifically, the service would be short a total of nearly 3,500 M-
1 tanks, over 4,000 M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, more than 400 Apache attack helicopters,
700 MLRS rocket launchers, and over 600 UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopters. Thurman, in part,
blamed forces outside the Army for this shortfall: "The Army's portion of the total defense
investment accounts has shown a steady decline, from a high of 21% in FY81 to [a] low of less than
191 Larry Carney, "6th Infantry Division's Red Star Rises in Alaska," Army Times, 7 April 1986, 10; and Chris Meyer,
"Army Reactivates 29th Infantry as National Guard Light Division," Armed Forces Journal International, November
1985, 24.
192 Although the Army desired activation of the division in February of 1985, according to an Army official: ". . .this
will depend on when Senator Dole can be present for the ceremony;" quoted in Larry Carney, "10th Division's
Reactivation Depends on Sen. Dole," Army Times, 28 January 1985, 20.
193 Detailed accounts of this hearing can be found in Tom Donnelly, "Army Plans to Sacrifice Weapons in Wake of
Shrinking Budgets," Defense News, 16 March 1987, 9; and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Army Planning Revealed at Its
Worst in Testimony on Its Modernization Plan?" Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, 14-20.
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17% [proposed] in FY89." Nonetheless, he also admitted to serious flaws in the Army's planning
process, which consistently projected future budgets for the Big Five program that were anywhere
from 22% to 64% higher than they actually turned out to be two years later. 194
If General Thurman's strategy in his presentation was to throw down a gauntlet to Congress
challenging them to ante up funds for Big Five procurement, it largely backfired. While some
additional funding for modernization was forthcoming, Thurman's admission to "naive" Army
planning put the service's credibility in doubt on Capital Hill. 195 Moreover, Thurman presented
Congress with too stark and easy a choice: preserve Army manpower levels or preserve defense
contracting jobs in their districts. Given this choice, the outcome was never in doubt: Congress
voted to cut troop levels. And, cutting manpower spaces would inevitably lead the Army to
reductions in force structure as well. Cuts in force structure clearly were coming, and the dominant
communities would try to ensure that the LID portion of this force structure took the biggest hit.
And, General Thurman's gambit threatened the dominant communities' most cherished programs.
Although Congress preserved these programs this time around, the service's dominant communities
were put on notice.
Several months after this presentation, many of the LID program's senior supporters left the
scene. General Wickham retired in the summer of 1987. At the same time, General Thurman
stepped down as Vice Chief of Staff, to become TRADOC Commander, effectively removing
himself from the Washington political wars. November 1987 saw the retirement of another staunch
LID supporter when Secretary Weinberger left the administration.
The new Defense Secretary, Frank Carlucci, came into office with a mandate to seek further
reductions in service budgets as a result of a just completed White House-Congressional budget
summit. He soon directed the Army to cut $9 billion more from its fiscal year 1989 budget
proposal. 196 The service responded, in part, by ordering the reduction of ten thousand active-duty
spaces in fiscal year 1988.197 To meet this reduction, the service initially proposed cutting one
brigade each from the 9th Motorized Division and the 6th Infantry Division, turning those brigades'
missions over to National Guard units. Worse yet for the Alaskan congressional delegation, the
194 General Thurman quoted in Ibid., 16.
195 One Hill critic described it as "some pretty naive long-range 'planning,' if you can dignify it that way;" quoted in
Ibid., 20.
196 Polsky, "Army Claims Victory," 9.
197 Included in this order was a congressionally-mandate 1.5% cut in total active duty officer strength; see Tice, "10,300
Spaces to Be Sliced," 1.
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brigade to be eliminated from the 6th Infantry Division was the one to be stationed at Fort
Wainwright.' 98
When word of this latter proposal reached Senator Stevens, the gentleman from Alaska
"jumped through the roof' according to one Senate aide, and quickly moved to scuttle it. During a
hastily arranged January 1988 meeting with Secretary Marsh, Stevens got the Army to agree to
restore the second brigade to Alaska, though now with only two active-duty battalions and a third
round-out unit from the Alaskan National Guard. Stevens and Marsh also agreed to delay full
manning of the division's first brigade for one year to fiscal year 1991. Consistent with Stevens'
preferences, however, the division's fully-manned first brigade was now to be assigned to Fort
Wainwright rather than Fort Richardson as earlier planned. 199 While the Defense Department
agreed to this revised plan, thereby restoring 1,400 personnel spaces to the Army, cuts to the 9t
Infantry Division went ahead as planned.
A new round of Army budget and manpower cuts began shortly after the Bush
Administration entered office in January 1989. The change in administrations also saw the
retirement of the last booster of the light infantry in the top leadership of the Department of the
Army - John Marsh stepped down as Secretary of the Army after serving eight full years in the
post. This loss came at a particularly inopportune time for the LID program, as it was suddenly
faced with a new, and ultimately fatal, opponent - the U.S. Marine Corps.
Marine Corps Opposition
While the Cold War remained, and before defense budgets began to drastically fall, the
Marine Corps response to the Army's LID concept could best be characterized as a "hands-off'
approach. The Corps response in these early years was summed up by then Marine Corps
Commandant P. X. Kelly who, when asked in an interview to comment on the LID initiative,
responded ". .. I really think that General Wickham is probably the best one to comment on that."200
For the first half of the 1980s, the Marine Corps succeeded in maintaining its share of a
growing DoD budget. They were able to increase troops levels by 25,000 personnel (about twelve
percent), and to undertake a large-scale modernization program of amphibious ships, aircraft, and
ground vehicles. In particular, the Corps procured large numbers of M-1 tanks, as it sought to
198 "6th, 9th Infantry Divisions May Lose Active Brigade," Army Times, 1 February 1988, 1.
199 This account is from Carney, "6th Infantry Deal Saves 1,400 Slots," 1.
200 General Paul X. Kelley, "An Exclusive AFJ Interview with General Paul X. Kelley, Commandant, US Marine
Corps," interview by Millard Barger, LuAnne K. Levens and Benjamin F. Schemmer, Armed Forces Journal
International, August 1984, 66.
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heavy-up its forces to do battle in Southwest Asia and on the flanks of NATO.20 1 With such
success, the Corps had little need to concern itself with an Army program like the LID.
The Marines' attitude of indifference began to change in late 1980s, as it became clear that
the Reagan-era defense build-up was over and as the Soviet threat began to recede from Europe.
The first hints of a change came in the new Marine Commandant's 1988 annual report to Congress.
Here General Alfred M. Gray, Jr. clearly stated that the Corps was refocusing its efforts on the Third
World:
While we are fully prepared for the most challenging conflict, your
Marine Corps must also stand ready for the most likely conflict - that
in the Third World. The reason the nation has a Marine Corps is to
project power into areas where we do not have forces stationed in
peacetime.. .this is the major contribution we provide the nation.20 2
A few paragraphs later, General Gray asserted that: "The availability of amphibious forces and
their capability to respond across the spectrum of conflict make them the forces of choice in crisis
response."203 No clearer warning could have been given to the Army LID supporters of what was to
come.
In January 1988, General Gray convened a force structure study group and gave it the
mandate to recommend changes in the Marine Corps to enable it to better fight low intensity
conflicts. Specifically, he directed that "the active force will focus on constant readiness for
employment for low and mid intensity conflicts."204 The group concluded its work by
recommending thirty changes, eventually known as the "Warfighting Enhancement Initiatives,"
to better prepare the Marines to fight as an expeditionary force.
Always adroit at public relations, the Marines moved quickly to make cosmetic changes to
their force. In February 1988, all Marine Corps combat organizations, known as air-ground task
forces, replaced the term amphibious with expeditionary in their title (thus, the Marine Amphibious
Units became Marine Expeditionary Units, Marine Amphibious Brigades became Marine
Expeditionary Brigades, and Marine Amphibious Divisions became Marine Expeditionary
201 See, for instance, Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Marine Amphibious Assault Forces Get Big Boost in New Defense Plan,"
Armed Forces Journal International, April 1982, 78 and 80; and F. Clifton Berry, Jr., "Broader Scope for US Marines,"
International Defense Review, no. 7 (1985): 1127-28.
202 General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., "Annual Report of the Marine Corps to Congress," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1988,
25.
203 Ibid.
204 Quoted in Haith, Thickening the Light Division, 39, n. 100.
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Divisions).20 5 The Marines' Light Armor Vehicle (LAV) battalions also underwent a name change
to Light Armor Infantry battalions, as the Corps began to emphasize once again its infantry focus.
A new four-part training program was begun within the Corps, emphasizing so-called "warrior"
skills, and conspicuously reminiscent of the training instituted by the Army for its light infantry.
The goal of the program was to bring the Corps back to its traditional ethos of "every Marine a
rifleman" and to ensure that every Marine office and NCO could lead in combat. 206 Exercises were
conducted throughout the year which demonstrated the Corps' low-intensity warfare capabilities.
And, the Corps took its case to the public. General Gray began an extensive round of visits
across the country, emphasizing the message time and again that
[t]he Marine Corps is the only military organization in the world that
can commit a potent, integrated, and balanced air-ground-logistics
force on short notice without mobilizing a single person. 20 7
At another presentation General Gray stated that
The Corps' ambition to be the premier third world force is not
secret. Expeditionary means you have to be light enough to go
where you have to go and heavy enough on the other end to win.20 8
The contrast with the highly reserve-dependent, low-firepower Army light infantry division was
implicit, but obvious, in both statements.
In July 1988, a two-day Marine Corps conference was held to discuss the Corps "unique"
role in low-intensity conflict. The thrust of the conference was clear from one of the papers
presented:
The inherent flexibility of Naval forces makes them especially well
suited for the LIC/MIC. . .requirements of the potential conflict
spectrum ... .This contrasts somewhat with the Army and Air Force,
which are best suited to focus on high-intensity conflict: superpower
confrontations in Europe and Asia. They do this by organizing and
training to fight such a conflict if deterrence fails. 209
By now, it was clear that the Marine machine was geared up and ready to roll.
205 Colonel (Ret.) John C. Scharfen, "The U.S. Marine Corps in 1988," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review
1989 115, no. 5 (May 1989): 167.
206 Ibid., 172-73; and Mike Wells, "Every Marine a Rifleman," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 August 1990, 204-205.
207 Quoted in Scharfen, "Marine Corps in 1988," 167.
208 Quoted in Haith, Thickening the Light Division, 39.
209 Quoted in Scharfen, "Marine Corps in 1988," 167.
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Over the next year, the Marine Corps implemented the Warfighting Enhancement Initiatives
to make Marine forces lighter and more infantry intensive. For example, much of the heavy
equipment, such as tanks, was moved into the Marine Corps Reserve and a fourth infantry company
was assigned to each Marine infantry battalion. These changes were codified in the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force Master Plan and the Marine Corps Long-Range Plan, approved in outline by
General Gray in July 1989.210 These planning documents emphasized the Corps' inherent light
infantry capabilities and its renewed focus on low-intensity conflict. Over the next several years the
Corps would devote entire issues of their service journal, The Marine Corps Gazette, to such topics
as LIC missions, insurgencies, and light infantry operations.
Congressional support for these Marine Corps changes was not long in coming. The 1989
edition of the U.S. Naval Institute's Naval Review, contained articles by both Senator Sam Nunn
and Senator John Warner (the Democratic and Republic leaders, respectively, on the Senate Armed
Services Committee) praising the Corps' shift to Third World contingencies. According to Senator
Nunn: ". . .overseas troop drawdowns would naturally lead to greater emphasis on rapidly
deployable forces, such as Marine air-ground task forces."21 1
With the removal of the Soviet threat to Western Europe, the Army too now recognized that
"the projection of power from within the continental United States to trouble spots around the
world" would be the basis of any future U.S. strategy.21 2 Therefore, the Marine Corps claims to be
the nation's "crisis contingency force" were seen by the Army leadership to be a broad attack
against the service's entire force structure, and especially its Light Infantry Divisions. As a result, a
vituperative debate began between the two services as they scrambled to redefine their missions in
the post-Cold War world.
The immediate argument between the Army and Marine Corps revolve around three sets of
issues. First, the Marines claimed that the Army's rapid response forces had little capability to
conduct forced entry operations, and, once on the ground, were deficient in firepower. The Army
responded that Marine task forces were limited to over-the-beach operations, and were unable to
sustain combat far inland. Second, the Marines faulted the Army's rapid response logistic support
capabilities, criticizing Army efforts to sacrifice support in favor of combat power, and claiming
instead that Marine units maintained "a 'tooth' to 'tail' ratio consistent with a truly expeditionary
210 Caleb Baker, "Marines Shift Emphasis to Low-Intensity Conflict," Defense News, 28 August 1989, 3.
211 Sen. Sam Nunn, "...Into the Future," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1989 115, no. 5 (May 1989):
170; also see Sen. John W. Warner, "Forging Ahead.. .," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1989 115, no.
5 (May 1989): 168-169.
212 Vuono, "National Strategy," 5.
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force." 213 The Army countered that Marine units were tied to off-shore logistics and were unable to
sustain operations much beyond the shore. Finally, Army spokesmen argued that low- to mid-
intensity operations in the future would require more than simply traditional combat capability.
Instead, special operations forces and combat service support units, like engineers and MPs, were
likely to be of equal or more importance in future combat operations - the former were particularly
important during the earliest stages of the operation, while the latter were especially relevant in the
post-combat "nation-building" phase. The overwhelming majority of these forces resided in the
Army. The Corps appeared more than willing to give the Army the combat service support role.
The Marines responded by pointing to their special operations capabilities resident in battalion-sized
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), and claimed that all their combat units had some special
operations training.214 In fact, Marine Corps spokesmen were ultimately willing to concede the
utility of all Army units - except the Light Infantry Divisions.215 One Marine Corps officer,
General John Sheehan, was quoted as commenting that the Army's light infantry units "is light
enough to get there but just light enough to get itself into trouble." 216
In the midst of this debate, the light infantry got their first taste of combat when the 2 d
Brigade of the 7th ID(L) was deployed to Panama as part of Operation Just Cause in December
1989.217 Interestingly, the SouthCom commander, the officer in charge of Just Cause, was none
213 Gen. Alfred M. Gray, Jr., "The Annual Report of the Marine Corps to the Congress," Marine Corps Gazette, April
1991, 27.
214 In fact, in 1985 the Marines changed the name of their Marine Amphibious Units (MAU's) to Marine Amphibious
Units (Special Operations Capable) or MAU(SOC) in order to highlight the unit's special operations capabilities; see
Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Commandant Directs Marines to Sharpen Their Inherent Special Ops Capability," Armed
Forces Journal International, October 1985, 24-25.
215 For instance, then Commander of Fleet Marine Force-Pacific, Lt. Gen. Robert F. Milligan, acknowledged that
"[s]ometimes the 82nd Airborne or the 101st Airborne is the right guy to do the job;" quoted in J.R. Wilson, "Masters of
the Flexible Response," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 February 1990, 198. General Gray commented before a congressional
committee that the Army's airborne units were a "most useful feature" and elsewhere announced his support for "the
Army's plan for a heavier corps-level capability;" see Michael R. Gordon, "Split Between Army and Marines Surfaces
in Debate on 3d World," New York Times, 15 March 1990, A18; and General Alfred M. Gray, Jr. "Interview: General
Alfred M. Gray, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps," interview by Fred Rainbow and John Miller, US Naval Institute
Proceedings 116, no. 4 (April 1990): 49.
216 General John Sheehan quoted in Gordon and Trainor, "Army Facing Cuts," Al.
217 For more on the 7 th Infantry Division's experiences during Operation Just Cause, see Thomas Donnelly,
Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming Panama (New York: Lexington Books,
1991), 316-22; Lt. Colonel David S. Hutchison, The 3rd Battalion 27th Infantry in Operation Just Cause (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 1992); Lt. General Carmen Cavezza, "Oral History Interview with
LTG Carmen Cavezza, Former Commanding General, 7 th Infantry Division," interview by Larry Yates, Robert K.
Wright, Jr. and Joe D. Huddleston, 30 April 1992, Oral History Interview No. JCIT 097Z, Interview series Joint
Task Force South in Operation Just Cause (Fort Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC and
Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History); and R. Cody Phillips, Operation Just Cause: The
Incursion into Panama, CMH Pub No. 70-85-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, n.d.).
Initial plans had called for the 7t" ID(L) to provide the first wave of troops, with Marine elements and the 8 2d
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other than General Maxwell Thurman, who had been brought back from near-retirement earlier in
the year to head the command. Not only did General Thurman utilize the light infantry, he also
managed to exclude the Marine Corps entirely from the operation, a fact which left the Corps
fuming.218
Conflict between the two services became so heated that General Colin Powell, now
Chairman of the Joints Chiefs, felt it necessary to invite himself to a congressional hearing, in
March 1990, on the future of the contingency force featuring Generals Vuono and Gray. General
Powell's apparent intent was to contain the public acrimony between the two services. Despite the
Chairman's presence, the discussion turned ugly when the Army and Marine leaders were asked to
comment on General Sheehan's earlier disparaging remark on Army light forces. After curtly
stating that senior Pentagon officials recognized the need for these forces, General Vuono simply
announced "I do not think I need to comment any further on the quote." Although General Gray's
response was lengthier, he finished up by commenting that "I think [General Sheehan's] statement
speaks for itself."219
End of the Light Infantry Division Concept?
As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the Army developed plans to transform
itself from a armor-heavy, NATO-oriented force to a lighter, crisis-contingency force. As part of
these plans, all four light infantry divisions were assigned to the rapid-response XVIII Airborne
Corps. Furthermore, the Army intended to shift its force structure in favor of the XVIII Airborne
Corps, with future force cuts planned to fall most heavily on armor and mechanized infantry
forces.220 In conjunction with these plans, the senior Army leadership formed a "Light Force
Modernization" task force to outline future equipment needs for the light forces. Future
procurement would go first to the contingency corps, and only later to the armor and mechanized
units. However, this task force was not designed to improve the capabilities of the foot-mobile
Airborne to follow, if necessary. This plan changed drastically once planning shifted from Southern Commands
Army component to the XVIII Airborne Corps. In the end, the 82d Airborne took the lead role, followed by 7th
Infantry Division's 2d Brigade; see Phillips, Operation Just Cause, 10. This was not the division's first deployment
to Central America: a battalion of the 7" ID(L) had been deployed to Honduras in May 1988 as part of Operation
Golden Pheasant, a "show-of-force" exercise designed against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas; see Otto Kreisher, "Drop
Into Honduras: Operation Golden Pheasant," Army, May 1988, 36-39.
218 While the Army frequently alluded to Operation Just Cause as a better example of future warfare and the service's
capabilities, Marine Corps General Gray stated before Congress that not only could the Marine's have performed the
operation, but that ". . .Just Cause. ..was a one-time scenario and the odds of this coming up again in my judgment are
very low;" quoted in Tom Donnelly, "Army, Marines Butt Heads Over Contingency Role," Army Times, 26 March
1990, 3.
219 Both General Vuono and General Gray quoted in Gordon, "Split Between Army and Marines," A18.
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infantry, but instead to improve the strategic deployability of the dominant intra-service
communities with an emphasis on lighter tanks, helicopters, and anti-aircraft and artillery
systems. 221. Essentially, although their traditional combat units might take cuts in the immediate
future, the dominant communities were seeking to retain their position of pre-eminence within the
service by "lightening up" their weapons platforms.
The August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by the armies of Saddam Hussein would provide a
further boost to the fortunes of these dominant communities. In response to Iraqi attack, the United
States began the largest U.S. overseas military deployment since the Vietnam War. Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm would proved to be a major success for all the Army's combat elements
- except its light infantry divisions. Aside from a small number of soldiers sent to the Gulf to
perform guard duty, no light infantry unit was even alerted for deployment to the theater.222 And,
the Army would take from Operation Desert Storm the lesson that that future contingencies likely
would involve operations against heavily mechanized opponents - the type of warfare in which the
light infantry division design was particularly weak. This insight, coupled with the need for rapid
deployability, led the service to renew its decade-long search for an Armored Gun System. One
version of the AGS was to be issued to the 82d Airborne and possibly another version made organic
to the light infantry, thereby substantially changing the nature of the latter units.223
Although the dominant communities and their combat forces had reoriented towards
contingency operations (the original mission focus of the light infantry), the LID force structure had
remained untouched in the Army draw-down through the end of 1992. The preservation of the light
infantry was not to last, as the Army now faced, thanks to congressional legislation, having to
support greater than expected levels of reservists within the framework of a declining budget and
additional mandated cuts to active-duty personnel. Moreover, the November 1992 presidential
election sent into office a Clinton Administration that had ran a popular campaign stressing the need
to re-focus the federal government's efforts onto domestic issues, including a call for further cuts in
the defense budget. As head of the House Armed Service Committee, the next Secretary of
Defense, Les Aspin had recently released a study describing a number of future force structure
options, including ones calling for as few as eight active-duty Army divisions.224 Having already
221 Baker, "Army Proposal," 4.
222 The 25th Infantry Division (Light), for example, sent 243 troops to the Gulf "mostly for guard duty;" see Elizabeth
Rathbun, "Tropic Lightning: Part Paradise, Part Hell on Earth," Army Times, 2 November 1992, 12.
223 Sean D. Naylor, "Army Fits Years of Change Into Months," Army Times, 7 January 1991, 24.
224 Chairman Les Aspin, An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era: Four
Illustrative Options (Washington, DC: U.S. House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992), 15. For more on
this force-sizing exercise see, Chairman Les Aspin, An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces for the Post-
Soviet Era (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, 24 January 1992); and Mark Gunzinger, "Beyond the
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made reductions to the heavy side of the force, with additional cuts to force structure widely
expected, and with renewed attacks by the Marine Corps and others against the LID role, it was
clear that the axe was next to fall on the light infantry divisions. In a further ill-omen, General
Vuono's retirement in July of 1991 meant that the last senior Army officer with any connection to
the early days of the LID's creation was now gone from the service.225
In early March 1993, the Army announced the first force structure reductions in the light
infantry in order to bring the service down to twelve active-duty divisions. First, the 7h Infantry
Division, which had been in the process of moving to Fort Lewis after the announced closing of its
Fort Ord base in the 1991 Base Closure Commission Report, would be reduced to a single brigade
whose ultimate fate was unclear. And, the 6t Infantry Division again would convert to a less than
full-strength single brigade but now stationed at both Forts Wainwright and Richardson. 226 With
both bases destined to stay open and with the construction funds he had so eagerly sought spent, no
word of protest came this time from Senator Steven's office.
In addition to cuts in the LID structure, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment would disband
and one brigade each from the two remaining European-based divisions (the 1 st Armored Division
and the 3d Infantry (Mechanized) Division) would be withdrawn from Europe to bring Army
strength on the continent down to the 65,000-troop level required by the new Clinton
Administration. One or both of the withdrawn brigades would be sent to Fort Lewis.227 Finally,
Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan suggested further reductions in active-duty manpower would
some be announced, hinting at a future active-duty Army end-strength of only 500,000 soldiers.
Although several Pentagon and congressionally-mandated studies suggested further cuts in
the light infantry force during the first several years of the Clinton Administration, the Army
retained the 10th Mountain Division and the 25th Infantry Division in its now twelve-division
force. 228 The 10h Mountain, however retained a National Guard round-out brigade and only two
Bottom-Up Review," in Essays on Strategy XIV, ed. Mary A. Sommerville (Washington, DC: Institute for National
Security Studies, National Defense University, 1996); available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss (accessed August 2007).
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227 There were suggestions that the two brigades were going to form the core of a new armored division to be assigned to
contingencies along the Pacific Rim; see "Two Heavy Brigades to Fort Lewis," Washington Update, AUSA Institute of
Land Warfare Monthly Newsletter (April 1994): 3; and "Chief of Staff Says He Envisions Army of 500,000 Active
Duty Troops," Inside the Army, 22 March 1993, 11.
228 For more on these studies, see General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles,
Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 1993),
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Budget Office, Options for Reconfiguring Service Roles and Missions (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office,
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active-duty ground maneuver brigades. The 25t Infantry remained a fully active-duty division; but,
in 1995, its First Brigade was moved to Fort Lewis and became a "detached" brigade of this
division.2 29 The 29" Infantry Division also remained in the National Guard as a light infantry
division.
The retention of these divisions may have been due, in large part, to their frequent use
throughout the 1990s for peacekeeping and nation-building operations. For example, in December
1992, elements of the 10th Mountain Division were deployed as quick reaction force in Somalia, and
remaining in the country until March 1994.230 The 10h Mountain's 1St Battalion generally acquitted
itself well during an otherwise unpleasant operation in Mogadishu, gaining valuable experience in
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.23 1 However, the unit's lack of adequate armor
protection became apparent even against such a primitive foe as the Somali warlords, and a
mechanized unit needed to be brought in to support the LID force. The eventual failure of UN
forces in Somalia produced a public and political backlash within the United States against
participation in United Nations-led peace support operations. Nonetheless, from September 1994
through January 1995, the 10th Mountain again participated in peacekeeping operations this time in
Haiti following the restoration of Jean Claude Devalier to power. Elements of the 25th ID(L) then
rotated in to Haiti from January through June 1995, in that division's first major deployment.
Unlike Somalia, Haitian brigands appeared to be equipped with little more than small arms and
possessed little will to fight American forces. In such an environment, the light infantry forces were
perfectly suited for carrying out policing and garrisoning duties until a functioning system of order
could be restored on the island. However, as was also true for the 10h Mountain in Somalia, the
March 1994); Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, and Kristin J. Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade of Change:
Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review, MR 1387 (Santa Monica, CA:
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lack of organic transport proved to be a problem.2 32 Elements of the 10th Mountain also were
deployed in peacekeeping roles in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997 and again in 1998 through
2000. Indeed, on the unit's website, the 10th Mountain boasted of being the most deployed Army
division during the 1990s; especially ironic given that this division was only at two-thirds strength.
But, being over-stretched and under-resources was symptomatic of the continuing weak
influence of the non-motorized infantry union within the Army. The percentage of light infantry in
the force structure was reduced from about twenty-two percent during the Cold War 1980s down to
about sixteen percent during the post-Cold War 1990s when the light infantry supposedly
contingency role became much more prominent. While these units saw frequent deployments, most
of Army's design and development efforts during the 1990s continued to focus on creating new and
improved mechanized and armored units capable rapid deployment and with sufficient anti-armor
capabilities: e.g., Force XXI, Army After Next, the Digitized Army, and Future Combat Systems.
CONCLUSION
The LID effort was designed to revitalize the moribund non-mechanized infantry by
enhancing its 61an and, more fundamentally, by emphasizing long-neglected basic foot-mobile
infantry skills. The first years of General Wickham's tenure as Army Chief of Staff were a time of
triumph for the Light Infantry Division and their chief benefactors, the foot-mobile infantry. The
initial success of this initiative, in terms of fielded divisions, contrasts starkly with the failure of the
High Technology Light Division.
In a little more than year and through a series of brilliant bureaucratic tactics, General
Wickham seemingly had been able to firmly embed the Light Infantry Division into the Army's
force structure. By modifying and constricting the service's design process, the LID operational
concept and organization had been created in record time. The conversion of the first active-duty
division to the new design was proceeding apace. Approval had been granted at the highest levels
of the Reagan Administration for one reserve and four active-duty Light Infantry Divisions. As part
of this effort, the Army would increase its active-duty force structure by two new divisions and add
a new National Guard division to its reserve component. Four of the Army eighteen active-duty
divisions now would be Light Infantry Divisions, as would one out of ten National Guard divisions.
All of this had been achieved without increasing the service's end-strength. And politically,
General Wickham had built a powerful base of support for the LID effort.
232 On the Haitian deployment, see Luong, Light Infantry Battalion, 34-37. On problems arising from the lack of
organic transport in light infantry units deployed to peacekeeping operations, see Major John M. Spiszer, The Light
Infantry Company and Tactical Mobility: A Step in Which Direction? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced
Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College (thesis), 1997).
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Within the service, he won the support and active cooperation of the Army's MACOMs.
The service schools and centers with relevant units and functions in the LID had been intensely
involved in its creation. These organizations were now well prepared and motivated to begin
developing the training programs necessary for the LID's success, programs emphasizing basic
foot-mobile infantry skills. Moreover, he was able to create these light infantry divisions without
threatening to divert programs from other more powerful unions within the service. In fact, he was
able, in several cases, to gain support from elements of these unions by promising to make these
infantry units available to NATO-based heavy divisions.
Outside the Army, General Wickham also succeeded in building support among powerful
constituencies. Within OSD, Wickham had been able to side-step criticism of the LID from various
agencies by seeking out powerful patrons at the highest levels of OSD. The Secretary of Defense,
in particular, would prove a staunch supporter throughout his tenure in office, and assure that the
LID program remained a fixture in the Army's budget. In Congress, Wickham was credited with
enhancing the role of the Army's reserve forces and with creating more combat capability without
asking for additional resources. More importantly, he gained powerful congressional supporters for
the LID program by offering up money and local civilian jobs through the manipulation of the
basing decisions for the new LID divisions. Through this process, however, the combat capabilities
of one division were seriously degraded, while the primary mission of the second was dubious at
best. Nonetheless, the support thus achieved helped the LID program sail easily through Congress
its first year, and would provide a temporary buffer against the storms to follow.
General Wickham's goal of establishing light infantry divisions within the Army's force
structure was well underway before his tenure as Army Chief of Staff came to an end. Just as the
creation of these units came to fruition, however, two events took place which would bring about
the first serious opposition within the military to the LID concept: the end of the Reagan-era rise in
defense budgets and the demise of the Cold War. Both developments increased the pressures on
Army force structure, as consequent reductions in the budget led to cuts in active-duty manpower
and, in turn, reductions in the number of divisions the service was able to field. Congressional
pressures to maintain National Guard and Reserve forces lead to further pressures on Army budget.
As a result, the heavy side of the Army scrambled for its share of funds and jealously guarded its
dominant role in the service. The scramble over budgets and missions also would the Marine Corps
to target the Army's light infantry concept as the former began its search for a new mission in the
changing budgetary and security environment. The Marines adopted their own light infantry
program and strongly criticize Army's Light Infantry Divisions. The Corps described itself as U.S.
military's true light infantry force.
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Throughout the 1990s the Army continued to reduce light infantry as a percentage of the
service's overall force structure. And, the focus of the service's development effort went to
examining how the dominant intra-service communities - the armor, mechanized, artillery, and
aviation communities - could best be adapted for an expeditionary force. At the same, the Army
deployed the remaining, and by now greatly reduced, light infantry with ever increasing frequency
as the missions for which foot-mobile light infantry were purportedly designed rose to prominence.
In the end, the Light Infantry Division program looks like a very mixed success. It largely
failed to produce an effective combat organization. It also failed to produce resources for its
primary community, the traditional foot-mobile infantry; indeed, it literally had to deny itself
resources in order to succeed at all. And what success it did have - generating four divisions - was
largely lost as soon as the Cold War ended and the Army began downsizing. Of course, this
happened just as the missions for which these organizations, given their limited capabilities, were
most suited suddenly rose to prominence; leaving the remaining LID forces over-worked and under-
resourced. Nonetheless, at a time when the political position of the foot-mobile infantry had
seemingly reached a nadir within the Army, General Wickham and his compatriots were able to
create four Light Infantry Divisions within the service's limited force structure; generating spaces
and command slots for new generation of light infantry officers; contradicting the theoretical
framework's expected outcome. The case of the LID design suggests that, appearances to the
contrary, the foot-mobile infantry may not be quite as weak a community as earlier proposed. The
case suggests that - although the propositions regarding oligarchic communities appear correct - the
picture of a simple oligarchy needs to be revised, with the internal structure and power relationships
among its members more finely described.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Intra-service politics is an important factor in understanding behavior and outcomes in
military services, particularly during peacetime. The theoretical framework developed in Chapter
One suggests a number of propositions concerning intra-service community politics and its
effects on the parent organization. First, every military service contains a variety of communities
or unions, each focused on specific missions, functions or technologies. These communities
compete with one another to determine the service's dominant culture and missions; and the
distribution of the service's budgets, equipment and personnel. For a service with a strong and
independent central leadership, one capable of acting as an honest broker between communities,
the intra-service politics can have a variety of benefits.
In services where such leadership is absent, however, one of two patterns can develop:
either a single community (or "monarchy") or an oligarchy of communities dominates the
service. As these patterns become established, the service's resources, doctrine, and dominant
roles and missions tend to align with these patterns. Doctrinal developments will reflect the
preference of the dominant unions. Likewise, the distribution of resources - including budgets,
weapons, programs, personnel and combat organizations - will mirror and tend to reinforce the
power of the dominant unions. Consequently, current missions that are best suited to one of the
dominant unions will be performed well (i.e., will have appropriate doctrine, organizations, and
weapons programs), and new missions suited to these unions will be readily adopted.
In such services, communities other than the dominant ones often are not represented in
the service's mainstream culture or primary mission, and receive far less doctrinal attention.
These lesser communities receive far fewer resources and training time as well. As a result,
missions and functions associated with these communities tend to be performed less well by the
parent service. Likewise, new potential missions and programs that fall outside the jurisdiction
of the dominant unions tend to be neglected. The doctrine, technologies or combat
organizational designs associated with these new missions or programs often will either be given
negligible attention or simply fail unless pressure is brought from outside the organization. And,
in those infrequent cases where the lesser communities appear to succeed in getting a new
initiative adopted, the dominant communities generally are able to turn the new effort to their
advantage or else have it implemented in such a way as to have the least adverse impact on
themselves.
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FINDINGS
External Constraints and Internal Army Politics
Several constants external to the Army have helped to shape its internal politics and force
structure over the latter half of the twentieth century. First of all, the Army has been in continual
competition with the other services for missions and budgets; a battle it has oftentimes been ill-
equipped to fight. For example, the Army - large and loosely structured - has found itself
generally at a disadvantage in inter-service competition against the smaller, more tightly
coordinated Marine Corps. Similarly, the Army's greater reliance - compared to the Air Force
and Navy - on manpower rather than technology has adversely affected its chances for success
in the inter-service battle against these services for resources.
A second, and related, set of constants and constraints revolves around the Army's
relationship with its reserve forces. Congress, for example, has often favored the interests and
budgets of the Army NG and Reserves over those of the active-duty Army. Meanwhile, the
active-duty Army developed a reliance on its reserve component for many functions over the
post-World War II - and especially post-Vietnam War - period. These forces, however, were
often unavailable when needed: the active-duty Army usually (and sometimes unfairly) viewed
these forces as ill-prepared for combat missions, while politicians often have proven reluctant to
mobilize these forces during crises. These conflicting impulses have produced stresses and
strains within the Army during both peace and war.
Third, the defense of Western Europe as part of NATO has been the main Army mission
in the post-World War II era. Despite this emphasis, the service has several times been call upon
to deploy or prepare for missions outside of the NATO context. However, since 1947, the Army
has not owned the means for deploying strategically; these assets have been controlled by others
outside the Army's control: i.e., the Air Force and Navy. Consequently, the Army has had to
adopt one of two strategies: forward basing and/or relying on the Air Force or Navy for
transport to the conflict area. Reliance on another service has generated much unease within the
Army over the years, an unease enhanced by the service's emphasis (perhaps at times over-
emphasis) on "rapid" deployment.
Several technological and military developments in the twentieth century have profoundly
affected the U.S. Army's intra-service communities. The mechanization of ground warfare
eliminated the horse-drawn cavalry, while giving rise to a new armor community. The development
of fixed-wing aviation led to the rise of a large, semi-autonomous air corps and then to a fully
independent and separate service. Later developments in rotary-wing aviation led to the rise of a
second aviation community, firmly embedded within the service and closely tied to the ground
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forces (though fears of independence persisted). Both the armor and aviation communities have
risen to membership in the service's ruling oligarchy. At the same time, the introduction of aircraft
and self-propelled ground vehicles served to splinter the once-dominant infantry into four separate
elements: airborne, air assault, mechanized, and foot-mobile infantry. The airborne infantry has
long been accorded a separate, elite status within the service. The air assault forces have largely
become associated with the aviation community. The mechanized infantry, meanwhile, joined with
the armor branch to form a dominant "heavy" union within the oligarchy. Finally, the artillery -
either self-propelled or towed by other vehicles - has remained a dominant community over the
years since World War II. Reflecting their essential roles in the Army's core mission, the aviation
community, the armor-mechanized infantry union, and the artillery have received the bulk of
procurement dollars and doctrinal/design emphasis since at least the end of the Vietnam War.
Aside from the cavalry, the biggest post-World War II loser among the Army communities
has been the traditional foot-mobile infantry union, both in terms of its position in the force structure
and its relative position in the Army's internal political power matrix. Two technological trends
helped undermine its position: the increasing mechanization of warfare, which occurred in armies
world-wide, and, more unique to the U.S. Army, the increasing substitution of firepower for
manpower. The introduction of nuclear weapons to the battlefield, related to the latter technological
trend, also undermined for a time the infantry's fortunes. Moreover, its dominant role in two
unpopular U.S. wars helped to reduce further the popularity of the infantry among politicians and
the public. The traditional foot-mobile infantry was largely a backwater by the early 1980's, by far
the weakest of the Army's combat communities.
Case Study Summaries
The three case studies of division design can be summarized along three dimensions:
force structure, resources, and capability/functionality. The first dimension examines whether
divisions with these designs were actually created and made part of the Army's force structure.
This dimension is important for two reasons: divisions have traditionally been the Army's "coin
of the realm;" and divisions provide command slots and promotion pathways for officers and
their respective branches/communities. The second dimension examines whether the creation of
these divisions resulted in resources (manpower, money, and procurement programs) flowing to
the relevant branches or communities represented in the division. The final dimension examines
how effective the resulting divisions are at performing their respective combat missions.
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Division 86
As expected by the theoretical framework described in Chapter One, the Division 86
design, oriented around the dominant communities within the U.S. Army and its ruling
oligarchy, was the central focus of Army design efforts for nearly eight years. It was, in turn,
one element of a larger program to integrate force design, major procurement programs (the "Big
Five" and other efforts), and doctrine (culminating in the 1983 version of FM 100-5, Operations)
to enable the Army to better fight a high-intensity conflict (primarily on the European continent)
- the primary mission of the service's dominant communities. The design process was entirely
an internal service process undertaken by the service's MACOMs (TRADOC and
AMC/DARCOM) in which intra-service politics normally occurs and, hence, in which the
relative power of the intra-service communities is best demonstrated. The Division 86 design
process - encompassing the oligarchy and their major procurement programs - was a major
undertaking, requiring eight years to complete. The design process involved most of the
institutional Army, either working on the design or developing and procuring the weapons that were
to go into it. The Division 86 design process and its associated studies were at the heart of the
Army's combat development and acquisition efforts during the 1970s and early 1980s.
Once complete, and having received Army-wide input during the design process, Division
86 quickly met with wide acceptance within the service. The new divisions were seen as a
tremendous advance in firepower, mobility and armored protection over their ROAD predecessors.
And the organization was generally judged a successful one in practice: The service's armor and
mechanized infantry divisions successfully implemented the design, although due to budgetary
difficulties in the mid-1980s, on a deferred scheduled. Aside from some minor adjustments, the
design remained essentially unchanged for nearly twenty years. This force design was used in
two highly successful combat operations (Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the first
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom up to the fall of Baghdad) against a large (but admittedly much
less capable) ground army.
In summary, Division 86, supported by the dominant elements of the Army's ruling
oligarchy, can be judged highly successful along all three dimensions. The majority of the
Army's divisions were converted to this design. It consumed the vast bulk of the service's
resources over a twenty-year timeframe. And, the design effort resulted in the development of a
highly capable set of combat divisions.
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High Technology Light Division (HTLD)
The HTLD was clearly outside of the purview of the reigning union oligarchy. Indeed, it
had no natural constituency among the service's communities. It was proposed by the Army
Chief of Staff, General E.C. Meyer, specifically as a counter to the prevailing emphasis on heavy
forces. The HTLD was a top-down initiative, resulting from a "spur of the moment" suggestion
by the Chief of Staff. And, the HTLD was seen as a direct competitor to the dominant
communities for resources. Specifically, the heavy armored/mechanized infantry community feared
that HTLD would compete for funding dollars and priorities with its Big Five and other
modernization programs. As the framework of intra-service politics developed in Chapter One
would suggest, the combination of weak senior Army's and the opposition of the intra-service
oligarchy helped lead to the failure of this design effort.
The program was initially tacked onto to the TRADOC-led Army 86 design effort. After
severally unsatisfactory attempts, General Meyer attempted to remove the process from the
realm of intra-service politics by assigning it to an independent organization - the High
Technology Test Bed (HTTB) affiliated with the 9th Infantry Division. This organization, not
surprisingly given its mission and structure, found itself in frequent conflict with the Army's
MACOMs, in particular TRADOC and AMC/DARCOM. This situation, in turn, merely increased
the opposition to the HTLD among TRADOC, AMC/DARCOM and the service's dominant
communities. As a result, when the 9th Infantry Division and the HTTB had to turn back to these
organizations for help in developing the HTLD design and in procuring the necessary equipment,
obstacles and conflict inevitably arose. Examples of such problems included the 9 th
Infantry/HTTB's friction with AMC/DARCOM over cumbersome materiel development
procedures, and the inability (or unwillingness) of TACOM to establish requirements for key HTLD
vehicles.
The confusion and conflict over requirements, concepts, and missions for the HTLD within
the service led to equal confusion among potential supporters outside the service. It caused, for
example, frequent congressional cutbacks in funding for crucial HTLD weapon systems. No where
is this better illustrated than in the unsuccessful search for an armored gun system.
In short, the HTLD, promoted by the Army Chief of staff alone and with no supporters
among the ruling oligarchy, can be judged a failure along all three dimensions: Only a single
division was ever activated, and that only a pale imitation of the original design. Moreover, at the
first opportunity, the 9 th Motorized Division was sacrificed to the budget reductions of the post-Cold
War era. Second, the Army failed to procure any of the major weapons systems considered crucial
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to the success of the concept. Finally, the division was considered unfit for combat and never
deployed following its transition to the HTLD design.
Light Infantry Division (LID)
The LID program, by contrast with the two previous designs, presents a mixed picture of
success, one consistent with the position of its supporters. The design effort promoted the interest
of the weakest member of the service's combat communities - the traditional, foot-mobile infantry.
Moreover, it too was the "pet project" of a new Army Chief of Staff, General John Wickham.
Nonetheless, the effort did succeed at one level - five light infantry divisions were added to the total
force structure (four in the active-duty component and one in the National Guard), three newly
formed and two modified from existing divisions. In other ways, however, it was far less
successful.
The program's principal sponsor - the Army's senior leadership - found it necessary to
undertake a variety of bureaucratic stratagems for steering the program around internal service
opposition. These tactics, while brilliantly executed and ensuring the program's implementation,
often had perverse effects on the capabilities of the light infantry divisions. First of all, the senior
leadership forced the pace of the design and implementation of the LID, creating the organization
and its operational concept in record time. Within the service, General Wickham won the support
and active cooperation of the Army's MACOMs. The service schools and centers with relevant
units and functions in the LID had been intensely involved in its creation. As a result, these
organizations were now well prepared and motivated to begin developing the training programs
necessary for the LID's success; programs that emphasized basic foot-mobile infantry skills. While
thus outrunning critics, however, the rapid pace set by the Army's senior leadership led to
inadequate analysis and testing of the design.
Besides making the MACOMs and their community representatives key players in the
design process, the senior leadership adopted other efforts to garner internal support from the
service's dominant communities for the program. Unlike the HTLD, General Wickham promised
to create these light infantry divisions without threatening to divert programs or dollars from other
more powerful unions within the service. And, eventually the LID program became a captive of
these dominant communities, focusing much of its efforts on supporting their primary mission - the
defense of Europe - rather than the low-intensity conflicts for which it was originally designed.
Outside the Army, General Wickham also succeeded in building support among powerful
constituencies. Within the Pentagon, he had been able to side-step criticism of the LID from
various agencies by seeking out powerful patrons at the highest levels of OSD. The Secretary of
Defense, in particular, would prove a staunch supporter throughout his tenure in office, and assured
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that the LID program remained a fixture in the Army's budget. In Congress, General Wickham was
credited through the LID program with enhancing the role of the Army's reserve forces and with
creating more combat capability without asking for additional resources. More importantly, he
gained powerful congressional supporters for this program by offering up money and local civilian
jobs through the manipulation of the basing decisions for the new LID divisions. Through this
process, however, the combat capabilities of one of these new divisions were seriously degraded,
while the primary mission of the second was dubious at best. Nonetheless, the support thus
achieved helped the LID program sail easily through Congress its first year, and would provide a
temporary buffer against the storms to follow.
Just as the creation of these units came to fruition, however, two events took place which
would bring about the first serious opposition within the military to the LID concept: the end of the
Reagan-era rise in defense budgets and the demise of the Cold War. Both developments increased
the pressures on Army force structure as consequent reductions in the service's budget led to cuts in
active-duty manpower and, in turn, to reductions in the number of divisions the service was able to
field. The post-Cold War inter-service scramble over budgets and missions would lead the Marine
Corps to target the Army's light infantry concept as the former began its search for a new mission in
the changing budgetary and security environment. The Marines adopted their own light infantry
program and strongly criticized the Army's Light Infantry Divisions. Congressional pressures to
maintain National Guard and Reserve forces led to further pressures on the Army budget.
With the end of the Cold War and the consequent demise of the service's primary mission of
defending Europe, the focus of the Army's attention remained focused on efforts to promote the
interests of the dominant intra-service communities. In so doing, the service shifted most of its
development efforts to examining how these communities - the armor, mechanized infantry,
artillery, and aviation communities - could best be adapted to an expeditionary force role. The
Army's light infantry divisions, by contrast, suffered from cutbacks and neglect. Throughout the
1990s the Army continued to reduce light infantry as a percentage of the service's overall force
structure. At the same time, the new era's prominent missions often called for the capabilities best
represented by these dwindling light forces, and the frequency of their deployment steadily rose.
The two remaining light infantry divisions soon became over-worked and under-resourced.
In summary, the LID program can be judged a mixed success. Owing to a series of
innovative and "near-brilliant" bureaucratic and political strategies employed by the senior Army
leadership, a number of light infantry divisions were created within the service's force structure.
This provided a number of command slots for light infantry officers and greater opportunities for
dismounted infantry training. However, in achieving this success, the divisions received few if any
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resources. The resulting combat capabilities of these divisions, likewise, were judged to be poor.
And, even as demand for these units increased, their resources and capabilities remained low while
their numbers dwindled.
Revised Picture of U.S. Army Oligarchy
Overall the evidence from these three case studies suggest the utility of an explanation based
on intra-service community politics for certain behaviors observed in military services.
Furthermore, they would appear to convey at least a degree of plausibility to the framework
proposed in Chapter One, specifically to that portion relevant to these case studies: i.e., services
with weak central leadership, ruled by a group of two or more intra-service communities. Though
much work remains to be done on this subject, the findings demonstrate that examining intra-
service community politics can provide useful and even crucial insights into the inner workings of
military organizations.
The results of the LID case, however, suggest a revision to the simple picture previously
proposed of a monolithic oligarchy ruling the Army. Instead, a better description might be one of a
multi-tiered oligarchy, with some members (e.g., the light infantry) weaker than others. This picture
is further supported by examining the pattern of branch/community backgrounds of the Army's top
rank and leadership positions, which are indicative of the relative power wielded by the various
branches and communities. The rank of four-star general (also known as "full general" or simply
general) is the highest rank attainable in the peacetime U.S. Army.1 As Table 5 illustrates, over one
half of all four-star promotions have been given to the infantry branch since 1950, and officers
from this branch have retained, at a minimum, a plurality of the promotion slots to four-star
general in each subsequent decade. Moreover, four-star generals with light infantry
backgrounds have been present since the 1970s, with two achieving that rank in the 1970s
(Generals Meyer and Wickham) and four reaching that rank in each of the three subsequent
decades.2 Table 6, which illustrates the backgrounds of some of the Army's top leaders in the
post-Vietnam era, reinforces this point: during a period of time in which the light infantry
SThe ranks of "five-star" and "six-star" generals are either only possible in wartime or are simply honorific titles.
During the period from January 1950 to January 2007, 162 U.S. Army officers were promoted to the four-star rank.
During this period, we were able to determine the branch affiliation for all but one officer.
2 Until the latter part of the 1970s, it is difficult to distinguish within the infantry branch officers with a primarily
"light" infantry background from those with a mechanized or "heavy" background. Actual mechanization of the
infantry did not get underway until the M113 began deploying with the ROAD divisions in the early 1960s. Given
the rates of promotion, it should take upwards of fifteen to twenty years before it is possible to identify general
officers with a career primarily focused on "light" or "heavy" infantry. Even then, many general officers might have
a mixed background with tours and commands in both heavy and light units, especially given the demands and
opportunities of the Vietnam War (a primarily light infantry war). As a result, only a few general officers from the
infantry branch can be clearly identified has having a purely light or mechanized infantry background.
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community appeared to be weakest (i.e., post-1972), two out of ten officers chosen to be Army
Chief of Staff, two out of nineteen officers chosen to be Vice Chief of Staff, and two out of
twelve officers chosen to be commander of TRADOC all had light infantry backgrounds.
Overall, these numbers combined with the LID case study suggests that the light infantry
community never fully left the ranks of the ruling oligarchy, but instead was reduced in influence
within that oligarchy.
A further examination of the community backgrounds of senior officers clearly supports
the notion that the infantry, armor, and artillery are all members of the service's oligarchy: over
ninety percent of the general officers came from one of these three branches since the 1950s.
Moreover, by the 1990s (i.e., when the service's emphasis on the "heavy" forces, begun in the
1970s, should first be reflected at the top general officer level), the number of newly promoted
four-star generals from the armor branch nearly equaled those from the infantry branch. Few
officers from other branches achieved the rank of four-star general, and, when they did so, it was
under unique circumstances or for unique positions. For example, the seven officers from
"logistics" backgrounds (e.g., ordnance, quartermaster, transportation) all were promoted to four-
star rank in order to become commander of AMC, consistent with the notion of this position as
being largely a "technical" one (see Table 7).3
Infantry/ Special
Engineer Armor Light Infantry Artillery "Logistics" Ops Aviation
1950s 1 4 12 5 0 0 0
1960s 3 8 15 10 0 0 0
1970s 1 3 15/2 5 1 0 0
1980s 0 4 18/4 5 2 0 0
1990s 0 10 11/4 3 4 1 0
2000s 0 6 11/4 2 0 0 1
Table 5: Branch Affiliation of Army Four-Star Generals, January 1950-January 2007
3 Of the remaining officers promoted to four-star rank since 1950, five came from the combat engineers; however,
the last of these officers obtained this rank in the early 1970s, all served in World War II; and all had unusual careers
in the army, serving in a variety of positions, commands, and branches throughout their careers. General
Schoomaker, the sole four-star with a special operations background, achieved his fourth star upon becoming
commander of the joint Special Operations Command; he came out of retirement to become Army Chief of Staff
under very unique circumstances.
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Infantry/ Special
Engineer Armor Light Infantry Artillery "Logistics" Ops Aviation
TRADOC
Commander 0 5 4/2 3 0 0 0
AMC
Commander 0 2 2/0 2 6 0 0
VCSA 0 5 8/2 5 0 0 
1
CSA 0 3 5/2 1 0 1 0
Table 6: Branch Affiliation of Senior Army Commanders Since 1972
Infantry/ Special
Engineer Armor Light Infantry Artillery "Logistics" Ops Aviation
TRADOC
Commander 0 5 4/2 3 0 0 0
AMC
Commander 1 2 2/0 3 7 0 0
VCSA 0 7 16/2 9 0 0 1
CSA 0 3 12/2 3 0 1 0
Table 7: Branch Affiliation of Senior Army Commanders Since World War II
These three tables also suggest that the position of the aviation community in the
oligarchy may not be as dominant as originally proposed. Only one officer from the aviation
branch has reached the level of four-star general - General Richard Cody. Moreover, he only
achieved this rank upon becoming Vice Chief of Staff in June 2004. He is also, so far, the only
officer from the aviation branch to command a combat division: the 10 1st Air Assault. It would
seem as if the aviation community has enough power within the oligarchy to obtain resources
and division spaces, but not enough to promote one of their own into the service's top echelon.
A brief review of the history of the aviation branch indicates that this revised picture is probably
true, although the promotion prospects are not as bleak as the numbers would indicate.
Until the creation of the aviation branch in 1983, only warrant officers were assigned
specifically and solely to aviation. Warrant officers - positioned midway between enlisted
personnel and officers - typically are viewed as senior technical experts or managers. In Army
aviation, they were mainly helicopter pilots, but were not allow to command anything more than
their aircraft.4 Unit commands were assigned to commissioned officers drawn from other
branches (oftentimes the infantry), and designated as having an "aviation expertise" (i.e., they
4 For more on warrant officers, see U.S. Congressional Budget Office, The Warrant Officer Ranks: Adding
Flexibility to Military Personnel Management (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, February 2002).
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were trained to fly aircraft).5 One of the arguments made for creating a separate aviation branch
was to provide a separate career and promotion path for aviation officers. The development of
an aviation brigade in the Division '86 design assisted in this effort by expanding the number of
command slots for aviation officers in armored or mechanized infantry divisions from a single
lieutenant colonel (given one aviation battalion per division) to one colonel and four lieutenant
colonels per division. For the first aviation officer to reach four-star rank in 2004 is appropriate
given that a career in aviation for commissioned officers only became possible starting in 1983
and that twenty or more years is typically needed for officers to reach the top echelons of their
service.
At the same time, however, it is doubtful that the aviation community will ever be truly
the equal of the dominant ground force communities within the oligarchy given, for example,
arguments expressed by elements of the senior army leadership against a separate aviation
branch at the time of the formation of that branch - attitudes and concerns that remain relevant to
this day. For example, one widely expressed fear was that the new aviation branch would repeat
the history of the Army Air Corps; at a minimum, ignoring the support of ground forces in the
close battle for independent deep operations and possibly being taken over by the Air Force
altogether. While remaining part of the Army, concerns have been raised that the aviation
community has developed too great a focus on the deep battle. 6 Both to prevent a repetition of
the service's experience with the Army Air Corps and because the Army is ultimately a ground-
based service, the aviation community will remain in the service's oligarchy and successfully
procure resources, but it will likely stay a tier below the armor-mechanized infantry and artillery
communities: not quite separate, but also not quite equal.
Since the latter half of the 1990's, the artillery community may have suffered some loss in
position within the oligarchy as well. Table 5 indicates that only five members of this community
achieved the service's top rank since 1990 versus sixteen armored officers and twenty-two infantry
officers during the same period. Moreover, the artillery branch endured major losses in the
service's modularity program: the change from divisions to brigade combat teams (BCTs) meant a
5 At least one of these officers did achieve four-star rank in the 1970s: General Robert M. Shoemaker.
6 For more on these arguments, see Major Frank W. Tate, Army Aviation as a Branch, Eighteen Years After the
Decision (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General
Staff College (thesis), 2001), 35-38; and Currey, With Wings As Eagles, 202-203. The focus on "deep battle"
occasionally has led to horrific consequences for aviation units, such as in botched attack by the 11th Attack
Helicopter Regiment against the Iraqi Medina Division in March 2003 during the first phase of Operation Iraqi
Freedom; see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra IH: The Inside Story of the Invasion and
Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 260-81.
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loss of one brigade-sized artillery unit per division within the Army's force structure and their
replacement with a battalion-sized artillery unit per BCT. And the artillery battalion went from
three batteries of artillery per battalion down to two batteries, resulting in a substantial loss in
artillery assets in the service's combat units. An interesting question for further research would be
why the artillery - which had been a key combat element of the Army throughout most of the
twentieth century - had suddenly been reduced throughout the service's force structure. Possible
reasons might include greater effort and coordination by the Air Force in providing ground support
to the Army, new "aerial artillery" assets with the rise of the Army's own aviation community, and
the greater precision in delivery means available to air-delivered ordnance to date relative to
artillery munitions (particularly important as the U.S. military seeks to reduce collateral damage).
However, the artillery community's future is far from bleak: to compensate for the loss of artillery
brigade command slots, artillery colonels are being offered the opportunity to command BCTs; the
service is funding research and development on high-precision artillery munitions; and new artillery
systems are under development. Finally, a key war-fighting element of the Army's new Future
Objective Force program is the delivery of long-range fires, clearly the role of the artillery
community.
The revised picture of the intra-service politics of the Army then is as follows: a weak
central leadership combined with an oligarchy of combat communities (armor-mechanized infantry,
artillery, aviation, and foot-mobile infantry) that dominate the remainder of the service. Within this
oligarchy, the combined armor-mechanized community is the strongest player, while the artillery
branch suffered some losses during the early part of the twenty-first century. The aviation
community has a lot power, but will remain a secondary player. The foot-mobile infantry, at least
for the moment, occupies the weakest position within the oligarchy and has been in that position
since the end of the Vietnam War.
This section concludes with several additional observations. First, changing or expanding
the membership of a ruling community oligarchy can be difficult and time-consuming. As
illustrated by the foot-mobile infantry, once a community achieves membership in the oligarchy, it
tends to retain that membership even through many losses in the intra-service wars; once in the
oligarchy, a community rarely leaves. It also can be very difficult, however, to break into the
oligarchy. Success in wartime is one way that a new community can enter into the ruling oligarchy;
7 Even vestiges of the cavalry remained in oligarchy long after the horse had been removed from the service in the
form of the armored branch's armored cavalry units. Since 1950, the role of armored cavalry regiment has been to
perform the traditional horse cavalry "security and reconnaissance missions"; see Hofmann, Through Mobility We
Conquer, 456.
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two prime examples of this success in the U.S. Army are the armored community in World War II
and the aviation community during the Vietnam War. But in peacetime, as Stephen Peter Rosen has
pointed out, changing the structure of a service's internal politics - i.e., changing the distribution of
power among a service's communities - is primarily an internal service affair. It involves, at heart,
the development and maintenance of promotion paths within a service, which in turn determines
who writes doctrine, who defines appropriate missions, and who determines distribution of
resources within the service.8 And, it is the senior leadership within the service that determines
these promotion paths. In the absence of strong, independent central leadership, these decisions are
made by the heads of the ruling communities, making it very difficult to bring about change.
Of the three patterns of intra-service politics described in Chapter One, monarchical
community control may be the most detrimental as it leads to the narrowest focus of the three
patterns. Alternatively, a strong central leadership independent of community biases may be the
best pattern, though it too has some drawbacks. A service ruled by two or more communities lies
somewhere in between. Given this, among future research questions might be the following: In the
case of monarchical community control, how can the grip of the dominant community be broken;
allowing, at a minimum, for the rise of several co-equal communities within the service? In the case
of strong central leadership, what, if any, the additional drawbacks or dangers exist beyond those
already described? And, how can a strong independent central leadership be established within a
service while maintaining the benefits of competing communities and without threatening civilian
control? Finally, what means, if any, are available to outsiders to influence internal service politics?
OBSERVATIONS ON U.S. ARMY POLITICS
Politics within the U.S. Army is complex, multi-layered, and multi-faceted; so too is the
politics among the Army and the other services. The case studies found in the previous chapters
focused primarily on the division design process and the "heavy vs. light" split within the Army,
but there are a variety of other ways to examine politics, competition, and communities within
the Army. For example, there is the jockeying for funds, programs, promotions, and prestige
amongst the communities that make up the service's oligarchy. A similar competition goes on
between the Army's combat arms and the various non-combat, or supporting, arms, with the
latter nearly always limited to a subordinate role. The Army's active-duty component and the
National Guard likewise compete for funding, equipment and manpower; a competition which
often spills over into the congressional arena. And, the Army competes for funds, manpower,
and missions with the Air Force and Navy. Finally, the U.S. military's largest ground army
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8 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 19-21.
competes for funds, programs, prestige and missions with the military's other ground forces - the
United States Marine Corps and the special operations community. This latter community
includes special operations elements from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps as well as
units ostensibly tied to the Army, such as Special Forces Operational Detachment-D (Delta
Force) and the Green Beret.
To conclude this work, we will summarize and bring up to date the Army's preparations
for various types of warfare, and its inability to achieve a balanced set of capabilities in the post-
Vietnam War era. Specifically, we will contrast the service's development of conventional high-
intensity combat capabilities on the one hand and its development (or lack thereof) of similar
capabilities for waging counterinsurgency warfare on the other. In short, we will examine how
the Army came to possess such a powerful capability for conventional war that it could swiftly
and easily defeat the conventional military of a mid-size regional power during the opening
phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and yet find itself so ill-prepared to wage the
counterinsurgency war that followed. In so doing, we hope to illustrate further some of the
community politics that swirls in and around the Army.
The Army's Special Operations Community
Before proceeding, we need to describe the role of one Army community that has been
neglected in this study so far, but is central to any discussion of counterinsurgency: the Army's
special operations community. While organizationally part of the Army, these special operations
forces (SOF) are seen by those in the service as outside and apart from the regular Army.
Several factors set the Special Forces apart from their regular Army counterparts.
Like similar units in the other services, Army SOF organizations have a history that is
distinct from and of more recent origin compared to their parent organization. The Special
Forces (Green Beret) trace their lineage back only to World War II and the clandestine Office of
Strategic Services. They were officially formed in 1952 to act as a covert guerrilla organization
operating behind Soviet lines in the event of war, only later acquiring a counterinsurgency role.
Delta Force (and possibly other classified units) was formed only after the Iranian seizure of the
U.S. embassy in 1979, and have had a distinctive counter-terrorist focus. 9
9 For more on the history of the Army Special Forces, see Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding
U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997), 8-20; Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.,
US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982); and Col.
Francis J. Kelly, Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office for the Department of the Army), 3-74.
291
SOF units also fight in a unique fashion. While the regular Army is designed to fight
conventional wars, these units are specifically designed to engage in unconventional warfare.
Employed in small teams, oftentimes in secret, these units operate either "behind the scenes" in
times of peace or "behind enemy lines" in times of war. In contrast with the regular military,
special operations forces tend to reward unconventional thinking, be less-hierarchically
organized, and often appear to their regular Army brethren as less disciplined. They often
operate independent of other forces, which also can contribute to a perception among the regular
Army that they constitute rogue elements within the military.
SOF troops, though drawn from their parent service, are chosen after a very rigorous
screening process, and consider themselves members of highly elite organizations within the
Army. And once chosen to join a SOF organization, members rarely return to the regular Army.
With one notable exception, SOF officers never rise to their service's top ranks. Army Chief of
Staff Peter Schoomaker is the exception, having spent the bulk of his career in special operations
community; aside from a stint as Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division late
in his career, his highest command of a regular Army unit was as Cavalry Troop commander (the
equivalent of a company commander). 10 However, his August 2003 appointment as Chief of
Staff - out of retirement no less - by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was seen by
many in the Army as a collective slap in the face to the service, especially following Rumsfeld's
ill-treatment of the previous Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki. 11
Overall, members of the Army's SOF community tend to have more in common with
their special operations brethren drawn from the other services, who also generally find
themselves to be unique and separate communities within their parent organizations, than they do
with the regular Army. Indeed, with exception of the Army's Rangers, the special operations
units from across all the four services can be seen as a community distinct from any other
organization or service within the U.S. military. This distinct special operations community was
made official with the creation of the Special Operations Command in the mid-1980s, which put
all of these units under one command.
10 The only other Army officer with a SOF background to serve at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level was General Hugh
Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from 1997 to 2001. But, while General Shelton did serve a tour of duty in
Vietnam as a member of the 5 th Special Forces Group and headed the U.S. Special Operations Command, the vast
bulk of his career was served in regular Army: returning to Vietnam as an officer in the 17 3d Airborne Brigade, and
with subsequent assignments in the 9" Infantry Division, the 8 2d Airborne Division (including as division
commander), and the 10 1"t Assault Division, before becoming commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps.
" Peter J. Boyer, "Downfall," The New Yorker, 20 November 2006; available on-line at http://www.newyorker.
com/archive/2006/11/20/061120fa fact (accessed March 2007).
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By contrast, the U.S. Army Rangers, while also an elite organization and (like Army
SOF) part of the United States Army Special Operations Command, are embraced by the regular
Army. The Rangers have a long history and one closely associated with their parent service.
They trace their lineage back to colonial America, with Ranger-like units having fought in both
King Phillips War and the French and Indian War.12 Two Ranger units (the Corps of Rangers
and Marion's Partisans) famously fought in the American Revolution, elements of the United
States Rangers fought in the War of 1812, and Ranger battalions fought in all the major theaters
of World War II. The Ranger School and the headquarters of the 7 5th Ranger Regiment are both
located at Fort Benning, GA, home of the Army's Infantry School and regarded Army-wide as
the heart and home of the infantry.13 Many infantry officers undergo Ranger training and
proudly wear their Ranger badge, even if they do not actually serve in a Ranger unit (Ranger
training was a early requirement for officers serving in LID units). Commissioned and non-
commissioned officers frequently rotate from Ranger units to infantry units and back again, and
often rise high in the service's leadership. Finally, unlike the other special operations units, the
Rangers rarely participate in operations independent of regular Army units; their motto "Rangers
lead the way!" indicate that they (unlike the SOF) see themselves as the lead element of the
larger Army organization.
Even within the small SOF community, however, a divide exists between those forces
engaged in more combat-oriented direct action missions (so-called "kinetic" missions) and those
involved in advisory or support roles. The Army's Delta Force, certain Air Force special
operations units, Navy SEAL teams, and many elements of the Marine Corps special operations
forces are part of the "kinetic" community; the Army Green Beret, with their traditional focus on
counterinsurgency, training and advisory roles, are members of the "non-kinetic" SOF sub-
community.
Conventional Warfare vs. Counterinsurgency Warfare
We now turn to a brief summary of the contrasting fortunes of high-intensity
conventional warfare and lower-intensity counterinsurgency warfare in the post-Vietnam U.S.
Army. Their respective fortunes have been dependent, in part, on several fundamental
characteristics of the two forms of warfare, which provide conventional forms of warfare an
12 The Ranger commander during the French and Indian War, Major Robert Rogers wrote the nineteen "standing
orders" still in use by the Rangers.
13 Another, distinctly twenty-first century, indication of the close association of the Rangers with the regular Army:
unlike the U.S. Army Special Forces website, the 7 5 th Ranger Regiment website can be accessed via the U.S. Army
Infantry Homepage, available at https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/ (accessed March 2007).
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advantage over counterinsurgency operations in the U.S. military. First, counterinsurgency
warfare tends to be a low-technology type of warfare. While technology can enhance the
soldier's capability for fighting this type of war, it can rarely substitute for manpower.
Moreover, the technologies that are relevant to counterinsurgency - e.g., intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies, telecommunications, body armor - do not tend to
be expensive "big-ticket" items. As a result, counterinsurgency warfare, in contrast to
conventional armored warfare, does not have a powerful industrial base in the United States
willing to lobby for its requisite capabilities in the corridors of government. Second, Congress
and the American people tend to be more averse towards U.S. involvement in
counterinsurgency-type wars than conventional ones, and thus prove less willing to support the
development of counterinsurgency capabilities.14 But a closer look at the intra-service politics
reveals additional reasons why counterinsurgency and other forms of low-intensity conflict have
remained niche missions within the U.S. Army, despite changing strategic contexts which might
favor the wider adoption of such missions by the service.
Vietnam and After
Counterinsurgency warfare first became a subject of intense interest within the U.S.
national security establishment in the early 1960s, driven by the Kennedy Administration's
concern with defeating communist wars of national liberation. It became identified at that time
with the Army's Special Forces, but was not widely embraced by the regular Army. The Special
Force's role, however, would prove to be limited to training and advising third countries in
counterinsurgency; they never would be large enough to engage in a sustained counterinsurgency
campaign of their own. Throughout the first five years of the war in Vietnam, the Army largely
rejected applying counterinsurgency tactics, relying instead on large-scale, conventional search-
and-destroy missions. The Marines, relying on their tradition of fighting small wars, did attempt
to employ some counterinsurgency tactics, but these efforts were discouraged and disparaged by
the regular Army and the military headquarters in Vietnam for much of the war. It was only in
the war's later years (following the departure of General Westmoreland) that the regular Army
14 Among the reasons observers cite for the greater U.S. public's aversion are the politically "messier" nature of
counterinsurgency warfare, the fact that such wars require a longer-term commitment coupled with more limited war
aims, and the fact that such wars are rarely fought for vital U.S. national interests. For one of the most recent
discussions of American dislike for counterinsurgency warfare, see Jeffrey Record, The American Wary of War:
Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency, Policy Analysis No. 577 (Washington, DC: The CATO
Institute, 1 September 2006).
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began to employ some counterinsurgency tactics, specifically "clear and hold" operations, with
any degree of success.5
As we have seen, however, once the U.S. completed its withdrawal of ground forces from
Vietnam, the regular Army and its newly dominant oligarchy abandoned further involvement in
counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency tactics rely heavily on dismounted soldiers,
and usually large numbers of such troops; providing local security and gathering intelligence,
two vital aspects of counterinsurgency, are best provided by dismounted patrols. Armored and
mechanized forces have little role to play in this type of fight. In short, the counterinsurgency
fight is primarily a light infantry battle, and consequently one that has run counter to the Army's
ruling oligarchy in the post-Vietnam War era.
Instead, from the end of the Vietnam War to the end of the Cold War, the Army focused
its attention and the bulk of its efforts towards developing the capabilities for fighting large-scale
conventional armored warfare. And, for most of this period that focus was on bringing these
forces to fight on the plains of Central Europe. National policy did eventually force the Army to
expand its sights to include the Persian Gulf region, but here too the fighting was conceived as
one involving massed armored forces. The other constant during this period was the limitation
on Army manpower and funding. Nearly all of the Army's internal and external politics
revolved around the issue of providing sufficient armored forces capable of engaging in high-
intensity combat in Central Europe given constrained personnel and financial resources. The
Total Army policy, for example, was conceived in large measure as a means for generating
combat power from the manpower-constrained active-duty component while retaining the
necessary combat support functions in the wider Army.'16 This policy, however, led to
complaints by members of the affected support communities that they lacked sufficient
representation in the active-duty component, and essentially were being sacrificed by the
dominant communities of the service's oligarchy (all members of the combat arms). Relations
between the Army National Guard and the active-duty Army too centered for much of period
around the question of what role the Guard would play in a high-intensity European conflict, and
how capable and prepared it should be for such a fight. Likewise, much of the Army's relations
with the Marines during this period centered around the latter's pursuit of a greater armored
warfare capability in order to better perform its missions, first in support of the Army on the
flanks of Europe and later in competition with the Army in the Persian Gulf region. As a result,
15 See Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in
Vietnam (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, Inc. 1999).
16 As point out in Chapter Three, the policy was also designed to prevent the repetition of the Vietnam-era absence
of large-scale reserve mobilization during a major military deployment.
295
for example, once its Big Five programs moved from development to acquisition, the Army
regularly found itself fighting off attempts - some successful and some not - by the Army
National Guard and the Marine Corps to garner more of these weapon systems for themselves.
While the Marines' efforts to acquire more Big Five equipment were occasionally welcomed (if
they brought their own funds to the table), the National Guard's efforts and funds always came at
the expense of the Army's active-duty component. Many of these battles between the active-duty
Army, Army National Guard, and Marines ended up being fought and decided in Congress -
often at the expense of the Army' active-duty component.
For most of this period, counterinsurgency warfare was given low priority in the Army,
when it was not ignored altogether. Until the formation of the Light Infantry Divisions, Army
planners seemed determined to eliminate from the service's force structure the very units best
able to carry out the counterinsurgency role: i.e., non-mechanized infantry. While a few Army
officers persisted in studying the subject, most received only a few hours of cursory instruction
in counterinsurgency within the service's school system. Even the Army's Total Force policy
reduced the service's ability to perform this mission: the transfer of many non-combat, support
functions to the Army Reserves included many functions vital to counterinsurgency operations,
such as civil affairs and psychological operations. But, the political leadership was unlikely to
activate the reserves for counterinsurgency-type conflicts.
Indeed, the capability for counterinsurgency warfare nearly disappeared from the active-
duty regular Army until increased communist activities in Latin America, beginning in the late
1970s, led to a renewed interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare at the top reaches
of the national security establishment. The Reagan Administration's more aggressive stance in
confronting Communism worldwide in the early 1980's led to further interest in combating local
communist insurgencies as well as fomenting insurgencies against established communist
governments. This, in turn, led a small number of Army officers and outside defense analysts to
examine the concepts associated with Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), including counterinsurgency
operations. 17 But the Army had a difficult time designing forces (like the Light Infantry
Divisions) to meet LIC missions given the absence of a detailed description of these missions
and their requirements in Army documents. And, while this renewed interest led the Army to
issue a new counterinsurgency field manual (along with several other LIC-related publications),
this document was largely a rehash of the service's Vietnam-era 1960's manual.
17 Among the civilian defense analysts addressing Low Intensity Conflict at this time were Edward Luttwak and
Robert Kupperman.
296
For the most of the post-Vietnam era, the Army relegated the counterinsurgency mission
to the Special Forces, which - due to their small size - remained limited to training and advisory
roles. Indeed, the Army greatly reduced the Special Forces in the immediate aftermath of the
Vietnam War. It required substantial pressure from outside the service - both by the Reagan
Administration and members of Congress - for the Army to expand its Special Forces
community and create the U.S. Army Special Operations Command in the mid-1980s. It was at
this time as well that the Army was forced to place its beloved Rangers within this command
organization.
In summary, by the end of the end of the Cold War, the active-duty Army and its
dominant oligarchy had achieved considerable success in terms of equipment, unit design and
doctrine for fighting large-scale conventional warfare. Meanwhile, counterinsurgency operations
were limited to the SOF community and a small niche of light infantry officers within the regular
Army.
Post-Cold War
The first Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm, would prove to be the high-water mark for
the Army's intra-service oligarchy and its preferred form of warfare. After nearly twenty years
of preparation for such a conflict (though against a much less capable opponent than what it was
originally designed to fight), the U.S. Army executed a near-perfect conventional massed
armored operation against the Iraqi army. And, it was able to achieve this victory while
relegating the Marines to a largely subsidiary supporting role and preventing the Army National
Guard's combat divisions from leaving the states; truly a total victory for the Army's intra-
service community oligarchy. Afterwards, however, the Army finally would have to confront
the issues arising from the end of Cold War and the removal of the service's core mission -
large-scale armored warfare on the plains of Central Europe.
As a result, following Operation Desert Storm, the Army was faced with an immediate
issue - how to reduce its force structure in the face of rapidly declining budgets. 1 In
accomplishing this task, the active-duty Army fought with the National Guard and Army Reserve
to achieve large reductions in the Reserve Component force structure, while maintaining
maximum combat capability in the active-duty force. Yet, cuts were also needed in the active-
duty forces; the Army's intra-service oligarchy succeeded in achieving these reductions while
simultaneously maximizing retention of its armored and mechanized forces.
18 Indeed reductions in force structure had become even before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and for a time in the fall
of 1990, the Army found itself in the awkward position of trying to cut its forces while building up forces in the
Persian Gulf.
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However, from the end of the first Gulf War to the start of the second (Operation Iraqi
Freedom), the Army and its oligarchy confronted a second, longer term issue: ensuring that the
service's dominant communities retained their dominance and relevance in the post-Cold War
era. Specifically, once the Army could no longer count on pre-positioning its heavy forces near
the expected main battlefield (i.e., Central Europe), it now had to determine how to turn its heavy
armored forces into a lighter expeditionary force to ensure that it could reach the service's new
battlefields in a timely fashion.
In the post-Cold War inter-service battles, the Marine Corps struck first as defense
budgets began their decline in the late 1980s, with its leadership proclaiming that they were the
military's true "light infantry" force in contrast to the Army's Potemkin-like LIDs. Moreover,
they argued that their shipboard deployments worldwide already prepared them to quickly
response to any contingency outside of Europe. By the early 1990s, the Marines had combined
with the Navy to produce the "Assault from the Sea" doctrine and an accompanying host of new
acquisition programs. In essence, with the end of the Cold War, the Marines fell back on their
two traditional combat missions: amphibious warfare (with their raiding-like "Assault from the
Sea" concept) and small wars (every Marine's a rifleman capable of performing LIC missions).
The Army leadership responded that the Marines had no combat role to play inland,
especially over extended periods of time, and therefore should not intrude on Army missions.
Meanwhile, they focused on transforming the service's heavy divisions into an expeditionary force
with a series of experimental and development programs. These efforts included Force XXI, a set
of digitization experiments conducted at Fort Hood Texas with the 4th Infantry (Mechanized)
Division, and the "Army After Next" project. All these programs were directed at developing a
lighter, more strategically mobile force with essentially the same combat power as the armor and
mechanized divisions of Division 86 - consistent with the continued dominance of the armor,
mechanized infantry, field artillery and aviation communities. Ironically, with their focus on
networking computers, telecommunications, and reconnaissance assets to enhance the survivability
of the force and substitute tactical speed and maneuverability for heavy armoring, all of these
programs represented a return to the old High Technology Light Division concept. As of the first
decade of the twenty-first century, the only tangible result of these efforts had been the deployment
of the medium-weight Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. These brigades were built around the
Stryker vehicle - basically a heavily digitized version of the Marine Corps wheeled LAV,
surrounded by add-on metal apron to protect against rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).
The latest incarnation of the Army trend towards lightening its heavy forces is the Future
Combat Systems (FCS) program and the Future Objective Force. FCS includes aviation assets,
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tank-like vehicles, infantry combat vehicles, and a number of artillery systems organized into a new
type of Brigade Combat Team. In theory, the greater strategic mobility of this force will be
achieved by replacing heavy armor with tactical mobility and networking these vehicles together
with long-range fire delivery systems and a wide array of sensors in order to achieve information
dominance on the battlefield - largely negating the need for close-in engagements. But again, the
battlefield envisioned is the same as before the end of the Cold War - a mid-to-high intensity
conventional conflict against a large armored ground force - only the location and enemy have
changed. As befits the service's premier weapons program for the future, it has been described as
"represent[ing] by far the biggest single investment that the Army is planning to make for the next
twenty years."'19 For example, it consumed well over half of the Army's Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation account in fiscal year 2006, nearly one-third of that budget in fiscal year 2007,
and a similar percentage of the research budget in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009. 20 Though
the program underwent some restructuring in Army's fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 budgets,
a brigade's worth of equipment was scheduled to be purchased annually starting in fiscal year 2015
and continuing for fifteen years thereafter, at an average cost of approximately $5 billion per
brigade.2 1 If Army procurement budgets remained flat after 2011, the General Accountability
Office (GAO) estimated that FCS procurement would consume sixty to seventy percent of the
service's procurement budget for at least eight years beginning in 2014.22
However, despite annual criticism from Congress, GAO, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) and others, and despite the Army's deep budgetary woes due continuing operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan, funding for the FCS program rarely, if ever, suffered a set-back in funding. In
part, the program maintains its support due to the strong industrial base backing it. Up through
19 J. Michael Gilmore, The Army's Future Combat Systems Program, CBO Testimony before the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, DC:
Congressional Budget Office, 4 April 2006), 5.
20 Association of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2006 Army Budget: An Analysis (Arlington, VA: Association
of the United States Army, 1985), 74-77; and U.S. Department of the Army, "The Army Budget - Fiscal Years (FY)
2008 and 2009," (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Public Affairs, 5 February 2007), 8.
21 In 2006, CBO estimated a cost per brigade of $6.7 billion when the Army planned on purchased 1.5 brigades per
year. The Army's move the following year to reduce the procurement to 1 brigade per year, while stretching the
procurement out five additional years, was expected to reduce unit cost somewhat. See Gilmore, Army's Future
Combat Systems Program, 5; and Daniel G. Dupont, "Army Proposes Major Weapons Cuts," InsideDefense.com
Newstand, 7 December 2006, available at http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,120100,00.html (accessed
March 2007).
22 And some portion of that remaining budget would need to go for spin-outs from FCS, the procurement of FCS
complementary programs; see Paul L. Francis, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Business Case Key for Future Combat
System's Success, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, GAO-06-564T (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, 4 April 2006),
15.
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2007, the FCS program was led by the team of Boeing and Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC) as lead system integrators, who in turn have awarded subcontracts for major
components of FCS throughout the leading names of the defense industry: General Dynamics,
United Defense, Raytheon, Northrop-Grumman, BAE Systems, Textron, Honeywell, Computer
Sciences Corporation, and Lockheed Martin.2 3
Most elements of the Army, meanwhile, showed little interest in counterinsurgency and
other LIC-type warfare following the end of Cold War, even as the service found itself deploying to
more and more such missions throughout the 1990s. With operations ranging from Somalia to Haiti
to Bosnia and Kosovo, the Clinton Administration made frequent use of the Army in small-scale
and humanitarian operations: stability operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Forced to
confront these operations, the Army, again led by a small cadre of interested officers, eventually
came up with a new term for such operations - Operations Other Than War (OOTW) - which
included attacks and raids, noncombatant evacuation operations, combating terrorism, support to
other nations' counterinsurgency efforts, peace operations, and disaster relief and humanitarian
assistance. Nonetheless, the service struggled throughout the 1990s to develop and write a coherent
doctrine on OOTW into its operations manuals. The Army doctrine writers also recognized that
stability operations, known as Phase IV operations, would be the responsibility of the military
following the completion of regular conventional combat operations, and a basic description of such
operations did make it into the services 2001 Operations manual. But beyond this concept
development, little more was accomplished.
For most officers, such deployments were a distraction from the Army's main task of
preparing for high-intensity armored warfare. Moreover, the service had long taken the view that
any unit prepared for the most intense combat could easily perform these "lesser" missions. Finally,
it should have been obvious to any politically aware officer at the close of the Clinton
Administration era that such missions would persist only until a new political party took over the
White House - these types of operations were widely decried by Republican Party politicians.
Indeed, George W. Bush specifically campaigned for the presidency in 2000 against using the
military in these derisively-termed "nation-building" efforts. Hoping to be rid of such missions, the
Army looked forward to the new Bush Administration. 24
Up until several years into Operation Iraqi Freedom, counterinsurgency remained a niche
mission within the Army, relegated to the Army's SOF community and to a small group of officers
23 David R. Graham and others, IDA Review of FCS Management, Volume I: Main Text, IDA Paper P-3929
(Alexandria, VA: The Institute for Defense Analyses, August 2004), 3.
24 Boyer, "Downfall."
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within the regular Army. Even though counterinsurgency (or Foreign Internal Defense) was
included in the OOTW concept, the emphasis was on supporting other countries' militaries as they
battled insurgents, not on U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency operations on their own;
essentially, the OOTW counterinsurgency mission fell into the Army Special Forces' training and
advisory role. Most of the Army's light infantry officers were consumed with carrying out the
Clinton-era humanitarian/nation-building missions, considered nuisance roles by many Army
officers.
And, in contrast to more conventional warfare capabilities, R&D and procurement programs
for the principle tool of counterinsurgency warfare - the dismounted soldier - faired poorly in the
post-Cold War period. While several programs designed to enhance the capabilities of the
individual combatant were begun in the 1990s (including the Single Integrated Protective Ensemble
(SIPE), the 21st Century Land Warrior (21CLW) and finally simply Land Warrior), each had a low
priority in terms of the Army's overall R&D efforts, each was severely under-funded, and some
(specifically Land Warrior) were seriously mismanaged. A similar trend can be seen in the
individual soldier program designed to work alongside the vehicle-focused FCS program: the
Future Force Warrior. Begun several years after FCS, Future Force Warrior sputtered fitfully along,
until its absorption into the Land Warrior program. As a result of these problems, by the end of the
twentieth century and into the beginning of the twenty-first, the dismounted infantryman carried
essentially the same equipment as did his counterpart in Vietnam forty years before (with the
notable recent exceptions of improved body armor and intra-squad radios).
Even within the small SOF community, the Green Beret were losing influencing, further
reducing the priority of counterinsurgency warfare. As terrorism became an issue of concern within
the national security establishment through the 1990s, the Special Forces began to lose funding and
prestige to the direct action ,or "kinetic," units within the special operations community. This trend
accelerated after 11 September 2001, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld assigned the
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to be the principal command with responsibility for
combating terrorism globally.25
The state of counterinsurgency in the Army shortly after the turn of the century may best be
illustrated by looking at the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Academy set up by the Army in Iraq.
Established in late 2005, nearly two and half years after the occupation of Iraq began, the goal of the
school was to provide some training in counterinsurgency operations to officers because, as the
25 The under-utilization of the Special Forces training capabilities became an issue during the two years of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, as the U.S. (relying mostly on private contractors) failed to train a new Iraqi Army; see James
Fallows, "Why Iraq Has No Army," The Atlantic Monthly, December 2005, 67-68.
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course summary put it, of "the need for U.S. forces to shift from a conventional warfare
mindset."26 Such a course had to be given after officers and their units were already deployed in-
theater to Iraq due to the absence of such instruction at home. Moreover, most of the instructors
were retired military because as one contractor explained it: "The old [counterinsurgency]
doctrine died out, along with the lessons of East Africa, Vietnam and Bolivia and now they need
people with this kind of memory who are retired and know from experience." 27
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Operation Iraqi Freedom exposed both the strengths and the weaknesses of the U.S. Army.
The Army proved once again, as it had during Operation Desert Storm, that it had no rival when it
comes to conducting high-intensity conventional combat; it swiftly overthrew the Saddam's regime
while suffering relatively few casualties. The Army's intra-service community oligarchy had done
its job well in preparing and equipping the Army for this type of warfare. Ironically, it may have
done its job too well - driving competitors away from engaging the U.S. in conventional warfare,
where it excels, and towards unconventional or asymmetric warfare where, as suggested by the
operations in Iraq up through the end of 2006, the U.S. Army is woefully lacking. The Army was
completely unprepared for the looting and instability which followed Saddam's fall, and, up to the
end of 2006, had been unable to contain, let alone halt, the subsequent insurgency and terrorism.
Under the external pressures of war, the Army has made adjustments. First, forced to fight
extended wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan without sufficient force structure the Army moved to a
brigade-focused modular design, which increased the number of brigades in the active-duty and
reserve force, and allowed for the independent deployment of these brigades. 28 On paper at least,
these brigades had more capability than their predecessors and returned tasks to active-duty forces
considered vital to counterinsurgency operations, including intelligence, civil affairs, military policy
and psychological operations. Despite this and similar moves to improve the Army's ability to
deploy forces, however, the service has been strained to near the breaking point by the dual
deployments. 29 To make up for the shortfalls, the Army has had to rely far too much on National
26 For more on the COIN Academy, see Jim Garamone, "Taji Center Stresses Counterinsurgency Mission,"
American Forces Press Service News Articles, 22 May 2006; available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id= 15701 (accessed March 2007).
27 Retired Army Colonel Patrick Lang quoted in Walter Pincus, "Security Contracts to Continue in Iraq,"
Washington Post, 4 February 2007, 19.
28 This move towards emphasizing brigades over divisions was actually an acceleration of the move towards
brigade-focused operations under FCS. Ultimately, the Army plans on having forty-eight Brigade Combat Teams
(BCTs) in the Active Component and twenty-eight BCTs in the reserves.
29 According to the service's new deployment plan, active brigades are to spend two years at home for each year
they are deployed overseas. However, because of the demands of Iraq and Afghan these brigades typically spend
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Guard units, activating many of these units for deployments of up to eighteen months. This led to
complaints from the Guard leadership and many Guard members that it was being over-stretched,
while its units were being sent into theater ill-equipped for the dangers of combat.
The Army also finally began to emphasize counterinsurgency operations, two-and-half to
three years after the occupation of Iraq got underway. For example, beginning in 2006
counterinsurgency and stability operations training at the Joint Combat Training Centers (CTCs)
became part of the standard pre-deployment training for all units heading to Iraq. 30 By the fall of
2006, nearly half the curriculum at the Army War College was focused on insurgency and
counterinsurgency. And in late 2006, the Army and Marine Corps released their first revised
counterinsurgency field manual in over twenty years, an effort completed in a little more than a year
and authored principally by officers with recent experience in Iraq.31 Many of these changes can be
traced to the efforts of General David Petraeus, in his role as commander of the Combined Arms
Center, and to the (yet again) small cadre of officers with counterinsurgency expertise that he
assembled around him.32 According to one of the counterinsurgency manual's authors, the Army's
new emphasis on COIN "is a struggle for the soul of the Army. A lot of work needs to be done to
change the mind-set of the force....We are trying to shift the culture of the force and balance it
better."33
The Future of Army Politics
Finally, what are the implications of these trends for the future of the Army's internal
politics? Will the present internal political structure - a weak central authority and a multi-tiered
oligarchy consisting of the "heavy community" (armor and mechanized infantry) on top,
only one year at home for each year they are deployed. Michael R. Gordon, "Breakpoint?: Iraq and America's
Military Forces," Survival 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006-07): 77.
30 The CTC's include the National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).
31 In an unusual twist, however, a large number of journalists, outside defense experts, and academics were asked to
comment on the draft manual; Sarah Sewall, "Modernizing U.S. Counterinsurgency Practice: Rethinking Risk and
Developing a National Strategy," Military Review 86, no. 5 (September/October 2006): 103.
32 For more on these and other changes to the Army during 2005/2006, including the creation of a 4-person Army-
Marine Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, see Joel Mathis, "Counterinsurgency Center in Kansas to
Play Crucial Role in Mideast Wars," The Lawrence Journal - World, 1 October 2006; Gordon, "Breakpoint," 67-82;
Lt. General David H. Petraeus, "Transforming Military Training: Using the Lessons of the Past to Build the Army
of the Future, Presentation to the Saban Center for Middle East Studies/21 st Century Defense Initiative, Proceedings
Transcript (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 14 September 2006); Association of the United States
Army, Reports from the A USA Army Installations Symposium and Exposition (Arlington, VA: Association of the
United States Army, 5 April 2006); and Julian E. Barnes, "Army Gives Rumsfeld Doctrine a Rewrite," Los Angeles
Times, 20 November 2006, 1.
33 Army Colonel Peter Mansoor quoted in Bryan Bender, "Pentagon Studying Its War Errors," Boston Globe, 16
August 2006.
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followed by artillery and aviation communities, and a weakened foot-mobile infantry community
- change over the next decade or so? First, it appears highly unlikely that the Army will again
develop a strong central leadership (last seen in World War II). This is especially true now, given
the increasing power of the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commands at the expense of the
individual services in the overall DoD policymaking process. So, while the service likely will
remain dominated by a ruling oligarchy, will the components of that oligarchy change?
Again, it is highly unlikely that any of the current members of the oligarchy will be pushed
aside. First, the Army will argue the need for maintaining a strong armored warfare capability in
order, at a minimum, to deter other countries from attempting to acquire an actual or perceived
advantage in this arena of warfare. And, the three top communities currently in the oligarchy are
and will remain key elements of the Army's strategy for fighting such wars. In addition, these three
communities do play a role, though a lesser one, in unconventional or COIN-like operations in
support of non-mechanized infantry (either providing firepower support or transportation). A strong
base of support outside of the Army also will continue for these three communities, given their
strong industrial bases and consequent support in Congress. In other words, whether the Army
chooses to continue focusing largely on preparing for high-intensity armored warfare or decides to
pursue a "full-spectrum" force, the current top three communities will continue their membership in
the ruling oligarchy. The next question then is whether the relative power between the oligarchy
members will change and whether new members might join the ruling collective?
As we have seen, new communities have joined existing oligarchies (or formed new ones)
in the past: e.g., the rise of the armored community in many armies following World War II; the
rise of the submarine and naval air communities in the U.S. Navy following World War II; and
the advent of the helicopter community in the U.S. Army following the Vietnam War. These
examples, however, have often been in response to the successful combination of new
technologies and new tactics in wartime. If change is to come in the U.S. Army it likely will
result instead from a changed strategic environment; one in which countries are far less likely to
confront the United States with the threat of a standard conventional war, but instead conduct
unconventional or asymmetric operations against it. Should this form of warfare rise to the level
of importance within the Army as to be co-equal with high-intensity conventional warfare, then
those communities which are best able to perform this type of warfare should end up joining the
service's ruling oligarchy or, if already members, increase their status and power within that
oligarchy.
The U.S. Air Force in the 1960s offers such an example of how a change in the strategic
environment can lead to a change in national strategy which, in turn, can lead to a change in a
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service's internal politics: the shift from nuclear "Massive Retaliation" national strategy to a
more conventional "Flexible Response," brought about by several changes in the international
strategic environment (e.g., rise of communist-inspired national liberation movements, increases
(real or perceived) in Soviet nuclear forces, etc.) heralded the shift in Air Force leadership from
the nuclear strategic bomber community to the conventional tactical fighter community. But it
was more than just the change in strategic environment that led to the rise of the tactical fighter
community; as important was the fact that other services responded to this change with their own
air programs - specifically Marine/Navy fixed wing aviation and Army rotary-wing aircraft. It
was this competition that helped push the Air Force to a greater emphasis on interdiction and
ground attack missions and aircraft, thus promoting the rise of its conventional fighter
community. Will the Army witness a similar, though less dramatic, transformation in its ruling
oligarchy? 34
As of this writing, it is unclear whether the new strategic environment will be able to serve
as a springboard for communities either to propel themselves into the Army's oligarchy or change
their status within that oligarchy. While it seems likely that counterinsurgency and other OOTW-
like operations will continue to present a threat to U.S. strategic interests, it is unclear whether these
missions likewise will assume a greater long-term role in the Army, or even whether the new
emphasis on counterinsurgency operations will outlast the war in Iraq. As noted earlier in this
chapter, a number of obstacles inhibit the Army from adopting counterinsurgency and similar types
of operations as one of its core mission areas; these obstacles will remain relevant in the future. One
such obstacle is the nation's and its army's traditional aversion to unconventional warfare like
counterinsurgency, an aversion that our experiences during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are
likely to enhance. Adding to the likelihood of an absence of external support for such missions is
the essentially low-technology nature of this type of warfare, which prohibits the development of an
associated large-scale industrial base. Although information systems and related technologies may
increasingly play a role in unconventional warfare (as well as in how foot-mobile soldiers fight),
they likely will remain a very small part of their respective industries; hence, they are unlikely to be
strong sources of support for these military applications. And, at present neither the short nor long
term signs bode well for an unconventional warfare mission in the U.S. Army.
In the short term, a great deal depends on the outcome of the war in Iraq (which many
believe is already lost), and the Army's perceived role in that outcome. Again, General Petraeus
34 To a degree, the situation confronting the oligarchy-dominated Army is easier than that of a single-community-
ruled service like the Air Force. Rather than requiring the complete overthrow the existing power structure, the
addition of new members to an oligarchical structure like the Army simply requires making room at the table for
another community and redistributing "goods" appropriately.
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and his small clique of counterinsurgency officers will have much to say about that outcome, as the
general took over as commander in Iraq in February 2006 and brought many of those officers with
him as advisors. 35 If the war continues to be long and bloody and ultimately is seen as a failure,
then the Army is likely to abandon the mission once again, or at minimum reduce its role to one of
training and advising in the future.
In the longer term, the signals are decidedly mixed as well. Among the trends indicating the
Army may not embrace unconventional warfare is the service's continuing emphasis on the FCS
program, suggesting that the Army may continue to plan for the least likely type of future warfare.
FCS, if it performs as the service advertises (which is questionable), may be very good against
traditional armies on an open battlefield. It may be very poorly suited, however, to warfare against
other types of opponents in other environments, largely because it is so heavily dependent upon
near-perfect situational awareness. Against small, easily hidden forces such situational awareness
may not be possible, nor will it likely be possible to achieve in closed terrain such as jungles and
urban areas. The likely vulnerability of these vehicles to even the simplest of weapons systems in
urban areas, where combat can take place unexpectedly at very short ranges, makes FCS vehicles
ill-suited to counterinsurgency and other OOTW missions.36 At the same time, the Army has
recently announced the cancellation of its premier individual combatant program (Land Warrior),
which had the potential to improve the capability of dismounted infantry for unconventional and
other missions. 3
On the plus side of the ledger, the Army's new modular force program has added additional
light infantry to the force structure.38 And, a new doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare is in place
35 Thomas E. Ricks, "Officers with PhDs Advising War Effort," Washington Post, 5 Feb 2007, 1.
36 Such weapons could include the ubiquitous RPGs or Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that have become
infamous and deadly in Iraq. Many FCS vehicles are designed to employ situational awareness, tactical mobility
and, as a last resort, active protection systems (APS) to counter the vulnerability of their thin skins. However, many
APS systems have minimum range within which they are ineffective - a range which can easily be gotten inside of
during combat on urban terrain.
37 See U.S. Army, Office of the Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), Descriptive
Summaries For Program Elements of the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army FY 2008/2009 Budget
Estimate, Volume I: Budget Activities 1, 2, 3 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 2007), p. ii; and
"Land Warrior Termination to Save Army $300 Million Over Six Years," Inside the Army, 12 February 2007;
available at http://insidedefense.com/secure/defense docnum.asp?f=defense-2002.ask&docnum=ARMY- 19-6-3
(accessed March 2007). While the Future Force Warrior program continues, its status within the service's broader
R&D efforts can best be seen in the Army's latest FCS White Paper, presents the soldier as simply one of twenty
systems of the FCS BCT - on a par with unmanned aerial vehicles and small unmanned ground vehicles; see U.S. Army,
Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM), Program Manager FCS, Future Combat (Brigade Combat Team (FCS
(BCT)): 18+1+1 Systems Overview (Warren, MI: U.S. Army TACOM, 11 April 2006).
38 For example, the last six of the Army's planned forty-eight active duty Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's) are
projected by the Army to be added in FY08/FY09; see Association of the United States Army, Army Seeks $130.1
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and being tested in combat in Iraq. Finally, the strategic situation that the Army will face after
Operation Iraqi Freedom will be fundamentally different from the one it faced following the
Vietnam War. In the immediate aftermath of the war in Iraq, the Army is likely to reemphasize its
more traditional, conventional combat roles, simply to reestablish a balance in the capabilities of a
combat force preoccupied at the moment with counterinsurgency warfare. But, the Army no longer
has a high-intensity conventional mission on NATO's Central Front to which it can turn all of its
attention once it gets out of Iraq.39 The question is: Will the Army again turn its back on
unconventional warfare or will it decide to develop a full-spectrum force, one capable of both mid-
to high-intensity conventional combat and lower-intensity unconventional or OOTW-like
operations? And, if it chooses to include OOTW-like operations as one of its core mission areas,
which Army communities, if any, would benefit from such a move?
At present, two existing Army communities could potentially benefit most from the
service's adoption of unconventional military operations as a core mission area: the Special Forces
and the foot-mobile infantry communities. Of these two, the Army's Special Forces community is
very unlikely to win a place within the service's ruling oligarchy - this community has always been
on the periphery of the Army, barely tolerated by most of the service's officer corps, and there is
little indication that this attitude will change. Far more likely, the Army's Special Forces
community could join with its fellow outcasts from the other services' special operations
communities to form a separate and virtual fifth service. Indeed, the various special operations
communities are far along this path following the creation of a Joint Special Operations combatant
command (SOCOM) combining these forces; the continuation of the "Global War on Terror" and
SOCOM's central role in that "war" likely will accelerate this trend.
In the long run then, only the foot-mobile infantry community is likely to benefit within the
Army from an increasing service focus on unconventional warfare. But, given all of the obstacles to
its acceptance, what could pressure the Army into making this form of warfare one of its core
mission areas?
Again, the example of the U.S. Air Force in the 1960s is instructive, as the answer may lay
in the typical bureaucratic response to external competition for an organization's roles and missions.
If the strategic environment is changing in the way suggested above (i.e., an environment in which
unconventional or asymmetric warfare is much more prevalent than in the past, and possibly even
Billion Budget and $83.4 Billion for War on Terrorism Next Year and an Additional $45 Billion to Cover War Costs
this Year (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 6 February 2007).
39 See Ann Scott Tyson, "Military Is Ill-Prepared for Other Conflicts," Washington Post, 19 March 2007, 1; and
David S. Cloud, "Army Brigade Finds Itself Stretched Thin," New York Times, 20 March 2007, 1.
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predominant), then several organizations other than the Army could easily lay claim to the
unconventional warfare role. For example, the special operations community and its new special
operations "service" could argue for that role. The Marine Corps, with its rifleman-centric ethos
and small-war tradition, likewise could argue that it has the capability for performing
unconventional or OOTW-like missions. Indeed, the Corps argued in the late-1980s that it was the
military's true light infantry force and far more capable than the Army to perform OOTW-like
missions.
Faced with outside competition for one of its missions, even a previously low-priority one,
the Army could respond in a defensive manner typical of bureaucracies (including the 1960's-era
U.S. Air Force) in similar situations: i.e., in order to protect its role in unconventional missions, the
service's could place greater priority and resources towards such missions. Such a response would
be enhanced (perhaps enough to overcome the previously mentioned hurdles to the Army's
acceptance of OOTW-like operations as a core mission area) if such warfare became perceived by
many to be "the only in game in town," lest the Army be seen as increasingly irrelevant to the
nation's security needs. In responding to these competitors and pressures, by devoting greater
resources to these missions, the Army's foot-mobile infantry community - the service's community
best able to fight such wars - would correspondingly rise in the service's internal political structure.
In short, if the Army of the near-future does confront a new strategic environment, one
where unconventional operations similar to present-day Iraq and Afghanistan are typical, and if it
faces competition from the Special Operations community and the Marine Corps for these missions,
then the Army is likely to respond a manner such that the foot-mobile infantry community regains
its position within the Army's dominant oligarchy. Short of such a shake-up in the service's ruling
oligarchy, however, the Army can be expected to return to its pre-OIF trends: programs like FCS,
involving the three dominant communities (armor/mechanized infantry, artillery, and aviation) and
their preferred mission area (high-intensity conventional armored conflict), will to continue to be the
service's top priority, while other programs receive little or no attention and resources. In such a
case, the Army will continue to improve its already overwhelming capability to fight the least
likeliest wars of the future, while finding itself surprised and unprepared for the wars the nation is
most likely to call upon it to fight.
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